EXECUTIVE BACKGROUNDER ON WESTERN SAHARA PREPARED FOR THE DIRECCTOR GENERAL, Dr. A NTSALUBA ON THE OCCATION OF THE BRIEFING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PORTFOLIO ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON MARCH 14, 2005 CAPE TOWN
A. Executive summary
Although Morocco relinquished its old territorial claims to parts of Algeria and Mauritania by 1972, it has continued to regard the Western Sahara as an integral part of the Kingdom. The territory has phosphate mines and rich offshore fishing grounds, and may hold underground water and oil. Morocco has occupied the territory since the Spanish colonial power withdrew in 1975, at which point the Algerian-supported Polisario Front, which is based near Tindouf just inside Algeria began a guerrilla war in support of independence for the self-proclaimed Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR is recognised by 76 countries but not by any global powerbroker, any permanent member of the UN Security Council or any European state. Morocco has consolidated its military hold on the Western Sahara, building a defensive sand wall around the economically useful zone, developing local infrastructure and encouraging Moroccan immigration and illegal settlement.
In 1988 both sides agreed to support a UN peace plan to allow the territory’s population to determine its own future through a referendum. A cease-fire has held since September 1991 but the referendum has not taken place because of disagreements over who should be allowed to vote. Recognising that the stalemate could last indefinitely and concerned at the mounting cost of the UN peace mission, The UN’s special envoy, former US secretary of date James Baker, began in 2000 to urge the two sides to negotiate a solution involving neither full independence nor full integration into Morocco, but a ‘third way’, namely a large degree of self-rule under Moroccan sovereignty. This idea was welcomed by Morocco but rejected by Polisario and its main supporter Algeria. Polisario accepted a new proposal from Mr. Baker, for a period of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty followed by a referendum within five years, but rejected by Morocco, which maintains that its sovereignty is ‘non-negotiable’.
In 2004 Spain began to take a prominent role in the search for a solution, but has made little progress. Mr. Baker resigned as UN envoy in June 2004. Morocco continues to procrastinate and obstruct, believing that it is unlikely to face sanctions for rejecting the plan and confident that, in time, Polisario will be forced to abandon its goal of full independence. Polisario is under pressure from the 200,000 Saharawi refugees in camps in south –west Algeria, and from the international community, which is anxious to resolve an issue that has kept regional tensions high and blocked progress towards a regional common market, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). France actively supports the Moroccan position while US continues to expand its strategic economic interests (energy) in the region.
The South African government actively supports the United Nations multilateral efforts to find a peaceful and lasting resolution to the conflict between the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and the Moroccan Kingdom. To this end the government supports the Baker Plan as adopted by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1495. South Africa also views Spain as a credible interlocutor in its engagements towards a durable solution.
South Africa’s policy is informed by the following:
In order to achieve the objectives of the UN Peace Plan South Africa recognised the SADR on 15 September 2005 and supports therefore, the holding of a referendum providing an opportunity for the Saharawi people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. South Africa also views the Western Sahara impasse as detrimental to the NEPAD reconstruction and development strategy of the continent especially in relation to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which has remained dormant for the past fifteen years as a result of the conflict. Within the multilateral context (UN, NAM, G77, SADC, Commonwealth) South Africa continues to highlight the plight of the Saharawi people and has provided R10 million towards humanitarian and refugee assistance as well as continuous support for the SADR’s diplomatic representation. Towards this end the SADR has been mobilising the international community for:
The attendance of South Africa at senior official level of the 30 years Polisario celebrations on 14 February 2006 has strengthened relations with the SADR.
The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is a desert territory in north-west Africa that borders Morocco to the south, Mauritania to the north and Algeria to the west. The territory covers an area of 252,120 sq. kilometres with a population of about 270,000 mostly inhabiting the main city of Laayoune.
The inhabitants, the Saharawis, are nomadic Arabs who subscribe to Islam. What has attracted the highly industrialized nations’ interests is that the territory is rich in phosphates, marine resources and is believed to have offshore oil deposits.
Spain colonized Western Sahara in 1884, becoming a Spanish province in 1934. Saharawi nationalism, emboldened by the independence wave sweeping through Africa as well as the invasion and occupation of the desert territory by Morocco and Mauritania, forced Spain to hand over the territory to the respective countries in 1976.
To resist recolonization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio De Oro (Polisario Front) immediately declared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and established a government in exile. Mauritania withdrew and formally rescinded its claim to the territory in 1979 due to Polisario resistance, which gave rise to a coup in Mauritania. Since then, this territory has been the subject of a long-running dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front.
Spain announced its intention to organize a referendum in Spanish Sahara by 1975. The outcome was expected to grant independence to the territories. Morocco however, launched an inquiry with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to claim Spanish Sahara as a Moroccan province.
