The Portfolio Committee on Labour, having visited the Natref refinery on 4 February 2005, reports as follows:

The Committee agreed in principle to visit the Sasol Natref gas/oil refinery in Sasolburg with a view to conduct a fact-finding mission into the accident which occurred on 26 January 2005, and through which 17 people were injured.

On 3 February 2005, the Committee received a preliminary briefing from the Department of Labour (DOL) on the incident. On 4 February 2005 in Sasolburg the Committee met with the management from Sasol and Natref, representatives from the South African Chemical and Allied Workers Union (SACWU), Solidarity Union (SU) and Chemical, Energy, Paper, Print, Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU), contractor representatives, health and safety representatives and affected workers. The Committee also conducted a site visit of the plant, including the section that was affected by the explosion.

The objectives of the visit were, firstly, to monitor compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act and, secondly, to meet with stakeholders at the Sasol Natref plant to discuss the incident that occurred on 26 January 2005.

Whilst the intention of the Committee was to conduct an oversight on occupational health and safety matters, time constraints made it impossible to complete its oversight at Sasol. Other plants will still have to be visited.

The report consists of the preliminary briefing which the Committee received from the DOL on 3 February 2005; interaction with Sasol and Natref management and other stakeholders in Sasolburg on 4 February 2005, as well follow–up meetings with Sasol management, labour representatives and the DOL on 15 and 22 February 2005 respectively.

As a sequel to the visit to Natref, the Committee met in Parliament on 15 and 22 February 2005 with the labour representatives from SACWU and Solidarity Union (SU), and the management from Sasol and the DOL respectively.

The Committee met with the Acting Deputy Director-General: Service Delivery, DOL, and members from the Free State provincial office:

The report tabled by the DOL indicated that the incident occurred when the plant was in shutdown mode for routine maintenance. It appeared that a gas leak caused the explosion. Although the incident occurred on 26 February 2005, departmental inspectors were able to get there on 27 February 2005 because they could not get access to the plant as the gas was still leaking.

The findings of the preliminary investigations suggested that a mechanical failure of a pump seal was suspected. Seventeen people received medical attention for gas inhalation and were later discharged from hospital. One stayed in hospital longer as a result of the history of psychiatric problems. The final report would be available once the autopsy report was finalised.

The identification of high-risk areas was done through blitz inspections. As a result of these blitz inspections, the DOL was able to identify industries that contributed to about 47% of incidents. The manufacturing industry was identified as one of those industries. For 2005/06, the DOL planned blitz inspections that would focus on identified sectors and come up with the relevant intervention strategy. The provincial management had been advised to build relationships with people on the ground, as well as forge

linkages between inspectors and provincial constituency offices.

The Committee made an appeal that it be informed about intended blitz inspections so that it could observe those inspections.

Employers were obliged to notify the DOL within 14 days from the date on which an incident occurred. In the case of Natref, the DOL did not receive any information in terms of incidents, except for one that occurred in 2003. However, the DOL was in the process of prosecuting Natref as a result of a number of incidents that occurred there. The withholding of information by companies remained a problem.

Most of the delays between the time an incident happens, the investigation and obtaining autopsy reports, were as a result of a shortage of experts. The DOL has put together a proposal that will focus on a training programme that is meant to empower people on the ground to enforce the law. An agreement was reached with the University of Cape Town to train inspectors, health and safety representatives, and shop stewards.

The DOL does tap into government expertise. The integration of health and safety within the Departments of Labour, of Health and of Minerals and Energy will assist in tapping such expertise. The DOL was concerned at the low levels at which inspectors are paid. As a result the DOL was losing most of its inspectors to the private sector.

The Committee registered its concern over the issue of subcontractors, the enforcement of the law over subcontractors, and the high number of temporary workers. Some companies seemed to neglect safety conditions specified in legislation.

The Committee was concerned about the adequacy of training given to health and safety committees, whether there were any weaknesses in the legislation dealing with inspections, and whether the DOL had adequate resources to provide more inspectors at Sasol.

The incident of 26 January 2005 happened at the alkyalation unit. The latter produces high-octane petrol from butane butyelene using hydrofluoric acid. The plant personnel noticed a gas leak and the alarm was raised immediately. However, the leaking gas ignited and resulted in a fire. A site emergency plan was then initiated. A preliminary investigation, which included worker representatives and experts, was conducted on 28 January 2005.

The company takes responsibility for contractors on site. International experts were involved as a means of improving the existing practices at Sasol, as well as learning the latest safety trends.

Sasol, together with other industries, was looking at a uniform safety training model that contractors should undergo. All employees at Sasol, including cleaners, undergo full safety induction through a fixed formal training programme.

Employees and their families were taken care of through wellness programmes and insurance policies. However, the unions were concerned about shortcomings in the legislation, especially after the death of the breadwinner.

Although training on health and safety was provided, more emphasis should be placed on training in respect of inspections. Intensive training should be given to workers in operation and production units. Each employee should receive the same training on how to deal with specific situations.

The shop stewards expressed differing views on training provided on health and safety. Some felt that the training they received was adequate, and that it was more a question of whether people took training seriously. Others felt that the training provided was inadequate, and that one day was not enough considering the complicated industry in which they operated.

b. Input by labour representatives

The union acknowledged that, in relation to the initiatives on the use of international expertise, it was given an opportunity to put forward what it believed could improve the situation. On the issue of training, SACWU felt that there was a need to integrate safety with any other training offered by the company. SACWU viewed the issue of contractors as a grey area. The DOL should check whether training given to safety representatives was done in accordance with the relevant legislation.

SU raised concerns around contract management, restructuring and retrenchments, practices of multi-skilling and labour brokers. Restructuring resulted in a shortage of labour and an increased workload. In relation to occupational health and safety matters, the industry operated in isolation. The visibility of inspections in the chemical industry should be enhanced. SU was concerned that there was no clear communication by management. In most cases management determined what should happen.

SU proposed that the company should establish a disciplinary procedure on any disciplinary action that related to safety.

c. Interaction with affected workers

The Committee received testimonies from two workers who were victims of the incident at Natref. One mentioned that the fire caught him while he was still informing other people about it. The other victim had developed bleeding since the accident happened.

3. 15 February 2005

Presentations by Solidarity Union and SACWU

a. Solidarity Union

SU based its presentation on the gas-related incidents in the chemical industry, more importantly on the six Sasol disaster explosions that occurred between May 2004 and 29 January 2005. SU registered its concern around the contractor maintenance involvement and chemical plant system problems.

However, SU also raised concerns around the following:

1. Unskilled contracted employees who work in a highly specialised complex environment without the relevant training, and contractors who are involved in shutdown maintenance procedures.
2. The attitude of management towards incidents, accidents and fatalities.
3. General non-transparency from management regarding the investigation of incidents.
4. Unnecessary lengthy periods of investigating incidents, accidents and fatalities.
5. Compensation and insufficient assistance to affected employees and their families.
6. Ageing chemical plants and equipment.
7. The continuous drive for production and profit, while compromising safety in the workplace.
8. The continuous reduction of personnel, and the supervisory shortfall of contractors due to skills lost and the reduction of personnel.
9. Non–compliance with safety standards by various parties.

SU indicated that they have had severe conflict with Sasol management due to recent incidents at the Secunda plant. They initially experienced difficulty in participating in the internal inquiries until the Natref incident, wherein the management physically took them to the section where the accident occurred, and the conflict was resolved on the spot. SU believed that the cost of an employee’s life should not be measured in relation to the proportional amount an employer pays to the Compensation Commissioner. There is a need to implement an effective specialist shutdown maintenance procedure and a change of mindset to prevent fatalities in the industry.

1. The appointment of safety representatives should be based on mutual consent between management and organised labour. Currently, it is solely a management decision.
2. Transparency relating to health and safety must be continuous.
3. Specialist contractor maintenance teams should be assembled on a permanent basis to conduct continuous maintenance at various plants.
4. There should be an improvement in the after–care of relatives of the deceased, and of injured employees themselves.
5. The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act should be amended so that it becomes a costly factor for an employer to have injuries or fatalities occur at the workplace.
6. Safety disciplinary procedures should be separated from ordinary disciplinary procedures. However, disciplinary steps for safety measures should not be viewed as punishment.
7. For the purposes of transparency, forensic pathological reports should be made available to all parties concerned.
8. CHIETA should be involved in the funding and implementation of safety training programmes for shop stewards. All training modules should contain safety training focus points.
9. Employees should be encouraged to act proactively so as to prevent further incidents, accidents and fatalities.
10. An in–depth research programme on occupational health and safety with constructive intervention outcomes should be launched.
11. There should be a balance between health and safety, and maintenance and production.
12. Safety in the workplace should involve a positive mindset change in the workplace.

b. SACWU

The presentation by SACWU was around the following:

1. The use of contractors.
2. Safety, health and environmental policies at Sasol.
3. The implementation of safety standards by contractors, Sasol plants and shutdown schedules.
4. The occupational health and safety and compensation legislation. Some contractors do not observe the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. This results in workers working day and night without the required rest periods required by law. When the union advises employees of their rights to ensure that they report non-adherence to safety standards, they are often afraid of dismissal.

