The
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development (Portfolio
Committee) and the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs
(Select Committee) having jointly held hearings to consider the implications of
the proposed new salary scales for the magistracy, in particular the
introduction of a new motor vehicle allowance for magistrates and senior
magistrates, as recommended in Notice 46 of 2005 in the Government Gazette
of 24 August 2005, and tabled in the House on 7 September 2005, report as
follows:
A. INTRODUCTION
1. On 18 October 2005, the Portfolio Committee
together with the Select Committee convened hearings with representatives from
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ), National
Treasury (Treasury) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to discuss and
consider the implications of the proposed new salary scales for magistrates, as
recommended by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Office Bearers
(The Commission). The Commission was
asked to submit a written account of the factors, issues and conclusions
arrived at, that gave rise to the salary proposals, in particular, the proposed
new motor vehicle allowances for magistrates and senior magistrates. The submissions of the institutions that
appeared before the Committees, as well as the written submission of the
Commission, are available for perusal in the office of the Committee Secretary.
All documents sourced by the Committees are similarly available (marked
Annexures 05 Mag Rem 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,12,13,14, 15, 16).
2. The aim of the hearings was three-fold. Firstly, to inquire into the details of the
proposed implementation plan and its consequences for government, in particular
the availability of a budgetary allocation of approximately R 157 million to
defray the cost of such proposed allowance.
Secondly, to determine the effects and implications of the proposed new
salary scales for magistrates and senior magistrates in relation to the broader
issue of disparate salaries for similarly qualified lawyers within the criminal
justice system in particular, as well as within the public sector as a whole, including relevant Chapter 9 bodies. Thirdly, to identify problems that currently
pertain in the implementation of the procedure for the determination of the
remuneration of magistrates by the Commission, in an effort to make
recommendations on steps needed to be taken at all levels to ensure that the
process will in future take place in accordance with the legislation governing
it.
B. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
1. Prior to 1995, magistrates formed part of the
public service and as such their salaries were determined through the
collective bargaining process applicable to members of the public service. From 1995, they were de-linked from the
collective bargaining process and together with judges the Minister for Justice
and Constitutional Development (the Minister) determined their salary increases
after consultation with the Minister of Finance.
In 2003, the
Judicial Officers Amendment Act (Act No 28 of 2003), was enacted as part of an
ongoing process of judicial reform aimed, inter alia, at strengthening judicial
independence in our young democracy. The
Act amended the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public
Office-Bearers Act (Act No 92 of 1997) (the Commission Act), so as to extend
the definition of “office-bearer” to include judges and magistrates and to make
further consequential amendments. The
Act further amended the Magistrates Act (Act No 90 of 1993) (the Magistrates
Act) to provide for this new system to regulate the remuneration determination
for magistrates. The new system for the
regulation of the remuneration of magistrates was aimed at ensuring that
magistrates do not participate in activities associated with the collective
bargaining system and as such gives effect to the views expressed by the
Constitutional Court in the Van Rooyen judgment, where the
Court held as follows:[1]
“Judicial officers ought not to
be put in a position of having to … engage in negotiations with the executive
over their salaries. They are judicial
officers, not employees, and cannot and should not resort to industrial action
to advance their interests in their conditions of service. That makes them vulnerable to having less
attention paid to their legitimate concerns in relation to such matters, than
others who can advance their interests through normal bargaining processes open
to them”.
2. When
determining the remuneration of magistrates, the procedures set out in section
12 of the Magistrates Act must be read together with the provisions of the
Commission Act that governs the composition and functioning of the
Commission. The procedures that must be
followed in determining the remuneration of magistrates can briefly be
summarised into the following steps:
·
The Commission must in order to
investigate and consider the remuneration of magistrates consult with the
Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Chief Justice or a person designated
by the Chief Justice (section 12(1)(c) of the Magistrates Act).
·
When the Commission is deliberating
the matter of the remuneration of judges or magistrates and if the Chairperson
of the Commission is a Constitutional Court judge or a judge, then he or she
must refrain from participating in any of the Commission’s deliberations
relating to such remuneration (section 8(3B)(a) read together with section
1(d)(i) and (ii) of the Commission Act).
