Report of the Portfolio Committee on
Correctional Services on a visit to
The
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services having visited the CMAX Centre on
A.
Introduction
On
B.
Purpose
of the Visit
The
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services visited the C Max facility on the
(a) Obtain
a detailed briefing from the management of the prison on the incident of the
(b) Obtain
a briefing on subsequent steps that have been taken to prevent a re-occurrence
of this incident as well as the longer-term security framework that will be
implemented.
(c) To
meet with the staff of the prison to discuss their concerns and problems as
well as to highlight the problem of corruption in the Department of
Correctional Services (DCS).
The objectives of this report are to:
(a) Identify
key issues of concern to the Portfolio Committee arising from the incident of
the
(b) Recommend
to the DCS management, further action that should be taken prevent a recurrence
of an incident of this nature.
(c) Identify
further steps that will be taken by the Portfolio Committee.
Attendance:
·
Mr DV
Bloem
·
Ms LS
Chikunga
·
·
Mr MS
Moatshe
·
Mr LJ
Tolo
·
·
Mr S
Mahote
C. Background
Pretoria
C Max holds 211 sentenced offenders and 43 unsentenced offenders. C Max is currently running at 81%
capacity. The centre has 152 established
posts of which 133 are filled.
The
C Max Centre is run as a programme rather than merely as a facility to house
maximum-security offenders. The
programme is divided into 2 phases.
Phase 1 consists of a 6-week programme during which time new arrivals to
the facility are given extremely limited privileges. Offenders spend 23 hours a day locked up in
single cells. They are handcuffed when
on exercise and exercise is done in individual small cages. They receive intense social and psychological
assessment during this phase and are evaluated after 6 weeks by a committee
that makes a recommendation to the Area Commissioner for approval. A decision
is then taken as to whether the offenders should commence to Phase 2 or remain
for a longer period in Phase 1. Phase 2
is divided in 3 groups- A, B and C groups. Privileges for each group are
gradually increased and the offenders will progress from one group to
another. If they transgress at any
stage, they start the programme again from the beginning. Completion of the programme without
transgressions will take 2 years after which offenders will be transferred back
to the prison from which they came from.
1. Incident
of
On
When
the 5 offenders realised that there was no possibility of escape, 2 of the
inmates disassociated themselves from the incident, as they stated that the
murder of correctional officials had not been part of the plan. The remaining 3 inmates wanted to commit
suicide but there were only 2 bullets left in the weapon. Two of the inmates put their heads together
and the third inmate fired a shot hoping to kill both of them but was
successful in killing only one of them.
The other inmate survived with surface wounds. The gunner then shot himself and died.
2. Investigation
The
SAPS is in the process of investigating the incident. The initial stage of the SAPS investigation
has shown that an employee of DCS was responsible for providing a firearm to
the offenders and he has been arrested and charged. The SAPS have also identified the owner of
the firearm. The three remaining inmates
are cooperating with the police in the investigation.
The
DCS is not embarking on an internal investigation of the incident but instead
will focus on wider issues related to the incident in order to minimise a
recurrence of an incident of this nature.
According to the Minister of Correctional Services, a task team will be
appointed to institute an independent investigation of the incident. Their mandate will include the incident at C
Max as well as security breaches at other centres such as the Pollsmoor
Correctional Centre.
D. Key
Issues of Concern
1. Security
measures
The
C Max Centre is meant to be the most secure facility in the country to house
dangerous offenders. Any security breach
at this facility is thus a serious concern, not only to the Portfolio
Committee, but to all the citizens of the country. While at the time of the visit of the
Portfolio Committee, the investigation into how security was breached was still
in progress, it was already known that an employee had managed to smuggle a
firearm into the facility and to provide this firearm to the offenders in order
to assist in their escape.
The
Committee members noted the following details on the visit:
(a) The
parking area adjacent to the prison is not under the jurisdiction of the
DCS. This is the area in which the
alleged getaway car was parked and as no searching or monitoring of cars in
this area occurs it can easily result in a security breach.
(b) In
addition, the wall to this parking area is shared with the prison which means
that items may be thrown over the wall for retrieval by corrupt officials.
(c) Staff
are not scanned at the initial reception point and only go through security
checks at the entrance to each prison on the complex.
(d) Vehicles
are searched manually, but this measure is not very effective as objects can
easily be bypassed.
(e) There
is no razor wire on the wall which divides the parking area from the prison
complex.
(f) While
the scanners at the time of the visit seemed to be working it was noted by the
management of the centre that when scanners break down it takes a long time for
the Department of Public Works to fix or replace them.
(g) Surveillance
cameras are outdated.
(h) A
concern was raised that the kitchen for C MAX is staffed by medium security
offenders and after normal working hours the kitchen is left unattended by the
correctional officials.
According
to the DCS, a number of security changes were made in C Max following a similar
incident in June 2004. These included:
(a) Prohibition
of handbags and parcels from passing beyond the first entry point of Pretoria C
Max.
(b) Increase
of searching staff at entry point to C Max.
After the incident of 7 November 2004 a
number of additional measures were taken including:
(c) Replacement
of personnel at the first entry point by officials from the Emergency Support
Team of the DCS. These personnel were
responsible for finding a cellphone that a visitor had tried to smuggle into
the facility only a few days after the incident of the 7 November 2004.
(d) All
contact visits have been halted.
The
top management of the 6 regions of the DCS met soon after the incident to
identify short-term security measures for urgent implementation around the
country to improve security. In
addition, in recognition of weaknesses in the current security system, the DCS
has identified a new security system framework for longer-term
implementation. This framework consists
of 5 pillars of security in the Minimum Security Standards. The pillars include:
(a) Personnel
security measures.
(b) Physical
security measures.
(c) Technological
security measures.
(d) Information
security management.
(e) Procedural
security measures.
Each
of these pillars must be coordinated with the others to ensure a comprehensive
and integrated approach to the management of security. It has been identified that the first pillar-
personnel security measures are vital to the success of any security
intervention by the DCS. The DCS is
planning and developing an internal ‘Integrity Verification System’ which will
be used to identify problematic individuals (i.e. those with criminal records)
within the DCS and also to prevent problematic individuals from getting
employment in the DCS. According to the
Minister of Correctional Services, the DCS is considering instituting periodic
security clearance checks of members who work in high-risk sections at
Correctional Centres.
The
Minister of Correctional Services announced that he has instructed an
investigation into the costs of installing electronic monitoring equipment in
all maximum security centres as well as other identified centres.
2. Corruption
amongst staff
The
Portfolio Committee recognises that not all staff who work in the DCS and in
the C Max facility are corrupt. However,
it is clear to the Committee that the incident at the C Max facility was
largely as a result of the actions of one or more corrupt correctional
officials working at the facility. While
physical security measures are of paramount importance in ensuring the security
of the employees, the public and the offenders, these measures can always be
bypassed by the actions of corrupt officials.
According
to the DCS, they identify top students to work in C Max. The C MAX staff all undergo a special
training course. No information was given to the Committee as to the nature and
duration of this ‘special’ training. However, of major concern to the Committee
is the fact that there is no screening process to vet staff before they start work
at the C Max. In addition, there is no
ongoing monitoring process of correctional officials working in high-risk
institutions.
3. Staff
concerns
In
line with the focus of the Committee on staffing issues in the DCS as well as
the fact that there is often a link between corruption and discontentment
amongst staff, the Portfolio Committee met with the C MAX staff during the
visit to discuss some of their concerns and problems. These included:
(a) Budgetary
constraints and the cutting of overtime remuneration has left the C Max (and
all other correctional centres) vulnerable to security breaches over the
weekends, when there are a reduced number of staff at work.
(b) Curtailment
of the freedom of union members to freely express their views.
(c) There
is a concern that the vetting and screening process for correctional officials
will not apply to the management echelons.
(d) Correctional
officials who report intelligence information feel that management responds
inappropriately by investigating the officials rather than interrogating the
information, which reduces the likelihood of officials reporting information.
(e) Security
measures are not approved due to budgetary constraints.
(f) Policy
of rotation of staff (including C Max heads) means that officials and
management do not have the opportunity to build trusting relationships with
each other.
(g) The
policy for recruitment of personnel into management positions is unclear.
(h) Communication
between management at regional and prison level with correctional officials is
poor.
(i) Management
does not address complaints that are lodged by staff.
(j) There
is no longer a norm with regard to the ratio of correctional officials to
offenders.
4. Gangs
One
of the major concerns of the Portfolio Committee, highlighted in this visit is
the relationship between prison gangs and disruptive incidents within prisons,
which often result in dangerous situations for both staff and offenders. The five offenders involved in the incident
belonged to the Airforce gang that specialises in planning escapes. The DCS was aware that these offenders were
members of this gang and at least one of the offenders was involved in a prior
escape attempt.
According
to the DCS, the Air force gang has become a majority in C Max and it is thus
impossible to separate Airforce gang members.
E. Recommendations
to DCS Management
1. Immediate
funding for the implementation of the five pillar security plan
Implementation
of the five-pillar security plan is a priority especially in high-risk centres
such as the C Max facility. The
Portfolio Committee expects that funding will be made available immediately to
implement this plan at the facility. The
DCS should report to the Committee on progress in the implementation of the
security plan at C Max as well as other correctional centres, as well as any
possible barriers to the implementation by the 1 April 2005.
The
DCS should motivate for funding for physical security measures, especially at
high risk institutions in the budget for 2005/06 and the MTEF. The Portfolio Committee would support this
motivation during its budget process.
2. Immediate
implementation of the screening of all DCS staff prior to employment and
periodically after employment
The
Portfolio Committee recognises the integral role that staff play in reducing
the likelihood of security breaches. The screening of DCS staff prior to
employment and during employment is very important. The Portfolio Committee strongly recommends
that the DCS implement the vetting procedure of new recruits immediately and
begins the process of vetting all existing DCS staff. Security checks of existing staff should be
done periodically to ensure that reduce the likelihood of the development of
corrupt tendencies amongst staff. The
DCS should report on progress in the implementation and barriers to
implementation to the Portfolio Committee by the 1 April 2005.
Vetting
of DCS staff should encompass all staff within DCS including management.
3. Special
training and vetting of C Max staff
Staff
that work at high-risk institutions such as C Max should undergo special
training to ensure effective functioning in this environment. This training should be sufficiently
intensive and directed in order to capacitate them to work effectively in this
environment. In addition, the vetting of staff in high-risk institutions such
as C Max should be a priority in terms of rollout of implementation of the
vetting process.
The
DCS should report to the Portfolio Committee on special measures taken to
ensure effective staffing at the C Max facility by the 1 April 2005.
4. Gangs
Prison
gangs are a historical reality within our prison system. The Portfolio Committee recommends that the
DCS reassess their approach to prison gangs.
In discussions with the Committee, DCS management has stated that it has
a policy of non-recognition of prison gangs in order to delegitimise them. The fact is that prison gangs exist and are
an integral facet of prison life throughout the country.
The
Portfolio Committee recommends that the DCS staff engage in directed
discussions with outside organisations and role-players (as well as individuals
within the prison system who have managed to work innovatively with prison
gangs) to develop a new, dynamic, flexible and creative approach to deal with
prisons gangs in a changing South African context. The approach should be one of ensuring that
the prisons become safer places for both staff and offenders, including gang and
non-gang members.
5. Addressing
staff concerns
It
is clear to the Portfolio Committee that there is a link between corruption and
discontentment amongst staff. While the
problems faced by staff is no excuse for corruption there are measures that can
be taken by the DCS to ensure a more content workforce and thus a more
effective work environment. The
Portfolio Committee expects the DCS to address the concerns raised by staff at
C Max including:
(a) Implementing
measures to improve communication between management and staff at C Max and
between regional management and the prison with a view to:
(b) Ensuring
that staff feel free to come forward with information without fear of
intimidation,
(c) That
complaints by staff are recorded and addressed where possible.
(d) That
management decisions are properly accounted for.
(e) That
policy decisions are properly communicated between national, regional and
prison level.
(f) Management
at prison, regional and national level, must take staff concerns around
security seriously. The Portfolio Committee
recommends that security equipment needs identified at the C Max are
prioritised and a budget immediately made available to fulfil these needs. In addition, it is recommended that an
attempt is made by DCS to limit the impact of the budget cuts to overtime in
high risk institutions such as the C Max.
6. Disciplinary
measures against staff implicated in incidents
While
the Portfolio Committee respects the need of the DCS to institute disciplinary
procedures against officials suspected of corruption within the framework of
the Labour Relations Act and the DCS disciplinary code, the Committee
recommends that:
(a) Disciplinary
proceedings are initiated promptly.
(b) That
all measures are taken to reduce attempts to derail the proceedings by officials
who do not want to see the proceedings continue.
(c) That
officials accused of serious offenses are not merely transferred to other
prisons or work spheres.
(d) That
if necessary the disciplinary code is modified to ensure that unnecessary
delays in process are restricted.
(e) That
officials accused of serious crimes such as aiding and abetting in a murder are
not allowed to be suspended with pay.
7. Establishment
of an internal crime intelligence function
According
to the DCS management at C Max the DCS wants to develop its own internal crime
intelligence function. The Portfolio
Committee would require a briefing by the DCS outlining the objective, ambit
and operation of this function.
8. Reports
The
Portfolio Committee requests that the DCS provide it with written reports of
both the June 2004 incidents and the November 2004 incident on completion of
the SAPS investigation and the DCS investigation. These reports should highlight the nature and
cause of the security breaches, the action taken against officials identified
in the incident, recommendations to ensure that the incidents do not recur and
the status of implementation of the recommendations.
F. Further
steps to be taken by the Portfolio Committee
1. Lack
of condemnation of the incident by the unions
The
Portfolio Committee notes with concern the lack of condemnation of the actions
of the implicated correctional official on the part of some of the unions. The Portfolio Committee will call the unions
in to discuss this (amongst other issues) within the first 6 months of 2005.
2. Message
to the public
The
Members of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services will alert the
members of the public in their constituencies about the dangers of aiding and
abetting offenders in the procurement of drugs, cellphones and weapons. In addition, when embarking of prison
oversight visits, the Members will talk to members of the community who are
visiting offenders at the correctional centres to inform them of the negative
role that they are playing in reducing the likelihood of rehabilitation of
offenders if they procure illegal substances and objects on behalf of
offenders.
3. Report
to correctional officials on concerns raised
The Portfolio Committee will discuss the
concerns raised by correctional officials of C Max with the management of the
facility and with regional or national management if necessary and report back
to the correctional officials on the results of discussions in this regard.
G. Conclusion
The
Members of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services offer their
condolences to the families of the deceased who lost their lives in this
incident. The actions of the two
deceased offenders is testimony to the fact that many correctional officials
are brave and committed individuals.
Unfortunately, there are also correctional officials who are corrupt and
very strong action must be taken against these officials.
The
Portfolio Committee is concerned about security breaches especially in high
risk institutions and will closely monitor the implementation of additional
security measures by the DCS to rectify this situation and avoid a recurrence
of an incident of this nature.
Report to be
considered.