ATC130311: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on its visit to the Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre in the Free State Province, dated 6 March 2013
Correctional Services
REPORT OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ON ITS VISIT TO THE GROENPUNT MAXIMUM SECURITY
CORRECTIONAL CENTRE IN THE
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1
A
delegation of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (the Committee),
and the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Development visited the
Groenpunt Maximum Security Correctional Centre on 16 January 2013, to assess
the situation at the centre following a riot which broke out at the centre a
week earlier. The Groenpunt management area which comprises the office of the
area commissioner as well as the Groenpunt Maximum and Medium correctional
centres is situated in Deneysville near Vereeniging, and is managed by the DCS
Free State/Northern Cape regional management.
1.2
During
the visit the delegation received a briefing by the Department of Correctional
Services (DCS) Northern Cape/Free State regional management, undertook tours
of the hospital, kitchen and maximum facilities affected by the riot, and met
with inmates and officials who had been at the centre during the riot. The
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) independent
correctional centre visitor (ICCV), the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board (CSPB) chairperson, and officials from the South African Police Service
(SAPS) also participated in the visit which concluded with a debriefing session
during which officials responded to the delegations prelimenary observations.
1.3
This
report comprises the background to the riot, observations made during the visit
and upon interrogation of the JICS preliminary reports on the incident, and
finally the Committees recommendations.
1.4.
The
Committee received numerous requests for intervention from officials and offenders
at the centre before and after the visit. Inmates, alleging poor rehabilitation
and other services received at the centre, requested transfers.
Officials alleged that their concerns,
particularly those about the shift system employed at the centre, the
implementation of the second phase of the occupational specific dispensation
(OSD), and overtime compensation, were being ignored. In an anonymous letter,
it was claimed that the poor morale and frustration of officials may have been
a major cause of the incident. All correspondence received was, and will
continue to be referred to the Inspecting Judge, and/or Minister of
Correctional Services and National Commissioner for investigation and response.
The matters raised in the correspondence will be revisited once the DCS and the
JICS have had opportunity to investigate and report on them.
1.5 The Committee notes that a number of the contributing factors identified by DCS and JICS officials in preliminary reports, and during the oversight visit, have repeatedly been brought to the attention of the DCS senior management in the course of our oversight activities, and in our reports adopted by the National Assembly. These recommendations have in the main not been responded to, and very few, if any, have been implemented.
1.6
The
Committee regularly informs the media of its oversight visits to allow
journalists opportunity to report on our activities in order for the broader
public to be made more aware of, amongst others, conditions in correctional
centres. Given the media interest the riot had attracted, several journalists
were present during the visit. The media and delegation had before the site
visit agreed that journalists and photographers would, owing to security-related
concerns, not be allowed to accompany the delegation on the site visit, but
that they could be present during the orientation and debriefing sessions
before and after. Unfortunately the agreement was breached and photographs were
taken following the attack on an official, elaborated on below. According to
media reports DCS authorities intervened and allegedly destroyed the footage,
causing much distress among the press, and certain civil society organisations.
The debate that ensued in the media following the incident has been noted. We would
like to emphasise that as our regular stakeholders are aware, the Committee
remains available to discuss, at appropriate forums, any concerns related to
the rendering of safe detention, rehabilitation and reintegration services to
inmates, and any concerns related to the effective oversight over those charged
with delivering such services.
2.
7-9 JANUARY 2013 RIOT: BACKGROUND AND PRELIMENARY
FINDINGS
2.1
Department of Correctional Services presentation
on the incident
2.1.1
On
the afternoon of 7 January 2013 half of the maximum offenders accommodated in
Unit A refused to enter their cells, and demanded to meet with the head of the correctional
centre (HCC) about a memorandum listing their grievances submitted some time
earlier, but which had not been responded to. The HCC met with the inmates who,
dissatisfied with his responses, demanded to meet with the Area Commissioner,
who was then informed of the situation. The ensuing unrest, which took approximately
two days to defuse, started later that afternoon, and saw inmates throwing
rocks at officials, breaking open cells, setting fire to mattresses and offices
in the unit, and looting.
2.1.2
Although
the DCS presentation gave little detail with regard to how the situation was
brought under control, it did reveal that emergency support teams (EST) from
the Groenpunt, Boksburg and Baviaanspoort management areas, and the SAPS were deployed
late on 7 January. The SAPS withdrew from the operation after the situation was
normalised on 14 January.
2.1.3
Twenty-five
offenders were immediately identified as instigators and transferred to the
Leeuwkop Correctional Centre, and the Ebongweni Super-Maximum Security Correctional
Centre. The number of those transferred to the Ebongweni centre eventually rose
to 197. A further 160 offenders were later transferred to the Pretoria Central
(50), Baviaanspoort (10),
2.1.4
According
to the DCS report three of the nine officials injured during the unrest were
admitted to hospital. At the time of the visit they had already been
discharged. The DCS provided officials with wellness services.
2.1.5
The
presentation stated that fifty offenders had sustained injuries during the
unrest, but that that number had since risen. The injured were treated at the
centres medical facility, and local public hospital.
2.1.6
The
grievances contained in the memorandum referred to above included: food
shortages, and poor management of the kitchens; poor infrastructure maintenance
including lack of urgency when attending to broken plumbing; poor medical care,
in particular the absence of nurses; poor rehabilitation programmes; absence of
offender development programmes; slow reclassification processes; poor case
management; poor management of internal security; poor management of
administrative functions resulting in delays in appeals and grievance
resolution; the functioning of existing prisoner management committees;
exploitation of offenders by officials; and officials failure to maintain a
safe and secure environment. The area managers responsible for Corrections, and
Development and Care have since the riot been given the responsibility of
attending to the grievances.
2.1.7
Following
the unrest all offenders in the area were visited by national, regional and
area managers, and staff members were addressed by the regional management. A
framework for the management of similar incidents was developed at a special
regional management board meeting; the regional executive will be responsible
for its implementation.
2.1.8
After
the riot search operations were undertaken at the Groenpunt Medium, Heilbron
and Vereeniging correctional centres. At both Heilbron and Groenpunt cellphones
and unauthorised items were confiscated from DCS officials; at Vereeniging
knives, batteries and simcards were confiscated from offenders.
2.1.9
In
its preliminary assessment of what had led to the unrest the DCS found that
gang activity, influential offenders manipulation of fellow offenders to
threaten security and destabilise the management of the centre,
official-corruption, a breakdown in the relationship between the management and
officials at the centre, and non-compliance with offender-grievance procedures
may have contributed to the riot.
2.1.10
At
the time of the visit a team led by the Deputy Regional Commissioner:
2.2
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional
Services preliminary investigation
2.2.1
The
JICS preliminary report on the incident was submitted to the DCS Chief Operations
Officer (COO) on 11 January 2013, and copied to the Committee. Their second
report, containing preliminary findings was submitted to the Free
State/Northern Cape regional management on 13 February 2013, and copied to the
Committee. The report contains detailed eyewitness accounts taken from inmates
and officials present during the unrest, and the subsequent days during which
transfers took place. The DCS is expected to comment on its contents by 6 March
2013, whereupon the JICS will finalise its findings and recommendations.
2.2.2
The
JICS investigation revealed that the Prisoner Management Committee (PMC) had
submitted the memorandum referred to above to the HCC on 15 November 2012.
Centre management discussed the contents on 28 November, and met with the PMC
on 30 November to provide feedback. Officials responsible for managing the kitchens
and case management were instructed to meet with the PMC. The meeting with the case
management committee (CMC) had had to be aborted; no meeting between the PMC
and kitchen managers was called. The JICS pointed out that the first memorandum
of concerns was submitted in April 2012.
2.2.3
Inmates
in the affected unit had been granted permission to play an early morning
soccer match on 7 January 2013. Despite the unit manager having granted
permission, officials working in the unit convened a meeting on the morning in
question. Inmates were therefore not unlocked at 09h00 as usual but remained in
their cells until 11h00 at which time they had grown exceedingly agitated, not
least because it had grown too hot to continue with the soccer match. Inmates
refused to enter the cells before lunch, and demanded to meet with the HCC.
During the meeting they raised their dissatisfaction about the attitude displayed
by the unit manager and officials responsible for the unit. The HCC was unable
to restore calm, and when he informed inmates that their concerns did not
warrant immediate attention, they demanded to meet with the Area Commissioner. This
request was not granted, and the Area Commissioner never visited the unit. The
EST was summoned in an attempt to force the inmates into their cells. Inmates
retaliated by throwing stones at the officials, and shortly thereafter the unrest
erupted. The situation was eventually brought under control at 23h00 with the
assistance of the SAPS.
2.2.4
After
the situation had been brought under control, inmates were assaulted by DCS
officials, including the EST members who, the JICS inspector observed,
assaulted inmates who were posing no threat, and were cooperating with them.
The assaults were among the immediate concerns raised in the JICS 11 January
report to the COO, which had by 13 February 2013 neither been acknowledged, nor
responded to.
2.2.5
The
JICS identified a number of serious matters, not reported in the DCS 16
January 2013 presentation, but nevertheless of major concern. These are
summarised in paragraphs 2.2.6-2.2.13 below.
2.2.6
The
severe staff shortage on the day was a major contributing factor to the DCS
inability to prevent the riot. Despite the fact that there were only 10
officials to guard them, all 728 inmates in the unit were unlocked at the same
time. The JICS had raised concerns about the staff shortage as early as 9 March
2012. In discussions between the Deputy Regional Commissioner and the JICS
which took place in February 2013, the Inspecting Judge described the still
acute staff shortage as a ticking time bomb.
2.2.7
On
the day of the riot off-duty officials were also summoned to return to the
centre to assist in the efforts to restore order. Some officials did not
respond to the initial alarm, and a second had to be issued. The HCC claimed
that because many of those who were off duty were non-centre-based officials and
were not required to assist during emergencies, they were reluctant to respond
to the call for assistance. The JICS investigator could not verify this claim.
2.2.8
The
HCC and Area Commissioners response to the unrest situation is of major
concern. According to the JICS report the HCC opted to manage the situation
from his office, while the Area Commissioner was not on the premises at all. The
COO was forced to take control of the situation when she arrived on the scene.
The JICS was unable to secure a meeting with the Area
Commissioner, and therefore their report does not contain his version of
events, or an explanation for his absence on the day. The JICS argues that had
the HCC and Area Commissioner done more to contain the inmates agitation
before the EST was deployed, it may have been possible to prevent the riot. The
claims that the EST had threatened the offenders when they refused to re-enter
their cells before the unrest had broken out, are a cause for concern as it may
have added to the frustration that eventually led to the unrest. The role the
regional commissioner and her deputy played was not mentioned in the JICS report.
2.2.9
The
centre was unprepared for the crisis: the generator was faulty and could not
immediately be used after the electricity flow was disrupted. Some of the
fire-fighting equipment had not been serviced since 2008. As the DCS was unable
to contain the fire, the centre was forced to seek assistance from the fire brigade
which took some time to respond to the alert. When in the course of his
investigation the JICS inspector requested that equipment be made available,
the key to the door of the room where the equipment was stored could not be
located immediately.
2.2.10
According
to inmates accounts of the incident several DCS officials were observed
video-recording the incident as is required when ESTs are deployed. DCS
officials however claim that no video footage of the incident is available, as
the batteries of the video recording equipment were flat at the time of the
incident.
2.2.11
The
SAPS had taken approximately two and a half hours to respond to the DCS call
for assistance. From the JICS report this appears due in part, but not
entirely, to the poor condition of the road leading to the centre.
2.2.12
The
road to the centre is riddled with potholes, and extremely difficult to
navigate. This slowed down the ESTs, the SAPS and the fire-brigade.
2.2.13
The
transfer process appears to have been very poorly managed. Inmates appear to
have been transferred regardless of whether they had had a role in the riot.
Many of those transferred claim that they were misled during the process, and
had had no idea that they were volunteering to be transferred to the Ebongweni centre.
It further appears as though the centre used the opportunity to transfer
inmates who had been perceived as trouble-makers, although they had not
necessarily been involved in the incident. It is not clear why those initially
identified as instigators were first transferred to the Leeuwkop centre, then
returned to the Groenpunt centre, eventually to be transferred to the Ebongweni
centre. From the JICS interview with the Head of the Ebongweni centre it is
apparent that the receiving centre, which specialises in behaviour modification
programmes that are implemented under specific conditions, was not prepared for
the influx. Although inmates ought to have been searched before being
transferred, three cellphones were confiscated upon their arrival at.
2.2.14
While
the DCS reported in writing that fifty inmates were injured, and added only
that that number had subsequently increased, the JICS during its first
investigation established that 74 offenders had been injured and admitted for
treatment between 7 and 9 January 2013. By the time the JICS final report was
compiled that number had risen to 104 injured. It is not clear when the
additional 40 inmates sustained their injuries, or whether the injuries were
sustained during the riot, but not immediately reported.
3.
OBSERVATIONS
3.1
Overcrowding
3.1.1
At
the time of the visit the Maximum Correctional Centre, which was built to
accommodate 1 193 offenders, was 132% overcrowded. This combined with the acute
staff shortage, impacted very negatively on all services rendered to inmates.
As was the case at most correctional centres visited by the Committee, the unit
management system implemented did not function as intended owing to the staff
shortages, and overcrowding.
3.2
Shift system
3.2.1
During
the delegations interaction with the officials who had been present during the
riot, frustration was voiced about their complaints regarding the impact the
shift system having been ignored by the centres management. According to the
officials they had repeatedly requested a return to a two-shift system. The four-shift
system employed at the time of the riot, and which at the time of the visit was
still being used, left periods of time during which the centre operated on half
its available staff complement i.e. 13h30 and 16h00; and 07h00 and 08h00. Most
incidents occurred during those periods. It was felt that calls for a return to
the two-shift system were being ignored, as some had personal interest in
retaining that shift system. Officials made clear that their morale was low
because of the manner in which they were being treated. Despite the negative
impact the four-shift system has had, the DCS apparently did nothing to assist
those officials who fell victim to the assaults as a result of the staff
shortage, and inappropriate shift-system,.
