Report
of the Portfolio Committee on Police, dated 16 August 2011, on its oversight visit
from 25-28 January 2011 to the following Police Stations:
·
·
Stellenbosch Police Station,
·
Cloetesville Police Station,
·
Robertson Police Station
·
Atlantis Police Station
The
Portfolio Committee on Police having conducted an oversight visit to the
1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
This
Report is divided into four sections. Section One outlines the structure of the
Report.
Section
Two - Introduction - outlines the objectives of the visits, the facilities visited,
and the members of the delegation, and explains the methodology used during the
visits.
Section
Three – Key Observations, Specific Recommendations and Additional Information
Requested - records in some detail the observations of the Members of the Portfolio
Committee on Police with respect to the Academy and each of the police
stations. The observations in this section are organised according to facility
visited - i.e. the Academy and each of the police stations - to provide a
detailed overview of the issues, problems and successes noted by the Members at
the Academy and each of the stations. In addition, under each facility, there
is a section on Additional Information Requested. This records requests for
additional information that were made by the Chairperson of the Committee
during the visit. Timeframes were given for receipt of this information and it
is recorded in the Report as to whether this information was received or not,
within the stipulated time period. Lastly, under each facility, there is a
sub-section on Specific Concerns and Recommendations which identifies a number
of specific concerns and recommendations that have been made by the Committee
with respect to the individual facility concerned, that is, the Academy or the
particular police station.
Section
Four - General Concerns and Recommendations - highlights more general concerns
of the Committee emanating from the oversight visit as a whole and includes a
number of general recommendations to the Department of Police arising from these
concerns. It should be noted that these recommendations are directed to the
National Department of Police, and will be taken up by the Committee in its
interaction with the Department during the budget and other oversight processes
of Parliament. The Department will be expected to respond to these concerns and
recommendations during these processes.
2. INTRODUCTION
The
Portfolio Committee on Police undertook an oversight visit to the
Objectives
of the visit
The
objectives of the oversight visit to the
Delegation
The
delegation consisted of:
Ms
LS Chikunga (ANC)- Chairperson and leader of the delegation
Ms
MC Dube (ANC)
Mr
G Lekgetho (ANC)
Ms PA Mocumi (ANC)
Ms MA Molebatsi (ANC)
Mr GD Schneemann (ANC)
Ms
A Van Wyk (ANC)
Ms D Kohler Barnard
(DA)
Mr M George (Cope)
Mr T Madima (Committee
Secretary)
Ms S Goba (Committee
Assistant)
Ms N Dollie (Senior
Researcher)
The delegation was
accompanied by the Parliamentary Liaison Officer to the Secretariat, Mr S
Mahote (26-28 January 2011), a representative from the Provincial
Commissioner’s office and the respective Cluster Commanders. Mr G Nodada and Ms
C Kalil from the
Announced
and Unannounced visits
The
Portfolio Committee on Police undertakes oversight visits to police stations
and other SAPS facilities each year as part of its routine oversight function.
The visits may be announced or unannounced. A decision was made to make an
unannounced visit to the
It
should be noted that, on arrival at the
Methodology
In
its visit to police stations, the Committee utilises the Station Monitoring
Tool (SMT) to assist in ensuring comprehensive gathering and interrogation of
information. The SMT is designed to ensure that Members cover a wide range of
issues during the visit - ranging from information on management of the
stations, capacity of detectives, human and physical resources, and
implementation of prioritised legislation, including the Domestic Violence Act
No. 116 of 1998, the Firearms Control Act, No. 60 of 2000 and the Child Justice
Act, No. 75 of 2008. The Committee also meets with interest groups, including
members of the Community Police Forum (CPF) and the unions. The Committee is
divided into groups during the visit and each group is responsible for
gathering information on specific areas. The Committee thereafter meets
together with the management of the station to discuss these observations and findings
in detail.
While
there is at present no monitoring tool for other facilities, the Committee has
developed a practice similar to the above with regard to its visits to training
facilities. The Committee is divided into two groups – one dealing with the
training curriculum and the other with the infrastructure of the facility -
which independently gather information and then meet together with the
management of the training facility to discuss observations and findings.
3. KEY OBSERVATIONS, SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION REQUESTED
3.1.
3.1.1. KEY OBSERVATIONS
The
Head of the Academy welcomed the delegation, noting the transformation that had
taken place in the Academy since 2005. A mini-presentation was conducted, during
which statistics and other information were made public (source document is
available). The Academy has 111 staff members of which 29 are trainers and three
are group leaders. It currently has 454 trainees.
The
following observations were made with regard to the training curriculum and
human resources at the Academy:
Revised Training Curriculum: The Head of Training presented the system and
mechanism through which the new police service curriculum is being implemented
nationally. The delegation received a
pack of all the learning support material utilised by the Academy. The training manager noted that the Committee was visiting the Academy
during orientation and that the final registration had just been completed.
The
duration of the revised training curriculum is ten months, after which recruits
undergo 12 months of field training at police stations. They then return to the
Academy for an assessment period of four months.
It
was explained that the revised training curriculum is not brand new; instead
there are a number of additions that have been made to the existing unit
standards. Key changes that have been made include:
There
are three cycles in the training programme. The first cycle consists of Orientation
to the SAPS and Law- and assessment both internally and nationally will occur
regularly. The second cycle between May and August is mostly practical and
deals with criminal investigations, community service centre and crime
prevention and is largely based on experiential learning. The third cycle deals
with ‘street survival techniques’ and is a culmination of all the work done
during that year where the theory/law is applied in group work.
While
these changes look commendable on paper, especially the inclusion of criminal
investigations, the Members raised the concern that there still does not seem
to be a clear enough link between the training received at the Academy and the
field training that they will receive at police stations. However, the fact
that they will return to the Academy after their 12-month field training may
assist in addressing this concern.
Discipline:
Members were concerned around the issue of discipline at the Academy and the
problem of absenteeism. It seems as if it is an onerous task to discipline for
absenteeism and there is a general trend to transfer rather than dismiss such
persons. The training manager mentioned that the SAPS academies have no control
over the issue of discipline. In terms of poor performance of staff, it was
noted that although disciplinary measures are meant to correct behaviour,
additional corrective measures need to be provided as well.
Members
raised the concern that neither the grievance nor the disciplinary register
tracked progress with finalisation of cases. Management noted with concern the
impact of the Bargaining Council agreement that allows trainees to join the
unions while undergoing training. Trainers thus represent trainees in
disciplinary hearings which may lead to a conflict of interest in terms of
programme delivery. The training manager also noted that when trainers work for
too long in the same area they grow complacent. The Academy is committed to
ensuring that they have high quality trainers who can set a good example to the
trainees. They have now implemented a review process where every three years
the suitability of the trainer is assessed.
Assessment:
Members applauded the 50% standard required to pass the training courses as a
positive step in ensuring quality recruits. Trainees that fail this requirement
have only one more chance to rewrite. Formative evaluation marks (test marks)
influence the summative evaluation marks. Members were not happy about the lack
of security measures in place to ensure the integrity of monthly tests and
summative evaluations.
Vision and
Screening of Trainees:
The Committee felt that there is a need to regularly screen police trainees, or
at least to have in place a second screening prior to the completion of
training, to ensure that only non-criminal elements are admitted to the SAPS.
Management of the Academy:
Members were impressed with the passion and dedication apparent particularly
with regard to the Head of Training and the other staff members that addressed
them. Measures used to facilitate effective management of the Academy include
strategic meetings, annual planning, ensuring availability of minutes for
strategic planning meetings and effective planning and allocation of resources.
