COMMENTS FROM THE HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL (HSRC) ON THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET VOTE FOR 2007/8.

 

Honourable members,

 

Thank you for inviting the HSRC to take part in this commentary process on the DFA budget. We do have a series of ties with the department including both projects and workshops and we do consider ourselves stakeholders and partners in the foreign policy process.

 

The feedback I present today is the result of a workshop we held at the HSRC’s democracy and governance research programme yesterday and is a summary of different ideas and views from a range of scholars. It does not reflect the consensual position of the HSRC or even of the D&G programme, but hopes to highlight issues and suggest areas of engagement. As this presentation contains a variety of views, I may not be able personally to further elucidate on some of these issues. If you would like further discussion or details, I would be happy to arrange further interaction with the specialist in question.

 

This presentation has less to do with critiquing line items in the DFA budget than engaging with underlying principles or emphases within it. Here are the handful of points we at D&G would like to make.

 

  1. GENERAL

Expansionary budget capturing ambitious plans and vision for the DFA and its representatives – rapidly increasing number of missions, high level of spending on infrastructure (property, technology), considerably above inflation increase in budget allocation over the MTEF period underpinning the expectation of a growing role for SA, in Africa and globally.

 

The race for energy resources in Africa could be destructive for development in Africa. The DFA needs to play a role in caucusing an African response to this race and its consequences.

 

  1. CAPACITY

But do we have the capacity to match these high expectations?

The budget indicates plans for the expansion of the Foreign Affairs Institute, for the hiring of unemployed graduates and also for a partnership with Unisa, but we are concerned not with the scope of the DFA’s planned engagement but with the depth, and in particular with the internal skills levels and reserves that must feed such an expansionary agenda.

We understand that while DFA is recruiting that retention is a problem, are unsure as to whether we are gaining sufficient language skills.

Do we have sufficiently skilled diplomats to manage all the new embassies and to sustain the old ones?

 

Three levels of capacity for the DFA to execute its goals:

 

1 – Policy research and analysis: is it sufficient to be a clearing house and not to be generating policy? Good work in terms of conferences and workshops, but do the SA embassies have the skills to collect and analyse the data that is essential to guide SA foreign policy?

 

2 – Foreign Affairs Institute: Is the next generation of diplomats with the requisite technical, linguistic and economic skills being fast-tracked rapidly enough?

 

3 – Presidential Advisory Unit: are the resources sufficient and the personnel skilled enough for this important unit to do its job adequately?

 

  1. PRINCIPLES (p30 of the Budget Vote)

 

    • We do agree with and support each of the six principles outlined as the lodestone of current South African policy, but with one caveat:
    • We find an engagement with Asia and in particular the building of a global South identity with countries like Brazil and India does not form part of the DFA’s guiding principles. It is clear that China, through its trade policy for instance, is engaging with us (and indeed with Africa) actively on virtually a daily basis; with no internal emphasis on Asia, the formulation of an adequate and informed response becomes difficult. Other than Africa, there is no acknowledgement of regional dynamics or partnerships.
    • While it is true we can’t spend unlimited amounts on all regions and do need priorities, it is noticeable (on p36 of the budget vote) that Asia and Australasia are the poor cousins of our foreign relations expenditure both in bilateral relations management and in diplomatic representation. We have to wonder whether that has more to do with the vision of SA’s role rather than the realities that are evident in our trade relations and in our economy.

 

 

  1. UNITED NATIONS

 

    • great source of pride that SA now serves on the security council of the UN and continues to grow in stature in the international community, however this exposure to high-level global politics is a double-edged sword or a mixed blessing:
    • Serving on the security council affects extent to which SA can be hands-on in its approach to Africa. Excludes SA from being a primary mediator in African conflicts.
    • Membership of the Security Council should provide the opportunity to embolden the African agenda and provide stimulus to continental priorities and objectives. But it is also a great distraction. It allows energy and resources to be drawn away from Africa (understand our mission in Ethiopia was scaled down to provide the extra personnel for an expanded UN mission - two Ambassadors). It also requires a high level of knowledge on a wide variety of global matters. The Middle East is important, but how much impact can SA have on this area? Are the resources our team require to engage with the middle east not better marshaled elsewhere on topics on which SA has a more natural authority (such as Africa)? There is a suggestion we might pare down our interests to our own African agenda.