·
Section 8(6) of the Commission Act
stipulates that in arriving at its recommendations the Commission must
take the following factors into account:
“(6)(i) The role, status, duties, functions and
responsibilities of the office-bearers concerned;
(ii)
the affordability of different
levels of remuneration of public office bearers;
(iii)
current principles and levels of
remuneration, particularly in respect of organs of state, and in society
generally;
(iv)
inflationary increases;
(v)
the availability of resources of the
State; and
(vi)
any other factor which, in the
opinion of the said Commission, is relevant”.
·
The recommendations of the
Commission must be published in the Gazette at least once a year in
respect of each category of office-bearers and must be submitted to Parliament before
publication (section 8(5) of the Commission Act).
·
In this regard, the Commission’s
annual recommendations must be submitted to Parliament before the
publication thereof in the Gazette.
In other words Parliament only needs to be informed about the
Commission’s recommendations and does not at this stage have to approve
or disapprove thereof. However, it is at
this point that Parliament has, through the Select Committee and the Portfolio
Committee, an opportunity to formulate a view on the Commission’s recommendations,
which in turn must be relayed to the Executive before the President constructs
the notice referred to in section 12(1)(a).
·
In this regard it should be noted
that while Parliament may have received the Commission’s recommendations before
they were published in 2005 (and this we, to date, have not been able to
establish), the Commission’s proposals were not referred by the Presiding
Officers to the relevant Committees for consideration and report. This may be
simply because the Commissions recommendations were not officially relayed to Parliament.
·
The publication of the Commission’s
recommendations in the Gazette is done in addition with the intention to
publicise its findings as widely as possible for public information. The
publication of the recommendations of the Commission in the Gazette
should not be confused with the publication of the President’s notice in the Gazette
to determine the salaries, allowances or benefits of magistrates.
·
The Commission then makes
recommendations to the President for his or her consideration as to the
salaries, allowances and benefits magistrates are entitled to following the
Commission’s investigation (section 12(1)(a)(i) of the Magistrates Act).
4. Publication of section 12(1)(a) notice
·
Section 12(1)(a)(i) and (ii) read
together with subsection (3) of the Magistrates Act provide that the President
determines the salaries, allowances or benefits that magistrates are entitled
to from time to time by notice in the Gazette, after
taking into consideration the recommendations of the Commission, and after
such notice has been submitted to Parliament for approval ( i.e. before
publication thereof in the Gazette).
·
Parliament must by resolution either
approve the notice, whether in whole or in part, or disapprove the notice
(section 12(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Magistrates Act). The notice has to be submitted to Parliament
to afford Parliament an opportunity to comment before any determination
may be published in the Gazette.
·
The President may determine
different categories of salaries and salary scales in respect of different
categories of magistrates (section 12(1)(b) of the Magistrates Act).
·
The remuneration payable to
magistrates shall be paid out of the National Revenue Fund as contemplated in
section 213 of the Constitution read with section 12(4) of the Magistrates Act.
C. Absence of budgetary allocation to
defray proposed new motor vehicle allowances for magistrates and senior
magistrates
1. Any reservations the Committees may have
had, with the introduction of the proposed new motor vehicle allowances for
magistrates and senior magistrates, were outweighed by the individual and
collective weight afforded three factors that are relevant in regard to the
approval of such allowances. Firstly,
the President of the
2. All
factors, especially the above three, having been
considered, the Committees accordingly recommended that both Houses of
Parliament approve the proposed new motor vehicle allowances for magistrates
and senior magistrates, as contained in Notice 46 of 2005, as it appears in the
Government Gazette of 24 August 2005, and that the costs thereof be defrayed in
terms of section 213(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read with section 12(4) of the Magistrates Act .
3. All other proposals recommended in
Notice 46 of 2002 have been properly budgeted for and the adoption thereof
presented no problem, and was accordingly recommended.
4. On Wednesday, 7 September 2005, the
National Assembly passed a resolution, which read:
That the House approves the draft notice and the schedule received from
the Presidency determining the rate at which salaries and allowances are
payable to the magistrates annually, with effect from 1 April 2005, in terms of
section 12(1)(a) of the Magistrates Act (act No 90 of 1993) as amended by
section 3 of the Judicial Officers (Amendment of Conditions of Service) Act
(Act No 28 of 2003).
