CTOP AMENDMENT BILL 2007
Submission on Behalf of the Consultation of
Monday, 05 November 2007
Our submission is that the scope of the 1996 Act
should not be enlarged in terms of more facilities and more staff unless the
widespread abuses of the present legislation are addressed at the same time.
Accordingly we respectfully submit that the following clauses (drafted by
counsel with Parliamentary drafting experience) should be added to the
Amendment Bill:
1.
Counselling
Add the
following section:
Before a medical practitioner, or registered midwife
or nurse, performs an abortion he or she shall ensure that the woman is
counselled in a manner which provides a full opportunity for discussion and
questions, and such counselling shall in every case include:
(a)
Sufficient information, imparted
either by electronic pictures or coloured diagrams and photographs, to enable
the woman to understand the existing stage of development of the unborn child
in her womb.
(b)
A discussion of the extent of the
risks involved in continuing the pregnancy, as set against the risks involved
in having an abortion. The latter must be explained in the light of the latest
medical science available at the time, and must include explanation of the
following risks:
(i)
The increased risk of breast cancer
following an abortion.
(ii)
The risk of depression and
associated symptoms after a period of years.
(iii)
The risk of difficulties in
conceiving, and bearing children in the future.
(c)
The available alternatives to
abortion, and in particular the ways in which the State and other agencies will
support the mother and child, particularly in the event of the child being born
disabled.
Why is this addition proposed?
Section 4 of the 1996 Act
provides that "The State shall promote the provision of non-mandatory and
non-directive counselling before and after the termination of a
pregnancy." The difficulty caused
by this section is:
1. that practitioners take the view that the onus of
providing counselling is on the State and not on them;
2. that "non mandatory" is taken to mean
there is no duty on the practitioner, whereas Parliament almost
certainly intended it to mean that a woman cannot be forced to listen to
counselling;
3. and "non directive" opens the door even
wider for the practitioner to assume that if a woman asks for an abortion any
mention of the risks involved might be construed as "directive."
The drafting of section 4
of the 1996 Act is therefore uncertain and equivocal. By contrast, the regulations relating to
counselling of persons receiving HIV testing are extensive, specific and
unambiguous.[1]
It is true that the
regulations made under the 1996 Act are more specific as to the content of
the counselling but they add nothing as to who must do the
counselling. Regulation 7 requires that
counselling should include:
1. The available alternatives to TOP (i.e., adoption,
fostering, parenting)
2. The procedure and associated risks of the TOP (it
is submitted this must require the use of graphic material for most women, and
must have regard to the current state of medical knowledge which today
recognizes at least 3 areas of risk – increased prevalence of breast cancer,
the 5-7 year depression syndrome, and difficulties relating to pregnancies in
the future.
3. Contraceptive measures for the future.
Not only is it vital that
legislation should specify who is responsible for ensuring that counselling is
done, but furthermore, there can be little doubt that any abortion performed
without such counselling will be illegal in the civil courts and give rise to
an action for damages because, without counselling, informed consent
required by section 5 cannot be obtained.
2. Informed Consent – Substitution of section 5
of the Principal Act
The
following section is hereby substituted for section 5 of the Principal Act:
(a)
Save as provided for by subsections
2 and 3 of this section, the informed consent of the woman shall be
required in every case before a
termination of pregnancy is performed and shall in every case consist of the
three ingredients of knowledge, appreciation and consent:
(i)
Knowledge means that the woman must
be fully informed, in a manner appropriate to her standard of education, of the
nature and extent of the risks involved.
(ii)
Appreciation means that she must not
merely receive the information but understand it as applicable to her
particular situation.
(iii)
Consent means that she must
subjectively consent to each step in the procedure and all its consequences.
(b)
In the case of a pregnant minor a
termination of pregnancy shall only be performed by a medical practitioner who
shall counsel her in accordance with section (aforesaid section) of this Act,
and thereafter proceed as follows:
(i)
If, following the counselling
procedure, the medical practitioner is satisfied that the minor is able to give
her informed consent, and she still wishes to proceed with the termination, he
shall then direct her to consult with one or both of her parents or guardians,
and advise her to consult with any other person she may have confidence in, and
then, if she wishes to proceed, to return after a minimum of 7 days with the
written consent of at least one parent or guardian. If appropriate, he must
explain that a judge can be asked to give consent in accordance with section 5
of this Act if it not possible to obtain the consent of one parent or guardian.
(ii)
If, following the counselling
procedure, the medical practitioner is not satisfied that the minor is able to
give her informed consent, and he is still of the opinion, after further
consultation with a second medical practitioner, that a termination of the
pregnancy is in her best interests, he shall contact the parents or guardians
and repeat the counselling procedure as set out in section ( ) (as above) of
this Act with the minor and in the presence of at least one parent or guardian.
The medical practitioner may then proceed with the termination provided he is
satisfied he has the consent of the minor and the informed consent of at least
one parent or guardian, or a judge.
(c)
Only a medical practitioner may
perform a termination of pregnancy on a woman who appears to be disabled
mentally or who appears to be unconscious. In the case of a mentally disabled
woman who in the opinion of the medical practitioner is not capable of giving
her informed consent, or in the case of a woman who has suffered a continuous
state of unconsciousness for a period of at least 14 days and in the view of at
least two medical practitioners is unlikely to recover consciousness in the
foreseeable future, the pregnancy may be terminated without the informed
consent of the woman, provided the informed consent of her natural guardian,
spouse or legal guardian (or, if such persons cannot be found her curator
personae) is obtained.
(d)
In order to provide for the
situations envisaged in section ( ) (the above para) of this Act, where the
consent of a parent or guardian is not available, the Minister shall make
Regulations enabling a minor or medical practitioner to apply to a Judge of the
High Court in chambers with expedition, without employing a legal
representative, and without court fees.
Why is this
substitution proposed?
Mandatory informed consent
is required by section 5 of the 1996 Act.
This requirement of the law was reiterated and explained in detail by
Judge Mojapelo in what is known as the second Christian Lawyers Association
challenge to the legislation.[2]
The judgment contains this
passage:
The courts have often
endorsed the following statements by Innes, CJ in Waring & Giitow v
Sherborne 1904 TS 340 at 144 to found a defence of consent:
"It must be clearly
shown that the risk was known, that it was realised, that it was voluntarily
undertaken. Knowledge, appreciation,
consent - these are the essential elements; but knowledge does not invariably imply
appreciation, and both together are not necessarily equivalent to consent"
The requirement of
"knowledge" means that the woman who consents to the termination of a
pregnancy must have full knowledge "of the nature and extent of the harm
or risk". See Castell v De Greef (supra) at 425. Neething Potgieter &
Visser (op cit) at 100-101 and Neethling (op cit) at 121-122.
The requirement of
"appreciation" implies more than mere knowledge. The woman who gives consent to the termination
of her pregnancy "must also comprehend and understand the nature and
extent of the harm or risk." See
Castell v De Greef (supra at 425); Neethling Potgieter & Visser (op cit) at
101 and Neethling (op cit) at 122.
The last requirement of
"consent" means that the woman must "in fact subjectively
consent" to the harm or risk associated with the termination of her
pregnancy and her consent "must be comprehensive" in that it must
"extend to the entire transaction, inclusive of its sequences".
Castell v De Greef (supra), at 425, Neethling Potgieter & Visser, (op cit)
at 120 and Neethling (op cit) at 122.
It is surely a matter of
common sense that no nurse, midwife or doctor can possibly be sure of these
matters without taking at least twenty minutes to explain the state of the
unborn child in the woman’s womb, the procedure he is offering, the risks
involved, and the alternatives open to her; he must then be prepared to answer
her questions however long it takes. An exception perhaps would be a
gynaecologist who wanted an abortion – in such a case it might be reasonable to
assume "informed consent".
We believe therefore that
it has been proved necessary to set out in the Act itself, not merely in
Regulations often not known to practitioners, both what is required and of
whom it is required.
3. Age of consent
It is our concern that the principal Act does not adequately
address some issues with respect to obtaining informed consent from a
minor. Section 5 of the principal Act
deals with mandatory informed consent.
Informed consent stands on three pillars: knowledge, appreciation and
consent. We therefore have the following
concerns regarding this section:
1.
it is highly doubtful that a minor
below the age of 16 (or even 18, for that matter) will be able to grasp the
knowledge of what risks a termination of pregnancy entails, not only the
termination itself, but also the long-term effects;
2.
even if a minor should be able to
grasp the knowledge, she most certainly does not have the maturity to
appreciate the long-term consequences of her action; and
3.
the ability of a minor to have a
termination without any parent or guardian's knowledge or consent has
medico-legal implications in cases where the minor's health is damaged, maybe
even irreparably, which implications are not addressed by the principal Act;
Suggestion
It is
suggested that Section 5 be rewritten to allow a minor to have a termination
only:
1.
after
two counseling sessions at least
seven days apart'
2.
which
counseling sessions include a visual
presentation of the termination and the gestational age of the foetus;
3.
which
counseling sessions shall be at least 20
minutes in duration each;
4.
which
counseling sessions shall reflect the latest scientific knowledge on the
effects of a termination of pregnancy; and
5.
with the permission of at least one adult, whether a relative or an
official, such as a judge or a hospital superintendent.
Rationale
Credible, scientific studies worldwide are finding
that the risks of psychological damage, substance abuse, homicide (mainly due
to risk-seeking behaviour) and suicide increase dramatically after a minor has
had a termination of pregnancy, compared to (1) the general population and (2)
those who had live births. This
information needs to be clearly spelled out to the minor seeking a termination,
in order for the consent to be fully informed and the practitioner being
protected from later medico-legal action.
It also highlights the importance of pre and post-termination
counselling. It is my wish that the Act
will be amended to further protect minors from taking an uninformed or poorly
informed decision.
4. Gestational Age
It is our concern that the principal Act allows for
terminations to take place quite late in pregnancy. With modern technology, babies born as young
as 21 weeks can be saved, which indicates their viability as human beings. Section 2 (c) (iii) allows for a termination
of pregnancy after the 20th week of gestation in cases where the
continued pregnancy "would pose a risk of injury to the foetus." This is an extraordinary contradiction, since
the paragraph implies that a termination of the pregnancy will not cause injury
to the foetus.
Suggestion
It is
suggested that Section 2 (c) (iii) be scrapped altogether.
Rationale
In the light of obstetric advances, the medically
expedient solution in such a case as envisaged by section 2 (c) (iii) would be
to evacuate the foetus from the womb via caesarean section, to prevent injury
from a continued pregnancy.
5. Conscientious Objection
Add the
following clause:
Save in a situation where it is necessary to act
immediately to save life, no person shall be under any duty, whether by
contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any
treatment authorized by the Principal Act or the Amendment Act (including any
treatment relating to surgical evacuation of the womb which may follow medical
treatment) to which he or she has a conscientious objection on the ground of
religion, conscience or belief, provided that the burden of proof of
conscientious objection shall rest on the person seeking to rely on it.
Why is this clause
proposed?
This clause is necessary
because so many thousands of health workers find themselves under pressure to
perform terminations of pregnancy contrary to their consciences and religious
beliefs. Ten years of TOP history has proved that the Constitution does not
provide sufficient protection for such persons without an express clause in the
CTOP legislation.
On June 22, 2007 the Labour
Court of Appeal (3 judges) handed down a judgement which stressed the need for
the Minister to provide certainty in this area of the law. (Charles and
others vs Gauteng Health Department and others).
NB: The above clause is based upon the
conscientious objection clause contained in the Abortion Act, 1967 in the
6. Keeping of Records
The following amendment of section 7(1) of the Principal Act is
recommended:
Section 7(1) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Act, 1996 is hereby amended by the addition of "or (c)" after "(b)"
in line three.
Why is this addition
proposed?
This clause is necessary
because the present law does not require any records to be kept of third
trimester abortions.
5. Offences and Penalties – Substitution of
section 10(1) of the Principal Act
The
following section is hereby substituted for section 10(1) of the Principal
Act.:
Any person who:
(a) terminates
a pregnancy otherwise than in accordance with the Principal Act, the Amendment
Act and this Act, or at a facility not approved in terms of the Acts, or
without ensuring that the requirements of the Acts relating to counselling and
informed consent have been complied with, shall be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10
years.
(b) wilfully
prevents a woman attending a facility approved for terminations of pregnancy,
or in any physical manner wilfully prevents the lawful termination of a
pregnancy shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or
to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years.
Why is this clause
necessary?
Sub-clause (1) makes it a criminal offence
for any person, including a doctor, to carry out an illegal abortion. Currently there is no prohibition against a
medical practitioner who carries out an abortion contrary to section 2(1) (a)
of the Principal Act. It also gives teeth to the requirements relating to
counselling and informed consent.
Sub-clause (2) clarifies
the current provision which some try to construe as applicable to health
workers who decline to do an abortion on the ground of conscientious objection.
The intention of Parliament was to
penalize demonstrators who blockade clinics and other forcible behaviour, not
those who have conscientious objection.
7. Obstruction / Referral
Concern
Section 10 (1) (c) states that any person who
"prevents the lawful termination of a pregnancy or obstructs access to a
facility for the termination of a pregnancy" is guilty of an offence. It is our understanding that this clause
addresses those who might forcibly prevent women from exercising their decision
to terminate a pregnancy. However, in
practice, this clause is often read (also by some legal experts) in such a way
that an obligation is placed on the
medical practitioner or registered midwife to perform a termination when so
requested.
Suggestion
It is suggested that the quoted Section 10 (1) (c) be replaced with:
"wilfully prevents
a woman attending a facility approved for terminations of pregnancy, or in any
physical manner wilfully prevents the lawful termination of a pregnancy …"
It is further recommended that a Conscientious Objection clause be
added to the Act, to further prevent any potential misunderstanding.
Rationale
The constitutional right to conscientious objection
should clearly be upheld by the Act, without thereby endangering the health of
the woman seeking an abortion.
9. Penalties and Offences
Concern
1.
Section 10 (1) (c) states that any
person who "prevents the lawful termination of a pregnancy or obstructs
access to a facility for the termination of a pregnancy" is guilty of an
offence. It is our understanding that
this clause addresses those who might forcibly prevent women from exercising
their decision to terminate a pregnancy.
However, in practice, this clause is often read (also by some legal
experts) in such a way that an obligation
is placed on the medical practitioner or registered midwife to perform a
termination when so requested.
2.
The Principal Act specifically does not
criminalise medical practitioners or registered midwives who act outside the
scope of the Act.
3.
Section 6 (1) (d) of the Amendment
Act criminalises the termination of a pregnancy at a facility other than those
designated in Section 2 of the Amendment Act.
However, the reality is that many medical practitioners are prescribing
misoprostol to induce a termination, whereafter the patient then has to attend
a clinic for a manual evacuation. In
such a case, would the termination be illegal in terms of Section 6 (1)
(d)? And if the patient inserts the
misoprostol tablets at home, is this regarded as illegal in terms of Section 6
(1) (d)?
4.
The widespread use of misoprostol to
induce a termination is a cause of great concern, for the following
reasons: (1) misoprostol is not
registered with the Medicines' Control Council (MCC) for such use and a medical
practitioner is thus medico-legally liable should anything go wrong; (2) in later stage of pregnancy, the woman
undergoing termination may bleed excessively before seeking an evacuation,
which could lead to severe harm or even death;
(3) in late pregnancy, termination by misoprostol may cause irreparable
damage to the cervix, leading to inability to maintain a pregnancy.
Suggestion
1.
It is suggested that the quoted Section 10 (1) (c)
be replaced with: "wilfully
prevents a woman attending a facility approved for terminations of pregnancy,
or in any physical manner wilfully prevents the lawful termination of a
pregnancy …" It is further recommended that a
Conscientious Objection clause be added to the Act, to further prevent any
potential misunderstanding.
2.
Though Section 2 of the Amendment Act partially
addresses the problem of medical practitioners, registered midwives or trained
nurses who trespass the Act, it is not sufficient. A clause specifically criminalizing illegal
activity by these parties (such as performing a termination contrary to or
outside of the stipulations contemplated in Section 2 (1) of the principal
Act).
3.
Section 6 (1) (d) of the Amendment
Act should specifically state that a termination shall be deemed to have been
initiated at the moment when medication
is administered with the intention of causing the termination of a pregnancy.
4.
The use of drugs not registered to
induce a termination should be expressly prohibited, especially after 12 weeks
gestation. Not doing so leaves the door
wide open for abuse by unscrupulous practitioners, at the expense of and to the
detriment of the woman seeking a termination.
Rationale
1.
The constitutional right to
conscientious objection should be clearly upheld by the Act, without thereby
endangering the health of the woman seeking an abortion.
2.
The present silence in both Acts
regarding illegal activity by medical practitioners, registered midwives and
suitably trained nurses, leaves the door open to abuse by such parties, for
personal gain.
3.
If the place where a termination is
deemed to have taken place is not clearly defined, Section 2 of the Amendment
Act is largely an academic exercise and the widespread abuse of misoprostol
will continue in unauthorised venues.
4.
A dangerous precedent with
far-reaching legal implications is being created if it is allowed situ-situ that medications are used
outside their field of registration, especially if the person using these
medications does not have the capacity to handle the effects or side-effects of
the medication.
Addendum 1: http://www.afterabortion.info/news/Fergusson.htm
Abortion Causes Mental Disorders:
Pro-Choice Researcher Says Some Journals
Rejected Politically Volatile Findings
Springfield, IL (Feb. 9,
2005) -- A study in New Zealand that tracked approximately 500 women from birth
to 25 years of age has confirmed that young women who have abortions
subsequently experience elevated rates of suicidal behaviors, depression,
substance abuse, anxiety, and other mental problems.
Most significantly, the
researchers – led by Professor David M. Fergusson, who is the director of the
longitudinal Christchurch Health and Development Study – found that the
higher rate of subsequent mental problems could not be explained by any pre-pregnancy
differences in mental health, which had been regularly evaluated over the
course of the 25-year study.
Findings Surprise Pro-Choice Researchers
According to Fergusson, the
researchers had undertaken the study anticipating that they would be able to
confirm the view that any problems found after abortion would be traceable to
mental health problems that had existed before the abortion. At first
glance, it appeared that their data would confirm this hypothesis. The
data showed that women who became pregnant before age 25 were more likely to
have experienced family dysfunction and adjustment problems, were more likely
to have left home at a young age, and were more likely to have entered a
cohabiting relationship.
However, when these and
many other factors were taken into account, the findings showed that women who
had abortions were still significantly more likely to experience mental health
problems. Thus, the data contradicted the hypothesis that prior mental
illness or other “pre-disposing” factors could explain the differences.
“We know what people were
like before they became pregnant,” Fergusson told The
The data persistently
pointed toward the politically unwelcome conclusion that abortion may itself be
the cause of subsequent mental health problems. So Fergusson presented
his results to
Despite his own pro-choice
political beliefs, Fergusson responded to the committee with a letter stating
that it would be “scientifically irresponsible” to suppress the findings simply
because they touched on an explosive political issue.
In an interview about the
findings with an Australian radio host, Fergusson stated: “I remain pro-choice.
I am not religious. I am an atheist and a rationalist. The findings did
surprise me, but the results appear to be very robust because they persist
across a series of disorders and a series of ages. . . . Abortion is a
traumatic life event; that is, it involves loss, it involves grief, it involves
difficulties. And the trauma may, in fact, predispose people to having mental
illness.”
Journals
Reject the Politically Incorrect Results
The research team of the
Christchurch Health and Development Study is used to having its studies on
health and human development accepted by the top medical journals on first
submission. After all, the collection of data from birth to adulthood of
1,265 children born in
Although he still holds a
pro-choice view, Fergusson believes women and doctors should not blindly accept
the unsupported claim that abortion is generally harmless or beneficial to
women. He appears particularly upset by the false assurances of
abortion’s safety given by the American Psychological Association (APA).
In a 2005 statement, the
APA claimed that “well-designed studies” have found that “the risk
of psychological harm is low.” In the discussion of their results,
Fergusson and his team note that the APA’s position paper ignored many key
studies showing evidence of abortion’s harm and looked only at a selective
sample of studies that have serious methodological flaws.
Fergusson told reporters
that “it verges on scandalous that a surgical procedure that is performed on
over one in 10 women has been so poorly researched and evaluated, given the
debates about the psychological consequences of abortion.”
Following Fergusson’s
complaints about the selective and misleading nature of the 2005 APA statement,
the APA removed the page from their Internet site. The statement can
still be found through a web
archive service, however.
Study May Have Profound Influence on Medicine, Law,
and Politics
The reaction to the
publication of the
The impact of the study in
other countries may be even more profound. According to The New Zealand
Herald, the
Doctors performing
abortions in
According to researcher Dr.
David Reardon, who has published more than a dozen studies investigating
abortion’s impact on women, Fergusson’s study reinforces a growing body of
literature showing that doctors in
“Fergusson’s study
underscores that fact that evidence-based medicine does not support the
conjecture that abortion will protect women from ‘serious danger’ to their
mental health,” said Reardon. “Instead, the best evidence indicates that
abortion is more likely to increase the risk of mental health problems.
Physicians who ignore this study may no longer be able to argue that they are
acting in good faith and may therefore be in violation of the law.”
“Record-based studies in Finland and
the United States
have conclusively proven that the risk of women dying in the year following an
abortion is significantly higher than the risk of death if the pregnancy is
allowed to continue to term,” said Reardon, who directs the Elliot Institute, a
research organization based in
But Reardon now believes
that alternative for recommending abortion no longer passes scientific muster,
either.
“This New Zealand study,
with its unsurpassed controls for possible alternative explanations, confirms
the findings of several recent studies linking abortion to higher rates of psychiatric
hospitalization. depression, generalized anxiety
disorder, substance abuse, suicidal tendencies,
poor bonding with
and parenting of later children, and sleep disorders,” he
said. “It should inevitably lead to a change in the standard of care
offered to women facing problem pregnancies.”
Some Women May Be At Greater Risk
Reardon, a biomedical
ethicist, is an advocate of “evidence-based medicine”—a movement in medical
training that encourages the questioning of “routine, accepted practices” which
have not been proven to be helpful in scientific trials. If one uses the
standards applied in evidence-based medicine, Reardon says, one can only
conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the view that abortion
is generally beneficial to women. Instead, the opposite appears to be
more likely.
“It is true that the
practice of medicine is both an art and a science,” Reardon said. “But given
the current research, doctors who do an abortion in the hope that it will
produce more good than harm for an individual woman can only justify their
decisions by reference to the art of medicine, not the science.”
According to Reardon, the
best available medical evidence shows that it is easier for a woman to adjust
to the birth of an unintended child than it is to adjust to the emotional
turmoil caused by an abortion.
“We are social beings, so
it is easier for people to adjust to having a new relationship in one’s life
than to adjust to the loss of a relationship,” he said. “In the context
of abortion, adjusting to the loss is especially difficult if there any
unresolved feelings of attachment, grief, or guilt.”
By using known risk factors,
the women who are at greatest risk of severe reactions to abortion could be
easily identified, according to Reardon. If this were done, some women
who are at highest risk of negative reactions might opt for childbirth instead
of abortion.
In a recent article
published in The
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Reardon identified
approximately 35 studies that had identified statistically validated risk
factors that most reliably predict which women are most likely to report
negative reactions.
“Risk factors for
maladjustment were first identified in a 1973 study published by Planned
Parenthood,” Reardon said. “Since that time, numerous other researchers
have further advanced our knowledge of the risk factors which should be used to
screen women at highest risk. These researchers have routinely
recommended that the risk factors should be used by doctors to identify women
who would benefit from more counseling, either so they can avoid
contraindicated abortions or so they can receive better follow up care to help
treat negative reactions.”
Feeling pressured by others
to consent to the abortion, having moral beliefs that abortion is wrong, or
having already developed a strong maternal attachment to the baby are three of
the most common risk factors, Reardon says.
While screening makes
sense, Reardon says that in practice, screening for risk factors is rare for
two reasons.
“First, there are
aberrations in the law that shields abortion providers from any liability for
emotional complications following an abortion,” he said. “This loophole
means that abortion clinics can save time and money by substituting
one-size-fits-all counseling for individualized screening.
“The second obstacle in the
way of screening is ideological. Many abortion providers insist that it is not
their job to try to figure out whether an abortion is more likely to hurt
than help a particular woman. They see their role as to ensure that any woman
who wants an abortion is provided one.”
“This ‘buyer beware’
mentality is actually inconsistent with medical ethics,” Reardon said.
“Actually, the ethic governing most abortion providers’ services is no
different than that of the abortionists: ‘If you have the money, we’ll do the
abortion.’ Women deserve better. They deserve to have doctors who
act like doctors. That means doctors who will give good medical advice based on
the best available evidence as applied to each patient’s individual risk
profile.”
Fergusson also believes
that the same rules that apply to other medical treatments should apply to
abortion. “If we were talking about an antibiotic or an asthma risk, and
someone reported adverse reactions, people would be advocating further research
to evaluate risk,” he said in the New Zealand Herald. “I can see no good
reason why the same rules don't apply to abortion.”
# # #
Sources:
David M. Fergusson, L. John
Horwood, and Elizabeth M. Ridder, “Abortion
in young women and subsequent mental health,” Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry 47(1): 16-24, 2006.
Nick
Grimm “Higher risk
of mental health problems after abortion: report” Australian Broadcasting
Corporation. 03/01/2006 http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1541543.htm
Ruth Hill, “Abortion
Researcher Confounded by Study” New Zealand Herald 1/5/06, http://www.nzherald.co.nz
APA
Briefing Paper on The Impact of Abortion on Women, http://web.archive.org
of http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/womenabortfacts.html
[1] See Minister of Health’s Directive in terms of section 2 of the National Policy for Health Act 116 of 1990 which defines “informed consent”, "pre-test counseling" and "post-test-counseling". Six different matters are specified as mandatory topics for pre-test counseling discussions.
[2] Christian Lawyers Association vs Minister of Health (no 2) 2005 1 SA 509