1. The code of good practice signed by contractors needs monitoring and evaluation by Sasol.

 

2. To ensure adherence by contractors to safety standards that may lead to the cancellation of contracts, penalty clauses should be part of the contracts.
3. The company should not give contracts to subcontractors who have no capacity to observe, implement and evaluate safety policies.
4. The safety audit on compliance with safety standards should include all contractors on site.
5. Independent experts should supplement the training of health and safety representatives.
6. The DOL should do some work in empowering its inspectorate.
7. Instead of importing expertise from abroad, funds from the National Skills Fund should be utilised to train young people on skilled labour.
8. Companies who hire pensioned employees should keep them for a specific period with a view to transfer skills to young people.

SACWU raised its concern around the delays in the arrival of DOL inspectors during the recent incident at Natref. The union is also concerned that some of the experts who leave Sasol register as subcontractors.

The Committee commended SU and SACWU for their presentations. It noted the lack of transparency that existed at Sasol between management and the unions. It agreed that the issue of capacity in the inspectorate would be raised with the DOL.

The Committee sought clarity around the following:

1. The monitoring of contractors.
2. The workplace structures.
3. Non–compliance in terms of overtime.
4. The trend of losing skills.
5. The specialist contract and maintenance teams.
6. The lifespan of machines.
7. The issue of labour brokers.

1. The chemical industry has "safety watchers" who are supposed to observe the comprehension process from the initiation stage to completion. However, monitoring of contractors is the responsibility of the supervisory line management and the safety watchers.
2. The Occupational Health and Safety Act makes provision for workplace forums. This is viewed as a constructive avenue to follow and a correct vehicle to drive an awareness campaign on health and safety in the workplace.
3. Usually when a company plans a structured maintenance programme, unions are requested to sign an agreement to work irregular hours. Some unions do not have a problem with that arrangement as this programme is usually scheduled for a relatively short time.
4. Some people leave the industry due to restructuring and retrenchments. Some, who are qualified and highly skilled, join plants where they can add value.
5. The union will engage with the management so as to get the correct people to form a specialised team to do effective, safe maintenance.
6. The Du Pont team will come up with specific findings on the issue of the ageing machinery.
7. Unions have no problem granting permission to extend the working hours, but they are concerned about its abuse. They suggested that there should be a harsh penalty either for full–time employees or contractors who abuse the system.
8. It came to the unions’ attention that some of the labour brokers are former employees of Sasol. It is a known fact that these people utilised their skills to provide a service to the chemical industry as contractors.

4. 22 February 2005

a. Presentation by Sasol

The presentation by Sasol was based on the following:

(1) The corporate position on safety, health and environment.

(2) The safety situation at Natref.

(3) Human resource issues.

(4) Corporate social investments.

In respect of corrective action, Sasol has systematically introduced improved safety, health and environmental standards, and systems and tools over the past years. Some of these include the ISO 14001, ISO 9002, quantitative targets for the reduction of injuries, fires, explosions and releases, responsible care, behavioural-based safety and many more. South African plants have been rated high in terms of the National Occupational Safety Association (NOSA) system. In March 2005, Sasol 1 reached the unique milestone of having received 30 NOSCAR awards.

As part of Sasol’s culture of continuous improvement, best practices from around the world are sought. Sasol benchmarks both its performance and systems regularly to ensure that it keeps up with global best practice. Sasol is unhappy with the recent fatalities and has introduced both internal and external reviewers to identify areas for improvement. The appointed external reviewers is DuPont, who is expected to submit its report in April 2005.

In respect of the speed by which investigations are done, Sasol endeavors to investigate incidents as soon as they occur. In most cases, incidents are investigated before the seven-day period prescribed by the General Administrative Regulations to the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1993, has expired.

However, the situation is somewhat different with the statutory enquiry that follows some of these investigations. These enquiries are similar to court cases. Postponements and subsequent delays are inevitable as dates must be suitable to all the parties involved.

Regarding the relationship between Sasol and the unions, Sasol has excellent relationships with the labour unions, namely CEPPWAWU, SACWU and Solidarity. Sasol was instrumental and played a significant role in the formation of the Chemical Industry Bargaining Council. The current Chairperson of the Council is a senior manager at Sasol. Regular meetings are held with all the unions’ leaders. Regular interaction with regional structures and shop stewards has resolved many differences between workers and management. Sasol also has a number of full-time shop stewards who share offices with the labour relations department.

The last strike at Sasol’s chemical and petroleum operations took place in 1998 and was part of a national strike. Joint union/management forums have addressed many important issues, such as restructuring, BEE, employment equity and productivity improvement.

Induction training in safety and compliance with national standards for the chemical industry is presented to Sasol employees and hired labour contractors. Contractors receive six hours of basic training plus two hours of plant-specific training. Sasol employees receive the same training, as well as fire and gas training because they are involved in dealing with such emergencies. Artisan-specific safety training is associated with their trade, for example. welding or boilermaking. Annual knowledge assessments of persons that were trained are also conducted. This is a prerequisite before entry permits are re-issued.

In respect of possible legislative changes, Sasol is satisfied with the quality of legislation although some unintended consequences have been identified.

Regarding working relations with the Department of Labour, especially in relation to inspections, all DOL personnel with a valid ID (DOL card) have access to the plant even without a Sasol permit. Personnel are, however, required to report to an identified Sasol Synfuels Safety Officer in the interest of the person’s safety. Sasol has recently accommodated a large number of trainee inspectors during shutdowns, who work with the DOL to grow competence in this regard.

Employment Assistance Programme (EAP) counseling services occur both telephonically and face-to-face. An external service provider is used to ensure confidentiality. Telephonic counseling is available 24 hours a day. Every Sasol employee and their households have access to the services free of charge. Counseling services are multilingual and are provided by professional counselors. The service can be accessed privately off site, and no details of the counseling service are revealed to Sasol.

Following a workplace-critical incident the EAP service provider is on site within 2 hours. The type of counseling given to primary and secondary victims of a critical incident takes the form of group or individual sessions. These sessions are 2 hours long depending on the size of the group.

Thereafter structured debriefing sessions are set up with individuals, teams, and couples or families as requested. If ongoing counseling is needed, employees can approach the EAP service provider. Survivors of trauma are carefully monitored and referred for counseling if needed.

There is no formalised career guidance system under Sasols corporate governance for artisans and technical staff. Sasol provides excellent training courses for these employees to reach supervisory and management levels. An example of such courses is the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) accredited Frontline Supervisors Course. Sasol’s innovative Accelerated Leadership Development Programme for Black employees prepares and guides young Black leadership talent over a period of two years to reach senior management levels. A number of current Black senior promotions have emerged from this programme.

All representatives are trained immediately after their appointment. They conduct dedicated monthly inspections, and participate in incident investigations. They also attend statutory safety meetings involved in task risk assessments and participate in third party audits such as NOSA.

Sasol does not consider executive safety representative duties as time lost, but rather as time well spent in the best interest of employees and the employer.

(1) Two hours per month for monthly inspections and continuous observation during time at work.

(2) NOSA audit - a full day is spent with auditors, and representatives are usually released from their normal duties.

(3) Accompany the DOL during visits for approximately one hour.

(4) Participation in incident investigations – two to four hours per incident.

(5) Task Risk Assessments - approximately two hours per month.

(6) Attendance of statutory safety meetings - approximately two hours per quarter.

In respect of the impact of accidents on the morale of employees, investigations into the accidents are being carried out. These investigations will determine the underlying cause of the accidents. However, as it is natural in any environment wherein workers have experienced a trauma and loss of colleagues, there is an impact on the morale of the employees. Despite being concerned, employees at these sites have rallied to assist their workmates and families. There is a sense of caring and responsibility towards each other. The EAP service provider and management are closely involved in monitoring the situation and providing counseling and support where needed or requested.

Prior to starting work, contractors undergo training on relevant safety rules. During shutdowns, safety watchers are appointed and receive specialised safety training to monitor safety and behaviour on site during the execution of work. Persons not complying with safety rules are reprimanded and on repetitive non-compliance are removed from site.

Natref does not operate its own trucking services. Contractor truck drivers are trained and tested on the safety and loading procedures of the site. The training and testing is repeated every 12 months. It is not possible to control the fatigue of drivers since it is difficult to control their working hours. This matter will be accounted for by the transport industry.

Sasol endeavors to respond to requests for information as soon as possible. Delays may, however, occur where these requests are lengthy and require a large amount of information from different departments within the organisation. A reasonable amount of time is, therefore, required to collate this information.

On the concern around the graph analysis on significant fires, explosions and releases, Sasol is not satisfied with this performance and is working hard at improvement. Internationally, the accepted way to address the issue of fires, explosions and releases, is through safety management. Sasol has started to introduce a system that has 14 elements and focuses on the technical systems and aspects of the plant safety.

Over the past five years Sasol has been tracking significant fires, explosions and releases. However, the graphical presentation reflects an improvement of 41 during the 2000/01 financial year and 26 in 2003/04. As a result of these relatively small numbers, statistically one cannot expect a completely smooth pattern.

In some Sasol factories the lifespan of machinery is over 50 years. A way of sustaining the integrity as well as the safety of the plants is by conducting shutdowns, which is the period during which equipment is inspected. If equipment falls outside the agreed industry standards, the equipment is replaced. For example, three reactors that were over 30 years of age and found to be inadequate, were replaced. In essence, a plant is renewed through the renewal maintenance programmes.

One method of ascertaining the lifespan of the equipment is by measuring the thickness of the pipes through ultrasonic wall thickness testing. This is an ongoing maintenance programme wherein the whole site is subdivided into a map, and the inspectors do the ultrasonic testing on a daily basis. The results are captured in a database where they can be used for predictions.

Over the past four years, the company had found that although many people complied with all the requirements, some do not. About four years ago, the company realised that there was a need to train people on what the plants required. Over 250 people have been trained in fitting and turning, boilermaking, welding, electrical instrumentation, electrical analysing and diesel mechanics. After training, they are tested at Sasol training centres to ensure that they meet the requirements and are released back into the market. Apart from the training provided to people who are trained for the company, Sasol is involved in community upliftment projects. About 150 people from communities were trained as artisans. The company also ensured that the latter was absorbed by contractors. Sasol has also entered into an agreement with CHIETA for training shutdown workers. However, contractors that are appointed by Sasol do not get involved in the training of workers.

Regarding the incident of 1 September 2004 where the presiding officer at the training unit wanted to allow the investigating officer from the South African Police Service (SAPS) to question the witness at a formal enquiry, but the legal representative of Sasol made an appeal to the Chief Inspector of the DOL relating to interpretation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It centred on the fact that the employees were entitled to a right to silence in terms of the constitution.

b. Presentation by DOL

The DOL reported on the four recent incidents that occurred at Sasol.

Deliberations

The Committee expressed concern at the delays in the investigation of incidents and delays in the arrival of DOL inspectors during the incident at Natref. From the side of the DOL, delays often result from the fact that some of the investigations were technical in nature, and required technical experts. The Committee is concerned at whether there is a possibility of short-circuiting the process.

The Committee sought clarity on the frequency of inspections in the gas industry, and whether the inspectors have enough capacity to conduct inspections in that industry, the DOL conducted regular inspections at workplaces. By the end of 2004, over 100 000 inspections were conducted around the country, and high-risk areas were identified. By the end of 2004, about 185 incidents were reported.

In relation to the capacity and pro-active nature of inspectors, a number of unannounced inspections were conducted. The challenge is the retention of scarce skills, as well as developing confidence of inspectors to deal with intimidating industries like Sasol with its legal capacity.

With the Occupational Health and Safety Act the DOL monitored compliance by issuing improvement, contravention and prohibition notices. From April 2004 to December 2004 almost 800 prohibition notices were issued.

In relation to the lifespan of equipment, most equipment at Sasol is manufactured from high quality steel. Records on maintenance must be kept.

On delays in getting autopsy reports, the DOL has no control over post-mortem reports. The preliminary report on the Sasol incident that occurred in September 2004 would be ready by the end of March 2005. The DOL is currently in the process of finalising the skills requirements and identifying high-risk sectors.

1. The DOL must provide the Committee with the final reports on inspections conducted at Sasol Secunda and Natref plants.
2. The Committee should visit the Sasol chemical plant in Secunda within the current year.
3. The DOL should provide the Committee with a database of subcontractors, as well as records of all inspections conducted at Sasol plants.

The Committee, in consultation with other stakeholders, should consider the DuPont report and its recommendations