Notice 46 of 2005 appeared in the
Government Gazette dated 24 August 2005 and is attached hereto for ease of
reference (Marked Annexure 05 Mag Rem 5).
5. The National Council of Provinces
however referred the matter to the Select Committee on Security and
Constitutional Affairs for deliberation. Joint hearings were held on 18 October
2005, and interim reports were tabled in both houses on 16 November 2005.
(Marked Annexture 05 Mag Rem 17 and 19).
The Houses required that a final report be tabled detailing the outcomes
and recommendations in relation to legislative and procedural matters relating
to the determination of salary levels for magistrates; the absence of a
budgetary allocation to defray the proposed new motor vehicle allowances for
senior magistrates and magistrates; the development of policy measures to deal
with the implications arising from the extension of motor vehicle allowances to
senior magistrates and magistrates; and any other matter relevent to or emanating
from the said hearings.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In making our recommendations the
Committees have considered that the determination of recommendations relating
to magistrates’ (and judges’) salaries is a relatively new exercise for the Commission. Like all new institutions and processes,
there are opportunities to develop and learn collectively from short-comings
and challenges. Most developing
democracies have at some time or another faced such and sometimes worse
institutional challenges, and it is out of corrective measures implemented
within constitutional mechanisms that strong and enduring practices of good
governance and institutions have developed. Consequently, after careful
consideration of all the written and oral submissions placed before the
Portfolio Committee and the Select Committee, on the recommendations contained in Notice 46 of 2005,
including the implications of the
proposed new motor vehicle allowance for magistrates and senior magistrates, as
recommended by the Commission; and -
(i) despite
any procedural shortcomings that may have occurred in relation to the Commissions work;
(ii) the
absence of a budgetary allocation of R157 million to the Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development, to defray the new proposed motor vehicle
allowance to entry level magistrates, magistrates and senior magistrates; and
(iii) because the relevant Government Departments are considering
proposals to create a salary regime which ensures parity and synergy between
the salary packages of legally qualified professionals working for the State,
the
Committees make the recommendations hereunder to ensure that the problems
pertaining to the work of the Commission do not
recurr.
1. The Independent Commission for the
Remuneration of Public Office Bearers:
1.1 The Commission must strictly comply with
the letter and spirit of the legislation and regulations applicable to it when
considering recommendations relating to the remuneration of judges and
magistrates. The following legal prescripts must strictly be complied with in
future:
1.2 The letter and spirit of section 8(3B)
(a) and (b) of the Commission Act replicated below, must be strictly adhered to
and complied with by the Commission and its Chairperson:
“If the
Chairperson of the Commission is an office bearer as defined in para (d)(i) of
the definition of “office-bearer” in section 1,that member must refrain from
participating in any of the Commission’s deliberations relating to the
remuneration of any office-bearer as defined in paragraph(d) of the said
definition
(b) Any
member of the Commission who may directly or indirectly derive any benefit from
the acceptance by the President of any recommendations by the Commission, must
refrain from participating in any of the Commissions deliberations relating to
such recommendations.”
1.3 When the Commission considers recommendations
relating to the remuneration of:
(i)
judges, it must have regard to the
provisions of the Judges Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act (Act no. 47 of 2001); and
(ii)
magistrates, it must have regard to
the provisions of the Magistrates Act and the
Commission’s Act in particular section 8;
1.4
In formulating recommendations on
the remuneration of magistrates, the Commission must have regard to the levels
of remuneration of similarly qualified individuals in the public and private
sectors in accordance with the provisions of the
Commission Act, particularly the prescripts of section 8(6)(iii);
1.5
In terms of section 8(5) of the
Commission Act, read with sections
12(1)(a)(ii) and 12(3) of the Magistrates Act, the recommendations of
the Commission relating to the remuneration of magistrates must be submitted to
Parliament before publication thereof.
1.6 The Commission must in future make
recommendations bearing in the mind the availability of resources within the
budget framework, as provided for in the Estimate of National Expenditure;(i.e:
see section 8(6)(v) )
1.7 The Commission should receive a single
submission on behalf of the magistracy from the Chief Justice or a person
designated by the Chief Justice relating to recommendations in respect of the
remuneration of magistrates, in accordance with section 12(1)(c)(ii), read with
section 8(3)of the Magistrates Act, and
should not consult with or receive submissions from individual or groups
of magistrates relating to the remuneration of magistrates, as seems to
have become the practice; considering the injunction of the Van Rooyen case that collective
bargaining practices should be discouraged at this level;
1.8 The Commission must meaningfully consult
with the Ministers of Finance and
Justice and Constitutional Development in terms of section 12 (1)(c)(i) of the
Magistrates Act, when considering recommendations in respect of the remuneration of magistrates. The process of consultation should be made
more formal and all substantive interactions should be through written communications ;
1.9 When consulting the Ministers as
referred to in paragraph 1.8 above, the
Commission must do so with a view to reaching consensus on the recommendations
relating to the determination of the remuneration of magistrates;
1.10 The Commission’s recommendations to the
President should reflect all the relevant views/submissions received relating to the recommendations in respect of the remuneration of magistrates,
especially when any or both of the above Ministers disagree with any aspect of
the recommendations made by the Commission;
1.11 The Commission must construct
a system for formulating recommendations on the remuneration of magistrates
that is objectively understood within an overall matrix or framework of remuneration and benefits
applicable to other members of the Judiciary and other similarly qualified
professionals in the employ of the State.
It is
recommended that the office of the Chief Justice must devise an internal forum
within the Judiciary aimed at facilitating a single submission to the
Commission relating to the remuneration of judges and magistrates, as indicated
in paragraph 2 of the recommendations pertaining to the Commission, above.
3. PARLIAMENT
It is also
recommended that any proposal in terms of section 8(5) of the Commission Act
and any notice referred to in Section 12(1)(a)(i) of the Magistrates Act,
submitted to Parliament, must be referred by the Presiding Officers to the
Portfolio Committee and the Select Committee jointly, for consideration and
report. The report and recommendations of
the Committees must thereafter be tabled for adoption in the relevant
Houses. Thereafter, Parliament’s
recommendations or comments must immediately be forwarded to the
President. Only after these processes
have been followed, and upon approval by both Houses of Parliament, should the
final determination be published in the Government Gazette.
Although not
relevant to this enquiry, any of the procedural shortcomings that are pertinent
to the development of recommendations relating to the remuneration of judges
should be immediately reviewed by the relevant institutions.
5. Policy Measures: The development or adoption of policy
measures arising from the expansion of travel allowances to magistrates
previously excluded
Magistrates
are appointed generally at the point that they have acquired at least 5 years
post university experience. In their
submission to the Committees the NPA pointed out that a prosecutor with at
least five years post university experience currently earned R139 383 compared
to the R313 738 per annum for a similarly qualified magistrate (i.e. a trainee
magistrate, without the present proposed salary packages having been taken into
account). This amounts to a differential
of R174 355, in salaries for lawyers who are equally qualified and
experienced. The
newly approved allowance for entry level magistrates will increase the already
significant salary gap between entry level magistrates and senior prosecutors
with five years and more years experience, by approximately R70 000.00. This will have the likely effect of further
significantly exacerbating an already existing atmosphere of instability in
institutions administering justice. In
fact, according to the NPA, they lose between 30 and 40 such experienced
prosecutors annually to the magistracy.
Considering the further 40 new magistrates posts created in 2005, the
prosecuting authority stands to loose a significant number of experienced
prosecutors during this period.
The Commission in its written
submission reported that “it is in the process of conducting a major review of
public office bearer remuneration, and intends making recommendations for the
implementation of an integrated fair and transparent total cost to employer
remuneration structure for all office bearers”(page 2, paragraph 2). The
Department of Justice reported that it has just completed a framework for an
integrated remuneration dispensation for its legally qualified professionals.
This process is aimed at addressing the historical inequities existing in the
current system, and introducing parity and synergy. It
was further reported that a similar exercise is currently being undertaken by
the DPSA in regard to personnel performing legal functions throughout the
public sector. While these
developments are to be welcomed, it is clear that if these processes are not
integrated or synergized, we will once again face a situation where disparate
salary packages have to be implemented for similarly qualified legal
professionals in the public domain.
