AUDITOR-GENERAL
SOUTH AFRICA

Report of the Auditor-General

on a performance audit of service delivery at police stations and 10111 call centres at the South African Police Service

March 2009

Published by authority

RP 22/2009

REPORT

OF THE

AUDITOR-GENERAL

TO PARLIAMENT

ON A

PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF SERVICE DELIVERY AT POLICE STATIONS AND 10111 CALL CENTRES AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE	PAGE
1. Executive summary	2
2. Purpose and content of the report	3
3. Responsibilities, standards and due process	4
4. Sector policing: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	4
5. Vehicle management: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	7
6. Training: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	11
7. Community service centres (CSC): Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	16
8. Domestic violence: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	17
9. Bulletproof vests: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	19
10. 10111 call centres: Key findings and the effects thereof as well as possible areas for improvement	20
11. Appreciation	26

REPORT OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL TO PARLIAMENT ON A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF SERVICE DELIVERY AT POLICE STATIONS AND 10111 CALL CENTRES AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Auditor-General has focused on a number of service delivery areas in the South African Police Service (SAPS) over the past number of years. During 2006-07 the lack of service delivery at police station and 10111 call centre level had been identified as a critical focus area.

After wide consultation it was decided to limit the scope of the performance audit to the basic measures, processes and systems (as prescribed by the relevant legislation, regulations and standing orders) that should be in place at police stations and 10111 call centres. The following sub-focus areas were identified with regard to police stations:

- Sector policing
- Vehicle management
- Training
- Community service centres
- Domestic violence
- Bulletproof vests

It must be noted that this report does not focus on the effect of the absence of the basic elements.

In conducting the performance audit, reliance was placed on documentation and other information provided by the SAPS, as well as on information obtained from interviews conducted.

Five police stations and one 10111 call centre per province were selected, therefore, in total, 45 police stations and nine 10111 call centres were audited. In selecting the stations their nature of operations, risk profiles, size and location were taken into account in order to ensure a representative sample of all the stations. Further background information regarding the sub-focus areas has been included in the relevant paragraphs that follow.

Some of the key audit findings are as follows:

1.1 *Sector policing*

A lack of an approved policy has resulted in inconsistencies in the implementation of sector policing and resourcing between different police stations.

1.2 *Vehicle management*

Previous appointment of members without driver's licences as well as the availability of only two K53 training centres resulted in instances of operational members not possessing driver's licences.

1.3 *Training*

Inter alia, high case load allocations, the duration of training courses, shortages of trainers and control environment deficiencies resulted in significant percentages of non-attendance and/or non-completion of training courses and the PERSAP system not being updated to reflect all training courses attended by members.

1.4 *Community service centres (CSC)*

Instances were noted where:

- the layout of CSCs did not cater for disabled persons
- basic infrastructure and equipment were not always in a working condition
- proper identification parade rooms did not exist
- holding cells could not be optimally utilised as some were in a state of dilapidation
- service charters[1] were not conspicuously displayed to the public.

1.5 *Domestic violence*

The performance audit revealed various instances where domestic violence incidents were either not recorded as prescribed or inappropriately recorded.

1.6 *Bulletproof vests*

Various instances were noted of SAPS operational members not being issued with bulletproof vests.

1.7 *10111 call centres*

i) The audit revealed instances where the minimum service level[2] was not adhered to.

ii) Due to some 10111 call centres not being properly equipped, statistics were not generated with regard to certain key deliverables.

iii) Instances were noted where certain items of equipment were not functioning, were obsolete, not functioning as intended, or not conducive to the prompt capturing of complaints.

2. PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF THE REPORT

The performance audit was conducted at the SAPS as per section 188(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, read in conjunction with sections 5(3) and 20(3) of the Public Audit Act, 2004 (Act No. 25 of 2004) The purpose of this report is to facilitate public accountability by bringing to the attention of Parliament the findings of the performance audit.

Sufficient audit work was performed to provide substantiating audit evidence for the findings set out herein. Where deemed appropriate, comments received from management have been reflected in the text.

It is anticipated that this report would give rise to corrective steps that would contribute constructively to the establishment and implementation of appropriate management measures and controls, and consequently to improved value for money.

[1] The charter details, inter alia, the roles and responsibilities of the CSC.
[2] A service level relates to the level of response derived from the number of calls received and the average time taken to respond to calls.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES, STANDARDS AND DUE PROCESS

3.1 RESPONSIBILITIES

The auditing of government institutions is based on the premise that it is the responsibility of the accounting officer to institute measures to ensure that resources are procured economically and utilised efficiently and effectively.

The responsibility for instituting these management measures rests with management. The primary objective of performance auditing is to confirm independently that these measures do exist and are effective; and to provide management, Parliament and other legislative bodies with information by means of a structured reporting process, on shortcomings in management measures and examples of the effects thereof.

3.2 STANDARDS

Performance audits are conducted in accordance with the Auditor-General's *Guidelines for the planning, execution, reporting and follow-up of performance audits conducted in the public sector.*

3.3 DUE PROCESS

After consensus on the factual correctness of the findings in the management report had been reached during steering committee meetings, these were brought to the attention of the accounting officer. The response of the accounting officer was received and has been incorporated into the report.

4. SECTOR POLICING: KEY FINDINGS AND THE EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

4.1 OVERVIEW

Sector policing entails that, by understanding the causes of crime and the factors that enable it to take place, the police and community join their capabilities and, in partnership, launch projects aimed at addressing these causes, enabling factors, identified hotspots and vulnerable communities.

The SAPS has been implementing sector policing since 2002. In line with the philosophy of community policing, namely to build relationships between the police and communities in order to address crime by adopting a problem-solving approach, sector policing must be seen as an enabling mechanism which organises and mobilises communities on a micro-level in order to bring the police service closer to the community.

The effectiveness of sector policing is largely dependent on the allocation of sufficient human resources to the policing of sectors. With regard to human resources the following matters are pertinent:

- As at 31 March 2008 the SAPS had 173 241 personnel in its employ.
- Significant capacity expansion was instituted within the SAPS from the 2002-03 financial year to the 2007-08 financial year. Already 54 120 additional staff members, apart from 24 500 replacements, were appointed. This reflected a growth of 45%.
- From the 2002-03 financial year up to the 2010-11 financial year the enlistment programme of the SAPS will reflect 82 300 additional staff members apart from 38 000 replacements, which will ultimately result in a growth of 69% over a nine-year period.

- In terms of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) a target has been set of 201 300 personnel as at 31 March 2011.
- The following target ranges are applicable:



Sector policing is based on the following principles:

- The geographical division of a police station area into smaller, manageable sectors based on:
  - geographical constraints
  - the composition and diversity of communities
  - community interests and needs.
- Establishing sector teams, managed by a sector commander and with adequate resources to ensure the provision of an appropriate and effective policing service in a specific sector.
- Participation by the role players in establishing safer communities.
- Using intelligence-driven crime prevention policing interventions at sector level in cooperation with identified role players.
- Establishing an effective communication structure in the form of a sector crime forum, as a sub-forum of the community policing forum, to ensure the integration and coordination of attempts to establish safer communities.

The responsibilities of a sector commander are:

- to introduce and establish the concept of sector policing in his sector
- to compile a sector profile[3]
- to manage the sector to achieve the objectives of sector policing by:
  - the establishment of a sector community forum
  - identifying the causes of crime and contributing factors in his sector
  - identifying, developing and coordinating crime prevention operations.

[3] A sector profile details the sector team, the population demographics of the sector and sector crime trends.

4.2 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

As a result of a lack of an approved policy (at the time of audit), it was noted in various instances that resourcing guidelines for sector policing, sector policing plans and competency profiles for sector commanders were either not compiled or available for audit purposes.

As a result, inconsistencies in the implementation of sector policing and in resource allocations are arising between different police stations with no proper explanation for this discrepancy being provided.

The key measurable objective of the visible policing programme (of which sector policing is a constituent element) is the prevention of all crimes by providing a proactive and responsive policing service that will prevent the priority crime rate from increasing. As a result of the deficiencies highlighted above, there is a risk that the key measurable objective will not be optimally achieved.

According to SAPS management a generic operational plan for station commissioners has been developed in line with the SAPS annual performance plan for the 2008-09 financial year and will be utilised as an individual performance plan. The implementation of sector policing forms an integral part regarding their crime prevention functions. The station commissioners will be assessed on the implementation of sector policing in terms of the following:

- Each sector has a sector commander and resources, thereby enabling the sector to operate 24 hours a day
- Obtaining and utilising of a crime pattern analysis for each sector
- A sector crime forum has been established for each sector, a chairperson has been appointed for each forum, and monthly meetings and tasking are conducted.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in eight of the nine provinces.

SAPS management also indicated that no requirements for a sector commander profile currently exist as the national instruction is still in draft format. However, key performance areas are well defined within their individual performance plans. In order to bring policing closer to the community in general, SAPS management indicated that the concept of sector policing was extended to other stations which fall outside of the ambit of the 169 high-contact crime stations for which it was originally intended.

4.3 SECTOR CRIME FORUM MEETINGS

Sector policing hinges on extensive community and other stakeholder involvement and interaction. Sector crime forum meetings facilitate both community and other stakeholder involvement and interaction.

The performance audit revealed that minutes of sector crime forum meetings were not always compiled. As a consequence, it was not possible to assess whether sector crime forums were functioning as intended.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in five of the nine provinces.

SAPS management indicated that no approved policy or national instruction for sector policing currently exists. Sector policing has been implemented by means of a draft policy

circulated, specifically towards the 169 high-contact crime stations. Compliance will be enforced once an instruction to this effect exists.

4.4 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Adequate management measures should be implemented to ensure that:

- the draft policy and national instruction are finalised and implemented
- an approved sector policing plan is prepared per station
- minutes are filed securely and available as a working document at all times
- stations are actively involved in the implementation and monitoring of sector policing
- crime prevention projects and initiatives per sector are undertaken on a regular basis
- sector forum, community policing forum and capacity-building meetings with the appropriate role players are held on a regular basis as prescribed and concerns raised during these meetings are recorded and addressed.

5. VEHICLE MANAGEMENT: KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

5.1 OVERVIEW

As at 31 March 2008, the SAPS had 40 509 vehicles at its disposal. The number of SAPS members totalled 173 240 persons. This translates into 4,28 staff members per vehicle and this ratio is further improved when shifts are taken into account. Moreover, the SAPS vehicle complement has increased from 27 055 vehicles to 40 509 vehicles for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 March 2008. This represents a percentage increase of 49,73%.

