COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE MINIBUS TAXI INDUSTRY IN THE CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN AREA

 

REPORT TO THE PREMIER

 

31 AUGUST 2005

CHAIRPERSON: ADV. DUMISA NTSEBEZA

 

 

EMBARGOED UNTIL AFTER PRESENTATION TO THE PREMIER

 

 

 

Disclaimer:

 

The contents of this report reflect the professional opinion of the Committee of Inquiry into the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the minibus taxi industry. They reflect the independent opinion of its members and do not in any way reflect the opinion, ideas or agendas of any political party in the Western Cape Province. The report is the product of three months of intensive investigations, public and private hearings as well as independent research.

 

 


 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

 

 

AFU                              Asset Forfeiture Unit

AMAPHELA                  Unroadworthy sedan taxis used to ferry passengers in

the African areas             

ANC                             African National Congress

BELLTA                        Bellville Taxi Association

BLOEWATA                  Bloekombos, Wallacedene Taxi Association

CATA                            Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association

CCT                              City of Cape Town

CODETA                       Cape Organisation of Democratic Taxi Association

DA                                Democratic Alliance  

DOCS                           Department of Community Safety

DCS                             Department of Community Safety

GABS                           Golden Arrow Bus Service

IMBIZO                         A summit;  a consultative gathering of stakeholders and

                                    interested parties

IMBOVANE                  Hitmen or Hit squads as referred to in the taxi industry in

 the Western and Eastern Cape

LAGUNYA                      Langa, Guguletu, Nyanga Taxi Association

MASHWABANA            An unroadworthy taxi van used for conveying passengers

in African areas

MOTHER BODY            An affiliate of taxi associations

NACTU                        National Council of Trade Unions

NDOT                           National Department of Transport

NIA                               National Intelligence Agency

NLTTA                          National Land Transport Transition Act

NTA                              National Taxi Alliance

PAC                             Pan Africanist Congress

PDP                             Public drivers permit

PEACA                         Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency

POLB                            Provincial Operating License Board

PTI                               Public Transport Interchange

SANCO                         South African National Civics Organisation

SAPS                           South African Police Services

SARCC                        South African Rail Commuter Corporation

SARS                          South African Revenue Service

SDU                             Self Defence Unit

SEAWATER                  Seawater Taxi Association

SNKTA                         Scottsdene,Northpine,Kraaifontein Taxi Association

TRP                              Taxi Recapitalisation Programme

UDM                             United Democratic Movement

UMAC                           U Managing Conflict

WARLORDS                 A group of people who are responsible for acts of

violence

WCPTC                        Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council

WEBTA                                    Western Cape Black Taxi Association

 

 

             

 


 

CONTENTS

 

 

 

          

           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

1.         INTRODUCTION

1.1 Establishment of the Committee

1.2 Terms of reference

1.3 Methodology

1.4 Constraints under which the Committee has

      operated

1.5 Applicable legislation

 

2.         THE PASSENGER TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE AREA

2.1 THE WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TAXI COUNCIL

            2.2.REGIONAL COUNCILS                    

            2.3 CODETA

            2.4 CATA

            2.5 SEDAN TAXIS (aMAPHELA)

            2.6 GOLDEN ARROW BUS SERVICES (gabs)                            

            2.7 METRORAIL

                                         

3.         INSTITUTIONS

             3.1 Western Cape Department of Transport

                   and Public Works

             3.2 Provincial Operational Licensing Board

             3.3 Provincial Taxi Registrar

             3.4 City of Cape Town: Transport and Planning

                   Department

            

4.          LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

              4.1 WESTERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY

                   SAFETY

              4.2 SAPS               

              4.3 PROVINCIAL TRAFFIC POLICE

              4.4 CITY OF CAPE TOWN TRAFFIC Police

              4.5 CITY POLICE

              4.6 CITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

 

5.          OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

              5.1  THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY (NPA)

5.2  the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA)

     

 

 

 

 

                 

6.         OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

            6.1 ORGANISED BUSINESS

            6.2 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FORUMS

            6.3 CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS

            6.4 POLITICAL PARTIES

            6.5 INDIVIDUALS

            6.6 ORGANISED LABOUR

            6.7 NGOs

 

                       

7.         THE PROCESS

            7.1 THOSE WHO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED

            7.2 WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

          

           

8          SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE GATHERED

            8.1 Evidence from pEOPLE IN DETENTION

                  8.1.1 PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE IN THE TAXI

                           INDUSTRY

                  8.1.2 RISE TO POWER

                  8.1.3 HIT-MEN (IIMBOVANE)

                  8.1.4 COLLECTION OF MONEYS FROM THE RANKS

                  8.1.5 COLLABORATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT

                           PERSONNEL

                  8.1.6 THE MOTIVE

            8.2 Evidence from pUBLIC hearings

            8.3 Evidence from PRIVATE hearings

            8.4 EVIDENCE FROM SPECIAL HEARINGS

           

9.        Trends emerging from the body of evidence

            9.1  CULTURE OF LAWLESSNESS

9.2  PREVALENCE OF HIT SQUADS (ANTS/IIMBOVANE)

9.3  UNRESOLVED ISSUES:  “THE STADIUM EVENT” AND

       “THE LAINGSBURG EVENT”

9.4 CULTURE OF ENTITLEMENT

9.5 ILLEGAL OPERATORS

           9.6 COLOURED MINIBUS TAXI OPERATORS

9.7 CODETA’S PERCEPTIONS OF CATA

9.8 CATA’S PERCEPTIONS OF CODETA

9.9 THE INDUSTRY’S PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

9.10THE COMMUNITY’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE

       INDUSTRY

9.11CULTURE OF FEAR

9.12 WAR CHEST

9.13 CORRUPTION IN STATE INSTITUTIONS

9.14 LACK OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

9.15 RECAPITALISATION AND OTHER GOVERNMENT

        INITIATIVES

9.16 SUBSIDISATION

9.17 PUBLIC TRANSPORT INTERCHANGES/RANKS

 

10.        FINDINGS BY THE COMMITTEE

           10.1 UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE INSTABILITY AND

                   RECURRING CONFLICT

           10.2 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE

                   VIOLENCE

           10.3 TAXI ASSOCIATIONS

 

 

11       IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE POTENTIAL AREAS FOR

           CONTINUING CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

           11.1 PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS LICENSING BOARD

11.2 HIT SQUADS

11.3 UNSOLVED CRIMINAL CASES

11.4 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE:

        RECAPITILISATION PROCESS

11.5 CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF RANKS

11.6 MOTHER BODIES

           

12.        POSSIBLE MECHANISMS TO ENSURE

           ACCOUNTABILITY, STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF 

           CONFLICT

           12.1 LAW ENFORCEMENT

            12.2 REGISTRATION AND DATABASES

            12.3 OVERHAUL OF THE OPERATIONS LICENSING

                   BOARD (POLB)

 

13.      PAST AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CODETA AND CATA

           13.1 ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT

                   

14.      GOVERNMENT’S OBLIGATION TOWARDS TAXI

           ASSOCIATIONS

       

15.      RECOMMENDATIONS

  

16.        CONCLUSION

            

 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

The Committee was established by the Premier of the Western Cape Province, Mr. Ebrahim Rasool on 22 April 2005 after consultation with the Cabinet.  The events leading up to the establishment of the Committee related directly to the violence perpetrated by taxi operators over the disputed routes to and from the Cape Gate shopping centre.

 

The Premier appointed 4 Committee members, namely Advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza as the Chairperson of the Committee, Mr Irvin Kinnes a criminologist, Mr Bongani Kupe, a transport economist, and Director Joseph Makhura, a police officer who has specialised in the investigation of taxi violence in the Western Cape.  Mr Sabata Ntontela was appointed as secretary to the Committee. The Committee commenced its work on 9 May 2005.

 

The terms of reference of the Committee were deliberately broad so that it could achieve three things:

 

Firstly, it was intended for the Committee to investigate the underlying reasons for the violence that has plagued the industry; secondly, to identify the people or groups who are instigating or responsible for the violence, and thirdly, to establish the structural and institutional factors that contribute to the conflict.

 

The Committee had an investigative unit of four police officers attached to it with the purpose of acting on some of the information that it had received during the course of the investigations.  The investigative unit did not have to wait for the Committee to table its report to the Premier before the necessary action on the information received could be taken.  The Committee had a leader of evidence, Mr Nkululeko Ntwana and a legal researcher, Adv. Phuti Setati to assist it, by formally putting all the evidence gathered before it.

 

The Committee initially set up operations and sourced the necessary logistics for the smooth running of the office in order to proceed with the hearings. From the onset, the Committee was confronted with Ordinance 13 of 1978 which provided that the Committee conducts its business in private.  After taking legal opinion, the Committee satisfied itself that it could, notwithstanding Ordinance 13, conduct public hearings.  It subsequently did so.  The Committee agreed with the Premier and the opinion of Legal Counsel that there was a constitutional imperative for openness, accountability and transparency that superseded the provisions of Ordinance 13 of 1978.

 

Once the legal matters were finalised, the Committee held meetings with certain stakeholders in which the Committee explained how it would work.  It also solicited from them what their expectations were.  Briefings were held with, among others, the Ministers for Community Safety and Transport and Public Works, various law enforcement agencies, taxi associations, organised business and labour.

 

A stakeholder imbizo was held towards the end of May 2005, specifically to urge stakeholders to participate in the process, as well as to get them to make oral and written submissions to the Committee.

 

The Committee held both private and public hearings, and met with 36 organisations and 20 private persons.  In some additional security arrangements had to be arranged when public hearings were held.     

 

The Committee also visited most of the taxi ranks affected by the violence.

 

During the investigations and hearings the Committee had oral and written submissions and 75 exhibits.  

 

The Committee held public and private hearings, as well as special hearings. In addition, evidence was also gathered from people in detention with regard to their roles in some of the murders that were committed.

 

In all three cases, definite trends emerged, pointing to an industry that is governed by chaos that, in some respects, benefits a certain group of people.

The following trends emerged from the body of evidence:

 

  • Culture of lawlessness;
  • Culture of fear and silence;
  • Culture of entitlement – the attitude by taxi operators that when they have applied for a permit, it WILL be granted;
  • Exorbitant taxi association membership fees;
  • Lack of law enforcement and dereliction of duty by institutions like the City of Cape Town in abandoning ranks to associations;
  • Dysfunctional Operating Licensing Board, and
  • Prevalent use of hit squads by CATA and CODETA, failure to arrest and prosecute those who sponsor the killers.

 

There is a core group of operators in both CATA and CODETA and drivers who are part of the inner circle ordering the hit squads to kill certain individuals. The Committee is of the opinion that these individuals who have never been arrested for ordering killings should be brought to justice. The fact that they have never been brought to justice facilitates and prolongs the culture of silence. There are also links with gangs and drugs that need to be investigated, especially with coloured taxi associations. This is restricted to extortion and protection rackets.

 

The fact that certain killings remain unresolved is an underlying reason in itself for the continued conflict between CATA and CODETA. Chief unresolved killings are the Khayelitsha Stadium killings where eleven people were killed and the Laingsburg events where four people were killed. The fact that nobody has been arrested for the killings has meant that many people in the industry have not had the opportunity for closure. A concerted attempt should be made to re-open both cases and the guilty parties must be brought to justice.

 

Some of the routes remain 70% overtraded and the Board continues to issue permits despite objections from the City.  The question as to whether there is corruption in the Board has been raised by the Committee.  We ordered that a full forensic audit be conducted on the members and activities of the Board. This report should be completed in the second week of September.

 

There are many more issues that the report deals with relating to the evidence that has been presented before it.

 

The report concludes with a list of recommendations that Government, through the Premier’s Office should urgently implement.   The recommendations include:

 

1.       The establishment of a semi-permanent dispute resolution body to mediate between taxi associations once disputes arise over routes.

 

2.       Such a dispute resolution body should be independent of, and report to the Provincial Transport Department’s Taxi Registrar.

 

3.       Government urgently reviews the workings of the Provincial

Operating Licensing Board with a view to changing its working

methods and internal administrative and other systems.  The Committee

was satisfied for example, that the POLB’s systems are such that the

requirement that permit applications should have valid tax clearance

certificates cannot be free of fraud and forgery.

 

4.       The practice of the Traffic Department allowing the CATA and CODETA patrols along the N1 and N2 should be discontinued by the department. 

These patrols do not have the right to stop vehicles on national roads.

 

5.       A multi-disciplinary investigative team comprising of SAPS, SARS, NPA, Crime Intelligence and NIA should be formed to investigate the taxi warlords who continue to order the killings, and other serious crimes related thereto, including contraventions of the Income Tax Act.

 

6.       The SAPS, Provincial and City Traffic together with the City Police must set up a joint task team to deal with any eventuality arising from failed disputes between owners and associations.  An early warning system should be developed and shared amongst the role-players.


        

 

1.            INTRODUCTION

 

Violence in the taxi industry has affected almost every province in the country. The Western Cape and in particular, the Cape Metropolitan area has been no exception.   In fact there has been a history of taxi conflicts and violence in this area as a result of the conflict, over a number of years.

 

The first major taxi conflict occurred between the late eighties and early nineties, between what was then known as WEBTA and LAGUNYA.  The work of the Committee has focused on the activities of CATA and CODETA. This has been so because both CATA and CODETA have been the primary parties to the conflict over the last ten years. 

 

A second major taxi war was between CATA and CODETA during the mid nineties.  A number of other taxi wars also plagued the Western Cape where gang members became involved in extorting monies from the taxi drivers during 1995.  During 1998, there was again another taxi war between CODETA and CATA.   In all of these conflicts, people lost their lives and some were seriously injured.  During 2001, there was another conflict between Golden Arrow Bus Services and members of the Ten–Ten group.  This group was formed by both CATA and CODETA to fight Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS).  The last fight between CATA and CODETA was over control and access to the Cape Gate shopping centre route in March and April 2005.

 

There has also been intra-association conflict between the affiliates of the associations that sometimes has gone unnoticed.   Despite the fact that there have been numerous peace agreements between the various associations and government, these agreements have not stood the test of time.  They were regularly broken when disputes arose.

 

As a result, the Premier and the Cabinet decided to institute a Committee of Inquiry into the underlying reasons for the instability and conflict in the minibus taxi industry in the Cape Town Metropolitan area. 

 

 

1.1        Establishment of the Committee

 

The Committee was established by the Premier of the Western Cape Province, Mr. Ebrahim Rasool on 22 April 2005 after consultation with the Cabinet.  The events leading up to the establishment of the Committee related directly to the violence perpetrated by taxi operators over the disputed routes to and from the Cape Gate shopping centre.

 

The Premier appointed 4 Committee members, namely Advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza as the chairperson of the Committee, Mr Irvin Kinnes a criminologist, Mr Bongani Kupe, a transport economist, and Director Joseph Makhura, a police officer who has specialised in the investigation of taxi violence in the Western Cape.  Mr Sabata Ntontela was appointed as secretary to the Committee. The Committee commenced its work on 9 May 2005.

 

1.2        Terms of reference

 

The Committee was established in terms of Ordinance 13 of 1978.  According to its terms of reference, the Committee was to conduct an inquiry into:

 

the underlying reasons for the instability and recurring conflict within the minibus taxi industry  (“the industry”) in the Cape Town Metropolitan area, including, without limitation, reasons related to:

 

  • the activities of legal and illegal operators and of any other person or group that cause or contribute to instability, conflict and violence, and /or gang related activities within the industry;

 

  • conduct on the part of any person or group  that seeks to encourage or afford protection to operators  who provide taxi transport services in contravention of legislation and/or in conflict  with conditions under which licenses are granted;

 

  • unlawful or undesirable conduct on the part of operators and /or drivers at or near authorised ranks;

 

  • institutional arrangement, industry structures and conditions for membership, the role of relevant stakeholders, and shortcomings with regard to the adoption of constitutions, the provisions thereof, enforcement of codes of conduct  and disciplinary action against, and expulsion of, members;

 

  • demands on workers within the industry due to, among others,  the saturation of routes and payments of remuneration linked to numbers of trips or passengers;

 

  • the provision of taxi transport services authorised by both radius-based permits and direct route-based permits and licenses;

 

  • the provision of taxi transport services authorised by both interchange-based and direct route-based permits and licenses; 

 

  • the statutory licensing application and adjudication process and the impact of the regulatory and administrative environment;

 

  • the identity of individuals and entities involved in creating or

           contributing to instability, conflict and violence in the industry;  and

 

  • any other factors that inhibit the economic empowerment potential of

            the industry.


 

To compile a report detailing:

 

  • Any findings in respect of the above;

 

  • Any recommendations in respect of such findings;.

 

  • To submit interim reports to the Premier on any matter referred to in paragraph 1, if and when considered appropriate by the Committee, and

 

  • To complete its work and submit a report as contemplated in paragraph 2 to the Premier within a period of three months from the date of its 

           appointment  

  

1.3        Methodology

 

In view of the fact that the Committee was appointed as an investigative committee, it was decided that despite the provisions of Ordinance 13, which stipulated that the Committee conducts its hearings in private, there would be public and private hearings.  This was so because of the imperatives of a constitutional democracy which emphasizes openness and transparency.

 

This much was confirmed by Senior Counsel’s legal opinion which the Committee obtained at the commencement of its work.  This was also in line with the attitude of the Provincial Government.  The Premier, Ebrahim Rasool said as much to the media at the first media briefing at which he introduced the Committee to the public and where he also announced that the Committee would commence its work soon.  

 

The Committee decided to appoint a leader of evidence and a legal researcher for the duration of its mandate period.

Advocate Phuti Setati was the legal researcher and Mr Nkululeko Ntwana was the leader of evidence.   Both Mr Setati and Mr Ntwana were seconded from the Provincial Legal Services.   Informal interviews were conducted with major stakeholders as a precursor to an imbizo to which all the role-players and stakeholders would be invited.   The purpose of the informal hearings was to prepare stakeholders for the process of giving evidence and understanding the role, function and workings of the Committee.

 

An imbizo was then held on 30 May 2005, attended by all role-players and stakeholders, including amongst others, the Minister of Transport and Public Works, the Department of Community Safety, organised labour, organised business, taxi associations, the Operating Licensing Board, the Provincial Taxi Registrar, the City of Cape Town and other interested and affected parties.

 

The process and purpose of the Committee was laid out and people and organisations were then invited to make submissions.

 

A press conference was called on 18 May 2005 where the Committee invited members of the public and interested and affected parties to make submissions.

 

In addition, an SAPS hotline number 08600 10111 was used and this was communicated to the media where members of the public could provide information anonymously if they wanted to.   The line was staffed by members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) who reported to the Committee on a daily basis as to the number of callers recorded and the information that they wanted to provide.

 

In addition, confidential informal interviews were conducted with members of the public, taxi associations, law enforcement agencies, the intelligence agency, state departments and convicted criminals.

 

We held public hearings that were open to the media.   At these hearings, the Committee warned people who testified not to prejudice people who were accused of crimes, as they had not received adequate notice to defend themselves in terms of the rules of natural justice.

 

People were subpoenaed to give evidence and they were then asked to testify and make submissions.

 

The Committee also held private hearings with persons whose identity it felt it had to protect.  Where their identity could lead to intimidation, or death, the hearings were held in private.  We also gave people an option to give evidence in private when the evidence that they would be providing could compromise their safety.

 

The Committee also called special hearings where it felt that there were issues that it had to deal with in a special manner.   There was one instance when the Committee actually believed that a special hearing between CATA Eyona, CATA Inter-township and CATA Seawater might end with an agreement that would last and be respected by all the participants.

 

Visits to prisons to interview convicted persons were conducted to interview them on matters related to their convictions.   We gave them the opportunity to co-operate with the Committee.   Some chose to co-operate and others did not.

 

The Committee agreed to have the National Intelligence Agency inspect the premises from which the Committee was operating on a regular basis.  We made arrangements with the security personnel at number 4 Dorp Street to prepare for the influx of visitors to the Committee.   Security was beefed up for the duration of public and private hearings.   We included the SAPS in security for the duration of public and private hearings.

 

The hearings were all recorded with simultaneous translations being provided and the transcripts of the hearings were delivered to the Committee on each subsequent day after a hearing.

 

1.4               Constraints under which the Committee has OPERATED

 

The Committee initially struggled with its setup phase and the logistics that went with it.  During May and the first half of June, the Committee was busy with setting up administrative systems for evidence collection.  There were several constraints.

 

For example, the media campaign was very ineffective in that the Committee’s communications did not reach all the people that it was intended to reach.  Office setup was difficult and time consuming.  It took about one month to acquire the necessary resources such as computers, telephones, photocopier, fax machine, vehicles and the division of office space.  This was especially problematic because of our limited timeframe of three months with which we were supposed to complete the investigation and develop a report.

 

Further, Senior Counsel’s opinion referred to above took some time.  One of the issues Senior Counsel was to advise on was whether public hearings could be held.   The delay in obtaining the opinion held up the organization of public hearings.

 

Further, secondment of our legal staff only took place after the first two weeks of operations in view of the fact that we had difficulty having them released from Provincial Legal Services.  Nevertheless, when once the systems were up and running, work began feverishly, the aim being to finish on time.

 

Other than the legal team, the Committee was supported by:  


 

Administrative Staff:

Thandeka Cacambile was appointed as secretary to the Secretary of the Committee.

Bongani Jack was appointed as administrator.

Virginia Davids was appointed as Personal Assistant to the Chairperson.

 

Investigative team:

The following police investigators were seconded to the Committee for the duration of its mandate:

  • Superintendent Andre Els;
  • Inspector  Patrick Mdwaba;
  • Inspector Caren Baartman, and
  • Inspector David Chauke

 

Communications

 

A communication strategy was developed together with Mr. Clayton Wakeford from the Office of the Premier who assisted with media communications and arranging press conferences and interviews with the press.

 

A company was appointed to take responsibility for putting out flyers at the taxi ranks to encourage taxi operators to come forward.

 

1.5        Applicable legislation

 

The following legislation is referred to throughout the report:

 

a)       Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996;

b)       National Land Transport Transition Act, 22 of 2000;

c)       Road Transportation Act, 74 of 1977;

d)       National Road Traffic Act, 93 of 1996;

e)       Western Cape Road Transportation Act Amendment Law, 8 of 1996;

f)         Committee of Inquiry Ordinance 13 of 1978;

g)       South African Police Services Act ,68 of 1995 (as amended);

h)       National Prosecuting Authority Act, 32 of 1998

i)         Intelligence Services Act, 38 of 1994;

j)         Western Cape Regulations on Special Procedures for Legislation, 2001 (PN 7 of 2002);

k)       Western Cape Regulations on Operating Licenses,  2002 (PN 59 of

     2002);

l)         Western Cape Regulations on Mini Bus Taxi Constitution, Code of

      Conduct and Grievance Procedure and Forms for Registration with 

      Provincial Taxi Registrar (PN 62 of 1997). 

 

Reference is also made to the Minibus Taxi Constitution, Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure and Forms for Registration with the Provincial Taxi         Registrar.


 

2.            THE PASSENGER TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE AREA

 

Passenger transport in the Western Cape Province is made up of different modes of transport, namely bus, sedan, minibus taxis, and rail.   Minibus Taxis are part of the Public Transport System, with the exception that they carry unsubsidized passengers and operate unscheduled services.

 

According to the City of Cape Town’s Transport Branch, bus transport account for the transport of 17% of passengers;  rail accounts for 54% of passengers and minibus taxis account for 29% of passengers.

 

During our hearings, evidence was presented from the City that the taxi routes in the Metro are 70% overtraded.  There are more than 7500 vehicles, of which it is estimated 43% are operating illegally.

 

Passenger transport is supposed to be regulated in the industry by the following role-players:

 

2.1        THE WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TAXI COUNCIL

 

The Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council (WCPTC) was formed as a response to the recommendations made by the National Taxi Task Team to the then Minister of Transport, Mr Mac Maharaj.  The process started at national level with the formation of the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) and then unfolded at provincial level with the formation of the Provincial Taxi Councils.

 

In the Western Cape the first Provincial Taxi Council was formed in 1996 with the constitution stipulating a term of two years for office bearers.  The second election of the executive took place in 1998.   Between 2000 and 2001 two groups (SANTACO and NTA) emerged, all muscling for representation in the Western Cape.  These two groups started negotiations in 2001 with a view to agreeing on one structure in the province.   This resulted in the appointment of the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council in February 2002 at the Breakwater Lodge Hotel in Cape Town.

 

The WCPTC is made up of 18 regions that are spread across the province.  Regions are geographically defined by the number of taxis in the area.   Each region has four representatives in the WCPTC that make up the full council. The full council appoints the executive Committee which consists of 22 members - one member from each region and four co-opted women.

 

The WCPTC has the following sub-committees:

 

·         Safety and Security;

·         Special Projects;

·         Labour;

·         Policy and Legislation;

·         Capacity Building and Training;

·         Economic Development, and

·         Conflict Resolution.

 

Not much is known about the activities of these Committees.  Some of the activities of the WCPTC are presently funded by the Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works and the offices of the organisation are located in Athlone, Cape Town.

 

2.2    REGIONAL COUNCILS

 

There are 18 regional councils that constitute the WCPTC. The representatives in the WCPTC are elected at regional level for representation at the WCPTC.  The Western Cape has the following regions:

  1. Bellville;
  2. Blaauwberg;
  3. Breede River;
  4. Cape Town ;
  5. Cape Town CBD;
  6. Central Karoo;
  7. Delft;
  8. Helderberg;
  9. Khayelitsha;
  10. Inter-Township;
  11. Klein Karoo;
  12. Southern Cape;
  13. Mitchell’s Plain;
  14. Overberg;
  15. Oostenberg;
  16. South Peninsula;
  17. Tygerberg, and
  18. West Coast.

 

The regions elect their regional executives and the regional chairpersons automatically become some of the regional representatives sitting in the WCPTC.  Although the regions have been formed and representatives elected to the WCPTC, they are still in the process of developing their constitutions.  Presently they are operating using the standard constitution provided in the National Land Transport Transition Act 22 of 2000. The Western Cape Department of Transport is assisting with the development of the constitution for the regions.

 

The absence of a constitution for the regional councils has resulted in the slow development of the various committees that will mirror those of the WCPTC.   As a result all the regional councils have neither offices nor officials   for the running of their own affairs.

 

This lack of facilities and infrastructure has resulted in the breakdown of communication between the taxi associations and the regional representatives in most areas.   Consequently, the regional structures in some areas are seen as non existent or lacking adequate representivity for the local associations.    

 

  2.3      CODETA     

 

The Cape Organisation of Democratic Taxi Association (CODETA) was established in 1991 by the Western Cape Black Taxi Association (WEBTA) and Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga Taxi Association (LAGUNYA) in the aftermath of a taxi war between LAGUNYA and WEBTA.  CODETA was established as a result of negotiations between the main taxi associations and was meant to create a better bargaining position for taxi operators in negotiating with government and to minimise the rivalry and violence in the taxi industry. 

 

A meeting was convened at the University of Cape Town facilitated by Mr Vasu Gounden, a mediator from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in 1991.  An agreement was struck between the parties (LAGUNYA and WEBTA) to form CODETA.   A decision was taken to launch the new organisation at the Goodwood Stadium during that year.   A new executive committee consisted of an equal number of members of both LAGUNYA and WEBTA.

 

The name CODETA was influenced by the developments that were taking place at the political level.   South Africa was negotiating a peace settlement at Kempton Park under the auspices of a Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).  The community leadership and organisations took advantage of the political scenario and forced these organisations - LAGUNYA and WEBTA - to embrace the spirit of negotiations and reconciliation that was taking place in the country at that time.

 

CODETA’s aim in the taxi industry was to:

·         Develop the taxi industry;

·         Create peace and stability;

·         Unify the taxi industry;

·         Assist those people who had lost their loved ones through violence;

·         Set up a strong financial accounting and auditing system;

·         Set up a database of members, drivers, vehicles and their location;

·         Set up ongoing liaison with the media and the public, and

·         Assist the government with the restructuring of the taxi industry.

 

All of the mentioned objectives were never realised during its existence.  The first executive committee of CODETA consisted of sixteen members who were from both LAGUNYA and WEBTA.  This committee continued to function for about two years before allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds emerged.  These allegations led to a breakaway group that was predominantly from the former WEBTA members.   After many failed attempts to deal with the allegations through negotiations, the breakaway group formed themselves into an organisation called the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA).  The rivalry between CATA and CODETA grew and resulted in many violent clashes that led to the 1996 Agreement.

 

An agreement between CATA and CODETA in 1996 over routes was made an order of the High Court.

 

The 1996 Agreement separated the two organisations into two different geographical areas.  CODETA was allocated Khayelitsha and most of the areas to the north of R300 whilst CATA was given access to the areas south of R300.  The allocation of areas was not based on anything except the preference for areas.  This meant in most instances, that associations that were on the wrong side of the boundary, were forced to join the federal structure that was near to them.

 

CODETA’s head office is at Kuwait rank, Site C, Khayelitsha and there are about 14 routes that operate under this umbrella body.   It is currently led by Mr David Speelman.   The leadership of CODETA has made claims that their organisation has a constitution.  The Committee was only provided with a copy of the standard constitution that was made available to the taxi industry by the National Department of Transport.  This constitution was developed for route based associations that needed to register with the Registrar of Taxis in the province.

 

All CODETA’s routes are registered with the Provincial Taxi Registrar. CODETA, as the federal structure, is not registered with the Registrar since it is not a route based taxi association and does not have a constitution.

 

CODETA survives on contributions from its affiliates.  All the CODETA affiliates pay various funds to the umbrella body and the money is used for the payment of the office staff, office rent, legal fees and many other issues that are handled by CODETA.    When the leadership was asked about the details of the organisation’s bank account, there was some reluctance to divulge the information.   Even though we were told by the leadership that the treasurer gives financial reports to the affiliates, the information we received from the affiliates was that there were no financial reports.

 

CODETA, like CATA, operates both long and short distance routes which originate from the Kuwait rank in Site C, Khayelitsha.  The long distance routes have major ranking facilities in Kuwait, Site C.  The short distance operations originate from two major ranks, Kuwait and Nonkqubela public transport interchanges.

 

In the past few years CODETA has been involved in violent clashes over routes with different service providers.  CODETA and CATA have been involved in violent clashes over routes in various areas in Cape Town.  Golden Arrow Bus Services have had their busses attacked by CODETA.  It is suspected that CATA also has been part of these attacks.   However, no one from this organisation has ever been prosecuted.

 

 

CODETA supervises the work of the routes and formally speaks on behalf of the organisation.  The joining fees of CODETA affiliates vary from route to route, but it is reliably understood that membership fees range from

R20 000 – R30 000.

 

2.4        CAPE AMALGAMATED TAXI ASSOCIATIONS (CATA)

 

CATA was formed in 1993 by a group of taxi operators mainly from WEBTA because these operators were dissatisfied with the way the CODETA leadership addressed their grievances.  These members felt that their views and needs were ignored by CODETA and therefore decided that a breakaway group was necessary.   Their aim was to establish a group that was going to represent their own interests.   As a result the CATA head office was initially located at Nyanga Central Rank but later moved to Olivetti House, Bellville.  When it became clear that CATA was not in a position to pay rent, the offices were moved back to the Nyanga rank.   CATA presently shares offices with the CATA Long Distance Taxi Association.

 

CATA is a federal structure that represents about 14 associations which are known as branches.   Most of them have their point of origin south of R300 in the Cape Metropolitan area.   CATA does not have a constitution, but all its branches have a constitution as required by legislation (NLTTA).   CATA is not registered with the Provincial Taxi Registrar because it does not have a constitution and does not operate in any route.   All CATA branches are provisionally registered with the Provincial Taxi Registrar.

 

Even though there is no yearly subscription fee by branches to CATA, the executive requests branches to pay monies whenever there is need for money.    Money is usually requested when the CATA  executive needs to pay for the activities of the federation.   There are three treasurers.    Even though the executive committee claimed to have a bank account they were not able to provide the Committee with the details of the account.   The branches are responsible for the maintenance of the CATA federal structure.  

 

In 1996 CATA and CODETA with the assistance of the then Minister for Transport and Public Works, Leonard Ramatlakane, and the High Court agreed to divide the areas of origin for the two federal structures.  The intention of this division was to ensure that these federal structures do not engage in violent clashes as a result of competition for routes. 

 

Before the agreement there were associations to the south of R300 that belonged to CODETA, such as Eyona Taxi Association in Guguletu and Inter-township in Langa.    Because of their location, these associations were forced to be part of CATA.   They joined CATA.

    

Most associations that belong to CATA originate from the following ranks:

·         Nyanga Central;

·         Langa;

·         Eyona;

·         Bellville;

·         Nyanga, and

·         Phillipi.

 

The Nyanga and Langa ranks have long distance operations that go to areas outside the Western Cape Province.  Bellville has long distance operations that are within the province.  Recently CATA has started long distance operations in the Kraaifontein and Hout Bay areas.   Most of these facilities are intended to service the short distance operations within the Cape Town Metro but are also used for long distance operations.

                                                    

2.5             AMAPHELA

 

During its investigations, the Committee came to know of sedan taxis operating in the townships of Nyanga, Guguletu, Crossroads and Phillipi East. These sedan taxis are known as “amaphela”.   “Amaphela” is a Xhosa word that denotes cockroaches.  There are taxis that are called “amaphela” in the communities of Nyanga, Guguletu, Crossroads and Phillipi East.  Evidence presented to the Committee suggested that these taxis operate without licenses, are un-roadworthy and transport passengers only in the townships. Most of the drivers of these vehicles do not have licenses.  The operators of “amaphela” belong to the Kiki-Murray taxi association which is affiliated to CATA.

 

The drivers justify their existence by arguing that the law (licensing) should not apply to them as they only transport people inside the townships and do not leave the township.

 

The Committee heard evidence that some of the established taxi operators own “amaphela” taxis.  The potential for conflict is significantly increased as “amaphela” taxis have now found people who are organising the owners into two camps, Kiki and Murray ranks.  This could lead to fights over access to ranks and routes.       

  

2.6       GOLDEN ARROW BUS SERVICES (GABS)

 

Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS) provides the only subsidised road based public transport services in the Cape Metropolitan area.  It is owned by a listed company Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited (HCI).

 

GABS presently operate on an interim contract since the Provincial Department of Transport has not finalised its public transport restructuring programme.   According to the National Land Transport Transition Act 22 of 2000, the provincial and metropolitan governments need to develop various public transport plans including the rationalisation plan which is aimed at government subsidised services.   These plans should serve as the basis for the issuing of contracts by government.    Part of the governments’ role is to decide on whether to go for tendered or negotiated contracts.   The provincial and metro governments have not finalised the approach, hence GABS still operates on an interim contract, in terms whereof the service provider operates on a month to month basis with no long term agreement.


 

Profile of Golden Arrow Bus Services

 

·         There are  932 vehicles in the bus fleet and a peak of 844 buses operating from Arrowgate, Phillipi, Tollgate, Eastgate, Simon’s Town and Atlantis;

·         5 836 departures per day;

·         51,3 million passengers journey per year;

·         900 routes operated;

·         Average trip length of 25,4 km;

·         Average distance between stops is 750 m;

·         202 600 passengers transported each working day;

·         163,7 million spent on supplies and services per year;

·         More than 209,7 million per year spent on wage and salary bill;

·         23,8 million litres of diesel used per year, and

·         2 332 employees.

 

2.7        Metrorail

 

Metrorail is a division of Transnet which is located under the National Department of Public Enterprise.   It is the only service provider contracted to operate commuter rail in the Western Cape.   The rail assets are owned by the South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC).  The SARCC is accountable to the National Department of Transport. 

 

Metrorail operates four major lines from Cape Town:

 

·         Simonstown;

·         Khayelitsha;

·         Cape Flats, and

·         Stellenbosch.

 

In the past few years Metrorail was affected by the increase of violence in trains.   Commuters were robbed, stabbed or thrown out of windows of moving trains.  This problem resulted in Metrorail taking various steps to address security in trains.   Some of the steps included the call for the re-introduction of railway police that will focus on the safety of commuters.  Others included the beefing up of security at stations and placing of cameras in strategic areas so as to be able to track the movement of offenders.  Even though these measures have not resulted in the total eradication of violence in trains, they did assist in the reduction of crime on commuter trains.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

3.         INSTITUTIONS

 

3.1               WESTERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND PUBLIC WORKS

 

The Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works has a Public Transport Branch that is responsible for the development, management and implementation of public transport policy, legislation and regulations. 

 

The Public Transport Branch has the following Directorates:

 

·         Empowerment and Institutional Management;

·         Planning and Contracts;

·         Provincial Transport Registrar;

·         Regulation and Control, and

·         Safety and Compliance.

The Public Transport Branch aims to deliver a safe, affordable, reliable and accessible public transport system.  It also aims to provide a quality public transport infrastructure.

The Branch is directly responsible for:

·         The transformation of the minibus taxi industry;.

·         Changing interim contracts to scheduled contracts to get rid of destructive competition on routes, and.

·         Managing the Provincial Operating License Board..

The Empowerment and Institutional Management Directorate is responsible for establishing and maintaining acceptable forums for the industry and for initiating, negotiating and formalizing all agreements with the different modes of public transport.   All this is aimed at enabling the industry to provide a high quality and user friendly public transport service.

