DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT IMMOVABLE ASSETS BILL

 

Thank you for your invitation to comment on the abovementioned bill. Below are our written comments. We would be willing to attend the hearings if you so wish.

 

General Comments

A.      The bill is to be welcomed. Service delivery in South Africa has clearly been suffering from a lack of attention to operations and maintenance of state-owned assets. In recent years there have been interesting developments in the “science” of asset management, not only in buildings but also in engineering infrastructure. We would do well to adopt a systematic approach to this, which the bill is designed to encourage.

B.      Having said that, and bearing in mind the enormous range of assets (eg land, buildings, airfields, dams, pipes, treatment works, roads etc), and range of capabilities of state entities, we would caution that the requirements should be introduced with care in order to encourage their adoption out of conviction rather than under compulsion. We acknowledge that this is implied in the accompanying memorandum on the objects of the bill where Clause 1.4 refers to lessons learned from the incremental implementation of the CIDB Act. We trust that this will happen.

C.      In particular, when the Minister promulgates guidelines (Cl.19.(1)(b)), issues standards (Cl.19.(1)(c)), and prescribes minimum standards (Cl.19.(2)) we urge the Minister to begin with simple approaches where appropriate. These can and should vary according to the type, size and capacity of custodians and users, and the complexity and value of the assets concerned, and could be modified over time. We note that making regulations (Cl.20) will be subject to a consultation process. While not a legal requirement, we hope that other key items such as guidelines and standards will also be compiled in consultation with stakeholders and industry players, especially since such guidelines are given considerable weight in Cl. 10.(b).

D.      We would point out that a similar process would be desirable to guide municipalities in the management of their assets, including municipal infrastructure. It is important that the current bill, and publications authorized by it, do not create a precedent that is inappropriate for the municipal sphere. Detailed consultations with Treasury, dplg and DWAF would be desirable in this regard. If it is intended that a similar approach be used for other state entities (eg SANRAL, ACSA etc) at some point in the future, then the same point applies – exercise care and increase consultation to avoid inappropriate precedents.

E.      We note that the Minister may implement programmes to give effect to this. We would commend this and suggest a substantial budget for the Department of Public Works to assist custodians and users, starting with those responsible for our most critical assets.

 

Detailed comments

The following comments have been generated from an understanding of asset management but with somewhat less understanding of the dynamics between different state entities vis á vis custodian and user.

1.             Cl. 2 – we note that the bill applies to national and provincial departments but excludes public entities. Presumably this means that provincial roads are in, and national roads administered by SANRAL (South African National Roads Agency Limited) are out, unless the Dept of Transport is the custodian and SANRAL the user. If that is so, then should there be more clarity on this? Or is SANRAL not seen as a user in terms of the definition in line 45? The same argument could apply to ACSA (Airports Company of South Africa) and the airports – which entity actually owns the airports? What will happen when all the dams and canals are transferred from DWAF to the proposed NWRA (National Water Resources Agency) sometime in the near future?

2.             Cl. 4.(2)(c) and 4.(3)(a) – should there be a requirement for users and custodians to enter into an agreement, whether it be a Service Level Agreement (for delivering a service one to another), or a simple delineation of responsibilities? It seems odd to make the custodian “liable for any action” with no apparent recourse or delegation of responsibility to the user.

3.             Cl. 5.(1)(f)(iii) – is it wise to put matters of policy (government’s socio-economic objectives), which might change over time, in legislation? In particular one can foresee the term “distribution of wealth” being subject to abuse.

4.             The central features of the bill, Clauses 6 to 13, appear to raise a number of questions, particularly in terms of who does what, between the custodian and the user. It is suggested that in most instances it is the user of the asset who is best situated to understand the maintenance requirements and costs, and yet the custodian appears to have that responsibility and must take the lead in determining requirements. Most of the following comments derive from this point.

5.             Cl. 6.(1)(b) – “a user must prepare or cause to be prepared”. Why is the underlined clause included in 6.(b) and not in 6.(a)? We suggest it can be in both, or omitted in both as it can be regarded as implied.

6.             Cl. 7 and Cl. 8 – at first glance some of the sub-clauses appear misplaced. Much of Cl. 7, apart from (a) and (f) relating to portfolio management, appear to be better undertaken by the user, while Cl. 8 (b) and (d) relating to acquisition and disposal, appear to be part of the custodian’s role in portfolio management. (See also comment on Cl. 13.(2).)

7.             Cl. 11 – “A user must give effect…” draws attention to the user’s need for resources to carry out the functions in the plan. This reinforces the desirability of an incremental phasing-in with due regard to the capacity of the wide range of users.

8.             Cl. 12.(1)(a) – this highlights another apparent mismatch on who does the costing. It seems that a user is told of his budget allocation which has been determined on the basis of activities and costs prepared by the custodian in Cl. 7.(e) and Cl. 13.(d)(v)&(vi).

9.             Cl. 13.(2) – on the same point, it is suggested that in many instances the user of an asset will have information on its maintenance needs and costs thereof, and a vested interest in quality maintenance, and so the user may assist the custodian rather than the other way round.

10.         Cl. 13.(3) – it seems odd that there is nothing in this clause on disposal of assets about consulting with, or with the concurrence of, the user. How is a “surplus immovable asset” defined? It appears that the custodian’s decision is final, as implied in Cl. 14.(2) in which the user “must surrender” the asset apparently without recourse to any procedure.

11.         Cl. 14.(1) – we suggest the first part should read: “The accounting officer of a user or custodian who is also a user must, …” (Underlined words added.)

12.         Cl. 14.(1)(e) – we see that both users and custodians (Cl. 13(1)(e) is identical wording) must establish performance measuring systems. Must they both do it? In the event of a conflict whose takes precedence?

13.         Cl. 14.(2) – we commented above on the lack of rights of a user being required to surrender an asset. We ask the question: what if the user has carefully maintained an asset at his own expense and is then called upon to surrender it; does he do so without compensation? Should there be a procedure for this?

14.         Cl. 15. – Since the Minister may grant exemptions, is there a process for requesting them?

15.         Cl. 16 – our general D above applies; the Minister must exercise caution to avoid precedents for the local sphere of government and state entities which are not government departments.

16.         Cl. 17.(3)(b) – any authority to carry out sub-delegation should include a requirement to inform the accounting officer.

17.         Cl. 17.(4) – should the power to revoke a decision by a sub-delegated authority be constrained by a time period, or an administrative process? Any use of this clause without due process might induce uncertainties about such delegated decisions, eg the letting of contracts, with negative effects on service delivery.

18.         Cl. 18.(1) – whereas Cl. 2 confines this bill to government departments, can the Minister (etc), in terms of this clause, assign powers to a public entity such as SANRAL or NWRA? If so, can the NWRA then sub-delegate powers to a Catchment Management Agency set up by DWAF?

19.         Cl. 19.(1)(a) – “the Minister may … designate an organ of state as a custodian…” is this a unilateral action? Could this be a means by which the DPW divests itself of responsibility for many assets? It may be with the best of intentions – devolving responsibility to those closest to the problem – but it can only be done with adequate consultation, preparation and the possibility of extra budgetary provision. We note that DWAF has been in the process of transferring rural water schemes to municipalities for some time. This has been delayed by municipalities’ reluctance to accept poorly maintained assets which require massive ongoing subsidies to operate. In some instances DWAF has now agreed to finance large amounts of refurbishment before transfer takes place. At the very least, this sub-clause should include “in consultation with the designated organ of state.”  

20.         Cl. 19.(1)(c)(i) – “minimum requirements in relation to cost and space” may be useful for buildings but not so for roads, dams and canals. Does this need a broader more inclusive definition, such as “cost per unit of the relevant asset”?

21.         Schedule on page 10 – we can find no reference to this or the role of land in the text of the bill although it appears to be an important type of asset which may need specialized attention.

 

 

We trust that you find the above comments useful. If you need further information, please contact Glynn Davies (011 313 3167) or Barry Jackson (011 313 3686).

 

Yours sincerely,

 

B.M. Jackson

Principal Policy Analyst

Development Bank of Southern Africa