3.3
Security
3.3.1
The
DCS presentation reflected no offender-on-offender, or offender-on-official
assaults in 2011/12. In 2012/13 there were no offender-on-official assaults,
and three offender-on-offender assaults. One official-on-offender assault was
reported in 2011/12, and none in 2012/13. Officials however claimed that at
least five incidents in which officials were stabbed during the understaffed periods
identified above, took place before the 9 January 2013 riot.
3.3.2
The
JICS in both its 11 January and 13 February reports mentioned that its
inspector had observed inmates being assaulted by EST members, and that the HCC
had been made aware of the assaults. These assaults were not mentioned in the
DCS report. While the Committee acknowledges that the allegations are still
under investigation, it is a cause for concern that this information was
omitted entirely from the DCS presentation.
3.3.3
The
delegation noted the number of cellphones and simcards found in possession of
inmates and officials. The DCS explained that certain officials had written
authorisation to enter facilities with cellphones, and that authorisation
should always be in writing. In relation to the matters above, two officials
from the Medium B centre had been charged internally for breach of security. It
was pointed out that the DCS did not have the intelligence to establish how the
cellphones were used, and therefore could not prove whether they had been used
in wrongdoing, or whether the only contravention was that no written permission
had been provided for their use. The DCS acknowledged that while it viewed the
contravention of the cellphone policy in a serious light, sanctions imposed
have to date not reflected this.
3.4
Grievance procedure
(inmates)
3.4.1
The
manner in which the centre had managed complaints received from inmates was
identified as a major concern. When questioned about the implementation of the
grievance policy, the DCS reiterated what the Correctional Services legislation
requires, but could not give an assessment of why those processes appeared to
have been completely ignored at the centre.
3.5
Infrastructure
3.5.1
The
delegation observed that as per the JICS preliminary report, and the DCS presentation,
extensive damage had been done to, in particular, the offices in the unit.
While, according to the DCS, many involved in the riot had been transferred,
some cells that had not been damaged were accommodating inmates.
3.5.2
It
was immediately apparent that not taking into account the damage done by the
fire, the unit appeared wholly unsuitable for accommodating inmates. The common
area in the centre of the unit, where it is assumed the inmates took exercise,
was nothing but a dusty open piece of land, with no lawn. It was clear that the
building had been poorly maintained. A manager present during the debriefing session
confirmed that the structure was unsuited to the incarceration of maximum
security offenders, who served long sentences. He identified the Tswelopele Correctional
Centre as a more suitable facility; none of the senior managers present
contradicted his statement
[1]
.
The delegation emphasised that the offenders held in the structure should be
moved to more suitable accommodation as soon as possible.
3.5.3
The
DCS reported that preliminary estimates found that the cost of the damage done
during the riot amounted to approximately R2 million. This amount did not
include professional fees, post and pre-contract escalation, etc. At the time
of the visit the DCS and the Department of Public Works (DPW) were in
discussions about the total cost of the damage.
3.6
Hospital
3.6.1
At
the time of the visit only two nurses were on duty, and the hospital section appeared
well-maintained and clean. The centre only provided primary health care
services; those with serious conditions were transferred to the local hospital.
At the time of the visit the centres hospital accommodated 38 inmates, and was
not overcrowded. The hospital admitted those suffering chronic and
psychological conditions, and those requiring observation. It is an accredited anti-retroviral-site
catering to about 800 HIV positive inmates. A dentist visited once a week. The
centre had one pharmacist. Three sessional doctors who visited the centre twice
a week.
3.6.2
The
centre is experiencing an extreme medical staff shortage. At the time of the
visit it employed only four medical professionals one of whom was the
operational manager. The three nurses worked in shifts of two. At some point
there had been 12 professional nurses, but given the conditions, most leave
after about two to three months. Nurses were often absent from work owing to
depression and burn-out brought on by the extreme working conditions.
3.6.3
Medical
staff explained that as the centre is a primary health care site, it should
employ one nurse for every 30 inmates. Owing to the shift system, and the staff
shortage two of the three nurses were on duty at a time, and had to take care
of the 2 000 inmates at the centre i.e. 1 nurse to 1 000 inmates. This resulted
in them not being able to adequately attend to those not hospitalised. They
emphasised that they had no choice but to prioritise those who have been
admitted to the hospital for observation.
3.6.4
A
seriously ill inmate who had been referred to the
3.6.5
The
nurses reported that care for mentally-ill inmates in the hospital was a major
challenge. They were currently being accommodated in the hospital with inmates
who have physical but not mental conditions. The centre did not have its own
psychologist, and was visited by one only once a month. According to centre
management this monthly visit is aimed mainly at meeting with inmates serving
life sentences. Although the mentally-ill inmates in the hospital unit were
well controlled, they suffered occasional relapses. During the day these
relapses which were often accompanied by violent behaviour, were manageable. At
night however, nurses are at home and on call, and ill inmates were housed
together regardless of their mental state. Then the situation was harder to
manage, and often became dangerous for all the patients. The medical staff felt
that identifying one centre in the region that could accommodate all mentally
ill offenders would assist in ensuring that they received the psychological
services they needed, in a more secure environment.
3.7
Correctional Supervision and Parole
3.7.1
The
chairperson of the CSPB explained that given the large population the
management area ought to have two CSPBs, but had only one which was under
staffed. Between 2005 and 2009 the CSPB operated without a vice-chairperson. Although
one has since been appointed, the CSPB has operated without a secretary since
2009. One of community members left in 2009, and that position had at the time
of the visit not yet been filled. The position of the second member of the public
to serve on the CSPB has been vacant since the contract expired in December
2012. The CSPB chairperson was of the view that should the one community
representative, and one CMC representative be appointed to serve on the board
as per the requirements, the situation would improve. The vacancies have, since
2009, regularly been brought to the regional managements attention.
3.7.2
The
CSPB chairperson emphasised that in addition to ensuring that all positions were
filled, it was essential to ensure that those appointed are suitably qualified.
Though dedicated training for CSPB members was vital, such training was not
provided. Those taking part in parole decisions should be adequately
experienced, and trained so as to ensure that the integrity of the process was
maintained.
3.7.3
The
CSPB did not report major backlogs, but emphasised that given the overcrowding,
and given the staff shortages it would not be able to implement their strategy
for ensuring that applications were considered timeously. In that case backlogs
would be inevitable.
3.7.4
Inmates
had complained of long delays in receiving responses to their applications for
medical parole. These could not be substantiated, as according to the area
management no applications for parole on medical grounds had been received. It
was not clear why the critically-ill inmate, who was receiving palliative care
in the hospital section, had not been considered for medical parole. The CSPB
chairperson confirmed that as the Medical Parole Advisory Board (MPBA) was
responsible for the consideration of medical parole applications, CSPBs had
little role in the process. He confirmed that, in his experience, the process
was fraught with challenges.
3.8
Nutrition services
3.8.1
The management confirmed that the centre
did not adhere to the four hours which had to separate the three meals inmates
should receive daily. Instead, lunch and supper were being served at the same
time, with the intention that inmates should save the supper portion of what is
distributed, until the early evening.
3.8.2
Officials
interviewed during the visit confirmed that the centre often ran short of meat
during mealtimes and that in those instances eggs were served as a substitute. Owing
to the manner in which meals were distributed, mainly the maximum centre was
affected by the meat shortage. According to the official it was impractical to
alter the order in which centres served meals.
3.8.3
Although
the kitchens appeared in good order during the visit, an inspection by the JICS
in March 2012 found that the condition of kitchen equipment, the levels of
hygiene and the preparation of food were all unsatisfactory. According to the
JICS records, meals were, at that time, served as required by the legislation.
3.8.4
When
the JICS visited the kitchen subsequent to the incident, it found that the
kitchen was clean. The inspector was told that since officials working in the
kitchen had started attending catering courses, service had vastly improved.
The freezer and cold rooms had been out of order since early November 2012, and
neither of the two DPW-appointed contractors has been able to repair them. In
the interim, meat was stored in the freezers at the centres abattoir, but milk
often became sour before being served.
3.8.5
In
an effort to curb gang violence, inmates accommodated in units P1 and P2 have
since 2010 received their meals in a sub-kitchen near the units. An official
interviewed by the JICS confirmed that at times these units received
insufficient food. In his view food was correctly rationed at the main kitchen
but that poor management of the transportation and distribution of the meals to
the sub-kitchen resulted in theft, which contributed to smuggling. The JICS second
visit to the kitchen revealed that only two officials were responsible for
serving meals, thus increasing the risk of food being smuggled, and for
breaches of security.
3.8.6
The
Regional Commissioner pointed out that immediately after the riot, meals were
being served as per the policy, appearing to take this as in indication that the
challenge was not as great as alluded to by the inmates.
3.9
Gang management
3.9.1
The
regional management stated that the management area was infamous for its gang
activity. Since the gang activity that took place at the centre in 2010, the
area was considered a prison gang hotspot, but a gang management strategy was
being put in place at the centre. The DCS preliminary investigation into the
riot revealed that the predominant gang at the centre, the Airforce, infamous
for escape attempts mainly, may have contributed to the unrest. Although members
of this gang posed an escape risk, they were not considered as dangerous as
some of the other gang members.
3.9.2
According
to senior officials present, most gang members were accommodated in the maximum
centre, but not exclusively in the unit in which the riot took place. The most
radical gang members were accommodated in another unit, and had therefore not
been involved in the riot.
3.9.3
Though
the DCS had alluded to possible gang-involvement in the riot, the JICS
investigation has to date not identified gang activity as a possible
contributor.
3.10
Prisoner Management
Committees
3.10.1
The
role the PMC, which comprises members elected by inmates to be their
representatives in meetings with the centre-management, may have played in the
riot is noted with concern. Although the DCS did not identify the PMC as a
possible contributor, the JICS found that the members of the PMC failed to
communicate the outcomes of meetings with the management, and apparently
encouraged inmates to throw rocks at officials at the start of the unrest.
3.11
Management
3.11.1
The DCS has acknowledged the risk inherent in
the management of a correctional centre, particularly one accommodating maximum
offenders, and that this risk is exacerbated by the DCS long-standing staff
shortages and overcrowding challenges. In addition, it has been acknowledged
that the Groenpunt area has a history of gang-related violence. Given these
facts, the Centres obvious unpreparedness for an emergency of the nature
described above is unacceptable. That a regional framework for the management
of similar incidents is only now being developed is of major concern.
3.11.2
In addition to not having had a strategy for
dealing with emergency security situations, it is apparent that basic safety
requirements had not been met: fire extinguishing equipment were not serviced
regularly, and the generator was not operational. Had the equipment been
working the damage to the infrastructure would undoubtedly have been minimised.
The JICS in its report mentioned that the condition of the road leading to the
centre had delayed both the SAPS and the fire brigade. Again, given the nature
of its work the DCS should have done everything in its power to ensure that the
road all vehicles had to use in the event of an emergency were accessible, and
in good condition. The apparent failure to bring the impact of the state of the
road to the relevant authorities attention so that a solution may have been
negotiated, showed not only a disregard for security, but also neglect as far
as the management of its vehicle fleet.
3.11.3
Per the JICS report, the head of the
Ebongweni centre was unprepared for the 197 inmates transferred there following
the riot. That unauthorised items were confiscated from those transferred there
upon their arrival, indicates that searches done before leaving Groenpunt were
inadequate. In light of the above, it may be surmised that the management
decision to transfer the inmates did not take into consideration the potential
risk to the security arrangements at the Ebongweni facility which accommodates
some of the countrys most dangerous criminals.
3.11.4
The report does not elaborate on the reasons
why those initially transferred to Leeuwkop were sent back to Groenpunt, and
eventually transferred to the Ebongweni centre. What is clear is that by
transporting inmates identified as instigators of a riot unnecessarily,
security was jeopardised and resources wasted.
3.11.5
The
breakdown in the relationship between the personnel and management of the
centre had contributed to the riot and the centres inability to manage the
crisis situation on the day. This was confirmed by both the DCS regional
management, and the JICS investigation.
3.11.6
The
area management had failed to ensure that complaints processes and procedures
were adhered to. Compliance inspections revealed that compliance with DCS
policies and procedures had dropped from 86% in 2011 to 57% in 2012, the lowest
in four years. The Deputy Regional Commissioner confirmed that a regional team
had visited the area to determine the reasons for the drop in compliance. A
number of challenges, including poor record-keeping were identified, and
measures were put in place to strengthen compliance. It was not clear why that action
plan had not yielded results, or whether the radical decrease in compliance had
been escalated for intervention by the national management.
3.11.7
During
the delegations meeting with them, officials claimed that unqualified and/or
inexperienced officials were appointed in strategic positions which should be
reserved for senior officials. Officials were frustrated that correctional
officials on levels 1 and 2 were being appointed to manage units, and felt that
their inexperience was jeopardising security.
3.11.8
Members
having noted the anonymous complaints received from officials, the JICS
reports that an inmate had allegedly been intimidated not to cooperate with the
investigators, and the DCS poor response to grievances by inmates, enquired
whether regional managers had been aware of the level of frustration and
disillusion felt by officials, and whether that had not been perceived as a
threat to order and security within the centre.
3.11.9
Major
concern was raised that although the regional management had been aware of extreme
challenges as far as staffing, it did little if anything to accelerate the
finalisation of the migration of 21 employees from the area commissioners
office, to the centre. Like the national office, regional offices appeared to
be overpopulated, while the centres where the real work of the DCS takes place
were in most cases, grossly and dangerously understaffed.
3.11.10It was felt that especially given
the serious challenges the area had clearly been
experiencing, senior managers ought to have
more regularly visited the centre to
track progress made in turning the situation around. The
lack of performance monitoring, even at national level, encouraged the levels
of ill-discipline which was to a large degree fuelled by poor working
conditions.
3.12.
Judicial Inspectorate for
Correctional Services
3.12.1
The
Committees enquiries prior the visit revealed that the ICCV post at the
maximum centre had been vacant since 20 November 2012, with the new ICCV only
due to start visiting the centre on 21 January 2013. Although the ICCV assigned
to the medium centre had visited the maximum facility approximately a week
before the riot, the JICS had not indicated whether it was aware of inmates
growing frustration.
4.
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
4.1
During
the visit an official was attacked and stabbed by three maximum security
inmates. After the incident the delegation had emphasised that the manner in
which officials lives were being placed at risk was unacceptable, and that
those responsible should be held fully accountable. The delegation requested
that once the investigation into the incident had been completed the committees
should be provided with the outcome. At the time of the adoption of this report,
that information had not yet been received.
4.2
A
day after the stabbing the delegation learnt, through the media, that one of
the inmates allegedly responsible for the attack succumbed to injuries apparently
sustained during the ESTs efforts to restrain him. The JICS and DCS were
requested to verify the reports, and to submit the outcome of their
investigations to the Committee. The JICS report on the incident was submitted
to the Regional Commissioner: Free State/Northern Cape on 13 February 2012 for
comment, and copied to the Committee. At the time of the adoption of this
report, the DCS report had not yet been received. According to the JICS, a
criminal investigation is underway, and this is welcomed.
4.3
Although
the JICS findings in relation to the above-mentioned unnatural death will not
be discussed here, the Committee must register its serious concern that the DCS
had apparently not reported the death to the JICS as required by the
Correctional Services Act, and the allegation that the DCS is withholding
information relating to the cause of death from the JICS regional inspector.
5
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee requests that the Minister ensures that the following recommendations are considered, and where possible, implemented. The Minister should further ensure that responses with regard to their feasibility and/or implementation progress reports are submitted to the Committee within a reasonable time of the report having been adopted . As stated in the introduction to this report, the Committee has in the past made several recommendations in relation to services provided to inmates. Those recommendations remain applicable, and are therefore not repeated here.
5.1.
Management
5.1.1
It is noted that in the JICS assessment
the riot may have been averted had the centre and area management done more to
discuss the inmates concerns in an attempt to defuse the situation, before deploying
the EST.
In the Committees view, and
given the specific function ESTs have, such teams should only be deployed under
conditions where security is threatened, and not as an alternative to custodial
officials and centre managers performing their duties.
5.1.2
The allegations that the EST had assaulted
offenders, and used unnecessary force are cause for serious concern. Similar
allegations have been made during visits to other centres, and in a number of
complaints submitted to the Committee. How the EST functions in the absence of
a clear., well-communicated strategy for dealing with emergencies, is uncertain.
Given that ESTs may under specific conditions use necessary force, it is
absolutely vital that the parameters within which that force may be used are
clearly defined.
Legislative provisions
must be translated into a specific strategy that is explained to both officials
and inmates, and consistently applied.
5.1.3
The DCS should present
the Committee with the current status of its strategies for managing emergency
situations, particularly those standard operating procedures governing the
functioning of ESTs. The Committee should also be provided with a detailed
account of how the ESTs deployed at the centre had attempted to manage the
situation, the procedures they had followed, and to what extent they had
complied with the legal provisions governing their activities
5.1.4
Clarity should be
provided on the role the HCC, area commissioner, as well as regional
commissioner had played in a) preventing the unrest, and b) managing the
emergency situation that arose. Should the claim that the COO had had to take
control of the situation upon arrival at the centre be substantiated,
appropriate action should be taken against those centre-, area and regional
managers who had failed to act with the necessary haste to contain the
situation.
5.1.5
Officials interviewed were clearly
frustrated by the pressure the shift system employed at the centre placed on
them. The concern about custodial staff being placed under even more strain by
the fact that some officials, who have migrated to centre-based posts, were
still performing administrative functions, was raised during visits to other
centres too, and again at Groenpunt.
Where
the DCS management does not take reasonable measures to ensure that the
correctional environment is as secure as it can be, it should be held ultimately
accountable for breaches of security, and assaults such as the ones described
above.
5.1.6
The Committee reiterates that the improper use
of human resources as illustrated above, draws into question the integrity of
the DCS reporting on its vacancies and post establishment. Where security
staff are deployed to perform any functions other than custodial, centre-based
duties, it is impossible to adequately develop strategies (including shift
systems) that will address centres needs. In addition, such inaccurate
reporting makes the DCS own management of its human resources, as well as
proper planning, impossible.
The DCS
should provide a breakdown of its establishment, indicating where the
discrepancies are e.g. where posts are incorrectly classified. The report
should include how, and by when the discrepancies would be addressed.
.
5.2
Management of inmate-grievances
5.2.1
In
November 2012, the Committee reported that according to the JICS 2011/12
annual report ICCVs received training to encourage inmates to follow the DCS
internal complaints process outlined in Section 21 of the Correctional Services
legislation. We reiterate what we then recommended i.e. that
the DCS should ensure that all HCCs adhere
to the provisions, and that all inmates are made aware of the complaints
procedure, not only at admission, but for the duration of their incarceration.
Failure to adequately respond to complaints not only contravened the provisions
of the Correctional Services legislation, but also violated inmates right to
just administrative action, and as illustrated above, threatened security.
5.2.2
In the same report we recommended that adequately
explaining how a correctional centre, and the correctional system works, was an
essential component of managing the inmate population, through managing inmates
expectations.
