THIS REPORT
REPLACES THE REPORT OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON POLICE PUBLISHED IN ATC No
157- 2010 ON THURSDAY, 9 DECEMBER 2010, P. 4312
The
Portfolio Committee on Police, having conducted an unannounced oversight visit
to Inanda Police Station in
1. INTRODUCTION
A Sub–Committee of the
Portfolio Committee on Police undertook an unannounced oversight visit to Inanda police station in
The purpose of the oversight visit
was to properly find facts on the allegations of theft of 87 firearms from
section 13 stores. The Committee also looked at the physical
infrastructure, records and management of the stores, and assess service delivery at the
police station, using selected sections of the SAPS Monitoring Tool.
2. DELEGATION
1) Ms
LS Chikunga (ANC) - Chairperson and leader of Delegation
2) MS
A Van Wyk (ANC)
3) Ms D Kohler Barnard (DA)
4) Mr
J Michaels (Committee Secretary)
5) Ms
N Dollie (Senior Researcher)
The
following individuals were also in attendance: Provincial Commissioner and the Station
Management team.
3.
KEY FINDINGS
AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE LOSS OF FIREARMS
Upon arrival at the police station,
the Committee discovered that the person responsible for the Section 13 stores,
where exhibits were held, was not in the office and had the keys in his
possession. However, members of the Provincial Crime
Prevention Unit (specifically Firearms, Liquor and Second Hand Goods – FLASH)
were scrutinising the records of the stores.
3.1 Construction of new police station
The station
management reported that, during the construction of the new police station,
all exhibits, including firearms, were stored in drums and moved to two
satellite police stations for safe-keeping. Subsequently problems arose with the
management of exhibits.
3.1.1 Observations
Members were
of the view that if this process had been better managed by the Station
Commander and the store commander then the losses would not have occurred. A
procedure should have been put in place during the construction to ensure that
losses could not occur during and after this process. The fact that this was
not done points to poor management at all levels.
3.2 Provincial Office
The Provincial
Crime Prevention Unit, or Fireams, Liquor And Second Hand Goods (FLASH), is responsible for monitoring
the intake of firearm exhibits in and out of all police stations in the
province. They receive monthly reports from all 185 police stations in KZN. From
these reports they are supposed to pick up discrepancies where these are
apparent. In addition, they are responsible for investigating when losses are
reported from SAPS 13 stores.
Initial
checks are done telephonically, and only if the relevant station officials
cannot account properly, do they follow up with an audit. In 2009/10 they
completed 15 audits. When problems are found during the audit, these are
reported. FLASH members admitted that they had not been able to pick up
problems at the Inanda station because the written
reports were relied on and were not properly scrutinised. It was stated that
the performance of the Inanda station looked good on
paper, as the high inputs (firearms received) correlated with high outputs
(firearms sent through to the provincial office). Approximately 20 firearms
exhibits are recorded at the station each month.
According to
the Provincial Inspectorate in both 2008 and 2009 discrepancies in the reports
from the station were identified. These discrepancies were reported to the Station
Commander and the National Office. However, no further action was taken and
there was no follow up.
3.2.1 Observations
Members
stated that this Provincial Crime Prevention Unit or FLASH seems to rely too
much on the accuracy and truthfulness of the reports submitted by the stations,
without acknowledging that these written reports could be manipulated to cover
up discrepancies and even theft. This Unit should ensure that they did not rely
solely on written reports, but also cross-checked the accuracy of the
information that they received by visiting the police stations on a periodic
basis.
Members
questioned why the Provincial Inspectorate failed to pick up on these problems in
a timely fashion. Negligence on the part
of the Provincial Inspectorate should also be recognised.
Responsibility
on the part of the Provincial Office had not been acknowledged. Members were of
the view that the Provincial Office ought to have known that there were
problems, but, due to its failure to take corrective action, the problem
spiralled out of control.
3.2.2 Recommendation
This
occurrence presents an opportunity to scrutinise Section 13 stores of police
stations in the rest of the province. The Committee thus recommends that teams
should be sent to other police stations to ensure that reports sent to the Provincial
Office accurately reflect the situation on the ground.
3.3 Firearms Register
No separate
firearms register for firearms exhibits was maintained at the station. The last
entry on the transfer register was made in November 2008. Thus, for the past two years no separate
register had been maintained. It is important to note that, prior to this, a
separate register was maintained. The Committee received no explanation as to
why it had been decided to discontinue the separate firearms register. The previous store commander said that it was
possible that the register was discontinued because the person responsible for
that register in 2008 had subsequently left.
Members were
concerned that the station did not have a separate Firearms Register, as
identified in the standing orders. Members of the station stated that it was
the prerogative of the station commander as to whether a Firearms Register was kept
or not, and that it was not a requirement per se of the standing orders.
3.3.1 Observations
The Inanda police
station has a vast number of firearms in their stores (about 5000). It thus
seems desirable to have a separate firearm register to ensure the adequate
safeguarding of these firearms. Members were concern that the station had not
had this register for the past two years.
Notwithstanding
whether the standing orders require a separate firearm register or whether this
is up to the discretion of the station commander, in the case of the Inanda police station it would have been a good management
decision to keep (or not to have discontinued) this register even if it was not
a requirement of the standing orders.
Members
expressed their concern about the high number of firearms that were not handed
over for destruction.
3.3.2 Recommendation
The high
number of firearms in the Section 13 stores necessitates that separate records
be kept. Thus the Committee recommends that a separate register be implemented
immediately.
3.4 Handover
The current
manager of the Section 13 store has been in this position for the past year. It
was acknowledged that when he took over the store a proper handover, which
would have required a cross-check of all records with the actual firearms in
the store, did not occur. According to the current store commander, when he
arrived at the police station, the store was in disarray, which was probably
why a proper handover did not occur at the time. He began checking the records in
August 2009 and compared them with the actual firearms. In May 2010 it was
discovered that a total of 87 firearms were missing from the stores.
The previous
store commander acknowledged that he did not complete a proper handover to the
new store commander. He stated that he had not received a proper handover when
he took over the store.
3.4.1 Observation
The process of completing a proper handover in
any position is essential, particularly in high-risk positions such as managing
a firearms store. The fact that the station commander at the station did not
ensure that his managers were following procedures is extremely problematic and
points to integral problems around management and control.
3.5 Regular inspections
The section
13 register was checked every day by the Captain or someone of a rank above captain.
The problem was that the checks were reliant solely on the paper trail. The
exhibits were meant to be signed by the clerk and then checked monthly by the store
commander. They were further meant to be checked every three months by the Station
Commander.
3.5.1 Observation
Committee members indicated that it was clear
that regular inspections of the register and the stores (and cross-checking of
the registers) had not occurred over the past few years. This pointed to poor
management, as the different levels of inspection should have picked up a
problem in good time.
3.6 Disciplinary actions and management issues
The previous
store commander (Captain Noko) from whom the current
store commander took over was transferred within the Inanda
police station to the Crime Prevention Unit. The previous store commander was
currently under investigation by the Provincial Commissioner’s office.
The previous
Station Commander was also currently under investigation. As the most senior
manager in the station, he was responsible for ensuring that his management
followed correct procedure. He clearly failed in doing this. The previous Station
Commander had been removed from his post at the station and was currently
working at the Provincial Office.
According to
the Provincial Commissioner, a report on what tasks should have been done by
the Station Commander was currently being drafted. On completion of the report,
disciplinary steps would be taken against the previous station commander if
negligence on his part was found.
3.6.1 Observations
Poor
management at all levels seems to be the root cause of the problem. According to
Committee members it appeared as if no action was taken against management at
the station, including the previous store commander and the Station Commander.
The store commander remained in a post in the Crime Prevention Unit at the
station, and the Station Commander was merely shifted to the Provincial office.
The only action taken swiftly was against the lower- ranking clerk.
Members
expressed concern that by moving a person (the previous Station Commander) to
the Provincial Office, the perception was created that the person had actually
received a promotion rather than a punishment for possible mismanagement.
3.6.2 Recommendation
Members
recommended that while the disciplinary process (and criminal process, if
necessary) continued, the person in question should be suspended. It was
important that consequences were seen to occur when such negligence occurred.
In this regard, the provincial management needed to act decisively.
3.7 Current state of the stores (Physical security and order)
Only one person
in the store had a key to the safe where the firearms were kept. The safe was
secured by a trellidoor, but there were no CCTV
cameras in the stores and no linkage from the stores to the Station Commander’s
office. The stores were very neat and the firearms were clearly marked and
identifiable.
3.7.1 Observation
The
Committee reflected positively on the manner in which the current stores were
managed.
4. KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS ON GENERAL OVERSIGHT ISSUES
4.1 Detectives
The key
crimes reported at the station were murder, residential burglary, assault and
rape. There were 64 detectives at the station. According to the Branch
Commander, this number was insufficient to deal with the needs of the station.
Twenty detectives were removed from this function (to form part of the crime intelligence
office), but their dockets remained with the detectives that were left behind.
There was an
adequate mix of experienced and younger detectives at the station. However,
seven of the 64 detectives had not been for detective training. The remaining
57 detectives had all completed the Full Detective training course. In
addition, a total of seven detectives had completed specialised training in
sexual offences, and the Branch Commander had completed the Detective Commander
training course. Twenty-seven detectives were trained in the implementation of
the Child Justice Act in May 2010.
The Branch
Commander reported that there was no shortage of police vehicles, as there were
approximately 28 vehicles for use by the detectives at the station. Approximately
1 200 cases
were reported at the station each month, of which about 950 were serious cases
and the remainder less serious offences. The detection rate was approximately
55% on average for all cases, which was noted to be a slight improvement on the
2009 detection rate. The average conviction rate was stated to be about 57%.
The Branch Commander acknowledged that they did face challenges with regard to
incorrectly formulated charges, but attempts had been made to deal with this
problem by convening morning meetings which were held to discuss the charges.
In addition they experienced problems with poor statement-taking, but members
were referred to training where necessary.
According to
the Branch Commander, dockets had gone missing over the past year, but these had
been lost by the courts etc and not by the police. In terms of securing
dockets, the station had a court register and had applied for 24 lock-up steel
cabinets for the 2010 financial year. They had locks on the office doors and
regular inspections and docket audits were done.
The Branch
Commander noted that as the station has been identified as a presidential
station, it was well resourced and had sufficient equipment, including
computers
4.2 Holding Cells
The officer
in command of the cells on the day could not identify how many cells were under
his command or how many people were currently in the cells. After some
deliberation, it was noted that there were only 28 persons in the cells on the
day of the visit. It was, however, not established what the capacity of the
cells was (though they were clearly not overcrowded and many of the cells were
empty).
A possible
juvenile was identified in one of the cells alongside adult suspects. He had not
seen a probation officer at the time of the Committee’s visit. On intervention
by a Member, his parents were phoned and his mother came to the police station.
While the police were not convinced that he was a juvenile, proper steps should
have been taken to ascertain this without question. In addition, some of the
suspects in the cells stated that they had not been allowed to make a phone
call.
The cells
were generally clean and in a good condition, aside for dripping toilets. No
escape had occurred and no deaths had been reported in the cells over the past
year.
4.3 Sector vehicles
No copies of the Domestic Violence Act were
kept in the sector vehicles.
5. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT THE STATION
The acting
Station Commander, who was the replacement of the previous Station Commander
that was sent to the Provincial Office after the missing firearms were
discovered, had only been at the station for a week at the time of the
Committee’s visit. The acting Station Commander refused to say whether he was
‘acting’ or whether he had been appointed to the position, stating that this
was for the Provincial Office to answer.
In the
opinion of the delegation, good management was essential for the effective
running of any police station. Disciplined members would follow the good
example set by management which needed to be reflected in all areas, both big
(i.e. ensuring that proper procedures and processes were adhered to) and small
(wearing caps). The Members noted that, as this was a presidential station
which had had huge resources pumped into it, it was imperative that the correct
Station Commander be appointed to fulfil this important function. The Members
believed that the Provincial Office ought to take all necessary steps to ensure
that they had faith in the ability of the Station Commander that would be
appointed, in order to realise the full potential that existed at the station.
6. INFORMATION REQUIRED
Members
indicated that the following information would need to be provided:
Report
to be considered