The vehicle distribution per province was as follows:

Province	Number of vehicles as at 31 March 2007	Number of vehicles as at 31 March 2008	Number of personnel[4] as at 31 March 2008	Personnel/ vehicle ratio at 31 March 2008
Eastern Cape	4 307	4 602	19 444	4.23
Free State	2 555	2 736	11 103	4.06
Gauteng	7 277	7 957	34 101	4.29
KwaZulu-Natal	5 355	5 730	23 902	4.17
Limpopo	2 830	3 086	12 254	3.97
Mpumalanga	2 046	2 110	9 804	4.65
North West	2 835	2 634	10 374	3.94
Northern Cape	1 396	1 519	7 033	4.63
Western Cape	4 968	5 464	20 475	3.75
National competencies	4 048	4 671[5]	24 751	5.30
Total	***37 617***	***40 509***	***173 241***	***4.28***

[4] The figures include both South African Police Service Act employees (137 709 as at 31 March 2008) and Public Act employees (35 532 employees as at 31 March 2008)
[5] A number of 3 424 vehicles of the national competencies are actually deployed in the provinces

- ***Vehicle distribution***



- ***Personnel/vehicle ratio***



The supplementary initiative for operational response vehicles to improve utilisation is the Automated Vehicle Location System (AVL) which is foreseen to enhance command and control over response vehicles.

Matters pertinent to the AVL are as follows:

- Forwarding of vehicle data to SAPS operational centres that would provide for mapping/depiction and analyses of vehicle tracking and fleet management data.
- Sophisticated control mechanisms and AVL for operational purposes to establish accurate and real time command and control of response vehicles for service delivery and information about vehicles being used in this regard.
- Provide SAPS dispatching officials with location/positioning updates that are transmitted in real time onto geo-spatial mapping facilities so that more informed decisions about further dispatching or redirecting of SAPS response vehicles can be made.
- Phased/parallel implementation (multi-year)
- The target is approximately 24 000 vehicles, to be completed by the end of the 2008-09 financial year.

Since the project commenced in the 2007-08 financial year, 13 631 vehicles have been equipped with AVL as at 20 June 2008. Progress is as follows:

Fitments per province		
1	Western Cape	2 916
2	KwaZulu-Natal	2 210
3	Northern Cape	496
4	Free State	1 604
5	Mpumalanga	381
6	Eastern Cape	785
7	North West	627
8	Gauteng	4 308
9	Limpopo	304
TOTAL	**ALL PROVINCES**	**13 631**

Where implemented, preliminary results indicated that AVL was largely achieving the desired outcomes.

5.2 DRIVER'S LICENCES

Past human resource practices which allowed for the appointment of members without driver's licences and the availability of only two K53 training centres resulted in instances of operational members without driver's licences. Furthermore, the SAPS does not maintain accurate statistics centrally which details members as with or without driver's licences.

This resulted in, for example, that 74% of operational members at one of the selected police stations did not possess valid driver's licences while at another police station an analysis of 10 shifts revealed the following:

Date	No. of members in shifts	Authorised drivers in shifts	No. of vehicles
2007-12-05	12	4	16
2007-12-29	12	4	16
2007-05-07	17	3	16
2007-07-03	12	6	16
2007-08-10	12	6	16
2007-05-14	17	3	16
2007-06-06	14	8	16
2007-04-04	28	7	16
2007-06-01	14	7	16
2007-05-02	15	8	16

In addition, at a police station, for example, records relating to authority to drive a state vehicle were not available. At another station in the same province, records were last updated as far back as 25 February 2004.

Operational members without driver's licences increases the risk of shifts not being manned by trained drivers which will result in service delivery inefficiencies in, inter alia, sector policing and reaction time to crimes reported.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in seven of the nine provinces.

According to SAPS management, the need for enough operational members with a valid driver's licence was addressed with the amendment of the SAPS enlistment policy framework[6]. It was also indicated that K53 training was being provided at Benoni and Bishop Lavis training institutions to members and reservists. A backlog of personnel requiring K53 training was identified and an approved project plan to address the backlog was put in place to deal with this matter.

Regarding statistical information, SAPS management indicated that the problem stems from the fact that driver's licence information is not always updated on the Persal system. In order to address this problem the SAPS has appointed data integrity clerks in the provinces whose core responsibility is the verification of strength schedules, as well as the updating of personal information on Persal.

5.3 UTILISATION AND ACCESS OF VEHICLES

Instances of inadequate control were identified, for example:

i) Vehicle registers were not reviewed[7].
ii) Controls over keys were not in place[8].
iii) Control over garaging authorities [9] was not always in place. At a police station, for example, there was no evidence of garaging authorities for 90% of the sample selected.

The following contributed to the above:

i) Inadequate control over the filing and review of supporting documentation.
ii) The use of operational SAPS vehicles to transport members to and from their places of residence on a daily basis[10].

The above increases the risk of vehicles not always being used for intended purposes and vehicles not being available to attend to operational policing matters.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in seven of the nine provinces.

According to SAPS management cognisance should be taken of the fact that inspections and evaluations are being conducted on a monthly basis at the various presidential, priority and high-contact crime stations to ensure compliance with all the relevant instructions.

5.4 VEHICLE REPAIRS

A lack of adequate management information and oversight resulted in instances of lengthy lead times regarding vehicles booked for repairs.

From the sample, an instance was noted (as at 31 December 2007) at a police station that 18 vehicles (constituting 21% of the police station's vehicle fleet) were out of service due

[6] Regulation 11 of the South African Police Service Regulations, promulgated 27 December 2002
[7] Standing order 03A/87/08, paragraph 8(8) (relates to the weekly inspection of vehicle registers by designated officials)
[8] Standing order 03A/87/08, paragraph 3b(1) (relates to details regarding the time that a vehicle is booked in and out and details regarding the person who has booked the vehicle in or out)
[9] Authorities which allows members to keep vehicles at home
[10] SFO3A/87/10, paragraphs 10(1)(a) and 10(6)

to repairs for 200 days or more. Moreover, four of the 18 vehicles mentioned above were booked in for repairs for 400 days or more.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in seven of the nine provinces.

According to SAPS management, with reference to the total jobs received for the 2007-08 financial year the following were outstanding:

Jobs received	272 383
Jobs outstanding	1 532
Jobs completed	270 851

With reference to the above table and the SAPS vehicle complement of 40 509 vehicles, on average a SAPS vehicle is booked in for repairs and maintenance six to seven times per year.

Also, taking into account the number and different kind of jobs performed for 2007-08 financial year, the following average vehicle turnaround times per category for the said period are as follows:

- Mechanical repairs/services : 5,4 days
- Accidents : 16,1 days (3rd party involvement)
- Damages : 10,1 days

5.5 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Adequate management measures should be implemented to ensure that:

- greater capacity is created with regard to K53 training centres to facilitate the training backlog of members without driver's licences
- the rollout of the AVL is expedited and the proposed staff structures relating to the Management Information System (MIS) governing AVL is implemented
- control measures, such as penalties, to enhance improved service delivery on the part of motor vehicle spares suppliers and outside vehicle repair service providers to the SAPS is implemented.
- the use of SAPS vehicles to transport members to and from their place of residence is phased out/minimised
- reliable and timely management information is generated.

6. TRAINING: KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

6.1 OVERVIEW

Training provided within the SAPS by the training division has since 2002 been focused on addressing operational needs within the SAPS. Needs identified within the SAPS by functionaries have highlighted aspects such as skills relating to the resolving of crime, basic training and management training in identified areas.

A clear decision was taken to support the government's approach in relation to outcomes-based training and ensuring that members of the SAPS not only receive training and skills required to perform their duties but also to ensure that relevant job-related qualifications are obtained, which will contribute to the professionalisation of members.

Since 2004, the SAPS has developed 20 outcomes-based programmes which focus on specific needs within the organisation. Key programmes developed in this area are, for instance, the basic training learning programme and the detective learning programme. All newly developed programmes interlink with each other, that is in the basic training programme learners are exposed to basic investigative techniques. The basic knowledge is extended through experiential learning during the field training phase of the basic training programme and is also re-emphasised and supported during the probation phase of the learner. The knowledge gained is then further extended with a broader focus area in the detective learning programme.

The following table relates to members who have attended the specific[11] training courses which formed part of the audit.

Financial year	Detective learning programme	Detective commanders	Statement taking
2004-05	1 202	143	2 434
2005-06	1 138	212	3 200
2006-07	1 126	125	3 357
Financial year	**Station management learning programme**	**Domestic violence**	**Victim empowerment**
2004-05	0	976	450
2005-06	0	1 269	444
2006-07	982	3 529	431

The station management learning programme was developed and only implemented in the 2006-07 financial year.

6.2 TRAINING DEFICIENCIES AND COMPLETENESS OF THE SAPS 96 REPORT

As part of this audit, the training provided from the inception date of a member's service up to 31 December 2007 was reviewed. It should be noted that the adequacy/content and/or impact of the training was not assessed. Training information as per the PERSAP

[11] Detective learning programme, detective commanders learning programme, station commissioners learning programme, domestic violence course and statement taking course

(SAPS 96 report) was used as a basis to determine whether members had attended specific training courses (where available the local training records were also obtained).

The audit indicated that the PERSAP was not accurately updated to reflect all training courses attended by members, thereby compromising the accuracy of management information. As a consequence, training deficiencies (if any) could not be adequately assessed. With reference to the specific training courses which formed part of the audit, non-attendance and/or non-completion were noted in some instances.

The following tables relating to five selected police stations in a specific province highlight both the non-updating of the PERSAP and instances of non-attendance/non-completion of the specified training courses:

- **Training course**: Detective learning programme
  Target audience: Operational staff complement of the detective branch

Police station	**Number of members in target audience**	**Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)**		**Members who attended the training course (as per local records)**	
		Number	**%**	**Number**	**%**
Station 1	108	6	5.6	3	2.8
Station 2	66	3	4.5	7	10.6
Station 3	66	5	7.6	33	50
Station 4	33	3	9.1	4	12.1
Station 5	20	3	15	6	30
Total	**293**	**20**	**6.8%**	**53**	**18.1%**

- **Training course:** Detective commanders learning programme
  Target audience: Commanders of the detective branch

Police station	**Number of members in target audience**	**Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)**		**Members who attended the training course (as per local records)**	
		Number	**%**	**Number**	**%**
Station 1	15	1	6.7	3	20
Station 2	9	1	11.1	1	11.1
Station 3	8	6	75	6	75
Station 4	5	0	0	1	20
Station 5	3	0	0	3	100
Total	**40**	**8**	**20%**	**14**	**35%**

- **Training course:** Statement taking course
  Target audience: CSC staff members

Police station	Number of members in target audience	Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)		Members who attended the training course (as per local records)	
		Number	%	Number	%
Station 1	150	1	0.7	3	2
Station 2	132	0	0	8	6.1
Station 3	93	46	49	0	0
Station 4	130	0	0	0	0
Station 5	46	0	0	2	4.3
Total	**551**	**47**	**8.5%**	**13**	**2.4%**

- **Training course:** Station commissioner's learning programme
  Target audience: Station commissioner

Police station	Number of members in target audience	Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)		Members who attended the training course (as per local records)	
		Number	%	Number	%
Station 1	1	0	0	0	0
Station 2	1	0	0	0	0
Station 3	1	0	0	0	0
Station 4	2	1	50	1	50
Station 5	1	0	0	0	0
Total	**6**	**1**	**16.7%**	**1**	**16.7%**

- **Training course:** Domestic violence programme
  Target audience: All operational SAPS members

Police station	Number of members in target audience	Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)		Members who attended the training course (as per local records)	
		Number	%	Number	%
Station 1	462	5	1.1	22	4.8
Station 2	250	2	0.8	90	36
Station 3	324	103	31.8	4	1.2
Station 4	166	0	0	0	0
Station 5	66	3	4.5	20	30
Total	**1268**	**113**	**8.9%**	**136**	**10.7%**

- **Training course:** Victim empowerment programme
  Target audience: All operational SAPS members

Police station	Number of members in target audience	Members who attended the training course (as per SAPS96)		Members who attended the training course (as per local records)	
		Number	%	Number	%
Station 1	462	0	0	6	1.3
Station 2	250	0	0	0	0
Station 3	324	65	20	0	0
Station 4	166	0	0	0	0
Station 5	66	0	0	9	13.6
Total	**1268**	**65**	**5.1%**	**15**	**1.2%**

In another province, at two police stations 100% of CSC staff had not attended the statement taking course.

The following factors contributed to the above:

i) High case loads/time constraints
ii) Duration of training programmes. The detective learning programme, for example, takes 16 weeks to complete.
iii) General shortage of trainers without a compensating accredited external training intervention
iv) Training is not presented on a regular basis and/or is presented by the national competency in Pretoria with small intakes.
v) Training providers did not update the PERSAP for internal training courses attended.
vi) Members who attended external training courses did not forward the required details to the provincial training office for capturing and/or the provincial training office did not capture details of external training courses attended by members.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in all nine provinces.

SAPS management indicated that, although the current courses address extensive areas of knowledge, members with knowledge and experience in the field should not be deemed not trained only because they have not been exposed to a specific current course. As an example, it is a fact that members from the detective environment have completed the old detective course prior to the inception of the detective learning programme.

According to SAPS management, the Training Administration System (TAS) was developed during 1999 and was only being utilised and rolled out since 2004. Although the TAS provides for extensive collection of training data, the extraction of the data for management information is limited due to a lack of available reports which can be exported from the mainframe system to software which allows for data analysis. The SAPS is, however, in a process to address this issue.

6.3 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- All SAPS 96 records should be updated with both internal and external training undertaken by members.
- Members should be exposed to the required training interventions within a reasonable time frame.

7. COMMUNITY SERVICE CENTRES (CSC): KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

7.1 OVERVIEW

The CSC is, in essence, the front line of a police station. Members of the public report their complaints at the CSC. CSC personnel are on duty 24 hours per day, normally in 12-hour shifts, to serve members of the public with any relevant policing aspect. CSC personnel also man the telephones in cases where crime victims choose to phone the police station instead of the 10111 call centre. The operational vehicles are then contacted via radio for follow-up.

Various registers are kept at the CSC, for example:

- Cell registers – record of all detainees
- Firearm register – record of all firearms at station level
- SAP 13 property register – record of found/stolen property/exhibits
- Occurrence book – record of all activities at the CSC
- Domestic violence register – record of domestic violence incidents reported to the police station
- Prisoners property register – record of all property of detainees

In instances where members of the public lay a charge, a case docket is opened. Thereafter case dockets are processed on the Case Administration System (CAS), a case number is allocated and forwarded to the complainant and the docket is allocated to a detective for investigation.

7.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Inspections were performed on the physical layout and infrastructure of the CSCs of the selected police stations to determine whether:

- the CSCs catered for disabled persons[12]
- basic infrastructure and equipment, inter alia, water, electricity and telephones, were available and in working condition
- proper identification parade rooms existed
- the service charter was conspicuously displayed to the members of public
- holding cells were sufficient and functional.

The audit revealed instances where:

i) the layout of the CSC did not cater for disabled persons. For example, ramps at the entrance of police stations were not installed. As a consequence, service delivery in respect of disabled persons was compromised.

ii) basic infrastructure and equipment were not in working condition. Shortcomings were noted with regard to water, electricity and sanitation services. As a consequence, there was an increased risk that CSC staff will not be able to adequately fulfil their functions. For example, CSC staff cannot utilise computer equipment if there is a lack of electricity.

