REPORT OF THE JOINT BUDGET COMMITTEE ON BUDGET ANALYSIS WORKSHOP
As
published in the ACT of 16 May 2007
1. Introduction
Parliamentary
oversight over the executive has reached a point where the Legislature and its
committees need to build capacity to keep up with reforms in the public sector.
Such reforms have included new requirements for planning, budgeting, financial
management and reporting. As a result the Legislature has had to refine and
develop its oversight processes to ensure that information from the executive
can be comprehensively interrogated to ensure better service delivery. More
specifically it has impacted on the manner in which parliamentary committees
perform their functions.
The Joint Budget Committee (henceforth the JBC) has, over the past years, held
several workshops to develop aspects of its functioning. In accordance with
this approach, the JBC held a workshop on budget analysis, practices and
techniques on Monday the 19th and Tuesday the 20th of February 2007. Although
the workshop focused on these subjects, discussions also touched on other
issues relevant to the Committee. The workshop was facilitated by The Applied
Fiscal Research Centre (AFReC) and took place at Lagoon Beach Hotel, Milnerton.
Proceedings included:
This
Report serves both as a recap of the event and a summary of challenges and
action points for the JBC on how to be more effective in its oversight role.
2. Joint Budget Committee’s Terms of Reference
Parliament
has, for the past several years, been occupied with the process of reviewing
and strengthening its oversight function. Part of this involves developing
oversight practices over budgetary matters. As a result, Parliament decided to,
amongst other things, establish a committee, the Joint Budget Committee, with
the following Terms of Reference (TOR):
(1) Consider proposed allocations in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
and the Appropriation Bill and whether these allocations are broadly in keeping
with the policy directions of the Government;
(2) Make proposals regarding the processes Parliament should follow with regard
to its role in the developing of budgets in accordance with constitutional
requirements;
(3) On a regular basis monitor monthly published actual revenue and expenditure
per department, and to ascertain whether they are in line with budget
projections;
(4) consider, when tabled, the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement, with the
exception of those sections dealing with the macro-economic situation and
revenue;
(5) conduct hearings on the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and Budget Policy
Review Document, with the exception of those sections dealing with the
macro-economic situation and revenue;
During the Workshop, the need to operationalise the JBC’s TOR was noted as
fundamental. In the process of operationalising its TOR, the Committee
identified various ongoing concerns, which needed to be addressed. These
include consolidating its mandate, especially its role and relationship
vis-á-vis other Parliamentary structures and other state institutions,
addressing issues of capacity and programming and reviewing its own progress.
2.1. The Joint Budget Committee’s TOR and Relationship with other Committees
In
terms of its general mandate, the JBC identified the need to ensure that budget
oversight was practiced in conjunction with other parliamentary committees, for
example those engaged in overseeing state finances.
To prevent overlap and improve operations, the JBC recognized that the roles
and responsibilities of each required clarification. The Committee discussed,
for example, to what extent it could assess issues of institutional
performance, such as value for money — which falls within the Standing
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA’s) remit. The issue of the JBCs engagement
with the provincial and local spheres and other organs of state, such as the
institutions supporting constitutional democracy—the Chapter Nine Institutions
— were also raised.
Once clarified, each committee could then design analytical tools to engage the
executive in its respective focus area effectively. Generally, the JBC felt it
would be appropriate for the Committee to be making recommendations to
Parliament. Related to this, the JBC also felt that 2007 was a suitable
juncture to revisit and update its 2005-2009 Strategic Plan.
In relation to the role of JBC in influencing Money Bills, the Committee stated
that clarity was required in terms of the JBC’s role in the Appropriation Bill,
currently formally referred to the Portfolio Committee on Finance and the
Division of Revenue Bill, which the Select Committee on Finance engages with.
The JBC further recognized that it should be informed of progress and make
inputs into the work of the Task Team established by the Joint Rules Committee
with the aim of developing legislation in accordance with Section 77 of the
Constitution to allow Parliament to amend Money Bills.
In addition, the JBC recognized that, in conducting oversight, the imperative
of facilitating public participation from both organized interest groups and
from disadvantaged stakeholders, such as those active in the second economy,
was an ongoing challenge. The Committee felt that, to supplement informational
inputs of this kind, it could also engage in more direct oversight through, for
instance, visiting sites of service delivery.
Lastly, the JBC highlighted that due to Members busy schedules and the
programming arrangements for the National Assembly and National Council of
Provinces, the ability of the Committee to fulfill its mandate in a timely
manner was considered to be serious challenge.
2.2 Oversight over Parliament’s Budget
A further specific oversight issue identified was the question of the JBCs
role in monitoring and assessing Parliament’s budget and expenditure. The
Committee felt that, until the legislation regulating Parliament’s financial
management has been adopted — the development of which the JBC should track —
the Committee should hold Parliament accountable for budgetary matters.
3. Capacity and Training Needs
In terms of workload and capacity, the JBC highlighted a lack of human
resources and other support as an ongoing concern. To better manage its
workload, the Committee discussed the option of restructuring the Committee and
utilising a sub-committee system, similar to that used by SCOPA. In this
regard, it was emphasised that the mandates of these sub-committees should be
very clear. The Committee also examined the possibility of developing
relations, perhaps through memorandums of understanding, with service providers
and non-executive organs of state such as the Auditor-General and the Financial
and Fiscal Commission.
Training for Members on budget analysis was also raised as a focus area.
Specifically the JBC, with the assistance of AFReC, identified the following
training requirements or topics:
As
an initial step, the JBC stated that guidelines on the annual programme of the
Committee as well as a manual on best practice to inform topical and technical
questions to departments would be of practical assistance and be useful for
developing institutional memory.
4. Presentation by the National Treasury and JBC Discussions
The National Treasury (NT) presented
on various subjects including the implementation of financial management
legislation, expenditure reports and monitoring, infrastructure projects and
under expenditure.
4.1 The Implementation of Financial Management Legislation
Concerning the implementation of financial management legislation such as
the PFMA, Treasury stated that the lack of project planning and management
capacity was a serious problem evident throughout government. Although
enthusiasm was present, information and skills were often lacking at
under-performing departments and entities. Examples of this were the recurring
requests by some departments for monthly disbursements of one twelfth of the
total annual funding envelope—this often does not coincide with the practical
expenditure needs.
The JBC noted the lack of financial management skills within government. The
Committee further stressed the need for departments to comply with legislative
requirements and, in this context, made the example of departments not paying
suppliers within the 30 day time period. Small suppliers in particular needed
to be protected from extended delays in payments. Treasury stated that the
necessary funds for payment of suppliers were normally adequate although, due
to internal inefficiencies and poor cash management in departments, these
payments were often not made within the prescribed time periods.
4.2 Monitoring Expenditure and Infrastructure
Treasury highlighted the importance of monitoring budgeted versus actual
revenue and expenditure figures as well as audited outcomes of previous
budgets. Treasury agreed that PFMA Section 32 reports — whose purpose was to
report on the implementation of the Appropriation Act, and after October of
each year, the Adjustments Appropriation Act — were important but limited
oversight instruments: they could not, for example, assist the JBC and other
oversight bodies in picking up on fiscal dumping in the last quarter of each
financial year. Apart from Section 32 Reports, NT also produces an internal
report, which monitors departments and entities’ expenditure patterns and service
delivery. These reports are not published.
Treasury also presented on the financing, expenditure and monitoring of
infrastructure projects. Some of the problems in infrastructure roll-out were
highlighted, such as the lengthy delays in environmental impact assessments and
delays associated with litigation. Treasury also explained its national
infrastructure project register, which tracks the progress of governmental
infrastructure projects from the identification phase through to the design,
construction and completion phases. Similar registers were also being
established for provincial government infrastructure programmes. Notably, the
register was not currently reflected in Section 32 reports. Treasury stated
that it was reliant on accurate and timeous input from departments and
provinces for the updating of this register. Treasury added that it would be
difficult to utilise the register for oversight purposes as it was complex
system.
Treasury also indicated that there were separate teams to monitor individual
infrastructure projects although their ability in this regard varied: large
construction projects, such as dam construction, were easy to monitor whilst
smaller projects, such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)’s small
enterprises development agency outlets in towns, were more difficult. The NT
stated that the monitoring of these projects should also be a bottom-up
participative process in that communities should assist with the verification
of completion and quality standards. The NT could only effectively focus on the
financial reporting aspect of departments’ service delivery programmes and
outputs. Some monitoring functions are delegated to Provincial Treasuries.
Treasury added that the monitoring of infrastructure projects at local level
was particularly problematic. The example of the multi-purpose community
centres (MPCCs) was used—with NT indicating that local authorities often did
not want to maintain and operate these centres. The tracking of Housing was
also noted as a challenge — Treasury explained that the nature of the
Department of Housing’s database as well as its internal tracking systems made
it difficult to count finalized units. The example of the slow pace of the N2
Gateway project was given. This project generated unique delivery problems and
delays, compounded by community preferences for the location of houses and the
relative cost of temporary relocation.
The JBC noted the lack of proper asset registers and the need for departments,
provinces and municipalities to properly value and account for their assets was
emphasized. In addition, the Committee referred to the importance of
parliamentary oversight over the Gautrain rapid rail project and the issue of
monitoring the transfers of funds from national to provincial government for
this purpose. Treasury indicated it was currently piloting a project monitoring
tool to ease financial accounting of transfers and subsidies.
Concerning the question of monitoring and enforcing conditional grants,
Treasury explained that, in cases where government departments failed to meet
conditions for grants, it had yet to use the legislated mechanisms to enforce
compliance. Instead, the practice had been for NT to facilitate quarterly
meetings with the relevant departments and entities. The NT added that it would
welcome the assistance of the JBC in formulating and overseeing the
implementation of criteria for grants.
4.3 Under-Expenditure
Treasury reported that under-expenditure was still a concern, especially in
some essential services such as Health — the Hospital Revitalization Programme
was used as an example Funds were, however, still allocated to these services
due to their importance. In other cases funds were redirected to other
departments. Generally reasons for under-expenditure varied but, as was the
case of Health, dysfunctional supply chain management and a lack of management
skills were often cited as causes. A further example related to the
construction of certain correctional centres, where the lack of proper
feasibility studies severely hampered roll out. Even though the NT proposed
that Public Private Partnership’s (PPP) arrangements should be followed with
the building of these centres, the relevant Department resisted. The issue of
the correctional centres was of great concern to the JBC as the centres were
supposed to be near completion.
Finally
Treasury asserted not all instances of under-expenditure were due to poor
financial management: in the case of the Department of Land Affairs, for
instance, money destined for land restitution projects was taken away due to
external difficulties in the restitution process. Generally, however, most
cases of under- expenditure could often be traced to inadequate strategic
planning.
4.4 Vacancies
On the subject of vacancies in the public sector, Treasury revealed that
employee appointment procedures in government were complex and lengthy and
should perhaps be streamlined. In addition, NT indicated that vacancies in
departments were sometimes inflated to that they could vire from these budget
line items at the end of financial year to cover other expenditure.
The JBC stated its concern about the skills mismatch in the public service as
well as the payment of bonuses despite the failures and lack of performance
contracts. The Committee further raised the issue of unrealistic bonuses when
Key Performance Indicators have not been met. Key Performance Indicators
(KPI’s) should be thoroughly researched and require focused scrutiny.
5. Presentation by the Auditor General and JBC Discussions
The Auditor General, Mr Terence Nombembe, in his first interaction with the
JBC, presented on the Financial Capability Model. Prior to discussing the
model, the AG explained the three types of audits undertaken by his office:
(a) audits on the reliability of financial information presented in
annual reports, which look for adequate evidence for the financial info
presented in annual report. The AG noted the increasing intensity of doubt
about evidence in some entities’ annual reports.
(b) audits of service delivery information — officially known as
‘‘audits of predetermined objectives’’. Underlying information should support
objectives set out in strategic plan. The AG reported that the NT and the Dept.
of Public Services and meet to define what information should be included in
annual reports.
(c) performance audits, which take a closer look at the delivery
competence of entities. Performance audits cover issues of efficiency,
effectiveness, and economy (the three ‘‘Es’’) of public expenditure management.
For example, such audits examine the input/output ratios of entities service
delivery programmes.
The Auditor General conceded that it is a common mistake to confuse the last
two types of audits. It is the intention of the AG to reverse the level of
concentration in the first type of audit towards a focus on the last two types
of audits. A balance between the three types of audits would bring the
operations of the AG closer to similar benchmark institutions in the world.
The AG informed the Committee that for purposes of performance audits his
office would work together with stakeholders such as the JBC.
The Financial Management Capability Model
The Auditor General of Canada has developed a Financial Management
Capability Model that can be used by regularity auditors to determine the
financial management capabilities of government departments. This model formed
the basis for the model currently under development by the South African Office
of the AG. The object of this model was to provide a framework to enable the
reader of Annual Reports to assess the adequacy of financial management, to
monitor progress and to make comparisons.
The AG explained the various levels of analysis contained in the model:
The AG indicated that the model
provided a benchmark for improvement and assists by asking the most relevant
questions, and in simplifying conclusions over the capacities of entities.
TheAG stated that explanations and assessments based on the Financial
Management Capability Model would be included in the next General Report of the
AG.
6. Recommendations
In line with its Terms of Reference, the Joint Budget Committee recommends
the following:
6.1 For the JBC to fulfil its oversight and monitoring responsibilities,
the Committees TOR must be further clarified and developed. It follows that an
operational system for the Committee should be designed and implemented.
An operational system should address, amongst other issues, the overlapping
functional areas between the JBC and other committees, for example SCOPA and
the Portfolio and Select Committees on Finance, as well as the Committee’s
reporting functions. Such a plan would empower the JBC to alert the relevant
sector committees to interrogate departments on expenditure management issues
as they arise. One additional option may be for the JBC to include a matrix of
key questions as an annexure to every quarterly report.
6.2 In addition, the Committee should undertake a formal training needs
assessment. As an initial step, guidelines on the annual programme of the
Committee as well as a manual detailing topical and technical questions to
departments could be developed.
6.3 Related to the above, the capacity needs of the Committee should to
be addressed. This would necessitate, amongst other things, addressing the
issue of institutional memory and ensuring continuity in the Committee’s human
resources and technical support.
6.4 The JBC should confer with other committees on strategic plans and
budget votes in order t track input/output ratios and later assess the outcomes
achieved. The Committee also indicated that PFMA Section 32 reports provide
little information that could be used by committees to detect early warning
signs on spending and service delivery. The JBC will further engage with
National Treasury on this matter.
6.5 That the JBC should consult with the AG in future, specifically on
the Financial Management Capability Model and whether departments have
reflected on this model.
Report to be considered.