 

 

  1. NEPAD AND THE AU

 

The African Union is well elaborated within the budget and various principles and activities are clearly marked and apparently well-funded. But Nepad, which is meant to be the overarching framework has been underemphasized within the budget and in policy. This is partly due to the current process of national implementation strategy formulation and the withdrawal of SA from leadership of Nepad. We believe this de-linking of Nepad and AU is not in the best interests of the continent. Emphasising the AU directs resources toward peace-diplomacy and away from economic-diplomacy. While peace and stability is of course critical, the long-term sustainable future of the continent demands economic development. We should therefore not delink the AU and Nepad. Our energies must go toward revitalizing Nepad and clarifying its developmental agenda. It’s time to revisit Nepad’s goals and adjust accordingly. An aspect of this may be giving the African Renaissance Fund, the main tool of the DFA’s engagement in Africa, more of an economic as well as a socio-economic focus. Peacekeeping and election support are naturally important, but so is reconstruction and the revitalization of strong African economies.

 

The ARF Act allows SA to mobilize other institutions and funds to increase the significance of the fund’s intervention. Not sure this is being done adequately. ARF should be used more to build and support institutions of democracy.

 

With such an important range of functions, and as the DFA’s only legitimate tool, it is argued that ARF should be considerably strengthened.

 

On peacekeeping, further issues of capacity are evident, though not from the budget. These include the training of troops and of pilots. We have generally done a good job of peacekeeping, but capacity also needs to be built on the continent.

 

The department is overstretched in terms of peace and support operations. The Dept might want to consider downsizing the number of countries where it is actively involved. Do not think there is any need for peace keeping troops in Eritrea and Ethiopia. What is needed here is to support negotiations leading to a common understanding between the two countries. The situation in northern Mali is not a major threat and does not require the deployment of SANDF. A small Ecowas force could do the job there cheaply and SA could simply help when it comes to  picking up the tab.

 

African reconstruction: Countries like Botswana, Namibia and Nigeria have got resources and can afford to fund their own hr and technical development projects. where they require technical secondment from SA. they can pay for that themselves.  Zambia probably needs some help acquiring modern technology, but has more than enough skilled human resources and the Dept needs to develop more cost-effective  ways of transferring skills to the Zambians. The more deserving case here is Mozambique.

 

  1. CIVIL SOCIETY

 

    • It is exactly the kind of input from SANCO that we have just heard in which the voice of the local is taken up to shape global objectives, that allows the positive harnessing of the process of globalisation. We would call for more of such interaction with a broader range of civil society organisations.
    • Should be more engagement required with private organizations already devoted to same objectives as the DFA, such as the Nelson Mandela Foundation
    • The budget suggests the DFA is not serious about building more durable partnerships with civil society; also has implications for DFA capacity and budget.

 

  1. EFFICIENCIES & RISKS

 

    • One of difficulties of looking at line-items on a budget is that it is impossible to judge whether the money is being spent well.
    • Would like a clearer sense that the DFA is constantly working to improve efficiencies in the department, that spending procedures and policies are being revisited and revised and that funds are being efficiently utilized.
    • Entertainment budget of R40-million. Efficient? Necessary?
    • The medium term framework for the DFA budget assumes gradual depreciation of the rand over the next 5 years. This would seem to entail a large degree of risk: will the Rand exchange rate gradually depreciate at the rate suggested? What if it depreciates rapidly or even catastrophically? Will this derail the expansionary ambitions of the department? What if the rand appreciates rapidly? We wonder whether the department has sufficiently considered these scenarios, whether it has discussed hedging its capex with the dept of finance and how it manages exchange control risk.

 

 

 

Adrian Hadland, Chief Research Specialist, Democracy and Governance Research Programme, HSRC

([email protected])