Register and Records:
The Committee noted that the following records and registers were utilised:
·
Attendance register file
·
Tests and memoranda
·
Sample learning support
material
·
Control register
It
was recommended by Members that the course content of each lesson is appended
at the back of each attendance register, as is done at the
The following observations were made in terms of
the physical infrastructure of the Academy:
The Barracks: The
Members inspected both the female and male trainee dormitories. The female
trainees are accommodated in large dormitories which each house 36 trainees.
The male trainees are housed in double rooms which each accommodate two
trainees. Female trainees voiced concern about the lack of privacy in their
dormitories in comparison to the accommodation provided to the male trainees.
They felt that this would negatively affect their ability to study effectively.
This lack of privacy is compounded by the fact that many of the blinds in the
female dormitories were not working though they had apparently been refurbished
during the previous intake. Members noted that the mattresses provided to the
trainees looked old and needed to be replaced . It was stated that 600 new
mattresses had been requested but that only 60 new mattresses had been
approved. The rooms were all relatively neat and clean but, as apparent
throughout the Academy this cleanliness was not thorough with patches of dirt
and dust visible on sills and lintels.
Ablution facilities: The
ablution facilities for the trainees were in a relatively poor state of repair.
Many of the toilets were not in working order and the baths were badly stained.
Tiles were missing from the walls and shower heads were missing. In one case
the single sink available for washing the clothes for 72 male trainees was
blocked and the washing basin filled with dirty water. Members raised the
concern that none of the broken toilets had been reported and recorded in the
maintenance register. Many of the toilets were without locks apparently due to
theft. This points to a problem with discipline. It was unclear why these basic
maintenance issues were not identified and addressed before the beginning of a
new year and new intake of trainees.
Inspections: Members
noted with concern that inspections had not been conducted the morning of the
visit even though the rule is that all rooms should be inspected each morning
by the trainers. A key concern in this regard is that this was only the second
day of training for the new recruits and that the lapse of inspection so soon
into their training experience would send a negative message to the recruits
that rules may be broken, even by those in authority. It was felt that the
staff of the Academy is setting a poor example to the new trainees.
‘Semi-official’ institutions: The facility has a tuck-shop offering refreshments and basic goods for
sale to trainees and staff. The tuck-shop is run as a ‘semi-official’
institution. Members were not comfortable with the explanation provided to them
of a ‘semi-official’ institution; however it seems to mean that the tuck-shop
can generate funds which are kept in a separate account. These funds are used
primarily to replenish the stock of the tuck-shop but permission may also be
granted for these funds to be used to buy other things for the institution such
as a sound system, or even for general maintenance requirements. Members raised
concerns around the nature of this ‘semi-official’ institution which seems to
lend itself to the possibility of abuse and corruption. Apparently, the account
and management of this ‘semi-official’ institution is run by a Committee of
four staff members who are then responsible for keeping the books and for
making decisions around whether the profits can be used for other purchases.
The
Mess is also run as a ‘semi-official’ institution. All staff in the kitchen are
SAPS personnel and are thus paid directly by SAPS. The Academy receives R60 per
trainee per day from the SAPS for the meals for trainees. This R60 is put into
a separate account (different to the account for the tuck-shop) and the same
Committee is responsible for managing this account. In addition, staff pay R15
to purchase a meal from the Mess. All
stock for the Mess is acquired from these funds. Staff members can apply to the
Committee to use the money in this fund for things other than food. While the
Mess decides what to order the Committee does the actual payments.
Members
on scrutiny of the books of the Mess saw that in December 2010 the Mess had an
amount of over R1.5 million in this account- as a float. In addition, scrutiny
of the books for October 2010 revealed a number of purchases for items other
than food. This raises a number of serious concerns including:
Members
were told that the books of both these ‘semi-official’ institutions have not to
date been externally audited but that there are plans to do so. A member of the
institution is responsible for inspecting the books but he is not a qualified
accountant or auditor. Head Office does an audit and monthly statements are
sent to Head Office. A key concern of Members is around the potential for
corruption and mismanagement of these funds.
Gym: The gym is provided as a
facility for staff. Trainees can only access the gym facility if accompanied by
a trainer. Despite requesting the records of attendance to the gym facility-
which looks unused and brand new even though it has been in existence since the
College reopened- these were not provided. Members did not receive a response
as to whether the use of the gym facilities is included in the new curriculum
for trainees in line with the focus of the police on physically fit recruits
and personnel, though it seems clear that this is not the case.
Stores: Members visited the
stores where basic equipment including bullet proof vests and plates, batons,
torches and firearm safes were being requisitioned to the trainees. The
requisition process was being completed at a number of mobile containers to
which the supplies had been moved from another store. The doors of the
container bins were all open and there seemed little control to the process
which meant that anyone could have got into a container and removed an item
without the knowledge of the requisitioning officer. In addition, while items
that had been requisitioned to trainees were ticked off on a list, it was only
the serial number for the bullet proof vests that was recorded alongside the
trainee’s name. This is despite the fact that both the batons and the safes
have serial numbers that could have been recorded against the name of the
trainee too, thus increasing control over these assets.
While
the Commander assured the Members that she was confident that she knew where
all the stock is at any time, Members were not convinced that this was indeed
the case, especially as stock was moved from the store to the open containers.
The
linen store was well kept and neat. The person in charge was aware of what
stock was in the store. The cleaning store was full to capacity with cleaning
products despite the fact that the new intake had already been requisitioned
with that months supply. Apparently this was due to the fact that there was a
delay in receipt of the cleaning items in 2010 which meant that these had only
arrived late in that year. Many of the bottles containing cleaning fluids had
leaked on the floor (apparently because of the heat). Members were concerned
that this posed a fire hazard due to the flammable nature of these products.
This problem was compounded by the fact that the nearest firearm extinguisher
was further down the passage and behind a locked door to which the cleaning
company- Democratic Cleaners- does not have access. Items requisitioned from
the store were ticked off in the register but not signed for.
The
armoury was very neat and orderly. The person in charge of the armoury was
correctly concerned about having the Members in his armoury and Members thus
had a quick look around before addressing their questions in the next door
office. The armoury is checked once a week and this was reflected in the
records.
Vehicles: The
log books and licences were up to date. One of the vehicles was not properly
cleaned inside. No cars are taken home at night for use by staff.
Interaction with the Unions: The Members met with members of both Police and Prisons Civil Right
Union (POPCRU) and the South African Policing Union (SAPU). Key concerns
expressed by the unions included:
3.1.2. ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION REQUESTED
The
following written reports are required from the management of the
·
A report on each of the
instances/accusations outlined in the newspaper article (Sunday Times dated 9
January 2011).
·
Accusations of nepotism
have been made. A report commenting on the following instances (names provided)
where family members are working at the facility should be submitted to the
Committee.
·
An explanation for why
unions are not granted observer status in selection processes.
·
A full report on the two
‘semi-official institutions’ and on the accounts for the tuck-shop and the
Mess, including the R1.5 million that is in the Mess account.
·
A full report on the meals
provided to trainees in response to the allegation that trainees were going
hungry, and that the money allocated for trainees’ meals by the Department is
not being spent on trainee meals.
·
An explanation on how the
problems between management and staff arose, and the steps that will be taken
to address/rectify this problem.
A
feedback report on the accusations as outlined in the newspaper article
mentioned above and dated 3 February 2011 has been received. This feedback
report covers some of the additional information requested by the Committee.