In May 1975 the United Nations (UN) sent a special commission to the region to study the situation and to prepare a special report. The final report was made public in October 1975 declaring that the majority of the population was "in favour of independence and against Moroccan and Mauritanian claims."Following these conclusions the ICJ affirmed: "the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory".
The first step towards confrontation took place upon the announcement of the ICJ’s decision giving rise to the "Green March" on 06 November 1975. Days later the Madrid Accord was signed, relinquishing Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. With this the Provincial Saharawi National Council was established. Spain officially withdrew on 28 February 1976. Morocco and Mauritania took over on 14 April 1976.
Following the coup de’etat in Mauritania on 10 July 1978, the Polisario Front declared a ceasefire, which led to the signature of the Algiers Agreement between the Polisario and Mauritania on 05 August 1979. Mauritania subsequently withdrew from Western Sahara. Following this development, Morocco unilaterally annexed the southern part of the Territories.
A protracted conflict then ensued with Morocco giving rise to the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara as informed by the OAU Settlement Plan, which was accepted by both Morocco and the Polisario Front on 30 August 1988. A UN monitored ceasefire followed. The referendum scheduled for the early 1990’s still need to take place.
1.1 The OAU and UN Peace Plan for Western Sahara
As fighting between Moroccan troops and Polisario forces continued, the UN and OAU made a concerted effort to settle the conflict in Western Sahara. In August 1988 the UN Secretary-General announced that a detailed peace plan had been drafted. The plan contained proposals for a cease-fire and a referendum to determine the status of the territory, while a UN representative, with wide-ranging powers, and a 2,000-strong UN monitoring force was to oversee their implementation. Prior to the referendum, Morocco was to reduce its presence in Western Sahara from 100,000 to 25,000 troops, who would then be confined to barracks, while Polisario forces (totaling an estimated 8,000) were to withdraw to their bases. Eligibility to vote in the referendum was to be decided by a UN team, and was expected to be restricted to persons enumerated in the 1974 Spanish census of the then Spanish Sahara and to those born in Western Sahara.
The referendum was to offer a choice between complete independence for the territory and its integration into Morocco. It was hoped that a further option would be added, offering a large measure of autonomy for the Saharawi people under the Moroccan crown. Both Morocco and the Polisario Front formally accepted the UN peace plan, although both sides expressed reservations. However, the UN’s expectation that a cease-fire could be secured within a month, and the referendum held within six months, proved wholly unrealistic.
In October 1988, the UN General Assembly agreed that direct talks should be held, followed by a cease-fire and a referendum. Morocco abstained in the voting, claiming that since both sides had accepted the UN proposal for a cease-fire, and there was no need for direct talks. Polisario stepped up their attacks, but King Hassan refused to ‘negotiate with his own subjects’ and announced his readiness to order his troops across international borders in pursuit of Polisario forces. Morocco meanwhile continued its massive development program in Western Sahara, where Moroccan settlers now outnumbered the original inhabitants in the territory. It was not until April 1991 that the UN Security Council approved Resolution 690, authorizing the establishment of a UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which was to implement the plan for a referendum of self-determination with a UN peace-keeping force to supervise the operation. The cease-fire came into effect on 6 September 1991, and deployment of MINURSO personnel began at el-Aaiu¢ n.
AU: Khartoum Summit, January 2006
The Sahara Press Service reported on 25th January that the AU Council for Peace and Security had declared the day before that the international community; "must show more determination to ensure the enforcement of the UN’s Peace Plan and the UN’s Security Council resolutions for the self-determination of the people in Western Sahara".
It went on to say that the AU Executive Council (Council of Ministers) expressed "concern" about the "permanent blockage of the peace process in addition to the increasing frustration of the people of Western Sahara".
We have not received any information from Head Office on how the Western Sahara was dealt with at the AU meeting in Khartoum.
1.2 The Baker Plan
In March 1997 the new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan appointed former US Secretary of State James Baker as his personal envoy to Western Sahara. Between June and September 1999 Baker chaired a series of direct talks between the Moroccan Government and representatives of Polisario in Lisbon (Portugal), London (United Kingdom) and Houston, Texas (USA) and a compromise agreement (often referred to as the Houston accords) was reached on the highly contentious issue of who would be eligible to vote in the long-delayed referendum, now scheduled to be held in December 1998. Baker appeared to have persuaded the Moroccan Government to accept a lower figure for the number of eligible voters than it had originally demanded. Agreement was also reached on the reduction of both sides’ military forces in the occupied territories.
In December 1999 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan conceded that the referendum was unlikely to take place before 2002, and early in 2000, amid growing frustration within the UN at the lack of progress in voter identification, he expressed doubts that the referendum would be held at all.
It was against this unhopeful background that the UN Secretary-General asked James Baker to resume his role as special envoy with a mandate to explore with the parties concerned ‘all ways and means to achieve an early, durable and agreed solution to the dispute’. The UN’s favoured option appeared to be autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The USA and France preferred to press for the widest possible autonomy for the disputed territory. However, a number of meetings in mid-2000 between Baker and representatives of the Moroccan Government and Polisario failed to make any progress, and neither side was prepared to discuss Baker’s suggestion of an alternative political solution to the referendum plan.