The Planning and Contracts Directorate is responsible for managing public transport planning in terms of legislation, infrastructure and operations.  It is also responsible for managing transport contracts.

The Regulation and Control Directorate renders administrative support to the Provincial Operating License Board and Transport Registrar.

The Safety and Compliance Directorate is responsible for:

·         Ensuring that the public transport industry implements government's public transport plans;

·         Minimizing illegal transportation;

·         Taking active steps to improve the safety of passengers and commuters, and

·         Managing vehicle impounding facilities.

 

3.2               Provincial OperatinG Licensing Board (POLB)

 

The Western Cape Provincial Operating Licensing Board is a statutory institution established by the Minister in terms of Section 30 of the National Land Transport Transition Act 22 of 2000.   Sect 30 (1) of the NLTTA provides:

 

“ … every MEC must establish a board for the province and appoint fit and proper persons as members who are characterised by their independence, impartiality and fairness and who further are suitable for membership by reason of their understanding of and expertise in or knowledge of the public transport industry”. 

 

In terms of Sect 30 (3) of the NLTTA the board’s main functions are to receive, consider and decide on or otherwise dispose of licenses according to national and provincial legislation.

 

The Regulation and Control Directorate provides administrative support to the Provincial Operating Licensing Board.

 

 3.3       Provincial Taxi Registrar

 

The Provincial Taxi Registrar is a statutory institution established by the Minister in terms of Section 53 of the NLTTA.   Each province is required to set up a registrar’s office that will be responsible for the registration of taxi associations, association members, routes and vehicles.

 

The Registrar’s role is to ensure that taxi associations meet the standards set up in the legislation for registration.   One of the most important requirements for an association for provincial registration as an association, is that it should have adopted a constitution that contains the basic provisions set out in the provincial constitution.  The Registrar’s role is to provide the standard constitution to the taxi industry, facilitate registration of associations and keep records of the members of the associations.

 

The Registrar is also required by law to register route based taxi associations. She/he is also required to monitor and acquire information with regard to compliance or non-compliance by taxi associations with the standard constitution and the Code of Conduct.

 

The Minister, in consultation with the Registrar, may appoint a panel of assessors to assist the Registrar in executing his/her duties as set out in the NLTTA.   One of the assessors’ roles is to advise and make recommendations to the Registrar on issues relating to the taxi industry.

 

3.4 City of Cape Town: Transport and Planning DEPARTMENT 

      

The City of Cape Town plays a role in the licensing and adjudication process. The POLB must notify the planning authority (in this case, the City of Cape Town) in terms of Section 39 of the NLTTA (22 of 2000), of any applications in the area of the planning authority.  This includes renewals, transfer of conversion permits and amendments.

 

The POLB must notify the City within 30 days after receiving an application. The City has 30 days to comment on the applications received from the Licensing Board.

 

The City is expected to comment on the applications with having due regard to transport plans prepared for the area.  The POLB is bound by the recommendations of City when it comes to refusal of permits, renewals etc.

The City investigates the routes and makes a recommendation as to whether they are overtraded. 

 

The City conducts its own research on the status of every route and the maximum permissible amount of taxis that could be allowed on specific routes.   The POLB after deliberating on the recommendations from the City will either accept or ignore the recommendations.
4.         LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

 

As with all areas of public transport, there are a number of law enforcement agencies that are responsible for the policing of public transport especially in the minibus taxi industry.   They include the South African Police Services, the City Police, the Provincial and Local Traffic Police.  The Department of Justice’s National Prosecuting Authority is responsible for the prosecution of operators who commit crime by breaking the laws that are meant to be observed by the industry.   Every department has a different role to play and there is integrated planning for each of the institutions that are involved in the policing function.

 

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has an intelligence gathering role and performs threat analyses on government programmes with respect to the minibus taxi industry.

 

4.1        WESTERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SAFETY

 

The Western Cape Department of Community Safety (DOCS) is responsible

for the civilian oversight of policing in the Province.   It has a relationship with the Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works in that it is responsible for provincial traffic control.   The department also has a project that is designed to provide safety on trains and at railway stations.  The Bambanani campaign provides security at railway interchanges across the Cape Metro.

 

Furthermore, the Department of Transport and Public Works pays for the deployment of 692 Bambanani volunteers at 42 railway stations. The department is not directly involved in the minibus taxi industry except for coordinating law enforcement agencies with respect to investigation of criminal activity.   The Minister of Community Safety has an oversight role with respect to the operational side of the investigations.  In the Western Cape, particularly during the post 1994 Nationalist Party hegemony in Government, MEC’s were called Ministers.  This was unfortunate because it sometimes caused perceptual confusions as to whether a National or Provincial Minister of State was meant.   Though there is now an attempt to let the Western Cape fall in line with the rest of the country, the old terminology of MEC’s being called “Ministers” still unfortunately exists.

      

4.2        SAPS

 

In terms of the South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995, the South African Police Services (SAPS) is charged with crime prevention and law enforcement.   It has the responsibility of making sure that all the laws relating to the minibus taxi industry are observed.  It investigates instances of criminality and also patrols taxi ranks when there are problems relating to violence.   SAPS established a taxi violence investigation unit during the early 1990’s.    They have subsequently dissolved this and other specialised units.

 

Most of the investigators involved in investigating some of the incidents of taxi conflicts have been drawn from the Serious Violent Crimes Unit, and SAPS have been responsible for all of the investigations relating to taxi hit squads during all the taxi related violence incidents.

 

4.3        PROVINCIAL Traffic Police

 

Provincial traffic policing is a competency of the Provincial Traffic Department.  They are part of the Department of Community Safety.

 

The provincial traffic police perform their mandate in terms of the National Land Transport Transition Act, 22 of 2000 (NLTTA).   Their core function is to address traffic violations in terms of the National Road Traffic Act, 93 of 1996 and the NLTTA.  They have twelve Traffic Centres and two Operational Centres located in Brackenfell and Somerset West.   They operate and work with the local authority and SAPS when taxis need to be impounded.    A new taxi pound was opened at Ndabeni on 12 April 2005.   They are responsible for the national and provincial roads leading into and out of Cape Town.

 

4.4        CITY OF CAPE TOWN TRAFFIC POLICE

 

The Traffic Police is located in the office of the Chief Operations Directorate.  They are deemed to be the lead agency and are located in the Chief Operations Officer Directorate.  Their role is to prevent and reduce traffic crimes, to check for moving violations, to perform specialist functions with respect to the operating licenses of minibus taxis, the enforcement of bye-laws and the enforcement of operating licenses and routes.  They issue between 900 and 1400 fines per month.

 

There are 450 traffic officers and 450 law enforcement officers, of which 28 have been dedicated to public transport which includes goods, commercial vehicles, minibus, sedan taxis and courier vehicles.   Statistics indicate that they deal with between 2 - 300 complaints against minibus taxis per week. They have 4253 registered taxis on the databases and 3214 illegal or unregistered taxis.

 

4.5        City Police

 

The City Police were established in terms of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (as amended).   There are currently about 800 members of the City Police who have responsibility for the following areas:

 

1)       Traffic Violations;

2)       Bye-Law enforcement;

3)       Crime Prevention, and

4)       Protection of Council property.

 

The City Police are responsible for playing a support role in policing operations.   They do not however have an investigative capacity and do not become involved in police investigations, although they share intelligence on crime hotspots with SAPS.

 

 

4.6        CITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 

 

The City employs approximately 400 law enforcement officers who have the responsibility of protecting council property like electrical sub-stations, council buildings and public facilities such as civic centres.   This should include taxi ranks.


 

5.         OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

 

There are other law enforcement agencies whose functions impact on the enforcement of laws in the taxi industry.   The National Prosecuting Authority and the National Intelligence Agency are two such institutions that play a role in dealing with offenders in the Taxi Industry.

 

5.1         THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY (NPA)

 

The National Prosecuting Authority reports directly to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.   The NPA was established in terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998.   The role and functions of the NPA are to prosecute offenders who commit crimes.    The NPA consists of the following arms:

 

  1. The Directorate of Public Prosecutions;
  2. The Directorate of Special Operations;
  3. The Special Investigative Unit;
  4. The Sexual Offences Unit, and
  5. Asset Forfeiture Unit.

 

For the purposes of investigating taxi related crimes, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Directorate of Special Operations (the Scorpions) and the Asset Forfeiture Units are relevant.

 

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is responsible for the prosecution of persons who commit crime.  They have been at the forefront of prosecuting individuals who committed violent crimes in the taxi industry. They are currently continuing investigations around specific incidents with a view to prosecuting those who are responsible for crime in the minibus taxi industry.


 

5.2         THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA)

 

In terms of the Intelligence Services Act 38 of 1994, NIA is charged with domestic intelligence and with the duty of gathering information where there is a threat to the state.   NIA is responsible for the protection of the state and its citizen’s against domestic threats.  It identifies possible threats to national security and has identified the instability in the taxi industry as such a threat.

 

NIA has stated that an early warning system in the taxi industry is essential to prepare government, and law enforcement agencies in particular, for intervention.


                       

6.         OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

 

During the course of its investigations, the Committee heard evidence from organised labour, organised business, community development forums, civic associations, political parties and private individuals.

 

6.1        ORGANISED BUSINESS      

 

Organised business is represented by the Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  They have more than 4600 members operating in the region.  To date, they collectively account for 200 000 jobs in the formal and informal sector of the economy.

 

In the Western Cape, the local chapter of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry is represented by Albert Schuitemaker. Organised business plays a vital role in the economy by providing jobs to stimulate the economy.   The industry is dependent on the transport sector getting people to work on time.  It is their opinion that the taxi industry is a major mover of people, although trains have a higher density of people.

 

A stable and a conflict-free minibus taxi industry is good for business.  Conflicts and instability in the minibus taxi industry cause disruptions.  Disruptions affect transportation of workers to and from work.   This inevitably affects business planning, productivity and so on, since business cannot function well in an environment attended by unpredictability.  This in turn leads to conflict between labour and management. The productivity of business is affected in the process and this impacts on delivery and ultimately on the business planning process.  Business functions in an area of predictability and therefore cannot afford to function optimally in an uncertain environment.

 

 

 

6.2        COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FORUMS

 

There are a number of community development associations that have a stake and interest in the minibus taxi industry.  Not for lack of trying, the Committee has regrettably not had any significant submissions from any community development forums except from that of Khayelitsha, YEK’UMUNYU.

 

YEK’UMUNYU (stop the greed) organisation made a presentation to the Committee and suggested that taxi owners should be in a position to tender for road contracts and other government tenders.  They also suggested that taxi owners should become owners of petrol service stations.

 

6.3        CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS

 

No evidence was presented to the Committee by Civic Associations.   Well  known civic associations such as the South African National Civics Association (SANCO) presented no evidence to the Committee despite calls on them to do so.   The exception was SANCO Du Noon, who represented the Du Noon Taxi Association in a particular dispute in the Milnerton / Blaauwberg area.   The fact that no other submissions were received leaves a gap.  In the opinion of the Committee, conflict and instability in the minibus taxi industry directly affect the community, and the absence of its direct voice on this subject is extremely regrettable.

 

6.4        POLITICAL PARTIES

 

Several letters were written to all the political parties in the Provincial Legislature to make written submissions to the Committee.  None of the political parties responded, except an individual member of the Democratic Alliance, Mr Robin Carlisle.

 

It is an indictment on the political parties that none of them elected to provide the Committee with any submission, when they are the first to complain about the violence that has been generated as a result of taxi violence.   As self-proclaimed “representatives” of the people, and as lawmakers, one would have expected them to have taken advantage of the existence of the Committee to make their views and policies known on this important subject.

 

The ruling party is the African National Congress, in alliance with the New National Party.  Other parties that are represented in the Provincial Legislature are:

 

  • The Democratic Alliance;
  • The Independent Democrats;
  • The African Christian Democratic Party, and
  • The United Democratic Movement.

 

None of these parties, as already stated made any submissions to the Committee with the exception of the Democratic Alliance, despite repeated attempts and requests for them to make submissions.   Only the New National Party responded.  It indicated that they did not have anyone who has information on the taxi industry.  They therefore elected not to make any submissions to the Committee.

 

6.5        INDIVIDUALS

 

Several individuals made submissions.  Some gave evidence before the Committee.  Their evidence has been valuable in reasonably shaping our view that certain individuals reasonably may be found to be behind the violent incidents in the industry.

 

In total, we have seen 20 individuals in private and public hearings. 


 

6.6        ORGANISED LABOUR

 

Organised Labour, COSATU and NACTU, participated and gave evidence to the Committee.    COSATU has an affiliate, called the South African Transport and Workers Union that operates in the Taxi Industry. They are trying to recruit taxi drivers, but have not been successful.   NACTU also has an affiliate called Transport and Omnibus Workers Union

 

COSATU stated that they view taxis as feeders to the line haul and did not see the possibility of taxis having multiple routes.  They argued that there were taxi owners who have many taxis and exploit drivers.  They believed that there should be one taxi, one owner and that there has not been transparency in the industry.  They also stated that operators and drivers were not able to operate their taxis as small businesses, and that the industry is run by a taxi mafia who use violent tactics against their competition.   This should cease if there is to be any meaningful progress.

 

NACTU agreed that there was violence in the industry and stated that the Minister for Transport had clearly avoided meeting with them.  The Minister had clearly preferred to meet with COSATU instead.  They also indicated that they have affiliates in the transport sector that have been attacked and killed by taxi operators.

 

 6.7       NGOs

 

The U-Managing Conflict Organisation (UMAC) organisation was the only non-governmental organisation that gave evidence before the Committee. UMAC is a conflict management agency that has been involved in mediating conflict between the taxis for over ten years.

 

It has managed to successfully broker peace in some of the taxi wars on the Cape Flats.  There have been very few non-governmental organisations that have worked in the taxi industry over the last few years.

7.         THE PROCESS

 

Members of the public and identified stakeholders provided evidence before the Committee.

 

It met with, and received confidential briefings from organisations involved in law enforcement, private individuals who had interests in the industry and members of taxi associations.

 

The purpose of the confidential briefings was to brief the stakeholders what was expected from them, and also to get a sense what their expectations were.   A second round of consultative sessions was held with stakeholders in the form of an imbizo where the majority of stakeholders and role-players attended.

 

The Committee always endeavoured to have the hearings in public, except where to do so could jeopardize the safety of its witnesses, in which case the hearings were held in camera.  

 

The Committee was expecting that members of civil society and members of the public would participate in the hearings.   The open public hearings were attended by members of the media.

   

7.1        THOSE WHO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED

 

Not everyone that was expected to attend did so.  There was a very poor showing by a number of key stakeholders to the process.  The Committee was disappointed that no commuter groups chose to give evidence before the Committee.

 

A number of stakeholders did however choose to attend.   The following table is an indication of the stakeholders that chose to attend the hearings and present the Committee with evidence:

 

SUMMARY OF HEARINGS

 

DATE

 

NAME & SURNAME

 

ORGANISATION

 

PUB / PRIV

30 May 2005

Stakeholders imbizo

 

Public

 

 

UDM

Public

 

 

POLB

Public

 

 

NPA

Public

 

 

NIA

Public

 

 

Community Safety Dept

Public

 

 

SANCO

Public

 

 

Transport Dept

Public

 

 

NACTU

Public

 

 

Cape Chamber of Commerce

Public

 

 

City of Cape Town

Public

 

 

Golden Arrow Bus Service

Public

 

 

Metrorail

Public

 

 

Yek’ Umunyu

Public

 

 

Public Transport Interchange

Public

 

 

SAPS

Public

 

 

CATA

Public

 

 

UTA Blaauwberg

Public

 

 

DCS

Public

 

 

BELLTA

Public

 

 

CATA Eyona

Public

 

 

CODETA

Public

 

 

CATA Langa

Public

 

 

 

Public

06 June 2005

CATA EYONA

CATA Eyona

Public

 

 

CATA Langa

Public

07 June 2005

Fatgie Davids

Basil Alcock

POLB

Public

 

Fezile Mbambo

Taxi Register

Public

08 June 2005

Merrington

City Traffic Police

Public

 

B. Knoll

City Police

Public

 

H. F. Malgas

Provincial Traffic Police

Public

09 June 2005

Victor Thomas

SNKTA

Public

 

 

CODETA

Public

10 June 2005

Mr. B. Nagel

WCPTC

Public

15 June 2005

Provincial Commissioner Mzwandile Petros

 

SAPS

 

 

Donavan Nel

NIA

 

 

D. Jaxa

BELTA CATA

Public

17 June 2005

Martin Makasi

Ntuthu Mtwana

UMAC

Public

 

T. Franks

NACTU

Public

 

M. Madolo

SANCO

Public

 

Howard Ngcobo

D.T.A.

Public

20 June 2005

CODETA

CODETA

Public

22 June 2005

Don Pasqualie

Nick Cronje

COSATU

GABS

Public

 

23 June 2005

Duma Jaxa

BELTA CATA

Public

 

N. Mbona

BLOEWATA

 

27 June 2005

Mike Skrikker

City Council

 

 

Adv. Sanet van Aarde

Forensic Audit

 

 

Sandra van Dalen

City Council

 

28 June 2005

Adv. Bridgeman

 

 

 

Scorpions

 

Public

29 June 2005

Mr. Davids

O. Licensing Board

Public

 

Mr. Bomseni

 

Public

30 June 2005

Mr. Alcock

POLB

Public

 

Mr. T. Manyathi

Transport & P/works

Public

04 July 2005

Special Hearing

CATA Seawater

 

 

 

Inter-townships

 

 

 

Eyona

 

05 July 2005

Special Hearing

CATA Seawater

 

 

 

Inter-townships

 

 

 

Eyona

 

05 July 2005

Maseti & Jaxa

CATA Mother body

 

08 July 2005

Andre Harrison

Metrorail

Public

 

Debbie Miller

Human rights NGO

 

12 July 2005

Sammy Tizora

Interchange manager

Public

 

CATA Seawater

CATA Seawater

 

 

CATA Langa

CATA Langa

 

18 July 2005

W. Mtule

CATA

 

 

F. Ndabeni

CATA

 

20 July 2005

J. Matinisi

Inter-township

 

 

K. Sithebile

CATA Eyona

 

 

 

7.2        WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

 

The Committee received written submissions from most of the persons who testified before it.   We did not receive, however, and despite request, submissions from the Provincial Registrar, the POLB and the Taxi Association CATA.  We also received confidential submissions from individuals, organisations and law enforcement authorities.

 

The Committee also received submissions from attorneys, police, the National Intelligence Agency, Scorpions and individual institutions.

 

 

 

 


           

8.         SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE GATHERED

 

The following chapters are a summary of evidence presented by people in prisons, people who gave testimony in public and private hearings.  It also includes evidence presented to the Committee from special hearings that were called.   We wish to point out that the evidence that the Committee has gathered is not prosecution ready evidence.    However, we are confident that we have gathered evidence that forms a good basis for further more intensive investigations.  Time and capacity constraints made it impossible for the Committee to do more than it did.   However, there is enough credible information gathered that justifies further intensive investigations.

 

The Committee has compiled a confidential annexe that contains a number of names about whom allegations have been made.   The annexe gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individuals mentioned may have committed serious crimes that warrant further investigations that should lead to  prosecutions.  This annexe, sealed, will be handed to the Premier, and it will be up to him to deal with it as he deems fit.

 

 

8.1               EVIDENCE FROM PEOPLE IN DETENTION

 

During the initial stages of the investigation, it came to the Committee’s attention that there were people in detention who could assist the Committee.  The Committee made appropriate arrangements with the Department of Correctional Services to conduct interviews with these individuals.   This was not only because the Committee members wanted to get an in depth understanding of the industry but also because the people behind bars wanted to expose the king pins or warlords responsible for the instability and conflict in the minibus taxi industry. 


 

8.1.1     Perpetrators of violence in the taxi industry

 

From the evidence gathered the Committee established that there is a culture of gangsterism in the minibus taxi industry.  The Committee heard evidence that during the eighties gangsters such as the Big Eight and “OnoBalaclava” ruled the industry.  During 2000/1, the Ten-Ten gang emerged and was responsible for attacks on Golden Arrow Bus Services.  These gangs, amongst other acts, terrorized communities, committed armed robberies and killed people considered to be enemies of their associations and/or the above-mentioned gangs.

 

It is evident from the information gathered from our sources that sophisticated ganglords are in the top structures of the taxi associations.  Not all taxi operators are members of these gangs.   A few individuals are warlords and they benefit from these taxi wars.   These individuals are mostly feared and their decisions become law and cannot be challenged.  They literally run the taxi industry even though some of them are not in the elected structures of the associations.  We heard evidence of cases where an elected chairperson would be forced to take orders from warlords, failing which his life or that of his family would be at risk. 

 

8.1.2     Rise to power

 

Most of these warlords started as mere taxi drivers working for other operators and they worked their way up by getting involved in the taxi wars.  It is generally accepted in the industry that those who have fought bravely during war, or have killed people, will be feared, and that is a ticket to becoming a warlord.   Members of the associations are forced to take part in the wars, failing which, they will either not be allowed to load their taxis at the ranks or face paying fines called fines for cowards.   This was chiefly the work of the Big Eight and the “OnoBalaclava” Gangs.  This is a form of extortion used by warlords to make sure that everyone becomes involved in the war.  Forcing new members to take part in the elimination of unwanted enemies is also considered a form of initiation.  The money collected goes into a war chest and is used to finance another war.

 

8.1.3     Hit-men (iimbovane)

 

Previous taxi wars were characterized by the taxi owners physically taking part in the shootings.    It is a recent development of the last nine years that hit men were hired. 

 

Hiring of hit-men, or commonly referred to as “iimbovane” (ants) to eliminate unwanted enemies is common in both CATA and CODETA.   Warlords decide who is to be eliminated and “iimbovane” are hired to do the job.  Normally these hit-men are not members of the association and they are in some instances accompanied by ordinary members of the association who are still working their way up to identify and/or in some cases assist in the killing of unwanted taxi operators.  When arrested, the above-mentioned warlords instruct members of the association to contribute money for bail and/or legal fees for their attorneys.   One of our sources revealed that “imbovane” are paid up to R12 000.00 for a single killing contract.   There is information that the war chest is also used to pay traditional healers’ bills.

 

Our sources also revealed specific individuals that are directly involved in the hiring of “iimbovane”.   Names of implicated persons from both associations have been made available to this Committee.

 

Whilst Coloured members of these associations are rarely involved in the planning and executing of attacks relating to taxi wars, there is, however, evidence that vehicles that are used to transport “iimbovane” to areas where they are supposed to commit the executions, are made available by Coloured members.

 

From the evidence presented to the Committee, “iimbovane” are people with strong military backgrounds.   Some are former liberation movement and Self-Defence Units cadres.  This is clear from the military precision with which the executions are planned and carried out. 

 

8.1.4     Collection of moneys from the ranks

 

Our sources also told us that there are monies that are collected from ranks.  The Committee was told that, during the taxi wars, warlords would appoint people who would be responsible for collecting money on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays of every week for the duration of the war from every member of the association.

 

During the taxi wars every taxi operator is expected to contribute R100.00 on the above-mentioned days.   This is a lot of money because if an association has a thousand taxis, a R100 000.00 is collected each day when money is collected.   Some of these mother body associations normally have more than a thousand taxis.  This money also is never accounted for, not only because taxi associations do not keep books of account but also because no one is allowed to question how the money is spent. 

 

This money is spent on inter alia the payment of “iimbovane”, traditional healers, bail, legal fees, ammunition, corrupt law enforcement officials, and so on.   The rest is utilized by warlords for their own personal needs.

 

8.1.5     Collaboration with law enforcement personnel

 

There is information suggesting that some of these warlords have concluded illicit deals with corrupt law enforcement officials.   There are also allegations that some of these warlords are police informers.  There were situations where these police turned a blind eye on illegal activities committed by these informers. 

 

We were informed that there were incidences where our sources and informers were jointly involved in criminal activities where they used vehicles belonging to the informers.  These vehicles would be confiscated and warlords would phone police officials and the cars would be released without any further investigation being conducted.

 

Some interviews revealed that some police officers wanted the taxi operators to buy them things (ranging from food to vehicles) in exchange for arrangement of either bail or dismissal of the cases under investigation.

 

The Committee was also told of an incident of a gunfight between members of two associations.  The police arrived.  There was a car chase.  Our sources drove into a taxi rank and changed vehicles.   On that day, the police came to the rank and confiscated the vehicles which were allegedly used in the incident.  One of the warlords phoned a specific police officer and immediately after the telephone call our source was ordered by the warlord to go and pick the vehicle up at the police station.  There were neither arrests nor prosecutions made in relation to the matter.

 

Concerns were raised about the manner in which certain police officials handle evidence.   One allegation was that statements made to police officials on tapes were leaked to the taxi operators, and tapes containing their evidence were played at taxi ranks.  According to our sources, the only reasonable inference they could draw was that someone in the police service deliberately leaked these tapes to the taxi operators.

 

8.1.6     The Motive

 

In all interviews with our sources, particularly those serving jail sentences, they were asked about their motives for volunteering information.  Their stated motive for talking with the Committee was that they wanted to expose the warlords.   They told the Committee that they felt betrayed by the leadership of the association.  They allege that immediately after their convictions, the associations broke all ties with them and also took their taxis out of the industry.   Some of these taxis were sold but they never got the proceeds thereof.

 

 

 

8.2        Evidence from public hearings

 

Provincial Operating Licensing Board (POLB)

 

The Provincial Operating License Board is meant to discharge its duties in terms of the NLTTA.  The POLB is supported by an administrative section. The Board is headed by Fatgie Davis and it is appointed by the Minister for Transport.   One of its main functions is to receive applications for permits and decide on them in terms of the NLTTA.    According to the POLB, they receive about 3500 applications per month.  There is a backlog with the current processing of applications at the Provincial Operating Licensing Board.   The other process is the conversion of permits into operating licenses.   There are many operators who operate without permits.

 

The administrative section is headed by Basil Alcock and they are the support staff of the Board.  Some of the problems they are faced with include applications that were being lost, backlogs (in the region of 4000) and staff being improperly trained.  It was found that the staff also lacked people’s skills.   What exacerbates matters is that almost half of the staff members are on fixed term contracts.  There were allegations of corruption and favouritism at the Board.   Mr. Alcock agreed that it was a problem which the Department of Transport needed to address.

 

Provincial Transport Registrar

 

The Provincial Transport Registrar’s (Mr. Fezile Mbambo) function is to receive applications from the route based associations for the registration of the members, their vehicles and their routes.  He has to see to it that registrations comply with the provisions of the NLTTA.    His other duties are to oversee Annual General Meetings of Associations, in compliance with the Act.   In our province there are 152 provisionally registered associations and for them to be fully registered, all their members would have to have operating licenses.

 

The Registrar told us that some of the problems that he is encountering in his office is the fact that these routes are not registered before they are handed over to the Board.   Secondly assessors who have to verify routes registered by associations and check compliance with policy, have up to now not been appointed.   The Western Cape is the only province in the country that has not appointed assessors.

 

The Registrar agreed that situations such as what happened at the Cape Gate shopping centre could have been avoided if both the City and the Province’s Planning Directorate took into account that the public would want access to Cape Gate by means other than private vehicles, and for that reason, minibus taxis should have been planned for.

 

City and Traffic Police

 

The City and Traffic Police were represented by Mr. Merrington and Mr. Knoll. The Directorate of City Police within the City of Cape Town was established after the integration of the administrations of local authority during December 2000.   There were six different administrations of local authority namely South Peninsula, Helderberg, Blaauwberg, Tygerberg, Oostenberg and the Cape Town Metro.

 

According to their statistics there are 4253 legal taxis and 3214 illegal taxis within the City of Cape Town.  This gives us a total of approximately 7467 taxis operating within the City.   They also alluded to the fact that they do not have enough space should they want to impound all the illegal taxis.   There is just one pound in the Province, in Ndabeni and owned by the City of Cape Town.

 

Their role and responsibility when it comes to enforcement is to prosecute offenders for all types of offences, ranging from speeding to specialist functions relating to taxi offences, for example, interpretation of licenses and routes.   On average they prosecute between 900 and 1400 taxis per month. They admitted that when it comes to human resources, they do not have the capacity to be proactive as they would have liked to and that they are more of a reactive service than a proactive one.   This leads to the operators taking law into their own hands.   The formation of a special taxi unit will alleviate the situation.   They also mentioned that there is no synergy between the different enforcement agencies within local, provincial and national government.

                                                     

Dealing with the misperception that the ranks belong to the associations, they advocated the idea that the City should assume management of the ranks. The other issue that was mentioned was the issue of the sedan taxis that operate at the townships commonly known as “amaphela”.   It is a well known fact that these vehicles are neither roadworthy nor do they have permits.  Even though this is a disaster waiting to happen, there seems to be a lack of will from the authorities to deal with the situation.

 

Provincial Traffic Police

 

Mr. Patrick Richard Curran testified on behalf of the Provincial Traffic Police. They are responsible for traffic law enforcement throughout the Western Cape, more particularly violations under the National Road Traffic Act, 93 of 1996 as well as NLTTA, 22 of 2000.   There are 385 traffic officials deployed throughout the province, 113 of whom are stationed within the Metropolitan Area.

 

Provincial Traffic Police also admitted that they have a capacity problem when it comes to enforcement.  The routes that they are responsible for are the highways, freeways and the national roads leading into and from Cape Town. With regards the Metropolitan Area, their duty is to support both City law enforcement agencies and SAPS.


 

Scottsdene Northpine Kraaifontein Taxi Association (SNKTA)

 

This Taxi Association is affiliated to CODETA and it was represented by Mr. Mervyn Reginald Petersen and its legal representative Ms. Celeste Louise Catherine Holmes. They operate from Kraaifontein, Northpine and  Scottsdene.

 

As a result of the conflict in Crossroads between the witdoeke and the comrades, some of the taxi operators started to settle in the Bloekombos and Wallacedene communities .   On the 22nd February 1996 CATA entered into a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with SNKTA in terms whereof they would load passengers between 5 and 6 a.m.   After the agreement was signed, CATA deviated from the agreement and they operated throughout the day on the Kraaifontein route.   In 1997 they successfully recruited African operators who were in SNKTA and amongst them is Justice Ngubo who is now Chairperson of Bellville Taxi Association (BELLTA).   When the breakaway group (known as BLOEWATA), split from SNKTA they could not be registered.  They thus operated under the auspices of BELLTA.    After joining BELLTA, which was a CATA affiliate, SNKTA was chased from the Kraaifontein, Bellville and Durbanville routes.   It led to SNKTA joining  CODETA .

 

This unresolved conflict provided the precursor for the recent conflict at the Cape Gate shopping centre. 

 

Cape Gate is a shopping centre erected in Okavango Road in Eversdal and it is private property.   BLOEWATA and SNKTA affiliated to CATA and CODETA respectively, had deliberations with the owner of the property with regards to securing rank facilities at the mall.  Initially SNKTA and BLOEWATA were allocated the same rank.   When conflict emerged between the two parties, they were separated and a peace agreement was signed.   On 2 March 2005 Khayelitsha Bellville Route moved straight from Khayelitsha to the Cape Gate Shopping Centre.   According to CODETA, passengers from Khayelitsha wanted to travel straight to the Cape Gate shopping centre instead of going via the Bellville interchange and this resulted in the conflict and accompanying violence.   However on the 10 March 2005 an agreement was signed aimed at resolving the conflict.

 

Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council

 

The Taxi Council was represented by Mr. Basil Nagel (Chairperson of the Council) and Mr. Paul Browning (Advisor for SANTACO).  SANTACO was established in 1998 as a result of the recommendations flowing from the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) report.    Mr. Joe Mabaso was elected its first President.  The Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council has a total membership of 90.   It has 18 regional councils and 152 primary associations.  The Council is of the opinion that they do not get recognition from the Provincial Government which instead directly engages the so called “Mother Bodies”. This is regrettable because the Council is the Government’s recognized representative body for the taxi industry in the Province.  The Memorandum of Understanding that was signed between the Government and the Council has not been honoured by either side.   However, the Council is looking forward to the day when the Provincial Government would work hand-in-glove with the democratically elected representative body in the province, namely the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council. 

 

The Council’s view on the issue of the Board is that it is not working efficiently and that it is offering poor quality of service to the operators.   Both Nagel and Browning complained about preferential treatment at the Operating Licensing Board.  They also complained about the slow pace of processing applications. They further accused the Board of just taking decisions without consulting the relevant taxi associations.

 

They further testified that, amongst other things, the Registrar was not appointed on a permanent basis, the routes have not been assessed and associations have not complied with registration – all factors that were bound to create instability and conflict in the industry.

 

Nagel criticised the Registrar, stating that he is failing to carry out his tasks as stipulated in the National Land Transport Transitional Act, and that he regularly involves himself in matters which are not part of his powers and duties.  Nagel added that only 40% of the Associations did not hold annual general meetings and 60% did not submit financial reports in 2004.

 

Explaining how the recent bout of violence began at Cape Gate, Nagel said that nobody considered the public transport needs to the centre and a group belonging to BELLTA broke away and established another association called BLOEWATA.   He provided the Committee with background to the Cape Gate dispute.  He also indicated that the Registrar should take responsibility for registering different associations on the same route.

 

South African Police Services (SAPS)

 

The South African Police Services was represented by the Western Cape Provincial Police Commissioner, Mzwandile Petros.   In 2000 when there was a war between the taxi and bus industry, the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, Jackie Selebi instructed that a provincial task team investigate the conflict.   The mandate was actually fulfilled by the 31st of August 2000 when the perpetrators of the violence were arrested.  The current trend in SAPS is to disband taxi violence investigative units when there is no serious taxi violence, and to re-establish such units at short notice when the taxi wars erupts again.   The Commissioner is of the view that an inspectorate be created whose sole responsibility would be to deal with public transport issues and offences.   This inspectorate would also be responsible for the impounding of unroadworthy vehicles.   This would allow SAPS and the Traffic Department to address their mandates and assist the inspectorate once violence erupts.  This inspectorate should be housed in a separate department.

 

Allegations of the law enforcement agencies doing nothing about acts of illegality as well as police officials who have a vested interest in the industry were put to the Provincial Commissioner.   There were also allegations that the police do not have capacity to deal with the situation.   In addition, there were allegations of favouritism where SAPS were seen to be siding with one association against the other.   With regards to the issue of police officials who are involved in taxi related criminal activities, the Commissioner stated that there was little evidence of this.  He added that there were regulations that prohibited police officers from owning taxis.

 

Commissioner Petros further testified that the police have identified the conflict to be between CATA and CODETA.  The recent conflict has erupted because of the decision by CODETA to bypass the Bellville Interchange and proceed straight to Cape Gate.    Before the conflict, CODETA would transport passengers to Bellville Interchange, from where CATA would transport them further to Durbanville.  CODETA transported passengers directly from Khayelitsha to Kraaifontein, Brackenfell or Durbanville.  CATA operators in the Kraaifontein area are against CODETA servicing their area. When violence erupted, SAPS members were deployed to stabilize the situation which resulted in a number of arrests and the seizure of fourteen firearms and six vehicles.  Continued conflict between CATA and CODETA in April 2005 resulted in the closure of the taxi ranks in Brackenfell, Bellville, Durbanville and Bloekombos.   The taxi ranks were re-opened for business on Tuesday 19th April 2005, after CATA and CODETA had once more given their assurance to put an end to all forms of violence.

 

In conclusion, the Commissioner stressed that as long as there is money to be made in the taxi industry, as long as the industry was not being effectively regulated and the enforcement of the public transport regulations not being effectively carried out, conflict will continue.  He added that TRP in the minibus taxi industry should also be finalized, and the implementation thereof hastened so as to stabilize the minibus taxi transport in the province.

 

National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

 

NIA was represented by Mr. Nel.  In introducing his evidence, Mr Nel indicated that the minibus taxis were the most used form of public transport. The remainder of his evidence can be summarised as appears below.   The unfortunate part was that this industry is marred by conflict.  This can be associated with the unregulated environment from which the industry originates.   The government has taken a number of policy decisions, some of which yielded the expected results whilst others have been exploited by the industry players.   For instance the TRP which is aimed at addressing the problems in the industry.   However, issues generally raised by the industry against this process is the question of profitability to taxi owners, affordability to commuters, possible job losses and interference of government in the affairs of the taxi industry through the introduction of regulations.

 

Lack of feedback from WCPTC and provincial government to the taxi operators has caused perceptions and discontent over the TRP.   The majority of operators obtain information on TRP from their fellow operators.  As a result there is lack of information on the role that TRP will play in the restructuring of the taxi industry.

 

Mr Nel said that the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council (WCPTC) was formed through the government’s formalization process and thereafter Taxi Rank Councils were established.   He added that in the recent taxi violence, government engaged taxi associations, with limited involvement of the WCPTC.  Consequently the position of associations was enhanced.  In addition, he said that operators now view associations as capable of delivering more than the WCPTC.

 

With regard to the issue of operating permits, Mr Nel said the National Minister of Transport has proclaimed the 31st of August 2005 as a cut-off date for the conversion of permits systems into operating licenses.   He added that the Western Cape has not started with this procedure and that Province is not likely to meet the deadline.  He said that a number of taxis were operating without permits because of lack of a specialised unit focusing on ensuring that the taxis observe the rules governing the industry.   He added that allegations of corruption have been levelled against traffic officers, whilst others have been accused of favouring some operators over others.

 

NIA recommended that Government should keep operators up to date on TRP process.   The system of allocation of permits should be reviewed with a view to improve the turnaround time on applications. Transport planning should form part of broader integrated development plans.  The Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works, the Cape Town Unicity and the Licensing Board should collectively include transport planning as part of medium to long term development planning.

 

In conclusion Mr. Nel stated that the instability in the taxi industry is a product of a combination of factors, some of which can be resolved by government. He emphasized that government processes should be streamlined to facilitate operations in the industry.   If these are addressed, transgressions of the law could be addressed effectively.

 

Scorpions

 

The Scorpions were represented by Adv. Bruce Morrison.   He confirmed that the taxi industry is the only transport industry that is not formally regulated by government.   It has largely been left to its own devices, much to the detriment of commuters who are forced to rely on them for transport.

 

He recommended that law enforcement agencies need to revisit historical taxi violence cases, as many of the perpetrators of the old taxi conflict, CATA and CODETA, still want to control the industry.   The alleged “warlords” need to be identified, investigated and convicted.   Taxi owners or drivers found guilty of serious criminal offences need to be blacklisted, and never be able to be in the industry again in any capacity.

 

The Scorpions said that they had received reports of taxi associations recruiting people to cut the cables on Metrorail lines.   The Scorpions added that cutting the cables disrupts the train services.  This compels the commuters to rely on taxis for transport to and from work.

 

Adv. Morrison explained that the Western Cape is experiencing an increase in the number of new residential areas and shopping centres.   A new shopping centre along the N1 was the scene of much of the taxi violence that erupted this year.   Various taxi associations competed for the monopoly of the route to this shopping centre, with dire consequences to not only operators but also innocent commuters.    Adv. Morrison thus proposed that the state department that approves the applications for developments should pay special attention to whether or not they provide for roads and public transport.  He also proposed that there should be a greater degree of liaison and sharing of intelligence between the police, intelligence agencies, the Traffic Department and the Taxi Council on potential conflict issues in the taxi industry.  This should include repeat offenders for traffic violations caused by taxi drivers, or on vehicles that are not roadworthy.

 

Michael H. Khupiso

 

Shortly before he was murdered Mr Khupiso (former Chairman of LAGUNYA) testified before the Committee.   He was accompanied by his friend Advocate Murray Bridgman.  The first problem he highlighted was the issue of the Operating Licensing Board.  There is a major dissatisfaction with the perceived methods by which permits are granted.  This has led to the increase in the number of illegal taxis and the belief that ignoring the law is justified.    He stated that the Chairperson of the Board should be taken to task with regards to the turn around time and that he should be told to put his house in order as he has the power to do so.

 

In dealing with the issue of the so called mother bodies, CATA and CODETA, he said that these associations should not be recognized as they are run as mafia organizations.  These associations have no constitution and they operate according to their own rules.  They have access to vast sums of money.  Their leaders often enrich themselves at the expense of the members.  These leaders collect money from the members but they never account for how it is spent.   These leaders are also regarded as responsible for organizing the hiring of assassins and the vehicles they use.

 

He also mentioned that certain taxi operators whom he named were also involved in criminal activities.  A large number of taxis operating from the ranks were stolen vehicles.   These vehicles were often hijacked and nothing was done in the associations to stop this.   Thieves were often seen as heroes, the providers of cheap vehicles.  The thieves used the taxi industry as cover and relied on the friendship of those who buy their vehicles to protect them.  The CATA and CODETA leadership also used these criminals.   The members of the South African Police Services were well aware of these activities.  Mr Khupiso mentioned that he had no doubt that there was corruption within the Police Services, but it was difficult to prove.   He ended by saying a new attitude by the taxi industry was required.  He believes that the majority of people involved in the taxi industry were good people who, given the chance, would be law abiding citizens.  They were quite eager to transform the industry into a properly run business with credible leadership.

 

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

 

The federation was represented by Mr. Don Jacques Pasquallie, a member of the Provincial Executive Committee of COSATU Western Cape.  He testified that COSATU had been advocating for a need for a comprehensive transport plan which must be developed by a Metropolitan transport authority that must be urgently set up by local authority and the provincial Government. In this plan the role of the taxis would be that of a feeder.   For an example people in Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain would be driven to a particular train or bus line and that they would be transported from Khayelitsha or Mitchell’s Plain to Brackenfell.   Seeing that taxis would not be the primary mode of transport  they would not need to be subsidized.   What they were also advocating was that there should be a limit to the number of taxis that an owner can have.   COSATU advocates the policy of one owner one taxi.


 

Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS)

 

GABS was represented by Mr. Nicholaas Stephanus Cronje (Chief Executive Officer).   According to him there are three main issues that contribute to the instability in the taxi industry.  The first point relates to the maladministration of the Operating Licensing Board where operators wait for years to get their operating licenses.    Secondly there was confusion as to who has to enforce the law and there were inconsistencies in the enforcement of the law.   Thirdly, he claimed that most routes are overtraded.

 

Mr Cronje advocated the use of transport plans in managing the developments of shopping centres.  Cape Gate was a classical example where there was no planning as to who was going to do what and it resulted in a free for all at the end of the day.   The TRP had created expectations in the industry which at this stage are not being met.   He did admit that they had an old fleet which was actually replaced on a continuous basis.  He commended the Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works for taking up the initiative of facilitating GABS’ access to the Nyanga terminus, which was a facility that was created for public transport

 

Metrorail

 

Metrorail is a division of Transnet Ltd, a state owned enterprise.  The responsible Ministry that oversees commuter rail transport is the Department of Transport.    Currently, in line with the Cabinet’s decision and as announced by the Minister of Transport, Metrorail and the South African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd (SARCC) are in the process of consolidating into a single passenger rail entity under the Department of Transport.

 

In these proceedings Metrorail was represented by Mr. Andre Harrison (Regional Manager) and Mr. Stephens Ngobeni (Operational Manager).   Their evidence is summarised below.

 

What Metrorail found out was that there were certain taxi associations who were approaching members of a cable syndicate to cut Metrorail cables.  The reason for this was to delay or sabotage the train service with the purpose of cashing in on intended rail commuters who would then be forced to utilize the services of the taxis.   In some instances the cutting of cables was done at points close to a spot where a number of taxis would assemble within a short period of time to take advantage of the new business opportunity.    Areas that were most targeted were Langa to Kapteinsklip and Khayelitsha, as well as Bellville to Strand and Muldersvlei.

 

The incidents of cable cuts created a huge delay on the train service to such an extent that in certain instances commuters migrated from the rail to the taxi.   These delays had serious economic consequences for the City of Cape Town.   Another modus operandi for sabotaging train service was by placing stones at strategic points on the railway line and this resulted in train delays.  A number of taxis immediately assemble next to the affected area and take advantage of the stranded commuters.

 

In conclusion the Metrorail officials emphasized that the lack of a transport plan created uncertainty in the provision of public transport.   The issuing of permits beyond the capacity of the market to sustain a viable business on a particular route would in all probability result in a level of competition that in turn might lead to battles for market share and the accompanying violence.   It was the Board’s responsibility to balance supply and demand.   In the absence of an approved Public Transport Plan, this might not always be achieved.

 

National Department of Transport

 

The Department was represented by its Deputy Director General, Mr. Lucky Montana and he came to explain the roll-out of the TRP process.  He acknowledged that the taxi industry plays a very important role in the country’s public transport system.  This was despite the fact that it was not subsidized by Government as against the other key public transport modes.

 

According to him the inability to recapitalize, lack of maintenance and self-regulation are some of the causes of instability in the industry.   The fact that the routes were over saturated and the corruption that existed at the licensing authorities exacerbated the problem.  The government is aware that the industry cannot recapitalize itself, hence the state of decay of the taxi fleet in the country.  The TRP seeks to replace the current taxi fleet.  It is also a means towards formalizing and regulating the taxi industry.   The emphasis is much more on road safety regarding taxi vehicles. The technical specifications and design requirements will include accessibility for people with special needs.

 

The conversions of Permits to Operating Licenses as well as law enforcement are central to the roll out of the TRP.   Some of the money would go towards enhancing the capacity of existing structures used by the provincial government to enforce the law among taxi operators.   The closing date of the conversion process is the 31st August 2005.   The Department is to commence with the registration of operators intending to exit the industry from the 1st December 2005 to 31st December 2005.   From the 1st January 2006 no taxi licenses/permits would be issued to non-compliant taxi vehicles.

 

Provincial Department of Transport

 

The Department was represented by its head, Mr Thami Manyathi.   He was accompanied by the Director responsible for Planning, Mr. Osman.  Mr. Manyathi acknowledged that the Department has to improve customer service at Goldbourn Centre.   He made an example of the good service that is being offered by the Revenue Services.   He referred to the very much improved customer service offered by SARS and which is non existent at Goldbourn Centre.

 

With regards to the issue of lack of proper planning, Mr Manyathi admitted that when it comes to property development, the issue of public transport happens as an afterthought.   In the case of Cape Gate, there was inadequate planning for the provision of public transport.    The issue of Cape Gate was a lesson for the Department.    He also indicated that the Department was going to review the whole issue of interchanges.   If there was justification for providing a direct trip from Khayelitsha to Kraaifontein, it should be possible for people to make such a trip rather than having to travel through Bellville Interchange before proceeding to Kraaifontein.

 

Mr. Manyathi also touched on the issue of tendered contracts in the Province. Currently the Department has an interim contract with Golden Arrow Bus Services.   It wants to move to tendered or negotiated contracts which will make some room for other operators and in that process it will be incorporating taxi operators.  This is part of the Provincial Strategy Infrastructure Plan.

 

Mr. Manyathi informed that the programme intends to improve the safety of operations, comfort to the users, and simultaneously improve affordability of the programme through the issuing of a capital subsidy.  The department indicated that it intended to have a “bosberaad” and would invite the operators so that it could take them through the preparations and implementation of the recapitalization programme.

 

Democratic Alliance (DA)

 

This was the only political organization that responded to our invitation to make submissions to the Committee.  It was represented by its spokesperson on Transport, Mr. Robin Carlisle.   A summary of his evidence follows below.

 

His perspective was that the taxi industry was one of the most important forms of transport.  Proper regulation would transform the industry, providing a predictable, safe and profitable environment for the operators.  On the 22 June 2004 the Minister reported that only 19 Associations (14%) had complied with the requirements to hold Annual General Meetings or to produce annual audited financial statements.   The Registrar’s office had failed to make formal reports to the Minister.  This lack of regulation had resulted in operators taking the law into their own hands.  Taxi warlordism was the consequence.

 

According to the strategic plan of the Transport Department 2003/2004, 5063 of the 12663 taxis were illegal (40%).   More recently, Minister Skwatsha advised the legislature that there were 3000 to 4000 illegal operators.

 

Mr. Carlisle concluded by saying that the failure to regulate arises from a lack of political will to deal with the problem.   This was exacerbated by too frequent connections between politicians and the industry.

 

Deborah Elizabeth Miller

 

Ms. Miller is a Human Rights Activist and she was asked by the people of Du Noon to speak on their behalf.   She also assists associations with permit applications and charges a fee for the service.   Her rates range from R250 to R500 per application, depending on the viability of the route.

 

The problem with Du Noon started with the establishment of the Killarney Interchange.   Taxi operators together with residents of Du Noon established their own association, Du Noon Taxi Association (DTA) but could not get permits.   Ms. Miller initially assisted them to hire permits from Mutual Taxi Association.   This did not go down well with United Taxi Association and Maitland Taxi Association and this resulted in violence.   DTA then asked Miller to assist them so that they could register to be on their own and they were ultimately registered by Mr. Fezile Mbambo.   This resulted in this latest spate of violence in that area.

 

She also voiced fears that the corrupt practices happening at Gouldburn Centre might be “transferred” to the new satellite office in George.   There were allegations that there was a board member whose family was from that area and their permits were before the board.

 

City Of Cape Town

 

The City was represented by Mark Llewellyn Skriker, Sandra van Dalen (City’s representative at the Operating Licensing Board) and Henri du Plessis.  Their evidence can be summarised as appears below.   Their main role is to act as an advisory body for the Board in the issuing of permits.

 

The aim was to achieve a balance between public transport supply and demand that was both effective and efficient.    The City’s mandate was to act in the interest of the commuter and also to act in the interest of the existing operators. However, one of the criticisms levelled against the Board by the City was that the Board does dispose of the applications within the prescribed period of 90 days.

 

One of the reasons for the conflict in the industry was that 70% of the routes were overtraded, and yet the associations were still recruiting new members.  The City was now preparing a document that would go to all taxi associations telling them as to which routes were overtraded.   The radius permit was still an issue although they were being converted to route based permits but that in itself was a problem.

 

The Operating Licensing Strategy of the City had been completed, but had not been ratified as policy by the executive of the City.    Mr. Skriker confirmed that the ideal situation was that all the rank facilities should belong to the City.  The reality was that certain associations act as though they own the rank facilities, by prescribing who should operate in those facilities.

 

The City admitted that they did not have a strategy for public transport interchanges.  This was a major problem because these conflicts usually manifest themselves around the use of these interchanges.   The reason why there was a conflict at Cape Gate was around the use of the Bellville Interchange.   Whatever development plans the City had for Cape Gate, if any, were clearly inadequate.

 

The City also conveyed to us that they were introducing a system of rank tokens at all the interchanges.   At the moment this system operates at the Cape Town Station Deck but they were planning to expand it to all the other interchanges.  Rank tokens were affixed to the vehicle indicating that a particular vehicle was allowed access for a particular facility.  There was also a problem of proliferation of informal traders at these facilities which make these interchanges unmanageable.

 

Cape Organisation of Democratic Taxi Association (CODETA)

 

CODETA was formed in 1991 as an attempt to unify the taxi industry.   It was an organization which grew out of the peace process after the taxi war between the two associations LAGUNYA (Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) and WEBTA (Western Cape Black Taxi Association).  During the hearings it was represented by its Chairman, Mr.D.Speelman, Mr. Baba Jezile and Mr. Malanga Peter Thethani.   Their evidence is summarised below.

 

The conflict at Bellville started with the opening of the interchange in November 2002.   To the surprise of CODETA they found out that CATA had an A point in Bellville.   The understanding was that no-one ought to have an A point in Town.   According to CODETA’s understanding, A point was the origin and B point the destination.   CODETA insists that A point should be in the townships or residential areas and B point in town, suburbs or where people work.   CODETA was not aware that there were organisations like CATA that had A point in town, suburbs or where people work. 

 

When the Cape Gate shopping centre was opened, CODETA took passengers directly from Khayelitsha to Cape Gate instead of using the Bellville interchange.   That’s where the problems started.   Another problem they identified was that at the Board, African operators were discriminated against and Coloured operators were getting preference.   Their operators would apply and wait for years without getting their permits.

 

They argued that law enforcement personnel should take their rightful place and not allow other operators to stop their taxis.  They also argued that they had enough resources to deal with fines that were issued by authorities.

 

Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA)

 

During the hearings CATA was represented by its Chairman, Mr. Sipho Alfred Maseti.    His testimony is summarised below.

 

Due to the abuse of power and misappropriation of funds by the CODETA leadership, former WEBTA members broke away to form a new organization called CATA.  It was launched at NY 49 stadium, Guguletu, in September 1994.   CATA was of the view that CODETA was politically aligned to the ANC and the perception was that they were getting more audience from the Provincial Government.   CATA said that CODETA was using ex-SDU members as their hitmen in the taxi conflict.

 

CATA does not believe that the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council serves the interest of the taxi industry.   According to CATA, the WCPTC was taking them nowhere.   Even during the recent conflicts, WCPTC never played any role in resolving the dispute.   The representivity in the Council was not reflective of the demographics of operators in the Province.  The Council does not take care of any grievances coming from the African operators, they claimed. 

 

 

8.3        Evidence from private hearings

 

The Committee received relatively good responses in its request that interested parties should make both oral and written submissions.

 

Provincial Operating Licensing Board

 

Witnesses who came to give evidence in private hearings have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Provincial Operating Licensing Board (POLB).  The following allegations were made against the administration of the POLB:

 

a)                   unreasonable and long turnaround time for applications;

b)                   employment of not only temporary but also incompetent staff;

c)                   corruption among staff members including senior staff members;

d)                   unreliability of their data capturing systems;

e)                   nepotism;

f)                     unprofessional manner in which applications are handled, and

g)                   lack of confidentiality of applications.

 

The following allegations were made against the members of the Board:

 

a)                   lack of impartiality on the part of the Board ;

b)                   licenses not granted even in deserving cases;.

c)                   inconsistency in Board decisions;

d)                   corruption amongst Board members;

e)                   unnecessary postponement of applications;

f)                     issuing of licenses even in respect of routes that are over traded, and

g)                   Issuing of licenses in respect of non-existent routes.

 

The following allegations were made against the office of the Registrar:

 

a)                   lack of consultation with associations on the part of the Registrar;

b)                   unreasonably long turnaround times for registration of associations;

c)                   inability to respond to complaints from associations, and

d)                   lack of research on the status of routes.

 

There were also allegations that associations have influence over individuals in the Board.   It was alleged that associations corrupt Board members to get licenses issued even in areas where routes were either over traded or unregistered.  During the recent conflict, both CODETA and CATA had individuals who claimed they had permits that allowed them to operate the Cape Gate route, although the route was not registered under any of the associations. 

 

There were allegations that some senior members of the POLB ordered their subordinates to expedite certain applications belonging to certain consultants.  There were also allegations that the working relationship amongst the two arms of the OLB was not a healthy one.

 

It was generally felt by witnesses that unless the POLB was reengineered, there would be no peace in the minibus taxi industry.    A practical example was the fact that it took long to process applications.   This led to operators taking to the route illegally while waiting for their applications to be processed.   This in turn sometimes led to violence.   Our sources were however, of the opinion that these problems were not insurmountable and that the solution was in the government’s urgent intervention in the form of restructuring the POLB.

 

The City of Cape Town

 

The City of Cape Town had been accused by taxi associations of being unable to manage taxi ranks.   It was important to reiterate that these ranks were in terms of the law, the property of the City.   It transpired from the hearings that there was no policing whatsoever in these ranks, which not only increases the risk of crime, but also encouraged the propensity to bullying by warlords, and by criminal elements in the taxi industry.

 

They also alleged that the City’s officials failed to impartially mediate disputes between associations.

 

There was a further allegation that objections by the City at the Board’s hearings were based on racial discrimination.   It was alleged that the City only objects where the applicant was a black person, but in cases of Golden Arrow Bus Services there was no objection from the City.

 

Operators were of the opinion that the tragedy at Cape Gate was caused by the City’s lack of proper planning.   They further felt that they were not taken into account let alone be consulted in the planning of new developments.   An example given was that of Century City where operators and/or associations were excluded.

 

Regulation of the minibus taxi industry

 

Most organizations and individuals felt that the taxi industry was completely unregulated despite numerous laws that were recently passed.   Operators were of the opinion that the government was not in control of the industry.  Operators felt that it was useless to pass laws if there were no measures to enforce those laws.   According to them, the government was unable to deal effectively with the issue of illegal operators and some associations had taken the law into their own hands by patrolling routes and this led to conflict among associations.   Operators felt that the government must assume its roles and responsibilities relating to law enforcement.

 

Taxi Recapitalisation Program (TRP)

 

Evidence placed before the Committee indicates that the recapitalisation programme was either not well work-shopped or too complicated for the operators to understand.   However operators insisted that the former and not the latter was the reason why the program was foreign to them.   They alleged that there was no clear communication between them and the government despite the existence of the taxi council.

 

Another general feeling among operators was that recapitalisation was taking time to be implemented.   In the meantime they were not informed of progress made.   There was also a general fear among most operators that they were going to lose their taxis and/or permits.   They felt that the scrapping allowance was little in that it was only enough to deposit a minibus and they doubted whether they would be able to service their installments and at the same time make a living out of the business.

 

It is fair to conclude, after hearing all these submissions from the operators that they are willing to work hand in hand with the government, but that they want to be actively involved in the implementation of the program.

Law Enforcement

 

Inadequate law enforcement was one of the concerns that was raised in private hearings.  Witnesses said that this did not only make the industry an unsafe place but also made it easy for the warlords to continue undermining the rule of law. 

 

There were allegations that police took sides during the taxi wars and that in some instances, matters reported to the police were not investigated.  The feeling was that there were certain police officials that had an interest in the industry, even though no one testified that there were police officers that owned taxis during the private hearings.

 

There were also concerns that in the industry threats were not taken seriously even when they had been reported to the authorities responsible for law enforcement.  We heard testimony of instances where some people had made threats to kill others and indeed those threatened operators were killed.

 

Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council

 

Serious concerns were raised with regard to the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council’s representation.   A general feeling was that members of this council were not doing their work.   Once they had been elected they did not only distance themselves from the ordinary peoples but also failed to convey their constituency’s grievances to the government.   It was also alleged that these members attended government conferences and workshops and failed to report back to the masses.

 

Another concern was representivity in the Council.   There was a general feeling that the membership of this council was not a true reflection of the minibus taxi industry in the Western Cape in terms of race.  Our sources argued that more than 60% (sixty percent) of the taxi industry operators in the province are African[1] and the rest are Coloured.   However there were only four Africans in the Council.  They contended that this situation was unfair in that African people’s interests were not considered though they were in the majority.  This imbalance was attributed to the manner in which elections for the positions in council were conducted.  This was directly related to the way in which the regions and voting systems were demarcated and allocated.

 

All regions were allowed to elect two members into the Council irrespective of their size.  A comparative example given to the Committee was that of  Khayelitsha, which represents more than one thousand taxi operators, and associations in the Karoo which represent less than twenty operators.   In terms of the election process both regions had to elect two members into the Council.   Our sources submitted that an alternative system of representation be employed which would be fairer and take the realities of the number of operators into account.

 

It appeared that most of the associations in the industry have lost confidence in the Council.  This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that associations would rather deal with “mother bodies” rather than the Council.   It was also said that the Council failed to deal with issues involving disputes among associations despite the fact that it had a component that was supposed to deal with conflicts in the taxi industry.

 

 

8.4        Evidence from special hearings

 

Langa Inter-township and Seawater Conflict

 

The Committee was asked to resolve an intra association conflict that involved CATA affiliates.  During these hearings the Inter-township Taxi Association was represented by Johnson Matinisi, Stanford Makhuleni, Michael Dalasile and Edward Mayiya.    Seawater on the other side had a legal representative, Attorney William Booth.  The Inter-township Taxi Association was initially affiliated to CODETA but now they are part of CATA.  This particular conflict started around May 2003 when the Inter-township operators were chased away from the Nyanga rank.  They were chased away by Seawater and the reasons given were that since the establishment of the Langa Forum, Langa operators were chased away from other townships.    Mr. Booth advanced an argument that there were Seawater operators who had permits to operate between Nyanga and Langa but were prevented from picking up passengers from the Langa rank.

 

Some of the Committee members then suggested that Mr. Matinisi and Mr Khumalo should go and speak to their members to see if they could not resolve the situation amicably.  A week later Dan Khumalo from Seawater made a proposal that they were prepared to accept Inter-township members provided that those members who were chased away from Langa could also be allowed back.  His second proposal was that the abovementioned operators be allowed to share the routes between Nyanga, Rylands and Langa.  Inter-township operators were not entirely happy with these proposals. They wanted a list of those operators who were going to be joining them. They also undertook to take this back to their membership to obtain a mandate.  We explained to these operators that it was not actually the Committee’s mandate to resolve the conflict, but to find the underlying reasons for the conflict.  We engaged them in this exercise because we saw that there was a possibility that the matter could be resolved amicably.

 

CATA Eyona and Seawater Conflict

 

During these hearings CATA Eyona was represented by . Kabelo Mdlankomo, Zolani Mntuyedwa, Lulama Luhlapo.  Seawater on the other side was represented by William Booth.  CATA Eyona was initially affiliated to CODETA but now they were part of CATA. The problem started when Seawater operated on CATA Eyona routes.   CATA Eyona was also chased away from Mowbray, Athlone and Killarney.  This was reported to the “Mother Body” but nothing was done.  The matter even went up to the High Court and the court ruled that operators should operate according to their permits.  Mr. Booth then raised the same argument that there were Seawater operators who had permits to operate from Eyona rank but were prevented from doing so by Eyona operators.

 

The Committee then suggested that Dan Khumalo and Mntuyedwa speak to their operators so as to try and resolve the issue amicably.  This proposal from Seawater was that the two associations be merged into one so that they could share the work.   This proposal was rejected by CATA Eyona stating that this was a plan by Seawater to take over their routes and rank.  The Committee explained to the operators that it was not their mandate to resolve the conflict but to find the underlying reasons for the conflict and to make recommendations to the Premier

 

The outcome of the mediation was that CATA Eyona refused to share facilities with CATA Seawater.  CATA Eyona requested the Mowbray PTI manager to provide them with separate facilities from those used by CATA Seawater.

 


     

9.         Trends emerging from the body of evidence

 

Certain trends have emerged from all the evidence gathered.    We highlight below what appeared to be common trends from a majority of witnesses, testifying at different times and places.

 

9.1        CULTURE OF LAWLESSNESS

 

The one defining feature from the evidence presented was the fact that a culture of lawlessness seemed to permeate the taxi industry.  There was a perception from amongst those who gave evidence at the Committee that a culture of fear and lawlessness characterised the industry.  This view was shared by both taxi operators and law enforcement agencies alike.

 

Silence dominates the industry.   This created an enabling environment for the continuation of the planning and execution of violence in the industry.   Acts of violence are planned and executed in a deliberate way.  This happens because perpetrators have instilled fear in the industry.   For example, many people were aware of the existence of and frequent use of hit squads or iimbovane to resolve disputes, but none of the members were prepared to testify in courts of law for fear of being victimised.   The Committee was given various testimonies about those hit squads but no one was prepared to give affidavits because of their fear of victimisation. 

 

Two people died during the life of the Committee.   This exacerbated the wave of fear in the industry.   However, the Committee did its best to ensure the safety of its witnesses at the hearings.  It also ensured the highest level of confidentiality of their testimony.   It was alleged by most witnesses that gave evidence that the warlords were aware of the fact that there was a lack of law enforcement and they took advantage of that.   The fact that there was no visible policing at the ranks, and also that threats were never taken seriously by law enforcement agencies made it easy for the warlords to continue intimidating law abiding members of the associations.

 

Most witnesses also indicated in their testimonies that there was a perception that associations owned taxi ranks.   In terms of the law, ranks are owned and should be managed by local authorities.   It appears these authorities have abdicated their legal responsibility.   Lack of management of ranks by local authorities exacerbated both lawlessness and the culture of entitlement by associations.  It was alleged that in some ranks, associations decide who should operate and be allowed to trade.  In some instances these associations were involved in acts of extortion by collecting money from traders in the ranks.  There were also allegations of associations chasing other associations from ranks.   For example in the Nyanga central rank CATA collects money from traders and the Seawater Taxi Association chased away the Inter-township Taxi Association.

 

9.1.1     Operating without licenses

 

There seems to be no explanation about the illegal operators in the taxi industry.  Throughout the process of hearing evidence from various taxi associations, it was apparent that all the associations have illegal operators. These illegal operators were considered legitimate operators by the association despite having no licenses.

 

The practice in the industry is that an individual member pays the joining fee, is accepted by the association and starts operating.  The individual member is told about the rules and regulations and later registered with the registrar so that he/ she can access the license from the POLB.

 

The association does not check the credential of the person joining the association, does not check the vehicle brought by the individual - roadworthy or stolen - and is less concerned about the previous  criminal record of the individual. 

 

The other prevalent practice in the associations is that members agree on a certain number of taxis that each member can possess.  This number is not based on any scientific research about the number of commuters in the area or any other issue.   As long as the member is able to access a vehicle he/she is allowed to use it and then look for an operating license later.

 

9.1.2     Use of unroadworthy vehicles

 

There seems to be an agreement in the taxi industry that old dilapidated vehicles which are not roadworthy can still be used in some parts of the city. 

 

Associations have an agreement that inter- and intra-township operations should be serviced by old dilapidated vehicles.   The assumption is that law enforcement in these areas is not as strong as in the suburbs.   CATA operators moving between Langa, Nyanga, Guguletu, Khayelitsha and Rylands use old dilapidated vehicles. CODETA operators moving between Khayelitsha, Nyanga and Mitchell’s Plain use old vehicles.  These vehicles are referred to as “Mashwabana”.

 

An owner who has been operating to town or suburbs and is not able to purchase a new vehicle is usually requested to join the inter-township route.  For example, Seawater Taxi Association has its main routes as Cape Town and Sea Point. These routes are operated by roadworthy vehicles even if those vehicles do not have permits.  Seawater also claims to have the Nyanga – Langa and the Nyanga – Rylands routes.  In the Nyanga – Langa and Nyanga – Rylands routes, Seawater uses the dilapidated vehicles that are not roadworthy.

 

Intra township operations - Guguletu, Phillipi, Nyanga and Mitchell’s Plain - use old unroadworthy sedan vehicles.   These vehicles are worse than those called “Mashwabana”.   These vehicles have no fixed routes.   Drivers have no drivers licenses or PDPs.   Some of the drivers are minors, are very flexible for community services and belong to associations that are not registered with the Registrar.    

 

It has become accepted that even though these vehicles are illegal in every way possible, they provide an essential service to the community.  The law enforcement officers do not interfere with these vehicles since they operate in the townships.

 

9.1.3      Lack of governance

 

Evidence reveals that associations seem to be managed on an ad hoc basis. There are no written rules and regulations managing the associations that every member of the associations can access when necessary.   The mother bodies i.e. CODETA and CATA do not have a constitution.  When the executive of these structures were requested to provide the Committee with copies of the constitution it was clear that none existed despite claims that they were available.

 

CATA claimed that the constitution was with the previous executive committee and that they did not have a copy in the office.   CODETA gave the translated version of the standard constitution that is provided by the NLTTA.   This trend of producing the standard constitution provided by the NLTTA continued even when various associations were requested to provide the Committee with their constitutions. 

 

CATA and CODETA – and all the associations - were not in a position to provide the Committee with the financial records of their organisations.   When CATA was requested to provide the Committee with the name of its treasurer, its spokespersons gave us three names.   When the Committee requested further details about the financial status of the organisation, and the bank account, we were told that the treasurers were better positioned to provide the information.  The Committee was later told that all the financial persons or treasurers were in the Eastern Cape and were not available to provide us with the necessary information.

 

CODETA on the other hand was reluctant to provide the Committee with the details of their bank account and was asking how this would assist the Committee.  What was clear was that CODETA was not in a position to provide us with the details.   They did not even provide the Committee with the financial reports tabled in their meetings.

 

When asked about the monthly or weekly subscriptions, CATA and CODETA were not in a position to quantify the money levied from their associate members.   CATA claimed that there are no subscriptions but that whenever there is a need the association consult members for contribution.   They were reluctant to tell the Committee that they have paid bail for the some members and not other.   CATA said that their policy was not to pay bail but to use the money for the activities of the organisation.   Despite the fact that CODETA agreed that there were standard funds contributed by associations, CODETA was unable to explain the use of these funds by the executive.

 

9.1.4     Lack of management

 

Associations have appointed structures called the Working Committees to be responsible for the management of the day to day operations.  A Working Committee is a structure that is not found in the constitution of any association, but exists in all the ranks and public transport interchanges.    As a result the roles and responsibilities of persons serving in the structure are defined according to what the current chairperson wants them to be.

 

The general understanding of the role of the Working Committee is that its task is to oversee the day to day operations of the association.   The Working Committee is also responsible for the discipline of drivers and members of the association in the rank.   They are the first to respond if there is conflict in one of the ranks.   In terms of accountability they report directly to the chairperson or the executive of the association.   The members of the Working Committee should be in the rank on a daily basis even though they are not remunerated. They are also taxi owners who have vehicles that are operating in the rank.

 

Members elected to this Committee are those who show ability to apply strong arm tactics in the rank and are fearless.   In most instances these members assume indirect leadership in the organisation.  They are responsible for the collection of funds from members and are used to chase away members who do not pay their dues.   Because they are not remunerated for the job they are doing everyday, they pay themselves through the collection of funds from the membership.

 

9.1.5     Gentlemen’s agreements

 

Associations belonging to the same mother body have in some cases agreed to share routes.   The reasons sometimes given by these associations are that they have a very good relationship and therefore are happy to operate together or that one of the associations does not have enough vehicles to service the area and does not mind sharing with the sister organisation.  In some instances it is a result of a relationship forged out of fear of being attacked by the resident association and therefore they invite neighbours or any close association that they regard as being strong and capable of engaging their potential enemies.  These agreements disregard the legal framework within which the associations should operate.   The consequence of such a relationship is that some of the members of the hosted association begin to apply for permits that belong to the resident association.  This practice is seen as legitimate and is acceptable when there are still no problems between the two entities.

 

The problem starts when the resident association is unhappy with the hosted association or its members or when the resident association feels it is now in a position to stand on its own.   The resident association begins by claiming that they are legitimate operators and want to service their area without the assistance of the hosted association.  The resident association goes on to demand separate facilities in the ranks or PTIs where the two associations have been using the same facility.   In forums and committees where the two associations were jointly represented the resident association begins to demand its status to be rectified to that of an independent association.

 

Experience has shown that the separation of the two associations from the gentlemen’s agreement becomes a very long and untidy process.   Because there is no paper trail reflecting the establishment of these relationships, it becomes difficult to assess the beginning of the relationship, and the point of breakdown.   It becomes impossible to understand or verify the statements given by either of the parties.   The Registrar and the POLB do not have any records of this relationship as it takes place outside their jurisdiction – a clear recipe for chaos and conflict.

 

9.1.6          Taxi conflict with GABS

 

In the past few years GABS has been involved in conflict with the taxi industry.   There have been various allegations that GABS has an official that is placed at the offices of the Provincial Operating Licensing Board with the aim of opposing all the applications for permits by taxi associations.   It is alleged this was a strategy to frustrate the taxi operators and remove them from competition.   However, GABS disputed these allegations and confirmed that they have a right to oppose applications that infringe on their operations.

 

The industry’s frustration with GABS has manifested itself in different violent clashes with GABS.   In Khayelitsha, as a result of perceived competition with GABS, the taxi industry attacked GABS busses.  This resulted in the injury of commuters.   Even though the culprits were arrested, and there is now relative peace between taxis and buses in Khayelitsha, GABS still does not operate from the major transport interchange in Khayelitsha.

 

In Nyanga, buses were chased away from the main public transport facility by taxi operators linked to CATA.   This facility was then monopolised by the taxi association and GABS was not allowed to operate from this rank.   The result was that commuters seeking the services of buses had to walk longer distances from the rank.  Recently after various interactions with taxi associations GABS was then allowed to operate from the rank.  This was at the initiative of the Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works.

 

9.1.8     Collection of money from ranks

 

Almost every witness touched on the collection of money from the ranks.   The joining fee has also been raised in the evidence as part of the money that these associations levy.  Testimony reveals that the money collected as joining fee ranges from R10 000.00 (ten thousand rands) to R60 000.00 (sixty thousand rands) per new recruit.   The Committee was told that the reason for this high amount is to deter people from joining.  This money goes to the coffers of the association.

 

Witnesses testimony corroborated each other that the amount collected and names of people collecting this money were the same.   The days on which the money is collected was also the same according to all testimonies.   For example the Committee was told that in CATA R100.00 (hundred rands) is collected on Mondays and Wednesdays and in cases where there are arrests and/or court cases, a further R1000.00 (thousand rand) is collected at the end of every month.   The Committee was also told that this money is levied per taxi and not per owner.   This means that where a member owns four taxis, he will be expected to contribute R400.00 (four hundred rand) twice a week and R4000.00 (four thousand rand) once a month.   Failure to make such contribution can lead to one incurring disfavour of the leaders.  That could mean that either their taxis will be taken of the road or they will face paying a fine determined by the leaders.   Some of the witnesses claimed to have reported the matter to relevant authorities but nothing was done.

 

Over and above the R100.00 (one hundred rand) and R1000.00 (one thousand rand) collected from members, there is a daily contribution of R10.00 every day.  These R10.00’s (ten rand) are collected by route associations and ultimately given to the leaders every week.  There is information that a taxi called “The Blue House Kombi” procured from the money made out of these ten rand collections.  This taxi travels on long distance routes within the province.  These are trips to towns such as Worcester, Ceres, Robertson and Hermanus.  This taxi makes about R250.00 (two hundred and fifty rands) on weekdays and R350.00 (three hundred and fifty rands) during weekends per day.   This taxi must also always be given first preference when it comes to loading of passengers on any of the above-mentioned routes.   There are rumours that this taxi was procured specifically to raise money for payment of iimbovane that are behind.

 

CODETA on the other hand levies its affiliates the same amount of money.  CODETA associations in turn levy their members in order to pay the amount demanded by CODETA.

 

9.2        PREVALENCE OF HIT SQUADS (ANTS / IIMBOVANE)

 

A general feature of the violence in the industry is the fact that most of the killings and attacks are planned by warlords.  These warlords are an inner circle of few people who operate secretly and are usually in charge of the war chest.   Iimbovane are young people who are not taxi operators, but are hired to commit acts of violence on behalf of the taxi associations.   Some of these hit squads members are former members of the military wing of the previous liberation movements such as ANC or PAC armed wings that were not integrated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

 

They are hired by the older generation of taxi drivers to commit acts of murder against their rivals.  If for example, a taxi association in Area A wants to take over a taxi rank in Area B, they would hire an iimbovane to go and shoot at the operators at the rank in Area B, before they take it over.  This has been the modus operandi for most of the attacks perpetrated so far.

 

The older, more experienced owners are usually responsible for selecting the target(s), planning the logistics, recruitment of the iimbovane and collecting the monies to pay for the services of the iimbovane.

 

They usually request a younger taxi driver to accompany the iimbovane to the site of the attack to identify the target.   The young taxi driver will be involved in pointing out the suspect before driving the iimbovane from the scene to safety.  From evidence presented, the Committee has heard that the iimbovane has demanded sums of money of up to R12 000, but have been paid between R2000 and  R5000 for their efforts.

 

Victor Sam, Max Makanda and Reggie Malimba were killed by iimbovane. According to evidence presented to the Committee, Victor Sam, at times also hired iimbovane to commit assassinations and other crimes.

 

There have been numerous events where it appears that iimbovane have been used to perpetrate taxi violence. During the course of the investigation, it was found that iimbovane were used in the following attacks:

 

  1. The Paarl Incident;
  2. The Grabouw Incident;
  3. Bloekombos Incident;
  4. The killing of Mr Rum from Kraaifontein , and
  5. Other recent shootings.

 

People who are ordering the killings

 

It is also evident from the evidence gathered, that it is the same people that are hiring the iimbovane.  Although the incidents differ and time has lapsed between the incidents, it remains the same people who reportedly ordered the shootings and killings.   It has been difficult for the Committee to get anyone to go on record to name the guilty parties.  They have provided such details to the Committee off the record.  The stated reason is that they fear for their safety and their lives.  They all however confirm that a particular group of people are responsible (in both CATA and CODETA) for ordering the killings. 

 

The members of this group of people are about thirty in extent and are to be found in the different taxi associations.  They are older, more experienced taxi owners and are able to control the activities of the taxi associations by either being rank managers, members of the working committee of either taxi association, or sometimes just taxi owners.   It is our contention that they have sufficient influence amongst the ordinary taxi members to issue instructions. Witnesses also believe that they are reasonably the ones who take responsibility to collect vast sums of cash from drivers at the ranks each day.

 

During the investigation, the Committee was able to establish their identities from the testimonies given by convicted iimbovane whom they had hired.  The difficulty with bringing the implicated people to court is that police investigations have been sloppy,  witnesses have also proved to be unreliable when testifying in court.   There is also a culture of fear that prevents witnesses from coming forward to corroborate the evidence of the convicted criminals.

 

During the hearings, some of these implicated individuals reportedly attended the hearings and intimidated other individuals.   In one case referred to the Committee, the Committee advised the complainant to lay a charge of intimidation against the named intimidator.

 

9.3      UNRESOLVED ISSUES:  “THE STADIUM AND THE LAINGSBURG

       EVENTS”

 

During the hearings and in interviews with the various taxi associations, there were continuous references to the Stadium and Laingsburg shootings.  The Committee has investigated the reasons why CATA and CODETA hold up these incidents as a historical basis for their explanation and justification for continued conflict and further incidents of violence in the industry.   It appears that both CATA and CODETA have not been able to get closure for the incidents where people lost their lives.  We deal with each of these incidents below.

 

9.3.1     THE Stadium Incident

 

During testimony from members of CATA, the Committee heard that during September 1994, CATA was invited to a SANCO rally which was to be held at Khayelitsha Stadium.  The members of CATA discussed the invitation and agreed that they should attend, although some members had reservations due to the fact that the invitations had indicated that they should not bring any firearms to the rally.  The invitations were received after CATA broke away from CODETA.  In the invitation they had been told that they would be expected to speak at the rally and explain the reasons they had left CODETA.

 

During the rally, members of CATA sang their own songs after they were warned by the Master of Ceremonies (MC) to be quiet.   The MC, allegedly remarked that SANCO also had its own “dogs” which they would unleash.   At the end of the proceedings, the MC announced that the CATA members must congregate in a particular corner of the stadium as there was someone who wanted to address them.

 

After the crowd had left the stadium, the CATA members were attacked with automatic firearms and a hand grenade was thrown into one of their vehicles. Eleven people died and scores were injured.   According to CATA, the police told them that the incident was not going to be investigated because there were high profile people of the ANC involved.

 

The Committee has not been able to trace any police dockets of this particular incident.

  

9.3.2     Laingsburg

 

The incident that took place in Laingsburg is unclear.   It is alleged that it was a retaliation by CATA for the Stadium shootings although it took place two years after the Stadium incident.

 

The Committee heard that CODETA members were transporting a deceased member to the Eastern Cape.   CATA got to hear of the convoy and sent some of its people to follow the convoy.   CATA ambushed the convoy at Laingsburg where four CODETA members died.

 

CATA allegedly shot one of their own members during the ambush, Mr Mfengwana, and allegedly dumped his body near Khayelitstha.   Some of the people who gave evidence to the Committee indicated that CATA had a feud with Mr Mfengwana and killed him under the guise of the taxi war.   From the dockets perused, it is clear that the police that were sent to the scene were inexperienced.   For the Laingsburg incident some people were arrested but the charges were later withdrawn.  For the Mfengwana case no one was arrested.  It is unacceptable in our view that these events still remain “unsolved”.

 

9.4        CULTURE OF ENTITLEMENT

 

Joining an association, paying huge sums of joining fees and submission of an application to the POLB seem to create an expectation in the members that they are entitled to permits.   As a result these association members operate even before they get feedback from the POLB on the success or failure of the permit application.

 

Evidence has shown that operators believe that they are entitled to get the permits if they have applied despite the fact that some of the routes remain 70% overtraded.  This attitude is further engendered by consultants who process applications for a fee at the Board.   Debbie Miller, indicated that she felt that it was the right of the operators in the Du Noon area to receive the total number of permits that she had applied for.   According to her, it is their “human right “ to receive the permits.   

 

9.5        ILLEGAL OPERATORS

 

Illegal operators have been defined by officials as those that operate without permits.   This definition does not take into consideration those operators that have legal permits but operate on routes that are not in their permits.   The definition of illegal operators has also resulted in the confusion about the number of illegal operators in the Cape Metropolitan area.  The various authorities that gave evidence to the Committee gave different statistics on illegal operators despite the fact that these authorities operate in the same area.

 

The Committee has also identified the fact that permits are attached to vehicles instead of owners or entities when it comes to taxis.  The result is that when the particular vehicle with a permit is involved in an accident, that means that the owner is not in a position to trade.   The trend is that operators use different vehicles and that it takes time to transfer permits to the new vehicle.

 

The consequences of illegal operators is that they infringe on other associations’ routes.   This leads to conflict.  In circumstances where no one has a permit to operate on the said route, it becomes difficult to mediate as every operator claims the legitimate right to operate on the route.

 

9.6   COLOURED MINIBUS TAXI OPERATORS

 

Taxi operators in Coloured areas do not face the same type of problems that are experienced by African operators.  The biggest Coloured minibus associations in the Cape Metropolitan areas are the Peninsula Taxi Association (PTA) and the Mitchell’s Plain Taxi Association.

 

Coloured taxi operators are however subjected to extortion and payment of protection fees by gang members.  The Committee has heard evidence of how taxi operators are subjected to a campaign of fear from gang members who have penetrated the industry, especially in the Mitchell’s Plain, Athlone, and Cape Town areas.

 

From the evidence that has been gathered, gang members are used by operators to force drivers to peddle drugs.   The Committee heard how gang members intimidate drivers, passengers and rank managers in their dealing with drugs at certain ranks such as Mitchell’s Plain.  The Committee heard that gang members own taxis in areas such as Bonteheuwel, Manenberg and Mitchell’s Plain, and extort monies from other taxi operators.

 

While the violence appears to be between two African associations, CATA and CODETA, the possibility exists that it can spill over to the Coloured associations as well. .

 

There have been very few violent conflicts between coloured taxi operators. It does however not mean that this will continue to be the state of affairs. The Committee visited various taxi ranks during its investigation and found that the potential for conflict exists between Coloured associations in these ranks..

 

9.7        CODETA’S PERCEPTIONS OF CATA

 

CODETA does not trust CATA members. The rivalry between the two organisations goes back since the inception of CATA. CATA was formed in 1993 as a result of dissatisfaction with CODETA. CATA is seen as being close to the PAC in view of the fact that they were organised by Mr Victor Sam who was a member of the PAC and subsequently joined the United Democratic Movement (UDM).  The antagonism between CATA and CODETA persists because of unresolved issues such as the Laingsburg and Stadium issues.    

 

 

9.8        CATA’S PERCEPTIONS OF CODETA

 

CATA members do not trust CODETA members. CATA was formed because of the perception that CODETA was not addressing the interests of the taxi industry. CATA also believes that CODETA is politically aligned to the ANC.that the attack on its members at the Stadium in Khayelitsha in 1994 was planned by SANCO and CODETA. Since the Stadium incident the relationship between CATA and CODETA has deteriorated. This has resulted in CATA and CODETA signing many agreements which have not worked in most instances.  As a result CATA members do not freely go to Khayelitsha and CODETA members do not freely go to Nyanga.

 

 

9.9        THE INDUSTRY’S PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT

 

From the evidence presented before the Committee, the government is perceived with disdain by the taxi industry.  The industry is disgruntled with the POLB for all the reasons already canvassed above. 

 

Complaints of poor law enforcement were received from CATA, CODETA and other taxi associations. Both CATA and CODETA complained that the law enforcement authorities take sides in their conflict.

 

The issue of unsolved cases has also given the impression that government is not serious about resolving the conflict in the taxi industry.   Many cases that relate to the killing of taxi operators have not been resolved by the police. Taxi operators believe that police have not made serious attempts to solve these cases. 

 

9.10 THE COMMUNITY’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE INDUSTRY

 

As already indicated, only two submissions were received from the community – from UMAC and YEKA –UMUNYU.

 

The Committee was always of the impression that the community’s perception of the taxi industry is very negative and that taxi operators are perceived as rude, violent and having no regard for the community needs.   However, it is remarkable that no formal submissions were made in this regard.

 

9.11      CULTURE OF FEAR

 

Most people who gave evidence spoke of the culture of fear in the industry. Many people who testified were reluctant to give names to the Committee except those already convicted. Those who gave names did so in private and were not ready to be quoted. The reason for this is that a culture of fear pervades the industry as a result of the many killings of taxi operators.  The murder of Khupiso may have strengthened this culture, although the Committee was pleasantly surprised that even after Khupiso’s murder, people still came to testify before the Committee.

 

From the evidence presented, there were people who refused to provide the Committee with names of people that were involved in perpetrating violence.

Their reasons related to the fact that they had families and were afraid to testify because they could be killed.

 

9.12      WAR CHEST

 

The Committee heard that the taxi bosses collect large amounts of money during taxi wars.  The money collected is used to ostensibly hire hit men, buy illegal fire-arms, employ the services of traditional healers, pay for legal fees, bail for those arrested, pay families of “iimbovane” and maintain the services of those involved in violence.  

 

This money is usually collected on a daily basis at the ranks. This money cannot be accounted for by those who collect it.  Those who collect the money cannot be questioned and anyone who questions them is viewed with suspicion and can also be targeted by the warlords.

 

Various patterns have emerged from evidence presented.  Money collected at the ranks on a daily basis:

 

  1. Not all the money collected is banked;
  2. It is our opinion that the subscription fees might be banked;
  3. Money for hitmen is collected during wars;
  4. There is a smaller group of people at the ranks that manage the money.  It is well known that both CATA and CODETA have “Working Committees” that manage what happens to the money that is collected;
  5. Some of iimbovanes in prison are paid;
  6. Legal representatives are paid;
  7. The money collected is not audited, nor is there proper accounting to  the members on a regular basis, and
  8. CATA and CODETA were reluctant to provide the Committee with details of their banking accounts.

 

CASE STUDY:  MONEY GENERATION - CATA

 

THE BELLVILLE TAXI ASSOCIATION (BELLTA)

 

Bellville Taxi Association is  a CATA affiliate which is in control of 14 routes

and collects money from each route. Nyanga and Mowbray lines are the most lucrative routes in Bellville.  The following illustrates the generation of monies for CATA and/or its affiliates:

 

Joining fees is R30 000.

Rank fees is R10 per day.

The Mowbray line has 117 vehicles  (117 x R10 x6 days= R7020)

The Nyanga line has 300 vehicles   (300 x R10 x 6 days =R18000)

Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays (R100 when there is a war)

Nyanga Line (117x300= R35 100)

Mowbray Line (300x300=R90 000)

 

For these two routes, if there is a war, Bellta could collect up to

R125 100 per week. If we assume that there are fourteen routes, then we can safely assume that BELLTA could generate well over R600 000 per week in a war situation.

 

What is clear from these calculations is that mother bodies have considerable financial resources to continue wars with their rivals because they operate cash businesses, for which there is no accounting system.  It is an untenable situation, one that puts an enormous capacity to commit violent crimes in the hands of a few individuals.  No orderly society, let alone a constitutional democracy can ever allow such a state of affairs to continue.  Whilst operators’ right to economic activity should be jealously protected, such rights should be limited by obligations that require the operators to account openly and transparently for the manner in which they earn their money, and how they disburse it.  They also have an obligation to pay tax.  Their conduct, manifested by their refusal to disclose to the Committee details of their banking accounts, if such exist, smirk of efforts at tax evasion, amongst other crimes they may be up to.  

 

9.13      CORRUPTION IN STATE INSTITUTIONS

 

A disturbing feature of the evidence that was presented to the Committee relates to the issue of corruption in state institutions. Allegations of corruption were levelled at the following institutions:

  • The South African Police Service;
  • The Provincial Operating Licensing Board;
  • Traffic Department (City and Provincial), and
  • City Transport Department.

 

In the case of the Provincial Operating Licensing Board the Committee recommended a forensic audit of the Board (administrative and executive). This recommendation was approved.  The audit is currently underway.

 

The allegations on SAPS corruption are mostly levelled against some of the members of the former Taxi Investigative Unit. Some of the allegations are that some of the individual police members:

 

§         Have been accepting money  and food from taxi associations;

§         Regularly use taxis to transport them to rugby matches in the Eastern Cape;

§         Own taxis and have an interest to see to it that the taxi conflict stays unresolved;

§         Protect certain taxi operators who are behind the taxi wars, and

§         Use some of the perpetrators of violence as informers.

 

While allegations of police corruption persist, there was very little evidence presented to the Committee with which we could make a definite finding.

 

Allegations of corruption in the City are that the members of the City Transport Branch own taxis and therefore have a direct interest in the taxi industry.

These allegations have not been verified.

 

Allegations against the Traffic Department at City and Provincial level are that:

 

  • They take sides in the taxi conflict, turning a blind eye to either CATA or CODETA offences;
  • Take money from taxi drivers and operators instead of enforcing the law that is being violated;
  • Allow CATA and CODETA to stop the taxis going to or coming from Cape Town to the Eastern Cape, and
  • They own taxis.

 

 

9.14      LACK OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

 

Despite the evidence from the Traffic Department, the Committee  heard that there is  a lack of law enforcement when it comes to policing taxi laws. Most of the taxi associations that testified before the Committee, indicated that they were tired of being stopped by their rivals when the police were not doing it. It is clear that routes are not properly policed, giving rise to taxi associations policing routes themselves. This in turn provided the ideal opportunity for fights and conflict between rival taxi associations.

 

 

9.15 RECAPITALISATION AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

 

According to the submission made by the National Transport Department, the TRP started in 1999. The objectives of the TRP are to:

  • Replace the current taxi fleet;
  • An attempt by government to intervene in the transport industry, and
  • Improve the public transport system.

 

The industry is measured by the amount of new vehicles entering the industry. There were various safety features that needed to be designed into the process of acquiring new vehicles. Currently there are approximately 16000 taxis in the country. With the recap process, it is the intention of government to exit 30% of the vehicles from the industry. 25% of the price of a new vehicle is to be de-linked over a period of seven years. The thirty five seater bus has been reviewed and it was found that it had an urban bias.

 

Government is now proposing three seating bands of busses:

9-14   seater;

17-24 seater, and

25-34 seater.

 

The operators have the choice of the type of taxi on the routes that they choose to work on. On 20 July 2005 the cabinet approved the draft safety regulations and the implementation framework. 

 

The strategy aims to create a provincial readiness assessment which aims to get the provinces moving in line with the taxi industry and in line with transport objectives.

The strategy also proposes to:

  • Finalisation of safety requirements;
  • Regulation of the industry;
  • Change the nature of the taxi operations;
  • Strengthen law enforcement, and
  • Empower the industry.

 

The safety requirements are due to be implemented on 1 January 2006.

In terms of regulation, government will be central to creating the amendments to the NLTTA. This relates to the ownership and control of taxi ranks and the ownership of routes.

 

There would be a set maximum amount to be charged on the contributions and joining fees of associations. There are also plans for the introduction of a taxi regulatory body.

 

The scrapping process would involve the replacement of 10 000 un-roadworthy taxis by December 2006. A total of R7.7 billion has been made available for the scrapping process. Of this amount, R2.5 billion has been made available for public transport law enforcement processes.

 

The subsidy for public transport will be reviewed. It is envisaged that taxi associations should form business associations. Interim bus contracts will be extended every month and it is the intention to make taxi associations compete for some of the bus contracts. An integrated ticketing system is being investigated.

 

Whilst the TRP is awaited with anxiety by the operators, the delay in implementing the programme is arguably a factor that might account for the instability in the industry.   Even the most enthusiastic of the operators are concerned that there is no certainty about the programme that has been talked about for the last years.

 

9.16      SUBSIDISATION

 

The subsidisation policy applies only to bus and railway passengers despite the fact that nationally the taxis carry more passengers than the two modes of transport put together.  In the Cape metropolitan area, whereas the taxi industry is the second largest carrier of commuters, taxi passengers still do not enjoy any form of subsidy like buses and railway.  The national department of transport is presently engaged in studies that are aimed at addressing subsidisation for taxi passengers.

 

Subsidisation of passengers using other modes and the impact of subsidies in those modes emerged when the whole issue of profitability in the taxi industry was discussed.  Taxi associations were adamant that with the absence of subsidisation they were not in a position to give better services to commuters and at the same time operate a sustainable business. 

 

The other issue that kept cropping up under subsidisation was the state of vehicles operated by the taxi industry.  The taxi associations acknowledged the dilapidated state of some of their vehicles. They were aware that the fleet was growing older and suggested that any form of subsidisation of their passengers would give the industry an opportunity to invest in the constant renewal of their fleet.

 

The discussion of the renewal of the fleet went along with issue of the TRP.  It was clear that although the taxi industry in principle supported the ideals of the TRP they were all not clear about what was going on in this programme.  The TRP was seen as a rescue mission but the taxi industry did not have the details of the programme. As a result they rejected it because different interpretations were given by other operators who saw it as working against the idea of the renewal of the fleet.

 

Rail and bus passengers are subsidized due to the fact that operators are providing a public transport service.

 

The Committee deliberated over whether passengers in the minibus taxi industry should also be subsidized. In view of the fact that the industry is privately owned, but provides a public transport service, the Committee is of the opinion that a subsidy should apply to these passengers as well.

 

 

9.17      PUBLIC TRANSPORT INTERCHANGES/RANKS

 

Public Transport Interchanges and ranks play an important role in the promotion and development of public transport.  They are built and owned by the municipality but are managed by the private sector.

 

In 1998 the City of Cape Town through Modalink appointed Arcus Engineering Consultants to study and prepare draft guidelines on the management of Public Transport Interchanges.  This study found that there was little, if any, operational management and maintenance of PTIs and that no local authority had provided funds or an organisation for these activities.  The study also found that there was no national or provincial statutory system to support these efforts. (Arcus Report).

 

Even though the study took place in 1998 there has been no effort on the side of the City to implement some of the findings.

 

The Langa Situation

 

In Langa the establishment of the interchange led to misunderstanding in the taxi industry.   Members of taxi associations that are not Langa residents felt that the Langa Forum used the constitution to chase away all taxi owners that were not residents in Langa.  These members argued that the constitution made provisions for only Langa operators to be represented in the Forum.  The Committee made various attempts to access the constitution of the Langa Forum but was unsuccessful.   The Committee was told that the chairman of the Langa Forum was away on business and was responsible for the safe keeping of the constitution.

 

The exclusion of other members in the Langa Forum has presented unnecessary problems for Langa associations in other areas.  For example the Committee learnt that as a result of the exclusion of other associations from Langa Forum, Langa associations were chased away from Nyanga and Wynberg.

 

Further investigation by the Committee showed that the problem emanates from the management of the PTIs.  The PTI managers establish taxi forums that are run exclusively by taxi associations.  This presented various problems for the management of PTI.   Some of the problems are as follows:

 

·         There seemed to be no clear distinction between the rank managers and PTI managers.  In most instances taxi owners were not aware that there were PTI managers who were above the rank managers, and

 

·         In some instances PTI managers were not aware of the problems taking place at taxi rank level.  As a result taxis claimed that they were chased away by rank managers.

 


           

10.        FINDINGS BY THE COMMITTEE

 

10.1            UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE INSTABILITY AND

RECURRING CONFLICT

 

The Committee is of the opinion that there are a number of underlying reasons for the instability and recurring conflict.   Amongst the chief reasons are the following:

 

1)       The unresolved and outstanding investigations around the Khayelitsha Stadium and Laingsburg incidents in 1994 and 1996 respectively.  In Khayelitsha no one was arrested and in Laingsburg no one was convicted.   About 11 people were murdered in Khayelitsha and about four died in Laingsburg;

 

2)       The role played by the executive and administrative sections of the POLB and the resultant corruption of the institution.  In addition the slow pace of processing licenses by the POLB has completely discredited the POLB in the industry.   No one speaks well of the POLB;

 

3)       Despite the fact that there is general agreement between all the institutions that taxi routes are overtraded, the POLB continues to issue permits on routes;

 

4)       The divisive role of the CATA and CODETA “Mother Bodies”.  These organisations are unaccountable and continue to collect monies from operators who are promised routes and licenses;

 

5)       The vested interests of taxi operators who have control over certain routes and do not allow anyone to interfere with their vested interests;

 

6)       The absolute lack of any significant law enforcement of the taxi ranks and routes.  The current practice is for rival taxi associations to force one another off a particular route if they do not belong there. This gives rise to continual conflict between rival associations to force one another off a particular route if they do not belong there.  This gives rise to associations taking over some of the routes and ranks by force from rival associations, and

 

7)       The culture of fear and terror amongst drivers, operators and commuters perpetuates the culture of silence amongst people who witness violence.  Consequently, no one ever was prepared to give evidence that would lead to the arrest and conviction of criminal elements in the industry.

 

10.2            INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE VIOLENCE

 

1)                 The chaos at the POLB with respect to processing applications, staff turnover and appointments as well as the questionable role of members of the Board itself.  The Board continues to allocate licenses even when some of the routes are  70% overtraded.

 

2)                 The Provincial Department of Transport did not implement  recommendations of an audit  report that was commissioned in 2001 to investigate the POLB administration   The audit report has found that:

 

·         The Board members were not considered as senior by the department and as a result the management of the institution was delegated to the Deputy Director;

·         No proper records were kept.  As a result it was not easy to follow what was happening after the application was submitted;

·         The applications are gazetted as soon as they are launched. There is usually no information on what was gazetted.  This means that the same application can be gazetted more than once depending on how many times it was launched, and

·         Almost half the staff involved in the processing of permits are temporary. This means that there is no consistency and continuity in the processing of permits.  Every six months new staff members have to be trained to do the same job.

 

3)                 The Provincial Transport Department has abdicated its responsibility towards the POLB. 

 

4)                 There is a serious lack of effective management, leadership and direction in the Board.  Consequently the Committee recommended an urgent extensive forensic audit be undertaken on the affairs of the Board.

 

5)                 The role of the Municipality of Cape Town with respect to the management of taxi ranks leaves much to be desired.  The Committee is of the opinion that the City of Cape Town has abdicated its responsibility of managing the ranks by outsourcing their management.  The result has been a deterioration of the ranks.  The taxi associations do not respect the interchange manages and the City is not making sufficient resources available at the ranks.  Security is seriously lacking and inadequate at these ranks.  There are hawkers, trading illegally at the ranks and paying fess to the taxi associations, who illegally sub-let Council property.  The Council also does not collect any fees from the associations.   The view of the Committee is that the City of Cape Town has effectively lost control of the management of these ranks. 

 

6)                 SARS does not seem to have been diligent in investigating whether taxi operators are tax payers at all.  Despite several attempts to get the Cape Town SARS investigations department to work with this Committee, they did not even return the calls and correspondence addressed to them.

 

7)                 The application of the criminal justice system to taxi operators has been seriously undermined by, inter alia, the following:

    

·         The SAPS seem to have failed to properly investigate serious crimes.   In some cases, they have  simply refused to investigate serious crimes e.g. The Stadium Event where they refused to investigate ostensibly because there were “ANC cadres” at the event;

·         There is no co-ordination between law enforcement agencies (SAPS, Scorpions, AFU, City Police, Traffic Police, NIA etc.) aimed at smashing the crimes that obviously do take place in the industry – and are escalating;

·         There is no system in place to warn the law enforcement agencies about serious crimes that are likely to be committed.  Law enforcement agencies seem to react to crisis situations that have arisen, and even so without commitment;

·         The operators in the industry have lost all respect for the sanctions provided by available legislation.  They do not pay fines (often very low) because they know they will not be acted upon by law enforcement agencies, and

·         Even though impounding of motor vehicles is an effective remedy available to law enforcement agencies, excuses seem to be readily found why resort is not had to this very effective remedy – no place to keep impounded taxis etc.  We seem to think it is all because those whose duty it is to enforce the law have lost the will to do so – a very sad state of affairs indeed.


 

10.3            TAXI ASSOCIATIONS

 

1)         The Taxi Associations principally, CATA and CODETA are involved in illegal activities such as the killings of their rivals during conflicts between them.

 

2)         They are in a position to collect fees from their members that range between twenty and sixty thousand rand in exchange for a promise of routes and licenses.   This should not be allowed to happen as it directly contributes to the conflict.

 

3)         The operators also collect cash monies of thousands of rand per route on a weekly basis.   We believe that, alternatively, these monies that are unaccounted for eventually end fuelling the wars between rival organisations.

 

4)         They do not keep books of account for this purpose.

 

5)         There is a culture of silence between the drivers, owners and leaders with respect to illegal activities such as hiring of hit-men to take out rival taxi leaders.

 

6)         The taxi association mother bodies operate like a modern day mafia with the power to extort monies from operators, the ability to kill people who disagree with them and threaten their interests.

 

7)         A group of about thirty to forty people has been identified to us who it is reasonable to believe might possibly be behind most of the violence that affects the industry.   It would appear that for the most part, they are  the owners and operators who have a vested interest in most of the routes.

 

8)         There is a strong indication of a link with gangs, especially in the Coloured associations.  These gangs reportedly extort monies from operators and drivers alike.

 

9)         It would further appear that there is a also a link with drugs and organised crime in that taxi drivers are used to cart drugs, sometimes sell drugs at the ranks, cart prostitutes to customers, and generally provide attorneys’ fees to people that have been arrested for particular crimes. 

 

10)        Taxi associations are supposed to provide their constitutions to the

   Taxi Registrar. This has not happened. Furthermore no annual

    general meetings have been held for the past four years.

 

 

 

 

 

 


11.      IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE POTENTIAL AREAS

         FOR CONTINUING CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

 

The Committee is of the opinion that there are a number of potential areas that could contribute to conflict over the next few years if not addressed by the Provincial Government.  It is a concern that some of these issues have been left to officials who do not have the commitment and capacity to deal with it. 

 

11.1      PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS LICENSING BOARD

 

The Committee is unanimous in its opinion that the POLB should be overhauled in terms of its operating systems, management framework and its financial systems  

 

11.2      HIT SQUADS

 

The investigations into hit squads in the industry, some of the members whom this Committee has identified should commence as soon as possible.  Where they are left untouched by justice, the possibility that they will continue to be hired by the senior members of the taxi industry, will no doubt continue.   It is in the interest of bringing stability to the taxi industry that the opportunity for recruitment, hiring and nurturing of these hit-men should be closed as soon as possible.  

 

The proposal from the Committee in this regard is that the multi-disciplinary task team should investigate them with the view of eventually arresting and bring them to justice as a matter of priority.   The multi-disciplinary team should have the resources to bring these individuals to justice.  The Committee is of the opinion that if these individuals are brought to justice, it will no doubt help to re-establish a sense of stability in the industry by encouraging others to come forward and share information with the law enforcement authorities. 


 

11.3      UNSOLVED CRIMINAL CASES

 

The Committee has noted  that there are a number of unsolved criminal cases that should be re-opened with a view to solving them.  Chief amongst these are the Laingsburg and Khayelitsha Stadium cases.   The Committee views this in an extremely serious light and are convinced that the investigation and arrests of suspects responsible for the attacks, will bring closure to the victims.  It will also greatly reduce the opportunity for conflict amongst the various taxi associations.  

 

11.4            UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE: RECAPITILISATION PROCESS

 

The TRP should urgently and effectively be communicated by the Transport Departments to all the taxi associations so that they can understand the process.   The fact that government has now announced the progress of the TRP indicates that there is considerable movement in the process.  A risk factor requiring attention is the illegal operators and the attitude of the National Taxi Alliance and its supporters in the Western Cape Province.   This will most certainly affect the reaction of drivers and operators and raise the levels of conflict in the Province. 

 

The TRP should be managed with the utmost care and professionalism on the part of the Department of Transport and Public Works.    

 

11.5      CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF RANKS

 

Certain ranks have been taken over by the taxi associations and access to these ranks are denied to members of other associations.  The City of Cape Town and law enforcement authorities must take control of  ranks if further conflict and management of these facilities is to be avoided. 


 

11.6      MOTHER BODIES

 

The question of “Mother Bodies” needs to be addressed as they exert an inordinate amount of control over their route based affiliates.  They are unaccountable, have not held annual general meetings and do not provide financial reports on a regular basis.  Whilst it is clear that they cannot be ignored or wished away since they have entrenched their positions over time, it is clear that they need to be engaged on a sustainable basis.   Ultimately, whether they or the taxi councils end up being the key players in the industry, what is clear is that government cannot and should not allow structures that are unaccountable to run such a critical industry.   Associations must accept that it can no longer be business as usual henceforth.  The stakes are simply too high.

 

           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


12.        POSSIBLE MECHANISMS TO ENSURE

         ACCOUNTABILITY, STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF

        CONFLICT

 

The Department of Transport through the Registrar, should consider developing or contracting an independent dispute resolution agency to manage potential conflicts in the industry.  The Registrar should also force associations to hold AGM’s, failing which they should be de-registered.

 

12.1      LAW ENFORCEMENT

 

Law enforcement should become an urgent part of reducing the conditions for the instability in the industry.  The fact that there are three law enforcement agencies responsible for minibus taxis, which do not communicate on a regular basis, creates problems.

 

The primary and secondary law enforcement agencies must as a matter of urgency have a meeting to review their role in the context of this report and begin to redefine their roles and responsibilities and find common purpose. 

 

12.2      REGISTRATION AND DATABASES

 

The registration of the taxi associations details are inadequate.  It creates problems when the Registrar does not have an updated database on the details of all taxi associations that are registered.   The Committee is of the opinion that the Registrar should consider a more effective system of collating information. 

  

12.3      OVERHAUL OF THE OPERATIONS LICENSING  BOARD (POLB)

 

The Committee had an in loco inspection at the POLB.   We came across files where there was clear forgery of SARS documents.   The staff at the POLB accepts any letter from SARS without checking its authenticity.  The Committee’s proposal is that it becomes a condition for a tax clearance certificate to be submitted with application    The POLB is already undergoing a forensic investigation into its practices and the recommendations should be used as a basis to overhaul its operations.     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

13.      PAST AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CODETA AND CATA

 

There have been past agreements between CATA and CODETA which have not been sustained, nor have they averted taxi conflict.  Where there are agreements that have been mediated, the mediation process should preferably be undertaken by an independent organisation that has the experience to mediate in such conflicts. In addition resources should be provided to monitor and enforce the agreements. 

 

13.1      ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT

 

Elements of a possible agreement with the taxi industry are the fact that there needs to be a restructuring of the WCPTC which should make it more inclusive and representative of the entire industry.   Secondly the influence of mother bodies must be significantly reduced and regional councils should receive recognition.   There needs to be sufficient resources allocated to  regional councils.    

 


                   

14.  GOVERNMENT’S OBLIGATION TOWARDS TAXI

      ASSOCIATIONS

 

Government should address the ensuing conflict and regularise the industry so that the operators are empowered to be business men and women.  The fact that the minibus taxi industry has burgeoned, growing from strength to strength on a sustainable basis, can only mean that there is entrepreneurship among those who ply their trade in this business.  The minibus industry is arguably the most original example one can get in South African of genuine Black empowerment.  With active Government support and intervention the taxi associations can play a constructive role in stabilising the industry in a way that can generate stability in the operations, whilst equally economically empowering the taxi operators who would now operate in a crime-free environment. 

 


 

15.        RECOMMENDATIONS

 

 

15.1       The Committee recommends the establishment of a semi-permanent dispute resolution body to mediate between taxi associations once disputes arise over routes.  Such a dispute resolution body should be independent,  and should report to the Registrar.

 

15.2       The Committee recommends that Government reviews the operational activities and management framework of the POLB in order to ensure compliance with legislative imperatives and to create efficiency and effectiveness.

 

15.3       Government should eradicate the practice of the Traffic Department allowing the CATA and CODETA patrols along the N1 and N2 as this has no basis in law.  

 

15.4       Government should immediately set up a multi-disciplinary investigative team comprising of SAPS, SARS, NPA, and NIA to investigate the taxi warlords who continue to order the killings and are involved in other criminal activity.  This team should, inter alia, examine the previous cases of taxi owners and drivers that have never been brought to justice with the intent to prosecute them.   The team should also investigate possible crimes of tax evasion by taxi owners.

     

15.5       Law enforcement agencies from SAPS,  Provincial  and City Traffic and

City Police should set up a joint task team to deal with any road traffic violations arising from failed disputes between owners and associations.  An early warning system should be developed and information and intelligence must be shared amongst the role-players.

 

15.6       The Committee recommends that all the tapes, transcripts, records, notes and reports that were gathered in the process of this investigation should not be immediately made available to the public until such time as the Premier and his Government have gone through the records to determine which records can be released without prejudicing those who are named.  This would obviously be in line with the rules of natural justice and the need to protect the rights of individuals in terms of the Constitution.

 

15.7       The Committee, however, further recommends that the body of evidence collected should be appropriately archived and with time, be made available to the public for research and other bona fide purposes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

16.        CONCLUSION

 

At the beginning of this report, we indicated that the Committee had time and capacity constraints.  In the remaining six weeks of its original mandate, it functioned without its chairperson, who was hospitalised from the 14th July 2005.   Although he was always available for consultations on critical issues, he could not avail himself physically until the beginning to middle of August 2005, by which date the Premier had graciously extended the Committee’s mandate period.

 

The Committee, notwithstanding these vicissitudes, believes that it has collected a credible body of evidence.

 

The efficacy and commitment with which the attempt to stabilise the industry is undertaken by all parties, remains the biggest challenge.  Part of the endeavour should be a commitment to implement, as soon as possible, those of the recommendations in this report that call for immediate action.

 

It is therefore hoped that the contents of this report will be acted upon with speed, to prevent further loss of life of operators and commuters.  The Committee hopes that the report will not gather the proverbial dust but that its contents will be discussed at the highest levels in Government, We particularly hope that the appointment of the multi-disciplinary investigative team will be given the urgent attention it deserves.

 

These are obviously difficult decisions to make, at times impacted upon by budgetary and other restraints.  Those difficult choices, however, will have to be made by the Premier, to whom we hand over this report, warts and all.  We do so, nonetheless, certain in the belief that his passionate concern for loss of life, that prompted him and his Government to appoint this Committee in the first place, will inform the Premier’s ultimate strategy decisively putting mechanisms for the resolution of the conflict and instability in the minibus taxi industry in the Cape Town Metropolitan area.   Time is of the utmost importance.

 

As for the rest, the Committee thanks the Premier and his Government for having afforded it the rare honour, privilege and opportunity to attempt to undertake such a heavy task.  We can only hope that their confidence in us was not misplaced.  We are confident that it was not.

 

         

.

 

in the first place.



[1]               It has always been a problem using the word “Black”. During the apartheid era, the liberation movement used Black to refer to Africans, Coloureds and Indians – all those who were disenfranchised by reason of not being white.  This is the sense in which in this text the world will be used.  Black will not be used to mean “Africans”.  That usage has the apartheid connotation that derives from the perjorative Afrikaans reference to Africans as “swartes”.