The
following information is contained in the feedback report:
·
In terms of the allegations
contained in the newspaper article:
o
The allegation regarding
the use of state vehicle to transport a pet to the vet was true but was felt justified
by the fact that the pet was seriously ill and taken to the Animal Anti-Cruelty
League for urgent medical attention and treatment.
o
The allegation of assault
on recruits by senior officers has been formally investigated and is awaiting
final consideration in terms of the disciplinary procedures.
o
A formal investigation into
the pornography found on the Commander’s computer has been formally
investigated and is awaiting final consideration in terms of the disciplinary
procedures.
o
The allegations of
corruption and nepotism are still under investigation. The outcome will be
reported to the Committee.
o
No special trips were made
to deliver chronic medication to senior officers but medication was delivered
on request, in instances where official duties were been performed in the
surrounding areas.
o
The Mess is a separate
legal entity which may provide tea and coffee to management. All members of the
Academy may order meals at the Mess at their own cost.
·
In terms of the
‘semi-official’ institutions, it is stated that a semi-official institution is
a ‘separate legal entity/legal person from the State, bearing its own rights,
duties and obligations, provided it complies with the legal requirements to so
constitute a “legal person”’. Relevant provisions of the SAPS Act, No. 68 of
1995 provide for this, including section 62(3) which defines a ‘club’ and
section 11 (which relates to the power of the National Commissioner to
establish institutions of any nature which may assist in the general
management, control and maintenance of the SAPS).
The Committee established to manage the institutions is subject to the relevant
Standing Orders (70-77), Divisional Instructions and the approved constitution
of the institution. These constitutions are standardised within the Division:
Human Resource Development.
It is stated in the response that it is preferred that an Institution
has a surplus fund, equalling three months running costs. With a running cost
of R640 000 per month, the surplus of R1.8 million is therefore seen to be
acceptable. The Institution must be in a position to repair and replace costly
equipment, and maintain and replace registers, stock and usable items.
Institutions may increase profit by negotiating discounts with suppliers and by
sourcing discounted items and prices. Memberships and other fees must be fixed
at a level to ensure sufficient profit to cover all costs.
The response states that the Academy may use the surplus funds in line with
the various Orders and the Constitution of the semi-official institutions. The
response further states that the institutions ‘may also utilise its surplus
funds to upgrade facilities’.
To ensure control, monthly and annual financial statements are submitted
to Division: Human Resource Development for evaluation and assessment.
Registers are inspected on a monthly basis in accordance with Standing Order
(financial) 74. In terms of Standing Order (financial) 72.13.2, only the books
and accounts of a shop must be audited by an auditor or qualified accountant.
No
report has to date been received on the remaining information requested
including:
·
An explanation for why
unions are not granted observer status in selection processes.
·
A full report on the meals
provided to trainees in response to the allegation that trainees were going
hungry, and that the money allocated for trainees meals by the Department is
not being spent on trainee meals.
·
An explanation on how the
problems between management and staff arose, and the steps that will be taken
to address/rectify this problem.
3.1.3.
SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The
following are the key concerns of the Committee:
The
following are the key recommendations of the Committee:
3.2. STELLENBOSCH
POLICE STATION (26 JANUARY 2011)
According
to the Station Commander the following are the key challenges faced by the
station:
3.2.1. KEY
OBSERVATIONS
Efficiency Rate Grading (2009/10): 87 %
Management: It
was noted that the Station Commander is managing a large and complex areas and
is informed about the issues regarding the station. However, high absenteeism
and poor attitude of a few of the members may require an even firmer management
approach. While regular management meetings are held- every Monday morning- it
seems as if these are not achieving their purpose as problems such as those apparent
in the management of the Section 13 stores have not been identified or
addressed.
Community Service Centre: A comprehensive notice board detailing crimes
in the area, a map of the area and information of interest to the community was
commended by the Members. Problems were noted with the implementation of the
Domestic Violence Act and Regulations including information missing from the
files. The Register was not properly completed. The Child Justice Act file also
needs to be corrected to ensure that it contains all the required information.
The Victim Support Centre was commended.
Firearm Safes: Insufficient
control measures are in place to ensure that theft does not occur from the walk-in
safe. An official should be present at all times (even when it is Members of
Parliament that are visiting). Members were left alone in the walk-in safe with
the firearms and ammunition. Of concern to Members was the fact that the
officials were unclear as to exactly how many firearms they had in the walk-in
safe. Two firearms were recorded as booked out the previous day. These were not
booked back in, yet, the following morning, they were again booked out. Two
other firearms could not be accounted for by the end of the visit of the
Committee.
Discipline:
Extensive absenteeism at management meetings is noted with concern. The Members
did note that it would be preferable for executive management meetings to be
held before general staff meetings. The station had 147 disciplinary cases in
2010/11 as well as two fraud/corruption cases. There are high levels of
absenteeism at the station and many of these disciplinary cases were linked to
absenteeism. Staff are exhausting their sick leave benefits and then receiving
leave without pay. Despite action taken in this regard more needs to be done to
address this situation.
Community Police Forum:
There is a good relationship between the CPF and the station. The recently
elected CPF received no orientation on appointment. Many CPF members required
training, but would prefer a shorter training programme than the five day
programme that is available as they are all working. Station management stated
that they would request the Department of Community Safety to develop a short
module for the CPF executive. It was noted that there is a lack of coordination
of community structures in the area i.e. the CPF, the Neighbourhood Watches and
the Street Committees. Neither the SAPS nor the CPF members were clear about
the funding of the CPF; however, there seems to be problems with accounting for
the R3000 that was given to the previous CPF. They are thus unsure as to
whether they will receive more funding for the 2011 financial year and how much
this would be.
Unions: There is a good
relationship between the management and the unions. However, there was a complaint
from the unions that members with long service are routinely passed over in
terms of promotions. The management noted that the province and not the station
is responsible for promotions.
Satellite Station: The
Kayamandi area has a satellite station which is insufficient for the needs of
that area and is draining the resources of the Stellenbosch police station. The
station was told in 2010 that Kayamandi would be transformed into a fully
fledged police station, but this has not occurred. The accommodation at the
Kayamandi satellite station is inadequate and yet has not been prioritised for
building or renovation. Additional municipal space would be desirable, in the
current municipal space that they are occupying.
Detectives: The
Detective component is located in separate offices a distance of approximately
2km from the station. There are a total of 45 detectives serving the station.
The Branch Commander stated that they require an additional 20 detectives,
mainly because the detectives need to serve the Crime Office (located next to
the Community Service Centre) at the station as well. Of these 45 detectives
about 15 have over 20 years experience in the detective branch. However they
also have a large group of young detectives including 10 newly appointed
detectives that were appointed in September 2010. All detectives have completed
the Introductory Course to Investigation and 29 of the 45 have completed the
Full Detective Training Course. It will thus take at least three more years for
all the 45 detectives at the station to be fully trained- as there are only
four intakes per year. It was noted that there is a marked difference in
capacity of detectives that have received the full training and those that have
not yet done so. However, it was also noted that often this full training is
only available to detectives after at least three years of service, which means
that they have already learnt bad habits which become more difficult to unlearn
after this time. It would thus be preferable for them to receive this training much
earlier in their career as detectives.
There
are a number of important infrastructure problems in the building in which the
detectives are housed. Most important of these is poor security- the building
is very old, and does not have adequate burglar proofing or access control.
Four detectives share an office which means that there are insufficient
interview or meeting rooms. The nearest facility for secure identification of
suspects by witnesses is in Bellville South. There are insufficient lock-up filing
cabinets for safe storage of dockets. Essentially, the building and facilities
for safe keeping of dockets are not sufficiently secure, though in the past
three years only one docket has been ‘lost’. This docket apparently disappeared
off a desk of a detective. The case was investigated but the detective was not
charged. The explanation given was that because four people share the office it
was not possible to lay blame on one person. The Members were not satisfied
with this explanation.
At
the time of the visit there were 740 cases under investigation and 1 372 cases
in court. In addition, there were a total of 738 reopened dockets. Each
detective carries approximately 38 dockets excluding the reopened dockets, but
if one includes these dockets the case load increases to approximately 70
cases. Detectives dealing with the property related cases hold on average fewer
dockets than those dealing with violent and other crimes as these cases are
finalised much sooner and thus the case closed more quickly. The highest case
load currently carried by a detective is 121 cases. The oldest docket that is
still open is for a 1996 murder case.
The
detection rate in the areas of murder, property crime and assault GBH are
relatively low and the conviction rates even lower. The following table
illustrates the detection and conviction rates for these three categories for 2010/11.
|
|
Murder |
Property Crime |
Assault GBH |
|
Detection rate |
19.80% (national average = 26.57% for 2009/10) |
12.5% (national average = 16.97% for 2009/10) |
22.5% (national average = 74.52% for 2009/10) |
|
Conviction rate |
2.82% (national average = 13.55% for 2009/10) |
3.64% (national average = 24.50% for 2009/10) |
52.2% (national average = 26.14% for 2009/10) |
|
Number of dockets older than 1 year |
43 |
1 |
50 |
The
Detectives require four additional vehicles. Thus even though they have two
detectives per vehicle, because they have to work in the Crime Office as well,
more vehicles are required. Most detectives do not have filing cabinets and the
filing cabinets that the detectives do have do not lock. In addition there are
only five computers serving all 45 personnel. Three of these are in the
administrative offices and only two are for detectives. They have one fax
machine and one photocopier. The e-docket system has not been implemented at
the station.
Detectives
still experience problems with poor statement taking and incorrectly formulated
charges. While the Branch Commander stated that these problems are identified,
rectified (particularly in terms of charges) and reported as required,
insufficient steps are taken to address the situation to ensure that it does
not reoccur- i.e. through training. Note that according to management the
problem has been addressed and there are no charges that are thrown out of court
due to incorrect charges. As the detectives, however, still perceive this to be
a problem, additional steps should be taken.
On
scrutiny of the Warrant and Court Register it was clear that they had not been
inspected and signed off regularly. In fact the hardcopy book had not been
checked for the past year. The Commander did say that the electronic dockets
were checked but that the hardcopy was not checked and that this would be
addressed.
A
number of problems were identified with regard to intersectoral co-operation
between the detectives, and other role-players in the criminal justice system.
These include:
Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences
(FCS) Unit: The FCS Unit is a relatively new unit within the
Stellenbosch precinct (according to the Cluster Commander it is not even
officially open) and is situated in the same offices as the detectives. The FCS
staff was moved from the Paarl FCS unit and now deals with all cases in the
Stellenbosch, Kayamandi, Cloetesville, Groot Drakenstein, Franschhoek and
Klapmuts area.
The
unit consists of a Commander with the rank of Captain, a single administrative
person, a forensic social worker and seven investigating officers. Two of the
seven investigating officers have not received specialised FCS training.
Approximately
20-40 crimes are reported each month and each investigating officer holds
between 30 and 40 dockets. There were a total of 136 dockets on hand at the
time of the visit. These included all sexual offences of which a large majority
(20 out of 30) were rape cases. In a large number of these cases the victims were
children. Due to the sensitive nature of these crimes, about one third of the
dockets were older than one year. The oldest open docket was for a 2004 case.
While it was recognised that it is desirable that everyone in the unit receive
counselling every 6 months, as this is voluntary rather than mandatory, this
does not occur.
As
the unit is housed in the same building as the detectives it experiences
similar problems around security. The filing cabinets that they do have do not
lock. In addition, the FCS has only one computer to serve all 10 staff members.
Despite their need to service a vast area, much of it rural, they have three
sedans and no bakkies.
The
following are the detection, disposal and conviction rates for the category
‘rape’ for 2010/11:
|
Rape:
Detection rate |
54.58% |
|
Rape:
Disposal rate |
53.66% |
|
Rape:
Conviction rate |
1.8% |
|
Number
of dockets older than 1 year |
45
dockets |
Cells: The station has
eight holding cells which serve the Stellenbosch, Kayamandi and Cloetesville
stations. The station was unclear as to the designed capacity of these cells –
they have apparently repeatedly asked for this information but it has not been
forthcoming- but on average on the weekends the cells hold about 50 persons. On
the date of the visit there were 11 persons in the cells, ten of whom were
housed in one cell. The Members questioned the decision- which is apparently
the norm- to hold so many people in one cell when there are many empty cells.
Apparently
the station is fortunate in that it normally only holds arrested persons who
are charged and then sent to court the following morning. They never receive
awaiting-trial offenders and only one or two persons who are on seven-day
remand. In addition, it was stated to
Members that the cells never house children. They are normally dealt with by
the detectives and then sent off in the care of their parents or to a place of
safety.
The
cells were in notably good condition- extremely well built, with fresh looking
paintwork (they were painted the previous year) and very clean. All toilets and
locks were in working order.
While
the cell register had been signed off as checked hourly for the day of the
visit, it was noted that the Register did not reflect this as occurring at all
times. This situation should be addressed.
There
had been no deaths in the cells over the past year. There had been one escape,
a walkout, in which a person left the cell during name calling process.
Disciplinary action has been taken against the officer in charge at the time.
Archives: The
archives were extremely well ordered – filed by year, month and day order- and
the requested file was found in seconds by the personnel working there. The
main problem, faced by the archives is the lack of space- the current office
space is full and in fact the 2011 files needed to be housed in a different
office. In addition, there is insufficient security in the archives room which
does not even have burglar bars on its windows. All dockets are filed
electronically but they do have a backup hardcopy CAS book.
SAPS 13 Store: The
SAPS 13 Store houses both general exhibits as well as firearms, which is
extremely problematic. The firearms are stored in metal trunks in the Store
which do not have locks. Thus anyone entering the Store to check a general
exhibit has access to the firearms.
The
Store holds the exhibit firearms, as well as firearms for deactivation (14),
amnesty firearms (2) and firearms awaiting licensing (18). One of the firearms
awaiting licensing has been in the Store for over three years. It is
problematic that the amnesty firearms are still in the Store as they are
required to be handed in within six weeks after the amnesty period had ended. In
addition, the Firearm Register is incorrectly completed as it contains
information on exhibits other than firearms, such as laptops and drugs.
Numerous
drugs are visibly apparent in the Store and it is unclear why they have not
been sent off for testing. Many of the exhibits in the Store do not have the
CAS number on their labels as required. The Store is much too small for the
number of exhibits that it holds and exhibits are packed about six deep into
the shelves.
Detainee
property is also contained in the Registers. The explanation for this was that
sometimes detainees are transferred from the cells, without returning their
possessions to them. These detainees may be hard to trace and in those cases
their possessions are then kept in the Stores.
Members
were also concerned about the attitude of the SAPS 13 Commander who seemed
resentful of the Members for taking up his time. In addition, the Members were
left in the Store alone for time periods while the Commander retrieved the
information/files that had been requested.
3.2.2.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED
While
the Station Commander at the station is managing a large and complex area and
is informed and in control of the situation, the Committee has some concerns around
ill-discipline and high levels of absenteeism at the station. This would
require that the Station Commander is firmer on these issues.
To
this effect the Station Commander should report in writing to the Committee by
4 February 2011 on:
·
Steps that will be taken to
address ill-discipline at the police station, including measures taken around
the commander of the SAPS 13 Store who did not behave appropriately in the
presence of the Members and the field trainer who also displayed ill-discipline
in front of the Members. The field training officer should account for the
reasons why the log book displayed 40 km for his trip to Kayamandi and back.
·
Report on high levels of
absenteeism and abuse of sick leave at the station.
Note
that the Provincial Office was not present at this meeting. Thus it was asked
that the Cluster Commander should liaise with the Provincial Office and report
in writing by 4 February 2011 on:
·
Steps taken to improve the
security of the detective offices. This includes information on firstly, why an
instruction was given out to apply for lock-up filing cabinets, apparently on
the instruction by Parliament, which is false, and, secondly, despite this
instruction, no filing cabinets have been received by the station. The Cluster
Commander was tasked with following up urgently on the renovations to the
Detective building.
·
Provide a report on the
financial statements for the R3 000 allocated to the previous CPF. The
Cluster/Province should report on the guidelines for which the allocated money
for the CPF can be used.
·
Provide a report on why a
person was shifted to archives without acknowledgement of additional
responsibility acquired in terms of promotion or increase in salary.
None
of these reports have been received to date.
3.2.3.
SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The
following are the key concerns of the Committee:
The
following are the key recommendations of the Committee:
3.3. CLOETESVILLE POLICE STATION- UNANNOUNCED (26 JANUARY 2011)
When
the Committee arrived at the Stellenbosch police station it was decided that a
small group of Members should go to the Cloetesville Police Station on an
unannounced visit.
3.3.1.
KEY OBSERVATIONS
Efficiency Rate Grading (2009/10): 65,57 %
Community Service Centre:
There was a concern that, while the filing system looked impressive, the
officials at the station did not actually know what was contained in the files.
SAPS 13 Store:
·
Firearms
One
amnesty firearm was still in the safe. The safe also included exhibits such as
drugs and cases of beer. While the Station Commander felt that this was the
best place for these exhibits as she was the only person with keys to the safe.
Members felt that these exhibits should be kept in the SAPS 13 store as keeping
these other exhibits in the safe would require that it was opened more than
necessary, which could lead to firearm losses/theft. Drugs were also found in
the safe, which should have been sent for forensic testing
The
requested item contained in the Register could not be found by the officials,
which points to poor filing in the SAPS 13 Store.
Vehicles: Lack of control,
management and maintenance of vehicles was apparent. The head of fleet
management could not explain why a vehicle with four flat tyres (since the
beginning of January) had not been sent for maintenance. Other vehicles that
had been involved in accidents had not been sent for repairs.
Visible Policing:
The post of head of Visible Policing had been vacant for two years.
Management Challenges: The
Members took a decision to leave the station without completing the inspection.
The main reason for discontinuing the visit was that it became increasingly
apparent that there was in effect no management of the police station. Neither
the Station Commander nor any of the other personnel could answer basic
questions around management of the various registers, or staffing issues.
According to the Station Commander there had been no management meeting since
November 2010 and the crime statistics for the past financial year had not been
submitted to the Cluster or Province. As mentioned above, the post of Head of
Visible Policing had been vacant for two years; the Human Resource manager was
in an acting position; the person in charge of the SAPS 13 was in hospital; and
the Designated Firearm Officer was sick on that day. The Station Commander, who
is expected to have a macro picture of the functioning of the station, in the
absence of these staff members, could not provide the answers to the Members.
3.3.2.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED
An
urgent intervention is required at the Cloetesville Police Station to assist
the Station Commander to effectively manage the station. The Cluster Commander (together with the
Provincial Office) should report in writing to the Committee by 4 February 2011
on:
·
The reasons for the
problems at the station and why these have been allowed to occur.
·
Steps that have and will be
taken to address the problems.
The
Station Commander was requested to provide the answers to the Station
Monitoring Tool (SMT), which was left at the station, by the following day - 27
January 2011. The completed SMT was sent to the hotel as requested.
These
reports have not been received to date.
3.3.3. SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS
The
following are the key recommendations of the Committee:
3.4. ROBERTSON
POLICE STATION (27 JANUARY 2011)
The
Robertson police station is a rural station serving a population of about 40
000 people. There is a 47.2% unemployment rate in the area with a high number
of seasonal workers. The station has 122 personnel and nine students. The
station is a ‘Colonel station’ and the Accounting Station is
3.4.1. KEY
OBSERVATIONS
Ranking: The ranking of the
station has declined in the past few years, apparently due to the increase in
crime in the area and the loss of some experienced personnel.
Management Issues:
The Committee was impressed with the hands on approach and in-depth knowledge
of the issues displayed by the Station Commander. Meetings between management
and members are not currently compulsory. Members felt that this would be
preferable and the management agreed that they would issue an instruction that
these meetings are compulsory, in future.
Unions: POPCRU was not
available but the other union members reported a good relationship with
management and applauded the open door policy of the Station Commander.
Firearm Safes: The
station has two safes - one containing firearms that are never used; and one
for firearms that are booked out. Over and above the firearms that are booked
out there were 48 new and unused firearms in the safe. Members questioned why
increasing resources are allocated to firearms when there may, in fact, be a surplus.
Community Service Centre: While
there are a high number of domestic violence incidents recorded in the Register,
the Domestic Violence Register was not properly completed, particularly the
last column in the Register. The Station Commander seemed to be signing off the
Register without proper checks. Backlogs in the collection of protection
orders, despite the Station Order that these are collected each day, were
apparent. Members were also concerned
that while the Domestic Violence Act and Child Justice Act files were generally
in good order, it seemed as if no-one was actually reading these files as
members in the CSC were not using the information correctly.
Of
serious concern to the Members was the high number of arrests for drunkenness.
Members questioned why this occurred and whether in fact it is correct to
arrest drunken people who may not have committed a crime, and were further
concerned that many of these arrests are done in public on the streets. Members
questioned whether this was an appropriate crime prevention measure. This seems
to be one of the few stations with such a high number of arrests for
drunkenness. The management of the station reported that they would reconsider
their stance in this regard.
In
addition, Members were concerned that there was no dedicated CSC manager but
that instead the CSC was managed by the different shift commanders. This means
that no-one is taking full responsibility for the tasks and responsibilities of
this position.
No-one
has been trained with regard to implementation of the Child Justice Act. The
last group of staff to receive training on domestic violence was in 2007.
Vehicles: There are a total
of 33 vehicles available to the station. Lack of control over vehicles was
clear. There was a concern that Sector Commanders were issued with vehicles for
use after working hours. Between nine and ten vehicles are taken home per night.
Members questioned why so many of the vehicles reflected extremely high
kilometres as high as 595 000 km on the clock and noted that it seems that
there may be a problem in the province with regard to reluctance to board old
vehicles with high mileage. It is a concern to Members that maintenance on
these vehicles may be more costly in the long run than replacement of the
vehicles.
In
one day as much as 345 km is recorded to have been travelled in the log books.
In addition, a high number of vehicles are damaged and in need of repair. Poor
service from the SAPS garages impacts negatively on service delivery. Possible
corruption in the SAPS garages was raised by Members as in one case a car
received a R26 000 engine overhaul, and then after 10 days on the road, the
engine had again broken down and was in need of repair. Vehicles sent to the
garages for repair took a long period of time before they were returned. In
response to some of the concerns the Station Commander noted that some of the vehicles
with high mileage are used as part of the Flying Squad which covers a much
wider area than Robertson alone. In addition, he stated that vehicles were no
longer used to take staff members home.
Discipline:
144 disciplinary cases took place in 2009/10 and 95 in 2010/11. Members
questioned why there is such a high number of disciplinary cases yet the
management of the station does not believe that there is a discipline problem.
Delays in processing cases by the provincial offices were noted- some cases
take as long as two years to finalise. Delays in finalising cases will
negatively impact on its efficacy as a disciplinary mechanism. Absenteeism was noted as a concern at the
station – the same members are booked off sick for long periods of time. Where
there is no medical certificate, unpaid leave is put in for that period.
Vacant Posts: The
Support Service Commander post has been vacant since 2007.
Detectives: The
detective component is housed at the police station. There are a total of 29
detectives at the station and one clerk, and according to the station personnel
these are sufficient to meet the needs of the station. Almost half of these 29
detectives have less than 10 years experience and there are concerns around the
levels of experience of some of the detectives. This is exacerbated by the fact
that only 19 of the 29 detectives have completed the Introductory Course to
Investigation and only 10 of these 19 detectives have completed the Full
Detective Training Course and are thus fully trained. According to the station
the annual intake for training is one detective per year and thus it would take
at this rate at least 19 years to ensure that all the current detectives are
fully trained. Two detectives have completed specialised training course- one
in sexual investigations and one in hostage negotiations.
The
detectives have not received any new vehicles since 2008. Many of their
vehicles have extremely high kilometres on the clock, which would not in itself
be a problem if it was not for the fact that they continuously break down, are
sent for repairs and then immediately break down again. This results in a detective:
vehicle ratio in reality of 3:1 rather than the ideal of 2:1. New vehicles were
requested in October 2008 and ideally they state that about eight additional
vehicles are required.
Lack
of adequate resources effect productivity and hamper security around dockets.
There are three computers for use by the detectives. There are very few lock-up
filing cabinets for safekeeping of dockets and many of those that are there do
not lock. There are no burglar bars on the windows or an alarm system. There is
a safe and all office doors can be locked. All detectives share offices and
there are thus insufficient interview/meeting rooms for use by detectives. The
nearest one-way mirror is in
It
was expressed that detectives seem to manage their case load. There are 502
current dockets which includes 452 dockets already at court and 14 ‘reopened’
cases. The average detection rate for 2009/10 was 23.94%. A total of 322 cases
were closed undetected in 2009/10. In terms of success in investigations the following
can be noted:
|
|
Rape |
Murder |
Property Crime |
Assault GBH |
|
Detection rate |
93.45% |
100%(national average = 26.57% for 2009/10) |
67.69% (national average = 16.97% for 2009/10) |
99.22% (National average = 74.52% for 2009/10) |
|
Conviction rate |
20.25% |
52.38% (national average = 13.55% for 2009/10) |
54.27% (national average = 24.50% for 2009/10) |
15.52% (national average = 26.14% for 2009/10) |
No
dockets have gone missing in the past three years. The last docket to go
missing was in 2005 where the case went to court but was withdrawn. Detectives
noted some improvements in the formulation of charges and statement-taking from
the CSC after a number of interventions were made at station level to address
these problems, but some problems still remain. Incorrectly formulated charged
decreased from 20/30 per month to 2-5 per month but January 2011 reflected an
increase again to ten incorrectly formulated charges. This needs to be
investigated. It should be noted that there are no paralegals at the CSC to
assist with this process.
The
usual problems are described in terms of intersectoral collaboration and
challenges. Key amongst these are concerns around bail, continuous remand and
withdrawal of cases without input from the investigating officer.
Cells: There are five cells
at the station each of which can hold eight people. While the cells are old,
and require some painting and other cosmetic improvements, the locks are newly
replaced and in good order, and they are secure. All the toilets in the cells
are in working order, but only one of the five showers works and some of the
lights are not working. Perusal of the Cell Register showed that while the
cells were visited hourly as required on the day of the visit, this was not
always the case. In some cases the cells were only visited every four hours.
There
was one death in the cell in November 2010 where a person arrested for being
drunk in the evening was found the following morning dead in the cell with
injuries to his ribs. The ICD was contacted and an internal disciplinary
process is still in progress. There was one escape in 2010 where a person who
was being charged at the Crime Office was left alone for a period and walked
out of the police station. He was recaptured a few days later and departmental
steps have been taken.
SAPS 13 Store: Serious
problems were apparent with both the storage of firearms and general exhibits.
·
Firearms
In
the firearms safe, firearm exhibits were kept together with amnesty firearms,
deactivation firearms and destruction firearms. To make matters worse, these
different firearms were not kept on separate shelves or in any other way
distinguished from each other but were all strewn on the same shelves
irrespective of whether they were exhibits or not. Many of the exhibit firearms
were not in bags and in some cases the bags were not sealed. Many of the
exhibit firearms did not contain CAS numbers.
The
lack of order in the firearms store was a serious concern. When asked to find a
particular firearm, which according to the Register should still have been
there, the person was unable to do so for the entire visit of the Committee. It
can only be hoped that the firearm is actually still there and not ‘missing’.
There
were a total of 86 amnesty firearms
in the safe. No acceptable explanation was given for why these were still at
the station as they were required to have been handed over at the end of the
amnesty period. The Provincial Office is responsible for ensuring that this had
occurred. This problem was compounded by the fact that the safe had been
inspected by both the Station Commander and the Cluster, and yet the fact that
these firearms were still there and should not have been was not detected and
addressed.
·
Other exhibits
The
Store was in a similar state of disorder. Items were not properly labelled and
many did not have CAS numbers. No acceptable explanation was given for the fact
that the previous day’s evidence was not yet in the Store. In addition, five
rape kits which should have been sent for forensics, labelled in one case 2009
and in the other cases August and November 2010, were still in the Store.
Archives: The
Members visited the archives. They were told by the person in charge that these
particular archives store files up to 2002 but found that in fact files up to 2005
were actually stored in that room. The archives were dusty, dirty and the files
haphazardly packed. Piles of files that had been taken out (clearly a long time
ago as they were dusty) had not been repacked. It should be noted that
detectives at the station remarked that it usually takes a day for them to
receive files from archives. These files should be immediately retrievable. The
station is not on the e-docket systems and the station had no information as to
when it would be put on the system.
Specialised Units: The
station has a small satellite component of the FCS – the main unit is based in
Sector Policing: The
station has four sectors and while the Members were told that all four sectors
are fully functional it is clear that, in practice, only three of these are
fully functional. Due to a shortage of vehicles the rural sector is only
patrolled on weekends by the reservists.
3.4.2. ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION REQUESTED
The
following was required from the Station Commander to be submitted in the form
of a written report to the Committee by 4 February 2011:
·
Explanation for why nine
vehicles are taken home by staff at night including by Sector managers, as well
as steps that will be taken to ensure that vehicles are not misused.
·
Explanation for why a
certain detective is not obliged to perform stand-by duties.
·
Explanation for why at
least five rape kits, dated 2009 and 2010, are still in the Stores and were not
sent to the Forensic Science Laboratories, including what the implications of
this are and what action will be taken in this regard.
·
Describe what steps will be
taken to address the serious problems identified in the Section 13 Stores,
where it is clear that a complete overhaul is needed.
The
following was required from the Provincial Office to be submitted in the form
of a written report to the Committee by 4 February 2011:
·
An explanation of the
policy with regard to servicing, repairs and boarding of vehicles, including a
detailed response to each vehicle identified on the list provided to the
Members.
·
An explanation for why
detectives do not have lock-up filing cabinets and burglar bars on the windows,
thus compromising security.
·
An explanation for why no
new vehicles for the detectives have been provided since 2008 and when they
will receive new vehicles.
·
An explanation for why
there are so many long-outstanding disciplinary cases which have not been
finalised, and the status of each of these cases.
·
An explanation for action
that they will take with regard to the removal of the amnesty firearms from the
station.
None
of these reports have been received to date.
3.4.3. SPECIFIC
CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The
following are the key concerns of the Committee:
The
following are the key recommendations of the Committee:
3.5. ATLANTIS
POLICE STATION (28 JANUARY 2011)
The
Station Commander was transferred to the station in 2009 to assist in combating
the gang violence in the area and some success had been noted in addressing the
gang problem. It was noted that he had applied for a transfer and would be
leaving the station the week following the visit of the Committee.
The
Station has 186 members and 22 students and serves a population of
approximately 500 000. Key challenges in the area include gang violence, rape
and robberies. The area has a high unemployment rate. There is a contact point
station at Mamre which is open from 8am to 4pm each day. This contact point
will be transformed into a satellite station with 13 members and will offer a
24 hour service. There are three field training officers at the station- two
warrant offices and one constable. The average reaction time is 17 minutes.
3.3.1.
KEY OBSERVATIONS
Efficiency Rate Grading (2009/10): 57, 93 %. It is a
concern to the Members that the rating of the station has worsened since 2006.
Management:
Members noted with concern the fact that the Station Commander was leaving and
that it was clear that he was an asset to the station and recognised in the
community. Apparently no new Station Commander had yet been appointed. The
station has had five different Station Commanders over the past five years. The
Station Commander seemed to be ‘hands on’ and had a good grasp of issues at the
station.
Vehicles: Members noted
during the inspection that some of the vehicles were dirty and that the log
books were not regularly updated. There is a shortage of vehicles at the
station. Only 41 of the 48 vehicles are functional and many are not suited to
the terrain. Two operational members do not have driver licences and 15 do not
have state authority to drive a vehicle. Five accidents occurred in 2009/10 due
to negligence. Problems were noted with regard to the Maitland Garage which
apparently refuses to repair broken car seats.
Firearm Safe: Concerns
were raised by Members regarding the control over the SAPS firearms as it
seemed as if not all firearms were accounted for. The police could not account
for two firearms that were booked out the previous day and not recorded as
booked back in. After checking they were accounted for, but the incomplete
record keeping is a serious concern and the lack of control in this regard
needs to be addressed.
Community Police Forum:
The CPF has been newly constituted since November 2010. It has to date received
no funding but had received some funding in the past. It is a concern that the
CPF members were not informed that the Station Commander would be leaving. The
Neighbourhood Watch members required training.
Unions: Shop stewards were
not available because of National Police Day celebrations. However, the
Committee met with individual members from the unions. These union members
reported positive interaction and relationship with the station management.
Community Service Centre:
While the number of domestic violence cases recorded was high- 86 for that month-
the Station Commander explained that the entries were pencilled in and then
corrected at the end of each month. However, the entries for December had not
been corrected by the date of the visit which was toward the end of January.
The Child Justice Act file was at the CSC but looked as if it had never been used.
The Station Orders were not user friendly and it was suggested that the station
liaise with the Robertson police station whose Station Orders were better
formulated.
Vacancies: A number of staff
were acting in positions for long periods of time such as in Support Services.
Discipline: A
serious abuse of sick leave was apparent at the station. A trainee was absent
for three months and, on returning, put in for 90 days unpaid leave, and
provided no medical certificate. While this will apparently be dealt with in a
disciplinary process, the Members believe that the severity of the case (which
is tantamount to abscondment) should result in immediate dismissal, especially
as this person is still a trainee. There seems to be no policy on abscondment
to deal with these cases, or, if it is there, it is not used.
In
2010 there were 305 disciplinary cases of which 27 are still outstanding cases
held up at provincial level. These outstanding cases are affecting 14 members.
Detectives: The
Branch Commander was on training on the date of the visit. It was of concern to
the Members that the Branch Commander who has the rank of Colonel has been
functioning in this position at the station since 2007 and is only now
undergoing middle management training. This clearly illustrates the problem of
the delinking of promotions/training and proper career planning within the
SAPS. Ineffective management of the detectives was noted as a problem by the
Cluster Commander who stated that they were aware of the problem at cluster and
provincial level. It is however, unclear what interventions have been taken at
that level to address the problem.
There
are 36 detectives at the station. According to the Resource Allocation Guide
(RAG) there should be 40 detectives which means that there are four vacant
posts. However according to the detectives they actually require at least 20
more detectives to deal with the high case loads and the serious gang problems
in the area.
Of
the 36 detectives, 35 have completed the Introductory Course to Investigation
but only 18 of them (50%) have completed the Full Detective Training Course.
Only two detectives received training in 2010 and thus it would take a total of
nine years to ensure that all existing detectives at the station were fully
trained.
These
36 detectives deal with a total of 2 811 cases of which 940 are currently under
investigation. Each detective deals with approximately 100 cases. It was noted
that a detective with the highest case load at the station- 320 cases- is not
managing this caseload effectively and struggles to close cases. It was of
extreme concern to the Members that despite recognition that this person is not
coping, the management has not taken appropriate steps to address the problem
by reducing the case load, shifting the person to a more appropriate area, or
providing training.
It
is clear that statistics are not used properly as tools by management to
strategise or to monitor performance. On request for detection and conviction
figures for various categories of crime three different figures were provided.
A total of 1930 cases were closed in the past financial year as undetected. In
terms of success in investigations the following can be noted:
|
|
Rape
|
Murder
|
Property
Crime |
Assault
GBH |
|
Detection rate |
71.7% |
25% (national average = 26.57% for 2009/10) |
16.21% (national average = 16.97% for 2009/10) |
81.33% (National average = 74.52% for 2009/10) |
|
Conviction rate |
3.88% |
5.74% (national average = 13.55% for 2009/10) |
18.23% (national average = 24.50% for 2009/10) |
14.03% (national average = 26.14% for 2009/10) |
|
Percentage of dockets older than 1 year |
10% |
89% |
8% |
10% |
Detectives
noted that despite a number of interventions there are still problems at the
station with regard to incorrectly formulated charges and poor statement
taking. In terms of resources, the detectives note that there is not a shortage
of vehicles on paper- the ratio is two people to each vehicle but that vehicles
are sent to the garage for repairs on a regular basis which increases this
ratio to 4:1. Approximately four additional vehicles would be desirable. The
detectives have eight computers and the station is not on the e-docket system.
As noted at all the stations there are insufficient lock up filing cabinets for
use by the detectives- no request for filing cabinets has been submitted in the
past year. While no dockets have been lost in the past three years this remains
a concern exacerbated by the fact that there is no burglar proofing on the
windows or an alarm system.
Once
again detectives noted a concern with the perceived ease in which prosecutors
withdraw cases without consultation with the detective involved. A prosecutor
withdrew 60 cases at once in the previous year.
Cells: There are six cells
at the station with a holding capacity of 42 people. The cells are in a good
condition with the exception of a number of lights that were not in working
order. These have apparently been reported. The Cell Registers were inspected
hourly as required and there had been no escapes or deaths in the cells over
the past year.
A
key concern was the fact that there were two people in the cells who had been
there for over the prescribed 48 hours and had not yet been charged or sent to
court. It was also a concern that the staff working at the cells has the perception
that detectives tend to frequently release persons from the cells without
charging them.
SAPS 13 Stores:
The
SAPS 13 safe was neat and the firearm identified in the Register was found
quickly. However, it was of concern to Members that the exhibit firearms and
safekeeping firearms were once again stored amongst each other on the shelves.
In addition, six firearms handed in during the amnesty period in 2010 were
still in the storeroom.
The
SAPS 13 Store seemed to be neat and well ordered, though it did take the person
working at the store a bit of time to find the item identified from the
Register. No losses have been reported from the store in the past year, but the
Register has not been checked regularly by the Station Commander, the Cluster
Commander or the Province.
Archives: The
visit took place on the National Police Day celebrations and the person in
charge of the archives had gone to
Sector policing: The
station has four sectors which are all operational. However, further probing
revealed that the stations used to have six sectors but due to the fact that
this required too many human and physical resources, a decision was made to
reduce these to four sectors. Sector Commanders state, however, that some of
the sectors are too unwieldy and should be split and thus operationally six
sectors are preferable. Sector Commanders also noted that there is no provision
for them to have their own vehicles, yet they are required to communicate with
the community on a daily basis. They thus share vehicles but this is not ideal
as they often need to be at different places at the same time. The lack of
vehicles at their disposal hampers their ability to function optimally. Sector
Commanders also noted that while on paper there were sufficient vehicles for
the police, the reality was sometimes quite different, as vehicles were often
being repaired in the garages.
3.5.2. ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION REQUESTED
The
Station Commander should respond in writing by 4 February on the following:
·
The circumstances around
the five vehicle accidents which occurred in 2010, the reasons for these
accidents, and steps that were taken after the accidents to address the
situation. What is the situation at present?
·
What are the current
vacancies at the station? How long have these posts been vacant and why? What
is the plan to address this situation?
·
Lack of compliance with the
constitutional provision that arrested persons need to be charged and sent to
court within 48 hours or else released. Why is there lack of compliance in this
regard and what steps have been taken to address the particular case noted on
21 January 2011.
The
Provincial Office should respond in writing by 4 February 2011 on the following:
·
The lack of follow
through/planning after the amnesty period by the Province to ensure that all
firearms handed in during this period are collected and destroyed. Explain the
policy and plan in this regard.
·
Whether there is a policy
on abscondment and, if so, what are the details of this policy?
·
Why they have removed the
Station Commander without ensuring that an Acting Station Commander has been
timeously appointed?
The
Provincial Office should respond in writing by 28 February 2011 on:
·
The results of an
investigation into the Detective Services at the Atlantis Police Station.
None
of these reports have been received to date.
3.5.3.
SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The
following are the key concerns of the Committee:
The
following are the key recommendations of the Committee:
4. GENERAL
CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Firstly,
with regard to the requests for additional information outlined in Section
Three, it is noted that, with the exception of a partial response from the
The
Department should respond in writing within two weeks of the tabling of this
Report as to:
·
why each of the police
stations did not provide a written response to the request for additional
information; and
·
why there was no
representative from the Provincial Commissioner’s office on the visit, until
this was specifically requested by the Committee.
Secondly,
the Department must ensure that the Academy and the four stations, as well as
the SAPS Western Cape Provincial Office, and the respective Cluster Commanders
respond in writing to the requests for additional information outlined in
Section Three within two weeks of tabling of this Report.
Thirdly,
the Department must ensure that the Academy and the four stations, as well as
the SAPS Western Cape Provincial Office, and the respective Cluster Commanders
respond in writing to the specific concerns and recommendations outlined in
Section 3 of the Report with regard to steps that they will be taking to
address these specific concerns and recommendations, within two weeks of
tabling of this Report.
Fourthly,
in addition to the specific recommendations made and further information
requested from the Academy and each of the police stations, the Portfolio
Committee of Police has a number of key concerns arising from the visit, which
require a response and intervention from the Department. At this stage, it has
been decided that the Committee will not ask for a response in writing to these
concerns from the Department, but will instead highlight these issues in its
interaction with the Department during the upcoming Budget process and other
oversight processes of Parliament.
Key
concerns arising from the visit and recommendations made include:
Detectives
·
Managers within the
Detective Branch are not fully utilising the information embedded in the
detection, conviction and other statistics that they collect. Many of the
Branch Commanders or acting Branch Commanders (in cases where the Branch
Commanders were away), did not have these statistics readily available and a
number of opposing sets of figures were provided. The Committee believes that
this information is not merely an indication of how well or how badly a station
is performing in comparison to its counterparts, but is an invaluable
management tool which should be continuously used for strategic decision-making
and planning around investigations.
·
The lack of security around
dockets remains a serious concern and was apparent at all stations visited. The
Department needs to explain firstly why a directive was apparently issued to
all stations that they should apply for lock- up filing cabinets (implicating
the Portfolio Committee on Police). Secondly, it should explain why, despite
this directive, these were not actually delivered despite the fact that at
least some of them submitted this application. The lack of security in the
detective offices is also a concern, especially for those stations which work
in gang-infested areas.
·
There seems to be a severe
shortage of technological equipment (as basic as a lack of computers) to assist
detectives in doing their work. This is despite assurances periodically given
to the Committee that the police have the resources required to do their work
effectively. The SAPS has high budget allocations voted each year for
information technology. It is unclear how the SAPS plans to move toward a
professional and effective police service when these shortages are still so
apparent at station level.
·
None of the police stations
visited are on the e-docket system. The Department needs to explain to the
Committee the rollout and prioritisation plan for this system at station level.
·
Some detectives at the
stations visited have not completed the two-week detective training course- in
other words they are working as detectives with no investigation training. Many
of the detectives have not completed the three-month detective training course.
It was clear that if detectives are going to be trained at the rate that they
have received training over the past few years- i.e. between one and four training
opportunities a year- it will take many years (at one station up to 19 years)
to ensure that all detectives are properly trained. In addition, many
detectives only receive the three-month training when they have been working
for years as detectives. This means that they have ingrained bad habits which
are then more difficult to address with training. The Department needs to
explain how it will fast track the training of detectives to ensure that all
detectives working in the SAPS are properly trained, and receive this training
early on in their detective career.
·
The Department should
explain to the Committee the rationale of the Crime Office, problems that they
have encountered with the establishment of these structures and the benefits of
the structure. The Committee is concerned about the impact of this office on
the detectives and the fact that the detectives at the crime scene are not
necessarily the ones that will be handling the cases.
·
A shortage of detectives in
terms of actual needs was identified at all the stations. The Department should
explain how they will ensure that, in practice, there are sufficient detectives
at all stations to deal with their identified needs.
SAPS 13 Stores
Intersectoral co-operation in the criminal justice
system
Discipline
Ranks
Vehicles
State (Official) Firearms and other Resources
Community Service Centre
Station management
Implementation of legislation
Community Policing Forums
Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences
Unit (FCS)
Report
to be considered.
Appendix 1: Media article
Appendix 2: Acronyms and Terms used in the Report
Acronyms:
CPF- Community
Police Forum
CSC-
Community
Service Centre
FCS- Family
Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit
SAPS- South
African Police Service
Terms used:
SAPS 13 Store- This
refers to the stores and safes that hold exhibits including firearm exhibits.
Firearm Safe: This
refers to the safe(s) that hold State (official firearms) for use by SAPS
members