[12] Specifications for police stations should comply with part S (Facilities for disabled persons) of SABS 0400 – 1990 (National Building Regulations)

iii) proper identification parade rooms did not exist. As a consequence, there is an increased risk that perpetrators of crime may not be identified by victims and/or witnesses.

iv) service charters which, inter alia, detail the role and responsibilities of the CSCs in relation to the public were not conspicuously displayed. As a consequence, members of the public will not always be aware of the CSC's role and responsibilities.

v) holding cells could not be optimally utilised as some were in a state of dilapidation.

These deficiencies were noted at police stations in all nine provinces.

According to SAPS management, cognisance should be taken of the fact that capital work projects are registered and prioritised in terms of strategic priorities. These priorities are aligned in terms of departmental expenditure on capital assets over the MTEF period. Funds were increased and devolved from the 2006-07 financial year based on certain arrangements with the Department of Public Works (PWD) and new police buildings were designed/built providing for movement of physically disabled persons.

7.3 POSSIBLE AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT

The process by which the SAPS envisages addressing the reported deficiencies should be formalised into a structured plan, and this plan should be expedited in accordance with sound project management principles.

8. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

8.1 OVERVIEW

The SAPS is involved in various activities relating to social crime prevention, especially the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act No. 116 of 1998) that imposes certain obligations on SAPS members who receive complaints of domestic violence.

The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) must, every six months, submit a report to Parliament regarding the number and particulars of matters reported to it in terms of subsection (4)(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act No. 110 of 1998) and setting out the recommendations made in respect of such matters.

Domestic violence includes physical, sexual, verbal or economic abuse, as well as harassment, stalking, damaging of property or any other abusive behaviour towards a complainant.

Various responsibilities are assigned to the station commissioner, CSC commissioner and members who deal with the complaint. Victim-friendly facilities are being established at police stations where victims can be treated.

During the 2005-06 financial year the SAPS developed an interdepartmental domestic violence training programme[13] to deal with the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act. A total of 9 656 members completed the programme at the end of the 2006-07 financial year.

Various projects were also implemented to reduce social crimes, for example, 16 Days of Activism which is held annually.

A number of domestic violence prevention programmes were also launched which are aimed at reducing violence through strategic partnerships, civil society and relevant non-governmental organisations, for example, the interdepartmental victim empowerment management committee and the victim's charter committee.

8.2 PRESCRIBED RECORDING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENTS

National Instruction 7/1999 requires, inter alia, the following:

- The occurrence book (OB) must include a notice, in a language of the victim's or complainant's choice, which must be handed to him/her explaining the remedies at his/her disposal in terms of the Domestic Violence Act and the right to lodge a complaint.
- The victim must sign the OB as acknowledgement that he/she was informed of his/her rights must be.
- Assistance must be rendered to the complainant must be recorded in the OB if the service was rendered at the CSC, and if the service was rendered at any other place it must be recorded in the pocket book of the member.

The audit revealed various instances where the requirements of the relevant National Instruction were not met.

At a certain province, for example, a review of 193 domestic violence incidents pertaining to the five police stations visited, indicated that in 188 (97%) instances not all the requirements as stipulated above were adhered to.

At a police station, for example, based on a review of 20 domestic violence incidents from the OB, it was noted that officers at the CSC did not document the language of the complainant relating to the complaint and did not obtain the victim's signature for confirmation of acknowledgement of their rights in all instances. Furthermore, it was noted that in 15 cases (75%), the SAPS 508(a) (reports of domestic violence incidents) was not completed by officers in the CSC and the OB number was not recorded in the domestic violence register.

As a result, there is a risk of a lower percentage of incidents being recorded and culminating in criminal charges. For example, at a police station no domestic violence incidents for the period under review culminated in criminal charges.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in eight of the nine provinces.

[13] Refer to paragraph 6.2 of this report regarding domestic violence training matters.

8.3 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Management should ensure that:

- all stipulations as per National Instruction are complied with
- all fields as required in the SAPS 508(a) should be completed and reviewed periodically to ensure compliance by members
- docket numbers and/or CAS numbers should be recorded in the OB at all times to ensure completeness.

9. BULLETPROOF VESTS: KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

9.1 OVERVIEW

Based on information provided by SAPS management, matters pertinent to bulletproof vests are as follows:

- The SAPS spent in excess of R300 million on bulletproof vests over the last three financial years, totalling more than 100 000 full sets of bulletproof vests.
- Of the total number of 100 000[14], approximately 25 000 bulletproof vests were configured for women (introduced for the first time in the 2006-07 financial year).
- The purchases were in accordance with needs determinations as received from provinces/components countrywide.
- The total number of bulletproof vests are now in the vicinity of 180 000 (compared to 137 709 South African Police Service Act employees, 35 532 Public Service Act employees and 66 394 reservists as at 31 March 2008) some of which are in the process of distribution. It must, however, be noted that not all police employees are operational members.
- The practice to issue a student constable with a bulletproof vest when completing his/her basic training has been introduced in the past financial year. An additional amount of approximately R32 million will be allocated to the division: Training in the 2008-09 financial year for this purpose.

9.2 ALLOCATION OF BULLETPROOF VESTS

Various instances were noted of SAPS operational members not being issued with bulletproof vests.

At a police station, for example, no bulletproof vests had been issued to female officers.

Failure to provide operational SAPS members with bulletproof vests increases the risk of the SAPS incurring a legal liability in case of death or injury.

This deficiency was noted at police stations in eight of the nine provinces.

SAPS management indicated that the matter did not relate to a shortage of bulletproof vests, but rather to the fact that bulletproof vests were not being optimally utilised.

[14] 42 121, 31 155 and 27 557 bulletproof vests for the 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08 financial years, respectively

9.3 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Management should ensure that all operational members are allocated adequate bulletproof vests to perform their operational duties.
- Control measures should be instituted to compel SAPS operational members to wear their vests at all times when on official duty.

10. 10111 CALL CENTRES: KEY FINDINGS AND EFFECTS THEREOF AS WELL AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

10.1 OVERVIEW

The primary functions of provincial 10111 call centres are:

- providing a 24-hour professional and immediate telephone contact during prevailing crime-related emergencies including the receiving and processing of all calls made to a 10111 call centre by the public
- dispatching the appropriate SAPS unit via radio to attend to all complaints received by the 10111 centre
- keeping record of all complaints attended to, from the moment of receiving the complaint until the complaint has been attended to by the appropriate SAPS unit.

The secondary functions of provincial 10111 call centres, inter alia, include:

- advising the public on service-related matters
- giving assistance to all SAPS units, by activating the relevant specialised units, such as the Special Task Force, Air Wing, Fire Brigade, Ambulance Services, etc., to attend to high-risk or emergency situations
- receive and process radio enquiries received from radio-equipped police vehicles
- serving as an early warning centre during hostage situations, major incidents or disasters by alerting and activating all the various role players, as well as coordinating their actions.

In Mpumalanga there is no fully functional 10111 call centre. According to SAPS management a new fully functional call centre, to be located in Middelburg, is envisaged for the Witbank/Middelburg area.

10.2 GAUTENG 10111 CALL CENTRE

The Gauteng 10111 call centre, situated in Midrand, was opened on 29 October 2007. Given its technology and human resource specifications, it is envisaged that the 'Gauteng 10111 Call Centre' model will be rolled out to other provinces over a period of time.

The audit revealed the following deficiencies relating to the call centre:

i) The seven reaction talk groups[15] have not been activated despite the centre being equipped with both the equipment and systems necessary for its activation.

[15] The seven reaction talk groups facilitate communication between the 10111 call centre and policing units which fall outside the ambit of the call centre.

ii) The centre is at present equipped with the AVL functionality, however, the said functionality is not being utilised despite the fact that 4 038 vehicles are already equipped with AVL in the Gauteng Province.

The above deficiencies will result in a risk of poor reaction times regarding vehicles.

10.3 SERVICE LEVELS[16]

A minimum service level of 90% is prescribed for 10111 call centres. The audit revealed various instances where the minimum service level was not adhered to or were not generated for monitoring purposes.

For example, at a 10111 call centre, a review of all shifts for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 December 2007 indicated that the required service level of 90% was not always attained. The following graph refers:



At another 10111 call centre the following significant deviations were noted for a sample of shifts selected.

Start and end time	Shift date	Stipulated service level	Service level attained per shift	Deviation from stipulated service level
22:00-06:00	05/01/2008	90%	70%	22%
14:00-22:00	01/01/2008	90%	39%	57%
22:00-06:00	26/12/2007	90%	58%	36%
06:00-18:00	23/12/2007	90%	71%	21%
06:00-14:00	15/12/2007	90%	55%	39%
06:00-18:00	01/12/2007	90%	71%	21%
22:00-06:00	17/11/2007	90%	41%	54%

The above stems from the following:

i) High volume of calls to the centre

ii) A high incidence of calls that do not require police action is reported to the 10111 centre, for example, non-emergencies, hoax calls, dropped calls and general non-crime-related enquiries. At a call centre, for example, of a total of 136 829 calls received during December 2007, only 22 645 (17%) required police action.

[16] A service level relates to the level of response derived from the number of calls received and the average time taken to respond to calls.

iii) Lack of trained personnel
iv) System inadequacies[17]

Non-adherence to the minimum service levels infers a lack of effective service delivery by the call centres.

This deficiency was noted at six of the nine call centres subjected to auditing.

According to SAPS management, cognisance should be taken of the fact that, although many calls are received, only a small percentage requires police assistance.

10.4 REACTION TIMES[18] OUTSIDE ACCEPTABLE NORMS

The following refers to the classification of complaints:

- Code A – all complaints in progress and all serious crimes which require immediate police response
- Code B – crime that has already taken place and is less serious with no immediate threat to the caller or other persons or property
- Code C – less serious crimes or offences, for instance drunkenness or loitering

The norms and standards for reaction times to crimes are as follows:

- Code A (Priority 1) – six minutes
- Code B (Priority 2) – 15 minutes
- Code C (Priority 3) – 25 minutes

The audit revealed deviations from the norms and standards for reaction times to crimes. This was due to:

- flaws with regard to data integrity
- deficiencies with regard to personnel and equipment
- a lack of availability of police vehicles (as they are sometimes used for purposes not directly related to policing).