The Committees thus
recommend that:
5.1 The Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development, Treasury and Department of Public Service and
Administration (and where necessary, the Commission) should work together to
design a remuneration framework/ or matrix that will ensure parity and synergy between
the salary packages of similarly qualified legal professionals working for the
State. In this manner, eradicating or at
the very least minimising the further destabilisation of institutions
administering justice through personnel movements chasing after higher
salaries, sometimes even in the same Department.
5.2 The
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Treasury having been
engaged in a process that is aimed at developing a comprehensive remunerative
structure based on parity for legal professionals in the Justice sector, must
table their proposals and implementation plan, with Parliament, by 1 September
2006.
5.3 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development must,
urgently, table in Parliament amendments to the regulations for the official
travel of all magistrates operating within clusters, in order to prevent
potential abuse of claims relating to S&T’s, accommodation and travel
allowances of the nature that was disclosed to the Committees during the
hearings. In particular, to examine the
legality and amend the regulations, if necessary, of the further payments of
allowances or benefits to magistrates, for travel purposes, after 1 April 2005,
outside the motor vehicle allowances, which are now being approved for all
magistrates, backdated to 1 April 2005. Such regulations must be tabled in
Parliament, by 1 September 2006.
5.4 Review present legislation
It is
recommended that the relevant pieces of legislation considered in this report
should be reviewed in accordance with the findings and recommendations of this
report, with the objective of simplifying and clarifying the procedure. The review should include a mechanism
allowing the proposals of the President to be revised and resubmitted to
Parliament should Parliament disapprove the notice in terms of section 12(3)(b)(ii) of the Magistrates
Act.
6. Engendering professionalism in the
Magistracy
During the
time that it has taken to convene the parliamentary hearings the Committees
have been disturbed at the behaviour of some magistrates who have in written
and oral form criticised Parliament’s processes and even questioned the
constitutionality of Parliament’s role.
Generally, Parliament should not be above reproach, but when these
criticisms are voiced by magistrates in an effort to enhance their personal
circumstances by advocating for higher salaries in stark contrast to the
prescripts laid down by the Constitutional Court in the Van Rooyen
judgment, these reproaches have the distinct flavour of unabashed avarice.
Taken to its
extreme the media covered stories of certain magistrates absenting themselves
from their courts during this time, on the pretext of being under stress due to
the possibility of the new motor vehicle allowances not being approved. This, if true was a lightly veiled attempt to
pressurise MPs to approve the new salary dispensation. The Committees were also made aware of
meetings convened in court buildings ostensibly to organise in protest against
any potential negative outcome of the Parliamentary process.
In matters
concerning the Judiciary, the Committees remain guided by the principles and
guidelines determined by the Constitutional Court, especially in the Van
Rooyen case.
The actions
of some magistrates, in contravention of the principles in the Van Rooyen
judgment, are unbecoming of judicial officers and have brought the Judiciary
into disrepute.
The Committees accordingly recommend that the
Magistrates’ Commission:
6.1 Conducts a full investigation into:
(i) absenteeism from work without valid
reason; including absenteeism due to alleged stress (particularly in the area
of the Eastern Cape) or any “go slow” or related action on the part of any
affected magistrate or senior magistrate; and
(ii) any other type of conduct or action by
any magistrate or senior magistrate, which ostensibly relates to the approval
by Parliament of the new salary regime amounting to behaviour unbecoming of a
judicial officer,
between the
period 13 September 2005 and 17 November 2005.
6.2 Submits
a Report by 01 December 2006 on the individual magistrates concerned,
identifying the disciplinary measures adopted or proposed to be adopted in each
instance, including relevant medical certificates for each magistrate absent
from work for stress or stress related illnesses during the period 13 September
to 17 November 2005 .
Conclusion
The
Committees express the hope that the report provides guidance and assistance to
all the role-players concerned in our mutual efforts to develop and build our
State Institutions. It is hoped that all
criticism levelled are received in this spirit and that our democratic state
continues to flourish in the wake of the constructive deliberations and engagement.
Report to be
considered.
[1] VAN ROOYEN AND OTHERS v THE STATE AND OTHERS (GENERAL COUNCIL OF
THE BAR OF SOUTH AFRICA INTERVENING) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC).