ATC080226: Special Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) on the Special ‘Browse’ Mole Consolidated Report document leaked to the public and investigated by Government Investigative Task Team, tabled in terms of section 6 (2) of Intelligence Services Oversight Act, Act 40 of 1994.
Joint Standing on Intelligence
COMMITTEE REPORT
National Assembly and National Council of Provinces
1. Special Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) on the
Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report document leaked to the public and
investigated by Government Investigative Task Team, tabled in terms of section
6 (2) of Intelligence Services Oversight Act, Act 40 of 1994.
Introduction
This is a Special Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence
(JSCI), tabled in Parliament in terms of Section 6 (2) of the Intelligence
Services Oversight Act, Act 42 of 1994.
The report emanates from the consideration of the outcome of the investigation
conducted by a Government Investigative Task Team into the leak of a top secret
document.
In 2006 the Directorate of Special Operation (DSO) produced a Top Secret
document known as the Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report, herein after
referred to as the Browse Mole Report. In 2007 the Browse Mole Report was
leaked to the South African public, as a consequence it was sent to the
Secretary General of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) on
The document is extremely inflammatory containing political intelligence and
numerous allegations and unsubstantiated statements about prominent political
figures in
On
The Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report
The Browse Mole Report is an intelligence document of the Directorate of
Special Operation. The report was supposed to be a Top Secret document of the
DSO but was leaked to the public in 2007 and consequently anonymously faxed on
On
The contents of the document are extremely inciteful and provocative,
containing,
inter alia
, numerous
allegations and unsubstantiated statements about prominent political figures in
The conclusion reached as a result of
the present browse, is that there are strong indications that former Deputy
President Jacob Zumas presidential ambitions are fuelled and sustained by a
conspiracy playing out both inside
Inside South Africa, as is well known,
groupings, like the South African Communist Party, the ANC Youth League, the
SACPs Youth League and Cosatu, seemingly disaffected from the presidency of
Thabo Mbeki, have
largely thrown in their lot with the former Deputy President; along with
these there exist elements within the Security and Intelligence Services that
appear to be considering the subversion of the apparatus of State in support of
a Zuma presidency
On the continental level, inquiries
have revealed that several Heads of State and leaders of African
politico/military groupings, apparently alienated by South Africas perceived
pre-eminence in the African Union and especially in Nepad, appear to be
providing both funding and support to Zumas cause. In some case these
political leaders appear to pose a threat to the sovereignity and integrity of
the
The document portrays the President of Angola, Eduardo Dos Santos to be giving
support to the Zuma conspiracy. It also alleges a $3 - $5 million financial
support by the Libyan government of Muammar Qadhafi, facilitated by the SACP
Secretary General, Blade Nzimande, towards
promotion
of a street level revolution in
The document further alleges that in early 2006, a meeting was convened at Shaft
17 Conference Centre at Nasrec outside Johannesburg with a select group of
senior Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) leaders that are now part of the general staff of
the SANDF. The ambassadors for the
It alleges that the Office of Jacob Zuma was involved in the conspiracy through
its association with groups hostile to the Mbeki regime, such as the legal
counsel for the murderers of Chris Hani and people associated with Brett
Kebble, who was alleged to have been Zumas major funder.
The document concludes that investigations should urgently be pursued via the
South African Reserve bank to establish transactions that may impact on the
matter. It calls for briefing of appropriate agencies to further investigate
the allegation contained in the report. It characterised the Zuma camp at one
level as a broad front of the discontent, while at another level as a
conspiratorial co-ordination whose players needed urgent identification and
appropriate action taken. It highlighted Zumas supporters as having powerful
links in the South African intelligence community.
The document ends by emphasising that issues raised were of sufficient concern
to make the following recommendations:
·
Full briefing of the National Director of Public
Prosecutions
·
Bringing the contents of the document to the attention of
the Minister of Intelligence and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development
·
Alerting the Presidency
·
Asking other agencies of the South African state to be
tasked to take some of the work further in terms of their mandates
·
Consideration to be given to declare a preparatory
investigation under Section 28 (13) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act,
to empower the DSO to initiate investigations into the following:
-
Money laundering
-
Tax evasion
-
Contravention of exchange control regulations
-
Conspiracy to sedition.
The Complaint by SACP
On
Following the aforesaid, on
The Government Investigative Task Team
On
-
Inquire into the
identity of the principal source and other sources referred to in the
report;
-
Determine if the
source(s) has been used by the other intelligence agencies of the state;
-
Determine if the
said source(s) has provided the DSO and any of the other state
intelligence agencies with intelligence and or information;
-
Determine if the
source(s) is linked to other networks, within and without
-
Establish the
identity of the person(s) who compiled the report;
-
Determine all
persons who were provided with copies of the report;
-
Ascertain the
version of the report given to the NDPP and the report the NDPP shared
with the DGs of the NIA and the SASS;
-
Ascertain the
version received from the legal firm acting on behalf the General
Secretary of COSATU;
-
Determine how the
General Secretary of COSATU received the report;
-
Ascertain where and
by whom the report was amended; and,
-
Make appropriate
recommendations.
The
JSCI was briefed that the findings of the Task Team were as follows:
·
The Browse Mole Report is reflective of typical information
peddling traits;
·
The DSO has fallen prey to dubious activities of information
peddlers. The context to this is that the DSO is involved in intelligence
collection activities for which they do not have the required competency
neither the experience. Further, that they believed in the substance of the
information generated. The DSO made use of private intelligence companies;
·
Law Enforcement Agencies have as yet not taken action
against these peddlers, even though they are known to produce and disseminate
defamatory and subversive documents;
·
Indications are that information peddlers make use of
facilitators and or have access to some senior leaders of the ruling party;
·
The probability exists that the leakage was timed, due to
the non responsiveness of the law enforcement agencies. The determination is
that these peddlers are driven by a need to create division within the ruling
party;
and,
·
These peddlers have links to foreign government including
Foreign Intelligence Services. This raises serious concerns about the role
played by these Foreign Intelligence Services in this matter.
The
Task Team made the following recommendations:
·
The investigation will continue to its logical conclusion
including court directed investigations;
·
Government should develop a public communication strategy
that will reflect the findings of this investigation and the dangers posed by
information peddlers;
·
NIA must execute its counter intelligence mandate by
conducting an audit on all state institutions particularly those who outsourced
intelligence gathering to private companies. NIA must advise on remedial
actions required;
·
The Directors General of the National Security Council must
develop a comprehensive strategy to curtail the risk posed by information
peddlers;
·
All Law Enforcement Agencies must conduct a review of their
operational assets to determine the extent to which they have been infiltrated
by the information peddlers.
The production of the Browse Mole
Report
The Browse Mole Report is a product of the DSO. It was initially produced as an
intelligence document based on the information compiled by a senior
investigator and three other undisclosed senior DSO officials. It was based on
information obtained from various sources. These sources of the DSO were,
inter alia
, the information peddlers
mentioned in the previous section. The Head of the DSO instructed these
investigators to get more information and produce one consolidated report. Mr
Ivor Powell is the person who produced the final consolidated report, known as
the Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report.
The JSCI has not established how many versions of the Browse Mole Report were
produced by the DSO and in which respect they differ from each other.
However what is clear from the briefing is
that four copies were made by the Head of the DSO, Adv. McCarthy.
They were distributed as follows:
·
Head of the DSO, Adv. McCarthy;
·
National Director of Public Prosecutions;
·
Director General NIA; and,
·
Director General SASS.
No intelligence mandate for the DSO
The Task Team briefed the committee that the DSO does not have intelligence
gathering mandate, yet they do so. They also informed the committee that the
DSO does not have the capacity to conduct and handle intelligence, hence they are
vulnerable when relying on private intelligence. The JSCI has continuously
raised concerns that the DSO was gathering intelligence without the appropriate
mandate and necessary oversight. The DSO leadership has always denied this.
The President, under section 84(2) of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) and in
terms of Government Notice number R317 dated
On
·
DSO as a structure is not unconstitutional;
·
DSO does not have a legal basis to collect intelligence. To
the extent that they have been doing so at the time it was done illegally and
it was ruled that it should stop. Their intelligence work should be done by the
intelligence structures;
·
For this reason the Inspector General for Intelligence (IG)
and JSCI have no oversight authority over DSO;
·
Several DSO personnel and external service providers have
not been subjected to security screening as required in law;
·
Section 19B of the NPA Act makes provision for a category of
DSO officials who have to be subjected to security screening;
·
Vetting of DSO personnel needed to be done immediately since
they were not complying with the
NPA
Act; and,
·
There is nothing wrong with where the DSO is presently
situated.
The
committee was furthermore advised by the DG of Justice that the Khampepe
Commission had made a recommendation,
that DSO immediately ceases its intelligence
gathering operations.
In a meeting with the JSCI on
The threats emanating from information
peddlers used by DSO in the production of the Mole document
The information peddlers are a network of people who originate mainly from
pre-1994 or apartheid officers, most of whom worked in the covert intelligence
structures. They were involved in sanctions busting and disinformation
through Stratcom Operations. The peddlers also have links with foreign
intelligence services such as of
Their
modus operandi
includes the use
of illegal intrusive techniques of getting information or intelligence. They
share this information among themselves and produce documents at different
sites of their network in order to give an impression of verification of
information to their clients. They use specific harmless facts out of context,
adding to that, dangerous lies, in the production of their documents. By the
use of selected facts, they proceed to distort the truth and so produce
documents and supply information to state institutions and governments. Their
products are mainly about fabricating conspiracies and plots as a method of
getting closer to those who hold power. The negative outcome is for their
clients to view the legitimate intelligence services as useless and start
relying on the peddlers.
During the briefings by the Task Team the JSCI was informed that the
information peddlers appear not to pursue an ideological motive but to extort
large sums of money from their clients. This money motive may not only be to
receive direct payment for information but also indirectly to get access to
state contracts. They use power and influence to get to state resources and
contracts. They are known to focus on contracts in the security and mining
industry.
The JSCI is of the opinion that the work of these peddlers is to destabilise
and subvert the
The Task Team established that the DSO utilised the information from these
information peddlers in the production of the Browse Mole Report. This
continued despite previous warnings from the Intelligence Community. They found
that there are people within the DSO who collaborate with these peddlers using
the resources of the state for activities which in our view, seeks to undermine
the efforts of the state in many ways.
Handling of the Browse Mole Report by
DSO
After the compilation of the Browse Mole Report, which was on the instance of
the Head of the DSO, Adv. McCarthy stated that he immediately met with Adv.
Pikoli and discussed the report with him. Pikolis attitude, he stated, was that
the report had all the hallmarks of the Military Intelligence and Defence
Intelligence structures of the past and that they should disassociate
themselves from it. McCarthy stated that he was in fact personally disappointed
with the report because whereas the compilers should just have:
summarised the facts they actually
went to making conclusions. Some of them very far fetched. Some of the
information in the report is just not reasonably possibly true. Some of the
information in the report with a little bit of probing one could establish that
it could not have happened.
They then accordingly agreed that the report had no formal status in the
Directorate of Special Operations and disassociated themselves from the Browse
Mole Report. In addition the DSO contended that the work done in respect of the
report was not an authorised investigation but an informal gathering of
information. The DSO further contended that they did not deem it necessary to
investigate matters contained in the report, as it did not fall under their
mandate.
On the contrary the Task Team found, that DSO had not shelved the Browse Mole
Report as stated, but had in fact acted on it in order to pursue or consider
prosecution. McCarthy had in fact tasked Adrian Mopp, the head of the DSO in
the
Moreover, the investigation of the Task Team has revealed that DSO actually
believed the intelligence which they received through the report. They did not
dismiss and discredit the Browse Mole Report as presented by McCarthy, as the
work of sinister forces.
However, the week after receiving the report, Adv. Pikoli met with the
Directors General of NIA and SASS and showed them the Browse Mole Report. They
were each given a copy of the report. Since the matters contained in the report
did not fall within the mandate of the DSO, DG NIA in fact confronted Adv.
Pikoli why the DSO was involved in intelligence gathering operations.
A further matter of concern relating to the Browse Mole Report was its
classification. It was classified Top Secret by the DSO. Even though DSO
advised the JSCI that they had a policy document dealing with the
classification of documents this was never presented to the committee. The
Browse Mole Report and its handling by DSO did not in many respects comply with
the provisions of their own policies as well as those of the Minimum
Information Security Standard (MISS).
The leak of the Browse Mole Report
It is not disputed that after
COSATU received the Browse Mole Report, their attorneys addressed a letter to
the National Director of Public Prosecutions.
This letter was also sent
to the Secretary General of the ANC and General Secretary of SACP and
complained about the contents of Browse Mole Report received by COSATU.
The attorney for COSATU recorded that on 07 May 2007 an 18-page document dated
07 December 2006 was received by fax at COSATUs head office in Johannesburg
and came from an unidentified person. The document was entitled Special Browse
Mole Consolidated Report and marked Top Secret.
Several days later the same document was posted from a
The Head of DSO, Adv. McCarthy was clear that he did not know who the people
were who leaked the Browse Mole Report. He claims that he first learnt about
its leakage on
The JSCI has, on the information presented to it, come to the conclusion that
the leaked document is not the same version as the one given to the National
Director of Public Prosecution and Directors General of the Services. The Task
Team has demonstrated that the leaked document originated from the senior
special investigator, Mr Ivor Powell and thereafter found its way to the public
through the peddlers and the media.
In this regard the Task Team found that McCarthy did not want to accept that
the Browse Mole Report was leaked by Ivor Powell. Yet it is not clear why Mr
McCarthy refused the Task Team access to the computers of the DSO and in
particular that of Powell. Instead McCarthy advised the JSCI that he was going
to instruct someone within the National Prosecuting Authority, Faiek Davids, to
conduct an investigation into the leak of the Browse Mole Report. This
non-cooperation went beyond denying access to DSO computers. The head of the
DSO also refused to provide the Task Team with the names of the sources of
their information as well the identity of other DSO officials who compiled the
Browse Mole Report.
The DSO did not take any remedial or corrective actions after the leak of their
Browse Mole Report despite it being classified as a Top Secret document. They
did not take any action against the senior special investigator from whom the
leak originated. They also did not take action against the illegal activities
of those who were involved in the production of the Browse Mole Report.
Findings of the JSCI
With all the relevant information at the disposal of the JSCI we came to the
following findings:
1.
The Browse Mole Report is the product of the DSO. The
leadership of the DSO, particularly the Head, authorised the investigation and
the production of this intelligence document which was outside section 28 of
NPA Act, Act 32 of 1998, accordingly the production of the Browse Mole
Report
was illegal;
2.
The purpose of the instruction to compile the Browse Mole
Report was primarily directed and targeted at gathering information on a known
individual. This person was the Deputy president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma;
3.
The DSO was clearly reluctant to cooperate with the Task
Team, including the refusal of access to certain of their computers, sources of
their information and the names of the compilers of the Browse Mole Report;
4.
Many DSO officers have no security clearance as required by
law.
NIA has
registered a vetting project for the DSO.
In addition, Ivor Powell and other senior
special investigators do not have the necessary security clearance. This is in
violation of section
19B of the NPA Act which provides for the security screening of special
investigators. Ivor Powells vetting has been delayed, because the Head of the
DSO has not responded by supplying the information requested by NIA in January
2007, which was critical in finalising his vetting;
5.
The DSO continues conducting intelligence operations and
collecting intelligence contrary to the recommendations of the Khampepe
Commission and the law. This illegal activity is prohibited in terms of section
209 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa;
6.
The DSO made use of informants, information peddlers and
private intelligence companies in collecting information that was used in
compiling the Browse Mole Report; and,
7.
The DSO did not take any remedial or corrective actions
after the leak of their Browse Mole Report despite it being classified as a
Top Secret document. They did not take any action against the senior special
investigator from whom the leak originated. They also neglected to take action
against the illegal activities of those who were involved in the production of
the Browse Mole Report.
Recommendations of the JSCI
The JSCI would like to make the following recommendations:
1.
The Executive Authority must take appropriate action against
the Head of the DSO and all the officials who were involved in the production
of the Browse Mole Report;
2.
The Government must direct the DSO to stop their
intelligence gathering operations with immediate effect;
3.
NIA must expedite the vetting of DSO officials, prioritising
those who are exposed to sensitive state information such as the DSO senior
special investigators;
4.
Government must expedite the regulation of private
intelligence gathering activities and put measures in place that will reduce
the risk of being exposed to information peddlers; and,
5.
That the government must conduct a comprehensive review of
the Directorate of Special Operations. Serious and urgent attention must be
given to the manner to which the DSO is presently operating.
Conclusions
The JSCI has come to the conclusion that the activities of the DSO in relation
to the production of the Browse Mole Report were very dangerous and against our
National Interest.
The contents of the
Browse Mole Report are extremely inflammatory and divisive.
It has the potential of throwing our new
democracy into chaos.
The DSO was involved in several illegal activities including intelligence
gathering without a legal mandate, lack of appropriate security clearance for
DSO officials, non-compliance with Minimum Information Security Standard
(MISS), and unauthorised interaction with private intelligence companies and
Foreign Intelligence Services.
Such
illegal and dangerous activities should be rooted out of our state institutions.
Arising out of the Browse Mole Report investigation, the Task Team is still
busy with further investigations which are at a sensitive stage and may lead to
the arrest and prosecution of certain individuals.
ADDENDUM
A. Chronological list of events in relation to the Browse Mole Report
|
DATE
|
EVENT
|
|
|
President
in terms of Section 84(2) of the Constitution appointed Khampepe Commission
of Inquiry to look into mandate and location of DSO
|
|
|
Cabinet
makes the announcement accepting the recommendations of the Khampepe Commission
on DSO
|
|
|
Browse
Mole Report given to Adv. McCarthy and Adv. Pikoli by DSO investigators
|
|
July
2006
|
Browse
Mole Report given to DGs NIA and SASS by Pikoli
|
|
2007
|
Browse
Mole Report leaked
|
|
07
May 2007
|
COSATU
received Special Browse Mole Consolidated Report (18 pages) dated
|
|
17
May 2007
|
COSATU
attorneys write to the NDPP, Adv. Pikoli, enquiring about the Browse Mole
Report
|
|
24
May 2007
|
The
NDPP responds to COSATU attorneys declining to assist
|
|
30
May 2007
|
A
Task Team was appointed by the National Security Council to investigate the
Browse Mole Report
|
|
|
The
SACP addressed a letter of complaint to the JSCI
|
|
|
The
JSCI considers the letter and submissions by the SACP
|
|
|
The
Task Team addresses the media at the Union Buildings on its findings on the
Browse Mole Report investigation
|
|
|
The
Task Team briefs the delegation of the JSCI on its investigation into the
Browse Mole Report in
|
|
|
JSCI
attends a briefing in
|
|
|
JSCI
received a further briefing by the Task Team members in
|
|
|
Further
briefing of the JSCI by the Task Team
|
|
|
JSCI
scheduled briefing by the Head of DSO fails to take place due to his non
attendance
|
|
|
JSCI
meets with the Minister of Intelligence Services
|
|
|
Meeting
with Head of DSO
|
|
|
Meeting
with the Minister of Intelligence Services and the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development
|
|
|
JSCI
briefing by DG Justice and Constitutional Development on Khampepe Commission
Report
|
|
|
Meeting
with Minister of Safety and Security
|
|
|
JSCI
meeting on the Browse Mole Report
|
|
|
JSCI
second meeting with Head of DSO
|
|
|
JSCI
last meeting with the Task Team
|
|
|
JSCI
considers its special report on the Browse Mole
|
|
|
JSCI
final consideration of its special report on the Browse Mole
|
|
|
|
Report to be considered.
National Council of Provinces
1. Report of the Select Committee on Finance on the Agreement Establishing
the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), dated 26 February
2008:
The Select Committee on Finance, having considered the request for approval by
Parliament of the Agreement Establishing the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform
Initiative recommends that the House, in terms of section 231 (2) of the
Constitution, approve the said Agreement.
Request to be considered.
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