COMMENTS
FROM THE HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL (HSRC) ON THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS BUDGET VOTE FOR 2007/8.
Honourable members,
Thank you for inviting the HSRC to take part in this commentary process
on the DFA budget. We do have a series of ties with the department including
both projects and workshops and we do consider ourselves stakeholders and
partners in the foreign policy process.
The feedback I present today is the result of a workshop we held at the
HSRC’s democracy and governance research programme yesterday and is a summary
of different ideas and views from a range of scholars. It does not reflect the
consensual position of the HSRC or even of the D&G programme, but hopes to
highlight issues and suggest areas of engagement. As this presentation contains
a variety of views, I may not be able personally to further elucidate on some
of these issues. If you would like further discussion or details, I would be
happy to arrange further interaction with the specialist in question.
This presentation has less to do with critiquing line items in the DFA
budget than engaging with underlying principles or emphases within it. Here are
the handful of points we at D&G would like to make.
- GENERAL
Expansionary
budget capturing ambitious plans and vision for the DFA and its representatives
– rapidly increasing number of missions, high level of spending on
infrastructure (property, technology), considerably above inflation increase in
budget allocation over the MTEF period underpinning the expectation of a
growing role for SA, in Africa and globally.
The race for
energy resources in Africa could be
destructive for development in Africa. The DFA
needs to play a role in caucusing an African response to this race and its
consequences.
- CAPACITY
But do we have the capacity to match
these high expectations?
The budget indicates plans for the
expansion of the Foreign Affairs Institute, for the hiring of unemployed
graduates and also for a partnership with Unisa, but we are concerned not with
the scope of the DFA’s planned engagement but with the depth, and in particular
with the internal skills levels and reserves that must feed such an
expansionary agenda.
We understand that while DFA is
recruiting that retention is a problem, are unsure as to whether we are gaining
sufficient language skills.
Do we have sufficiently skilled
diplomats to manage all the new embassies and to sustain the old ones?
Three levels of capacity for the DFA to execute its goals:
1 – Policy research and analysis: is it sufficient to be a clearing
house and not to be generating policy? Good work in terms of conferences and
workshops, but do the SA embassies have the skills to collect and analyse the
data that is essential to guide SA foreign policy?
2 – Foreign Affairs Institute: Is the next generation of diplomats with
the requisite technical, linguistic and economic skills being fast-tracked
rapidly enough?
3 – Presidential Advisory Unit: are the resources sufficient and the
personnel skilled enough for this important unit to do its job adequately?
- PRINCIPLES
(p30 of the Budget Vote)
- We do
agree with and support each of the six principles outlined as the
lodestone of current South African policy, but with one caveat:
- We
find an engagement with Asia and
in particular the building of a global South identity with countries like
Brazil and India does
not form part of the DFA’s guiding principles. It is clear that China,
through its trade policy for instance, is engaging with us (and indeed
with Africa)
actively on virtually a daily basis; with no internal emphasis on Asia, the
formulation of an adequate and informed response becomes difficult. Other
than Africa,
there is no acknowledgement of regional dynamics or partnerships.
- While
it is true we can’t spend unlimited amounts on all regions and do need
priorities, it is noticeable (on p36 of the budget vote) that Asia and Australasia are
the poor cousins of our foreign relations expenditure both in bilateral
relations management and in diplomatic representation. We have to wonder
whether that has more to do with the vision of SA’s role rather than the
realities that are evident in our trade relations and in our economy.
- UNITED
NATIONS
- great
source of pride that SA now serves on the security council of the UN and
continues to grow in stature in the international community, however this
exposure to high-level global politics is a double-edged sword or a mixed
blessing:
- Serving
on the security council affects extent to which SA can be hands-on in its
approach to Africa.
Excludes SA from being a primary mediator in African conflicts.
- Membership
of the Security Council should provide the opportunity to embolden the
African agenda and provide stimulus to continental priorities and
objectives. But it is also a great distraction. It allows energy and
resources to be drawn away from Africa
(understand our mission in Ethiopia was
scaled down to provide the extra personnel for an expanded UN mission -
two Ambassadors). It also requires a high level of knowledge on a wide
variety of global matters. The Middle East is
important, but how much impact can SA have on this area? Are the
resources our team require to engage with the middle east not better
marshaled elsewhere on topics on which SA has a more natural authority
(such as Africa)? There is a suggestion we might pare down our interests
to our own African agenda.
- NEPAD
AND THE AU
The African Union is well elaborated
within the budget and various principles and activities are clearly marked and
apparently well-funded. But Nepad, which is meant to be the overarching
framework has been underemphasized within the budget and in policy. This is
partly due to the current process of national implementation strategy
formulation and the withdrawal of SA from leadership of Nepad. We believe this
de-linking of Nepad and AU is not in the best interests of the continent.
Emphasising the AU directs resources toward peace-diplomacy and away from
economic-diplomacy. While peace and stability is of course critical, the
long-term sustainable future of the continent demands economic development. We
should therefore not delink the AU and Nepad. Our energies must go toward
revitalizing Nepad and clarifying its developmental agenda. It’s time to
revisit Nepad’s goals and adjust accordingly. An aspect of this may be giving
the African Renaissance Fund, the main tool of the DFA’s engagement in Africa, more of an
economic as well as a socio-economic focus. Peacekeeping and election support
are naturally important, but so is reconstruction and the revitalization of
strong African economies.
The ARF Act allows SA to mobilize
other institutions and funds to increase the significance of the fund’s
intervention. Not sure this is being done adequately. ARF should be used more
to build and support institutions of democracy.
With such an important range of
functions, and as the DFA’s only legitimate tool, it is argued that ARF should
be considerably strengthened.
On peacekeeping, further issues of
capacity are evident, though not from the budget. These include the training of
troops and of pilots. We have generally done a good job of peacekeeping, but
capacity also needs to be built on the continent.
The department is overstretched in
terms of peace and support operations. The Dept might
want to consider downsizing the number of countries where it is actively
involved. Do not think there is any need for peace keeping troops in Eritrea
and Ethiopia.
What is needed here is to support negotiations leading to a common
understanding between the two countries. The situation in northern Mali
is not a major threat and does not require the deployment of SANDF. A small
Ecowas force could do the job there cheaply and SA could simply help when it
comes to picking up the tab.
African reconstruction:
Countries like Botswana,
Namibia
and Nigeria
have got resources and can afford to fund their own hr and technical
development projects. where they require technical secondment from SA. they can
pay for that themselves. Zambia probably
needs some help acquiring modern technology, but has more than enough skilled human
resources and the Dept needs to develop more cost-effective ways of transferring skills to the Zambians.
The more deserving case here is Mozambique.
- CIVIL
SOCIETY
- It is
exactly the kind of input from SANCO that we have just heard in which the
voice of the local is taken up to shape global objectives, that allows
the positive harnessing of the process of globalisation. We would call
for more of such interaction with a broader range of civil society
organisations.
- Should
be more engagement required with private organizations already devoted to
same objectives as the DFA, such as the Nelson Mandela Foundation
- The
budget suggests the DFA is not serious about building more durable
partnerships with civil society; also has implications for DFA capacity
and budget.
- EFFICIENCIES
& RISKS
- One of
difficulties of looking at line-items on a budget is that it is
impossible to judge whether the money is being spent well.
- Would
like a clearer sense that the DFA is constantly working to improve
efficiencies in the department, that spending procedures and policies are
being revisited and revised and that funds are being efficiently
utilized.
- Entertainment
budget of R40-million. Efficient? Necessary?
- The
medium term framework for the DFA budget assumes gradual depreciation of
the rand over the next 5 years. This would seem to entail a large degree
of risk: will the Rand
exchange rate gradually depreciate at the rate suggested? What if it
depreciates rapidly or even catastrophically? Will this derail the
expansionary ambitions of the department? What if the rand appreciates
rapidly? We wonder whether the department has sufficiently considered
these scenarios, whether it has discussed hedging its capex with the dept
of finance and how it manages exchange control risk.
Adrian Hadland, Chief Research Specialist, Democracy and Governance
Research Programme, HSRC
([email protected])