The following table relating to a call centre with high deviations refers:

IR number	Time reported	Time transmitted	Time elapsed (min)	Priority
3493600/2/2008	00:04	00:15	11	A
4522300/2/2008	05:15	05:28	13	A
1779100/2/2008	00:22	00:35	13	A
1799500/2/2008	15:27	15:47	20	A
4528800/2/2008	05:36	06:32	56	A
2888400/2/2008	14:15	15:18	63	A
2717400/2/2008	11:48	12:54	66	A
4065300/2/2008	15:55	16:12	35	B
4145900/2/2008	18:30	19:50	80	B
1779100/2/2008	15:05	17:04	119	B
4116400/2/2008	17:24	19:39	135	C

[17] Refer to paragraph 10.6
[18] Time from when a call is received to the time it is dispatched to a response vehicle

Deviations from the aforementioned norms and standards are indicative of a lack of effective service delivery.

This deficiency was noted at eight of the nine call centres subjected to auditing.

Furthermore, no evidence could be provided regarding any oversight or monitoring mechanism relating to the analysis and follow-up of reaction times as per the CAS[19] and data compiled at the 10111 call centres.

SAPS management indicated that in a few instances, reaction times were recorded incorrectly where down times were experienced, resulting in manual calculations being performed.

10.5 STATISTICS – NORMS, RECORDING AND REVIEW

Due to various 10111 call centres not being equipped with a Mobile Device System (MDS) and/or software deficiencies, statistics were not always generated with regard to, inter alia, the following aspects:

Average speed of call answer

Longest queue

Number queuing

Total calls abandoned

Call abandoned from queuing

Calls abandoned from hold

Calls not ready

Number on hold

Failure to generate the appropriate statistics for analysis purposes may impact negatively on service delivery and performance.

This deficiency was noted at six of the nine call centres subjected to auditing.

Furthermore, at the three call centres where statistics were generated, a number of deviations from set norms and standards were noted. In this regard refer to the table below which reflects the actual performance of a 10111 call centre in comparison with established norms and standards.

[19] Time from when a call is dispatched to a vehicle to when the vehicle arrives at the crime scene (CAS function 1.13.9)

Description of norms and standards	Norm/standard	Actual performance during the period April 2007 to December 2007
Longest queue	0 seconds	Actual data not reliable
Number queuing	0 calls	Actual data not maintained
Total calls abandoned	0 calls	100 739 (41% of all calls received)
Calls abandoned from queuing	0 calls	52 012 (21% of all calls received)
Calls abandoned from hold	0 calls	41 090 (17% of all calls received)
Calls not ready	20 seconds	33 seconds*
Number on hold	0 calls	138*

The deviations from set norms and standards can be ascribed to software deficiencies which:

- hinder the recording and dispatching of information in an efficient manner
- which do not provide for the effective monitoring of management information.

The audit also revealed a lack of consistency with regard to the setting of norms and standards. For example, at one call centre, the 'average speed of call answer' was two seconds, whereas in another province it was four seconds.

According to SAPS management, although call statistics form part of management information, the focus within SAPS is on incidents/complaints lodged. It was also indicated that it is difficult to formulate standards where different applications and PABXs are used at call centres.

10.6 DEFICIENCIES WITH REGARD TO THE ADEQUACY AND FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Detailed equipment needs analyses regarding 10111 call centres were not performed, which resulted in instances of the following being noted:

i) Certain items of equipment were not functioning, for example voice loggers to record all calls received were not functioning
ii) Obsolete equipment, for example a call centre was on upgrade level 1 while the national standard is upgrade level 4[20]
iii) Equipment not conducive to the prompt capturing of complaints, for example the telephone handset had to be picked up while answering complaints which was time consuming as only one hand could be used to capture information

For example, at a call centre malfunctioning equipment resulted in the following deficiencies:

i) Total number of calls received (for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007) was 20 126 but the service level for the year was 0%.
ii) Call centre agents abandoned 7 635 calls during the calendar year ended 2007.
iii) The maximum call duration for one call is three hours and twenty-six minutes.

[20] Level to the standard of the equipment at a call centre

In another instance, a call centre only operated as a radio unit due to limited equipment.

As a result, responses to incidents may not be attended to in a prompt and timely manner.

This deficiency was noted at 44,44% of call centres subjected to auditing.

SAPS management indicated that faulty/malfunctioning equipment should be reported to local and national SITA service centres and repaired/replaced within set time frames according to the respective SAPS/SITA service level agreements in place.

10.7 NO CONTINGENCY PLAN EXISTS IN RESPECT OF SYSTEMS DAMAGE

Adequate contingency plans to remain operational during systems damage/failures were lacking.

As a result, service delivery will be negatively impacted upon in the event of systems damage or failure. Furthermore, records of critical information will be lost as data recovery is not possible.

This deficiency was noted at 44,44% of call centres subjected to auditing.

10.8 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Management should implement adequate measures to ensure that:

- the current strategy to increase the desired service level is maintained and continue to implement and monitor its action plan geared towards ensuring that the call centres are operating in line with its predetermined norms and standards on a consistent basis
- the current inadequacy with regard to trained personnel and equipment should be addressed
- a strategy should be formulated with regard to the follow up and reduction of hoax calls
- a feasibility study should be performed with regard to the equipment and software requirements of the 10111 call centres so as to facilitate the generation of reliable management information
- a detailed equipment needs analysis should be performed regarding equipment deficiencies and an action plan formulated and implemented to address said deficiencies
- contingency plans should be formulated and implemented for all 10111 call centres.

11. APPRECIATION

The assistance rendered during the audit by the staff of SAPS is sincerely appreciated.

Auditor - General.

Pretoria

3 March 2009

AUDITOR-GENERAL
SOUTH AFRICA