Polisario, for its part, insisted that the problems confronting the referendum were not insurmountable and that it would support any proposals put forward by the UN to allow the appeals process to begin. At a further meeting chaired by Baker in September 2000 Morocco indicated its willingness to begin talks on autonomy for Western Sahara. Polisario however continued to reject any alternative to the referendum, which it remained confident of winning. In response to Morocco’s decision to allow the 2001 Paris-Dakar rally to pass through Western Sahara, Polisario threatened to end the nine-year cease-fire; however, after appeals from the UN, the OAU and Algeria, it eventually decided not to resume hostilities, although the Polisario leadership warned that it remained in a state of war.
In February 2001 celebrations were held to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the declaration of the SADR, at which Polisario displayed an array of military hardware. Amid growing frustration at the lack of political progress, Sahrawi refugees felt that the chance of holding the UN referendum was becoming ever more remote. The Polisario leadership continued to voice its threat to resume hostilities, and observers noted mounting pressure from the refugees for such action to be taken.
In December 2000 Polisario had released 201 Moroccan prisoners of war, taken captive in the mid-1970s, but despite appeals from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it refused to release almost 1,500 Moroccans still held in detention. Polisario claimed that Morocco was holding some 179 of its troops.
In June 2001 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a compromise resolution encouraging Morocco and Polisario to discuss an autonomy plan for Western Sahara, proposed by Annan, but without abandoning the delayed referendum.
A veteran US diplomat, William Lacy Swing took up his appointment as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and MINURSO Chief of Mission in December 2001. However, there were reports that the mission’s staff in the territory was being reduced and that the work of voter identification had effectively ceased. Within the EU, only Spain now continued to uphold the original referendum plan. On a visit to Rabat President Jacques Chirac of France referred to Western Sahara as the ‘southern provinces of Morocco’.
Although Algerian officials denied reports in the local press that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had accepted the Baker plan at a meeting with US President George W. Bush in November 2001 some commentators maintained that the price of Algeria’s growing rapprochement with the United States after the September suicide attacks on the mainland USA would be its abandonment of the Sahrawi cause.
Meanwhile, Polisario lodged a legal challenge at the UN when Morocco granted the first oil permits in Western Sahara, one to Kerr McGee of the USA and another to TotalFinaElf of France. In February 2002 the UN’s legal Counselor stated that although the oil permits were not illegal per se, exploration work and production that was not in the interest of, or according to the wishes of, the Saharawi people would represent a violation of the principles of international law.
At the beginning of January 2002 Polisario released 115 Moroccan detainees who had been held for more than 20 years, angering the Moroccan authorities by highlighting the role played by the Spanish Premier, Jose¢ Mari¢ a Aznar, in their release. According to the ICRC, some 1,362 Moroccan prisoners of war were still held by Polisario in camps around Tindouf in Algeria. The Moroccan authorities insisted that they no longer held any Polisario supporters as prisoners.
In a new report to the UN Security Council in February 2002, Kofi Annan stated that the future of the peace progress in Western Sahara was depressing, and that in his opinion there were only four options available:
However, the Secretary-General pointed out that while Algeria and Polisario might be willing to discuss this last option, Morocco was firmly opposed to it. Morocco’s Minister of Foreign Affairs had earlier described it as a dangerous plan that would set a precedent for conflicts elsewhere in Africa. Meanwhile, Morocco’s permanent representative to the UN, and most of the Moroccan press, attributed the partition plan to Algeria, claiming that the Algerian authorities wished to create a Saharawi ‘mini-state’, under their protection, through which Algeria would acquire an outlet to the Atlantic.
At the end of July 2002 the UN Security Council met again on the issue, but it remained deeply divided and was unable to agree on any of the options put forward by the Secretary-General in February. Nevertheless, all members agreed that the UN should not walk away from the problem, and a resolution was adopted renewing MINURSO’s mandate for a further six months. James Baker was invited to continue his efforts to seek a political solution to the dispute. The Security Council reiterated its determination to secure a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara, and expressed its readiness to consider any approach proposed by the Secretary-General and his special envoy which provided for self-determination. Some UN sources, however, stated that it would be virtually impossible to find any common ground for the parties even to begin talking, and that Baker’s room to maneuver was extremely limited.
On 31 July 2003 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1495 on Western Sahara. This supported the Baker plan and called on parties and states of the region to co-operate fully with the secretary-general and his special envoy in working towards the implementation of the peace plan. Minus’s mandate was extended to 31 October 2003. Following strong opposition from France, Resolution 1495 did not go so far as to demand that Morocco and Polisario comply with the plan. Nevertheless, the Spanish permanent representative to the UN, chairing the Security Council, insisted that the resolution provided the two parties with sufficient ‘political room’ to reach a definite solution to the dispute on the basis of the Baker plan: this had not imposed a solution on the parties but urged them to resume sustained discussions. Kofi Annan invited the parties to act constructively and work with him and Baker towards acceptance and implementation of the peace plan.