According to the DCS, all
sentenced offenders are, upon admission, provided with a booklet explaining the
parole process. In our opinion, that booklet should be expanded to include
explanations of all processes related to the functioning of a correctional
centre
. As per our recommendation in relation to the dissemination of
parole-related information,
the booklet
should be simple, providing clear information in a language the inmates will
understand. Centres should regularly engage inmates in activities that
reinforce and/or provide clarity regarding the system.
5.2.3
The
Committee
acknowledges that forums at
which inmates are able to voice their concerns and seek clarity regarding policies
and/or matters they do not fully understand are absolutely vital. However, we
have serious reservations about the function and effectiveness of PMCs. We are of
the opinion that given the staffing and overcrowding challenges, and the impact
these have on order and security, allowing PMCs to act as representatives, and
enjoy the influence they appear to be enjoying, may pose too much of a risk.
The Committee therefore recommends that the
appropriateness of PMCs be reviewed.
5.3
Corruption
5.3.1
Given the apparent ease with which
cellphones may be smuggled into correctional centres,
it has become essential that the DCS should explore the use of
technology to make the use of cellphones in correctional centres impossible as
a long term measure, and in the short term explore how through consistently
imposed and appropriate sanctions, officials are deterred from smuggling
cellphones to inmates, and/or reneging on their duty to ensure that no inmate
is in possession of a cellphone, or any other unauthorised items. Where
security is breached in this manner, criminal charges should always be pursued.
5.4
Transfers
5.4.1
The
apparently chaotic and irregular application of the transfer policy following
the riot, confirms what has frequently been reported by the JICS, and raised by
the Committee: the punitive manner in which transfers are applied. Unwarranted
transfers destabilise offenders, and cause
unnecessary trauma to their families, and should therefore be avoided.
5.4.2
Given the specialised nature of the
programmes provided by the Ebongweni centre, and the stringent procedures
followed in caring for, and managing that inmate population, clarity should be
provided on the procedure followed to ascertain whether the 197 inmates
transferred there were in need of the interventions that the centre specialises
in.
5.5
Official on Offender assaults
5.5.1
The
Committee has repeatedly spoken out against assaults on inmates by officials.
While we recognise that given the challenges of the correctional environment,
and given how dangerous many of the offenders in the care of already
over-extended custodial officers care are, we cannot condone any assault, on
any offender regardless of the transgression he or she has committed
. The alleged assault of offenders by the
EST, and the alleged death at the hands of correctional officials on 16 January
2013 should not only be investigated internally, but criminally too. Dismissal
should be the only acceptable sanction for assaulting and/or killing an
offender.
5.6
Investigations
5.6.1
The
delegation had voiced concerns about the integrity of an investigation into the
riot, by the DCS itself. These concerns have been intensified by the claims
that the Area Commissioner had to date refused to be interviewed by the JICS,
and that DCS officials are refusing to cooperate with the JICS inspector
investigating the unnatural death that occurred on 16 January 2013. Although
the Committee had requested to be provided with the outcome of the
investigation and/or status reports on progress made, those reports had not
been received at the time of the adoption of this report. In a letter to the Chairperson,
the National Commissioner indicated that status reports on progress made in the
investigation could not be provided, owing to the complexity of the information
requested.
The Committee is of the
opinion that it is inappropriate for DCS officials to lead investigations into
serious incidents particularly those in which officials are likely to be
implicated, and which may have been caused by mismanagement
.
All measures to ensure that investigations
are performed in a manner that is transparent and impartial should be explored.
5.7
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional
Services
5.7.1
Upon
considering the JICS 1 September to 31 December 2011, and the 1 January to 31
March 2012 quarterly reports, the Committee had noted with extreme concern that
the DCS virtually ignored the JICS recommendations and findings, and at that
time recommended that the relationship be drastically improved to ensure that
the JICS execution of its mandate was possible. In August 2012 the JICS
reported that since the responsibility of liaising with the JICS had been
assigned to the COO, the relationship had drastically improved. Of concern is
that despite the reported improvement, the JICS initial report on the
Groenpunt incident had gone unacknowledged, and unresponded to, and officials
resisted efforts by JICS inspectors to investigate both the riot, and the
unnatural death that took place on 16 January 2013. In addition, the above-mentioned
unnatural death was not reported to the JICS as per the legislative
requirements.
This blatant undermining of
the Office of the Inspecting Judge is a further illustration of why, if it is
to be an effective oversight body, the independence of that office should be
definitively asserted.
5.8
Inter-departmental cooperation
5.8.1
Given the severity of the challenges facing
the DCS, many of which appearing insurmountable if left only to the DCS to
resolve, the Committee recommends that ways in which the Justice, Crime
Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster departments could assist, should be
explored
.
6.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Committee expresses its appreciation to the regional
management, and especially the management and staff at the Groenpunt Correctional
Centre, for their co-operation during the visits. The JICS timeous response to
requests for reports and information is appreciated.
Report to be
considered
[1]
The Tswelopele correctional centre in
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