Negotiations on specific elements of the plan were expected to take place, in an attempt at progress towards implementation before the end of the year. However, given what was regarded as Morocco’s intransigence, compounded by divisions within the Security Council, observers were not optimistic that significant progress would be made. The resolution also called on Polisario to release without further delay all remaining Moroccan prisoners of war, and for Morocco and Polisario to co-operate with the ICRC to resolve the fate of persons unaccounted for since the beginning of the conflict. Morocco stated that it was satisfied with Resolution 1495 because it accepted the basic principle that any solution to the problem should be negotiated and accepted by all parties. However, it reiterated its rejection of Baker’s latest proposals, arguing that they drew inspiration from the 1991 settlement plan and moved away from the principle of a political solution.
At the end of October 2003 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1513, extending the mandate of MINURSO until 31 January 2004. In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General urged Morocco to become actively engaged by accepting and implmenting the peace plan.
Annan stated that he had acceded to Morocco’s request for more time to reflect and consult before giving its final response. He hoped that Morocco’s response would be positive, but if not he would return to the Council with his views on the future of the peace progress as well as MINURSO’s mandate.
The Secretary-General welcomed the release of 243 Moroccan prisoners of war on 1 September, and called on Polisario to ensure the immediate release of the remaining 914 prisoners of war. Morocco, for its part, responded angrily to Annan’s suggestion that it become actively engaged in implementing the Baker plan, accusing him of deliberately misinterpreting Resolution 1495 and deviating from the UN’s neutral position.
Polisario was still holding Moroccan prisoners. In November 2003 the Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, who had replaced William Lacy Swing as MINURSO Chief of Mission, toured the Territories and held meetings with Moroccan, Algerian and Mauritanian officials as well as with Polisario. Morocco continued to declare that it remained committed to a peaceful settlement of the dispute in co-operation with the UN, but insisted that the international community had recognized the impracticality of implementing the 1991-settlement plan and the only way forward was the so-called ‘third way’. Some observers argued that Morocco feared that Polisario cadres would dominate the transitional local administration proposed under the Baker plan, leading to a pro-independence vote in the referendum.
On a visit to Morocco in early December, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the parties had to find a solution through negotiations on the basis of the Baker plan. Yet, mindful that the loss of the Western Sahara could bring down King Muhammad’s regime, he stated that Washington was not seeking to impose a solution, that President Bush understood the sensitivity of the issue for the Moroccan people, and that the USA would concentrate its efforts on promoting negotiations between Morocco and Algeria. However, Algeria insisted that Morocco should talk directly to Polisario under the auspices of the UN, emphasizing that the Security Council had recently renewed its support for the Saharawi people’s right to self-determination.
In January 2004, on the basis of recommendations from the Secretary-General, the UN Security Council agreed on a three-month extension to MINURSO’s mandate, in the hope that an agreement could be reached on the Baker plan. Kofi Annan had indicated that he wanted a ‘final response’ from Morocco on the peace plan and also stated that he hoped that the UNHCR would soon be in a position to start organizing family visits due to ‘positive developments’ in confidence-building between the two sides, but expressed concern about aid shortages that were causing acute and chronic malnutrition among some Saharawi refugees. Polisario’s UN representative accused Morocco of continuing to use delaying tactics to obstruct the UN’s peace efforts.
Morocco began a joint maritime surveillance operation with Spain off the waters between Western Sahara and the Canary Islands in February 2004, as part of recent accords signed with Spain to combat illegal immigration as the Western Sahara had become an important transit point for illegal immigrants, especially from sub-Saharan Africa, seeking to enter Europe via Spain.
In March 2004 Muhammad Abdel-Aziz, Secretary-General of Polisario and President of the SADR, visited the USA where he met UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York and was later received by several members of the US congress.
He also held talks with James Baker in Houston to discuss prospects for the implementation of the peace plan.
Shortly before the Security Council was due to meet at the end of April 2004 to discuss Western Sahara, Morocco’s Minister of Communication announced that Morocco had given its response to the UN on the Baker plan. He stressed that Morocco was seeking an agreed and lasting political solution but insisted that it absolutely ruled out the independence option and transitional period. It was willing to discuss other aspects of the plan and to negotiate on the basis of a lasting autonomy for Western Sahara (i.e. the devolution of some authority to the population of Morocco’s ‘southern provinces’ within a framework that guaranteed Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial unity).
In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General stated that there were two options from which to choose: either to withdraw the peace-keeping force or to seek once again to get the parties to work towards accepting and implementing the revised Baker plan. Kofi Annan reiterated his support for the second option and stated that Baker’s peace plan remained the best political solution, providing each side with some of what it wanted. On 29 April 2004 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1541, which extended MINURSO’s mandate for another six months to 31 October (Annan had asked for a 10-month extension) and reaffirmed its support for the revised Baker plan as ‘an optimum political solution on the basis of agreement between Morocco and Polisario’.
By May 2004 Morocco was willing to negotiate a large measure of autonomy for Western Sahara, while insisting that Morocco’s sovereignty must be respected, expressing the hope that with newly re-elected President Bouteflika of Algeria progress could be made towards a united and stable Maghreb. Morocco also stated that Saharawi culture was one of the main components of the multiple facets of Moroccan identity.
At the end of May 2004 the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Barnier, stated that France believed that a solution to the Western Sahara dispute based on a broad autonomy for the territory must be studied imaginatively and constructively by everyone. He added that a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco was necessary in order to settle an issue that was hindering Maghreb integration and relations between the Maghreb and Europe.
At the beginning of June 2004 a Spanish government delegation led by the Secretary of the State for Foreign Affairs visited the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf and held talks with Muhammad Abdel-Aziz and other Polisario officials. During the visit, the first by a Spanish government minister, Polisario officials emphasized that Spain, as the former colonial power, had an historical responsibility in the long-running dispute. The minister stated that Spain wanted to encourage rapprochement and dialogue between the parties involved in the dispute.
In June 2004 James Baker resigned his post, apparently frustrated by his failure as the personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General to break the political stalemate. Kofi Annan asked Alvaro de Soto to take over the role, with instructions to continue to seek a mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the Saharawi people. While Morocco issued an official statement regretting Baker’s decision, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation boasted that Baker’s decision had been precipitated by ‘the tenacity of Moroccan diplomacy’. The Moroccan press accused Baker of having ‘flagrantly sided with Algeria’ in the dispute, and of having tried to impose his solution on Morocco. They claimed that his resignation would create a climate that was favourable to a ‘fair solution’. Polisario regretted Baker’s resignation, and insisted that it was an explicit form of protest against Morocco’s intransigent position; his departure represented a serious set-back for the UN’s efforts to resolve the dispute. Algerian officials paid homage to Baker’s negotiating skills and perseverance.
1.3 Recent Political developments
In an address on November 6 2005 on the 30th anniversary of the "Green March", (when, 350,000 people journeyed to the Western Saharan border to show support for Morocco’s claim to the region following the withdrawal of Spain), King Mohammed VI proposed granting autonomy to Western Sahara, within the context of Moroccan sovereignty.
The King also reiterated Morocco’s position that his country would not abandon "an inch of his Sahara", and called for national unity and territorial integrity in the face of what he described as a "fabricated conflict".
Although Morocco’s basic position on the issue has not changed, it appears that the king is trying to encourage a more participatory approach to the debate on the dispute and to reframe it as a political rather than an exclusively national security issue. The king also stated that he would consult with political parties before putting forward a Moroccan proposal on Western Sahara to the UN, and that he would consult the Saharawi population and the Territory’s elected officials (particularly tribal chiefs) on a project to establish an advanced regional system where they would be involved in the restructuring of the royal consultative council for Saharawi affairs, an institution created during King Hassan II’s reign to give Saharawis a forum for running their affairs.
In his speech the king indirectly attacked Algeria for its support for Western Saharan independence and for Polisario, while calling for a negotiated political solution that would be "agreed and lasting within the context of a positive co-operation with the reasonable UN recommendations and its good offices". The two parties’ entrenched positions have not changed significantly, despite the release of last remaining Moroccan prisoners of war in August and Morocco continues to reject the UN-proposed referendum, which would allow a vote on independence.
Polisario continues to demand that the UN move forward with a referendum. There are also disputes between Morocco and Polisario and Algeria over the size of the Saharawi population (and therefore who would be eligible to vote in a UN plebiscite). The population of the region has swelled since 1975, with the two sides claiming figures as divergent as 75,000 and 200,000 residents.
The king’s address coincided with demonstrations by hundreds of people in Madrid at a conference supporting Western Saharan independence including violent clashes between protestors and Moroccan police in the Western Saharan capital, Laayounne, in October 2005. International interest in Western Sahara remains weak despite the important economic costs and security implications of the conflict.
In an interview with the BBC in November 2005 Mohammed Abdelaziz, the President of the SADR said that the king was "burying his head in the sand". He added that Western Sahara was not a Moroccan province to be granted a type of administration and reiterated that the conflict was a matter of decolonisation, to be achieved through the implementation of the UN-proposed referendum.
1.4 Western Sahara: Morocco and Algeria
Moroccan foreign policy is driven by two key goals: to extend trade and investment links and to build support for its position on Western Sahara.
Tensions with neighbouring Algeria have been perpetuated by Algeria’s support for the Polisario Front, but they are grounded in long-standing rivalry for regional leadership, contrasting political and economic systems, and territorial disputes following Algerian independence in 1962. The border with Algeria has been closed since September 1994.
Morocco subscribes to the goals of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), but will not sacrifice its claim to the Western Sahara to achieve them. Relations with Tunisia are " correct", if hardly warm, while Libya, with its erratic foreign policy, is regarded warily. Morocco tends to have more diplomatic and commercial links with the Arab States of the Gulf. It is on good terms with Mauritania and is taking an increasingly prominent role in the economic development of that impoverished country.
The political and economic benefits of a solution to the Western Sahara issue include the revival of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and increased regional trade and international investment. France, the US (which wants stronger economic links with North Africa) and most recently Spain have sought unsuccessfully to persuade Algeria to accept Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. However, sympathy for Western Saharan "decolonisation" and self-determination is deeply embedded within the Algerian military and political elite, and the unresolved dispute remains a major impediment to an improvement in ties between Morocco and Algeria.
1.5. Western Sahara: France and Spain
France and Spain are Morocco’s most important European partners. Relations with France under the presidency of the centre-right Jacques Chirac have been warm. France is a major source of trade, aid and debt-equity swaps. France also continues its support for Morocco on the Western Sahara dispute.
Relations with Spain have traditionally been more difficult. Tensions with Spain centre on illegal migration and drug smuggling across the strait of Gibraltar and territorial disputes, including the demarcation of maritime borders (particularly where oil may be found), the retention by Spain of a number of enclaves and islands along Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, notably Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara. These issues have provoked periodic upsets and in July 2002, there was a brief armed confrontation over an islet, held by Spain but claimed by Morocco, 200 metres off Morocco’s north coast. However, the left-wing government elected in Spain in March 2004 has sought to build better relations with Morocco.
There has been an increase in co-operation over migration, drug smuggling and the "war on terror" (especially following the bombing of the Madrid railroad in March 2004 by terrorists believing to be linked to radical Moroccan Islamist groups). Official Spanish aid has increased, as has Spanish investment. Morocco has also appreciated the new Spanish government’s efforts to find a solution to the Western Sahara dispute that is acceptable to Rabat.
Popular frustration with the slow progress of negotiations recently resurfaced within the occupied territories and within Morocco. Concerns about Moroccan treatment of the Saharawis and human rights abuses by the Moroccan security forces triggered the recent so-called "second Intifadah". A wave of demonstrations started between the 2nd and 11th of March 2005. Other prisoners followed the initial protest by hunger strikes and later across the Territories.
A second wave of protest against Moroccan occupation started from the 22nd of May and lasted right through to the month of June 2005. University campuses and the streets of the occupied Territories became battlefields. Reports of human rights abuses, torture and the disappearance of people became common. International journalists from Norway, Spain and Reporters Sans Frontiers were detained, tortured for information and then deported.
Morocco repeatedly refused several delegations of Spanish Members of Parliament to visit the Territories. Against the backdrop of the recent upheavals in the occupied territories the Spanish authorities then undertook a wave of diplomatic initiatives.
The social tensions that are once again rearing its ugly head pertaining to Western Sahara is important, particularly the plight of the refugees in the camps based in Tindouf, Algeria. Around one hundred and fifty thousand (150 000) refugees are living in the camps relying on international humanitarian aid. The deteriorating humanitarian situation represents a serious situation that has the potential to destabilise the North Africa region.
On Sunday, 4 December three persons were wounded during demonstrations in Boujdour. The demonstrators demanded the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the Western Sahara. Police dispersed the demonstrators and several men dressed in civilian clothing (possibly police). After the demonstration several houses were forcibly searched.
On the same day in Tan Tan, a Saharawi man was brutally beaten to death by a Moroccan police officer. It was claimed that the deceased, Mr. Abba Cheikh, refused to pay a bribe.
The President of SADR, Mohamed Abdelaziz condemned the deployment of 500 Moroccan soldiers in the disputed Territory, dressed in civil clothing. According to unofficial reports the deployment is part of a larger plan to reinforce Morocco's military presence in the Territory. The soldiers were deployed in intermediate and secondary schools in Laayoune.
On 14 December 2005 Moroccan security forces forcibly dispersed students who were organizing informative days at the University of Marrakech on the question of the Western Sahara and Moroccan human rights violations. The students retaliated, but the soldiers later managed to break the resistance with the aid of police agents dressed in plain clothing.
Three senior citizens in the town of Dakhla died on 19 December after they were run over by a Moroccan military vehicle. The Saharawi Government immediately condemned the act as a malicious killing by the Moroccan government. Some NGOs in the Western Sahara have labeled the incident as "new assassinations". The Moroccan government gave no official explanation.
According to local media reports, an Appeal Court in El Aaiún, in the Western Sahara, on 14 December, sentenced seven leaders of the Saharawi cause to prison sentences that range from six months to three years. These seven leaders, accused of organising the riots that took place in several Western Saharan cities in May this year, were sentenced for participating in "criminal activities" and for "encouraging violent attacks against civil servants" although some of them where not even in the country at the time. Two renowned Saharawi leaders, Ms. Aminatu Haidar and Mr. Ali Salem Tamek, were among the accused and were sentenced to seven months and eight months imprisonment respectively.
The prison sentences delivered on the Saharawi leaders contrast dramatically with the twenty years prison sentences delivered on several young Saharawis by a Moroccan court in June in connection with the riots. According to the Spanish press, the purpose of the "softer sentences" delivered on the leaders of the Saharawi cause is to avoid encouraging the ongoing demonstrations in favour of independence that have been going on in the Western Saharan region since the riots began in May.
However, the court case seems to have encouraged more demonstrations in El Aaiún, Bujador and Smara, forcing the Moroccan authorities to deploy additional soldiers in the region to maintain order.
In a recent statement to the As Shark el Ausat newspaper, Moroccan Minister of Communication Nabil Benabdalá said that 350 additional soldiers have been deployed in the region. Minister Benabdalá accused the Algerian secret service of being behind the demonstrations in the Western Sahara. He also said that the leaders of the demonstrations and the Spanish media are coordinating their actions in order to ensure that these actions obtain wider publicity.
One of the accused, Mr. Hamad Hamad, was arrested while he was trying to obtain asylum in the Spanish Cultural Centre in El Aaiún. According to the Spanish press, the Moroccan security forces, however, stormed the Spanish Cultural Centre without obtaining permission from the Spanish authorities. The Spanish Foreign Ministry has, however, asked the Moroccan authorities to ensure that Mr. Hamad is judged in accordance with the principles of the State of Law. Mr. Hamad has been sentenced to two years imprisonment.
According to the El Mundo newspaper, the defence lawyers of the accused have decided to appeal against the sentences and, in a letter to Moroccan King Mohammed VI, several international non-governmental organisations, including Human Rights Watch, have indicated that there is "no evidence whatsoever" that these leaders actually participated or encouraged violence against the Moroccan Police. According to Human Rights Watch, the accused are being "persecuted" because "they are known for their open opposition to the constant violation of the human rights of the Saharawi people" and because of their "peaceful campaign in favour of the independence of the region".
3. Domestic economic situation
Western Sahara is a land with major natural potential, including oil, minerals, and fishing. Its geographical position allows it to be considered as a key geo-strategic territory. The Dakhla area in the southern coast consists of important underground lakes. This has geo-economic implications, especially as water is increasingly becoming a strategic resource for many countries in the region. The land is also rich in phosphates, concentrated in Saguia al-Hamra.
The phosphate mining industry is currently the lifeline of the economy, constituting 62% of the territories’ exports. The full exploitation of its rich reserves of phosphates would give the country one of the highest per capita incomes on the African continent, due to its small population. However, the phosphate factor in the Western Sahara conflict is a marginal issue.
Oil is becoming a key area of concern for many. Some suspect that the current deadlock and the UN’s failure to resolve the conflict are related to an attempt to secure European and American oil interest in the region. A number of European and US companies are currently benefiting from Saharawi oil.
The SADR also announced in January 2006 the commencement of the right to obtain onshore licenses for oil exploration in the Saharawi territories. According to the SADR, the announcement and the licensing procedures have been done in accordance with UN legal opinion regarding activities in Western Sahara.
The announcement of onshore licenses follows the ongoing negotiations currently taking place between the SADR and six British oil companies for offshore licensing. The offer for offshore licensing was published in May 2005. The six companies are all small and medium sized exploration companies, and none of the major role-players such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP were involved in the bidding. It has been reported that one of the contracting companies for the onshore contracts was Premier Oil PLC, based in London.
According to the SADR, the activities of all companies that will be rewarded contracts will only start after full sovereignty over the territory is given to the Saharawi people.
Two kinds of contracts have been proposed. The first proposed an accord on the basis of the sharing of the production once the Saharawi received their sovereignty over the territory. The second type arranges for the granting of licenses on the basis of an accord on guarantees covering the period separating the dates of the signing of the contracts. The latter had been the preferred formula the concerned companies seem to have opted for.
The exploitation of Western Sahara natural resources has always been an issue in the conflict, but recently it has become the focus of much more attention. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the strategic importance of energy resources such as hydrocarbons and oil to the Moroccan economy has increased considerably. Secondly, the issue has become one around which the Polisario and some of its sympathizers are organizing, prompted by Morocco's initiation of its own oil exploration.
The quest for oil in Western Sahara waters has attracted much attention since Morocco announced it had granted reconnaissance licenses to Total and Kerr McGee in 2001. Morocco, of course, has no oil of it own. That leaves its balance of payment exposed to the most volatile of commodity markets. For 2005 the oil import bill rose by an estimated 65%, year-on-year. If we added to the economic incentives for oil production the strategic reasons of wanting to control the full resources of a politically disputed territory, it is even more clear that Morocco will maintain and tighten its grip on the exploration for offshore and onshore oil. If, and when oil is discovered, the legal status of the territory and the interpretations of what can and cannot be done with its resources will come to the fore. The issuing of exploration licenses by the SADR can thus be seen as a counter-action to the exploration policy of the Moroccan government.
The POLISARIO also indicated that it is about to announce the results of its licensing for offshore exploration. The award will directly challenge Morocco's claims to sovereignty, just as Kerr-McGee is believed to be preparing for exploratory drilling under a Moroccan license. A move by Kerr-McGee from seismic work to actual drilling would reopen debate around the 2002 Hans Correll legal opinion. The opinion was widely interpreted to mean that data gathering was permissible, but any activity generating wealth from Saharan resources would have to be for the benefit of the people of the territory.
In 2006 resource sovereignty will be a key issue for Africa, and will create fertile ground for the continuation of the dispute in Western Sahara. The future announcement by POLISARIO of the offshore awards, their announcement to start the tendering for onshore licensing, and the continued work done by companies such as Kerr-McGee will plunge the whole debate back into the realm of political disputes over the identity of the Saharawis, and the future of Western Sahara.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
The Norwegian Oil Fund last year withdrew from investment in Kerr-McGee because of its work in Western Sahara, and Sweden's largest pension fund manager has followed suit. Future fund gatekeepers and campaigning service providers stand to run the risk of being internationally ostracized, if and when they do decide to support either side in the exploration of the Western Sahara.
Other natural resources that have significant geo-strategic implications include iron ore, titanium oxide, vanadium and rich fishing waters along the 400 mile coastline bordering the Canaries, which could yield up to two million tons of fish per annum. The Western Sahara ports at Laayoune, Boudjour, and Dakhla have lately come to represent more than 60% of Morocco’s annual fisheries yield of almost one million tons. This presently accounts to up to 7% of Morocco’s export earnings of US $ 65,6 billion.
The South African government actively supports the United Nations multilateral efforts to find a peaceful and lasting resolution to the conflict between the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and the Moroccan Kingdom. To this end the government supports the Baker Plan as adopted by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1495. South Africa also views Spain as a credible interlocutor in its engagements towards a durable solution.
South Africa’s policy is informed by the following:
In order to achieve the objectives of the UN Peace Plan South Africa recognised the SADR on 15 September 2005 and supports therefore, the holding of a referendum providing an opportunity for the Saharawi people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.
South Africa also views the Western Sahara impasse as detrimental to the NEPAD reconstruction and development strategy of the continent especially in relation to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which has remained dormant for the past fifteen years as a result of the conflict. Within the multilateral context (UN, NAM, G77, SADC) South Africa continues to highlight the plight of the Saharawi people and has provided R10 million towards humanitarian and refugee assistance as well as continuous support for the SADR’s diplomatic representation. Towards this end the SADR has been mobilising the international community for:
The attendance of South Africa at senior official level of the 30 years Polisario celebrations on 14 February 2006 has strengthened relations with the SADR.
Announced its recognition of the SADR following the efforts of President Mbeki to bring together Morocco and Polisario in South Africa. In a letter informing Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero of his efforts (15th August 2004) President Mbeki explained that, responding to a request from Morocco for South Africa "to contribute to the search for a solution within the context of the UN processes led by the UN Secretary-General", he had invited Morocco and the Polisario Front, with the agreement of the UNSG, to meet in SA on 6-7 September 2004. The subsequent refusal of Morocco to attend the meeting occasioned the "full recognition"SA announcement.
South Africa recognised the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic on 15 September 2005 and established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. The first SADR resident ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Sadafa Bahia presented his credentials to President Mbeki on 19 December 2004. The South African Ambassador to Algeria, HE RSS Moloi is also accredited to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Ambassador Moloi presented his credentials on 21 May 2005. The first high level visit by any South African government official took place on 07 April 2005 when the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the refugee camps in Tindouf. Minister Zuma pledged continued AU action on the SADR issue.
The South African government maintains a modest Technical Assistance programme in support of the SADR Embassy based in Pretoria as well as Humanitarian Aid of R10 million. The current Ambassador, Mr. Oubbi Bouchraya, replaced the outgoing SADR Ambassador. The latter arrived in South Africa on Friday, 16 January 2006 to take up his post.
Nota Bene:
The SADR Embassy forwarded a letter to President Mbeki in which they ask assistance from the South African government with the release of Polisario Front members and supporters being held in Moroccan prisons and allegedly being subjected to torture and human rights abuses. This is especially relevant since the Polisario Front recently released all the remaining Moroccan Prisoners of War
The way forward
The South African government should consider the following initiatives in an attempt to assist the peace process with finding a lasting solution to the protracted conflict between Morocco and the colonized peoples of the Territory of Western Sahara.
These initiatives could be the following: