COMMENTARY ON south african public transport policy, with emphasis on the GAUTRAIN scheme

 

The purpose of this document is to review some aspects of South African public transport policy, with special emphasis on the Gauteng Department of Transport and Public Works (Gautrans) high-speed rail scheme (Gautrain).

Up till 2005 the Gautrain website included a feasibility report that referred in several places to the fact that traffic has been growing at 7% a year. The report also stated that –

"the shortcomings of the existing public transport system, which is plagued by a plethora of problems, is well known". (para 8.1.1)

The Gautrain website is regularly updated, and the report referred to above has been replaced by other reports. These are not substantially different to the original document, however and this commentary will continue to quote the references from the original report.

It is unfortunate that the Gautrain feasibility reports fail to spell out exactly what the problems are. This document will, however, attempt to do so and will draw attention to the fact that many of the "plethora of problems" are the result of (a) shortcomings in transport policy and (b) a failure on the part of the authorities to apply those policies that do exist. Instead of throwing more infrastructure at the problem, the following questions should be asked:

This document divided into the following sections (For those who do not wish to wade through tedious detail, the document is summarised in paragraph 13).

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. DISTORTIONS IN TRANSPORT

High-speed railway lines are an accepted part of the transport scene in a number of developed countries.

There can be no doubt that they can contribute to economic growth and development in certain specific instances, but given the distortions that exist in transport in South Africa, it is unlikely that a short-distance high-speed rail line will make any contribution to economic progress in this country.

A major distortion is that South Africa spends between R180 billion and R200 billion a year on personal transport (cars, 4x4s, suv’s, etc). This is about 15% of GDP. In comparison, the United States – the most motorised country – spends about 13%, according to the Gautrain report. Other developed countries, such as the UK and Japan, report figures of around 10-12%.

In relation to its productivity, South Africa therefore overspends as much as 2% of its GDP on cars – an amount of around R20-30 billion a year. Perhaps this overspending is good for the motor industry, but in a broader context it is equivalent to "losing" the Olympic Games every year! It does not end there, either. South Africa has about two cars for every ten people while developed countries have between four and seven cars per ten people. So, not only does South Africa overspend on private motoring, but a higher-than-average percentage of the population (around 70%) remains either immobile, or dependent on inadequate public transport.

One of the reasons for the overspending on private motoring is the relatively low rate of tax on fuel in South Africa compared with most developed countries. This amounts to a hidden annual subsidy of at least R10 billion to motorists. Not only is this more than the total subsidy paid to public transport, but it goes to the least efficient form of commuter transport and is given to the richest section of the community!

Another subsidy to motorists is the relatively low licence fees paid in South Africa in relation to international averages. This is equivalent to a subsidy of another R1 to R2 billion a year.

It is hardly surprising that private motoring is growing at 7% a year (and car sales at over 20%) when incentives of this kind are given to the car-owning population!

Another disturbing statistic is the increase in the use of cars for the "journey to work" in South Africa. Despite the focus on public transport (train, bus and taxi) motor cars are well on their way to becoming the main form of commuter transport in South Africa’s major province and will soon take over in other provinces as well! This helps to explain why S.A. spends so much on private transport despite a low rate of car ownership. In the light of steadily increasing oil prices, this is an unsustainable trend.

Returning to public transport, further distortions exist in the way subsidies are applied to rail and road services. Different formulas are used to determine subsidies, and different fare structures exist between the modes. As a result of inconsistent subsidy regimes, many subsidised bus services operate only about 30 hours out of 168 per week, while ageing railway equipment operates about 140 hours out of 168. A more balanced approach towards "sweating" the assets is required. Bus services should actually start earlier and finish later than the trains do, to allow passengers to feed into and away from the rail services.

In circumstances such as the above, there is no reason to believe that an isolated short-distance high speed line will make any significant difference to the sub-optimal performance of South Africa’s urban transport system.

2. fragmented public transport and government policy

Introduction

The Gautrain reports go out of their way to give the impression that the scheme is in alignment with some "overall plan" and that it is part of a transport "system". It should be pointed out that no such plan or system exists. Throughout the country, transport "planners" sit in their offices, surrounded by large wall-mounted maps, deluding themselves that they are "planning" a transport system. This self-delusion is evident from the following comments in the Gautrain report:

The following paragraphs present a more realistic view of the situation.

Fragmented Public Transport

There is no "holistic transport system" in Gauteng or for that matter, anywhere in South Africa. Formal public transport is fragmented, inadequate in terms of both route coverage and frequency, and has failed to develop in keeping with urban expansion. There is no integrated ticketing, scheduling, marketing or branding. Different operators offer different services under different sets of rules. Users do not perceive formal public transport to be a coherent product.

This is one of the "plethora of problems" mentioned in the Gautrain report, and it is one of the reasons why car traffic has been growing at 7% a year.

Government policy and legislation

Sections 4 and 5 of the National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA) refer 13 times in all to the need to co-ordinate, integrate and rationalise public transport. Section 4 specifically requires public transport subsidies to be aimed at currently marginalised users and those who have poor access to economic opportunities.

Section 10 of the NLTTA requires Transport Authorities (TAs) to be set up. Sections 19 to 28 require these Authorities to produce a variety of plans relating to transport in general and public transport in particular.

These requirements have not been met. There are no TAs in existence (except for an embryonic body in Thekwini/Durban) and no sufficiently detailed public transport plans have been drawn up for any urban area in South Africa (late 2005). Until these steps are followed, the "plethora of problems" will remain.

The Gautrain report concedes that certain administrative functions relating to public transport in general, "have not been devolved" yet. There are "no specific target dates" for concessioning. The process "has been put on hold". Against this unco-ordinated background , Gautrans plans to introduce a multi-billion transport project!

The Gautrain report then describes various administrative options to run Gautrain, including a "special-purpose agency to oversee the project" or "as a project falling under the Chief Directorate of Public Transport".

 

This proposal to introduce an extra layer of administration, is in conflict with the principles of co-ordination set out in the NLTTA. (Sections 4 and 5 refer).

The Gautrain scheme will play no part in meeting the requirements or principles of the NLTTA. It is not aimed at currently marginalised users and will not assist those who have poor access to social and economic activity.

 

UPDATE: In mid-2003 the Metropolitan Council of Johannesburg published an Integrated Transport Plan for the Witwatersrand region. The
2-volume 547-page document suggests several changes to the way public transport should be run in the area. However, it is still too vague in terms of actual routes and schedules. It also concedes that much work still needs to be done to actually establish a Transport Authority.

Page 259 reads as follows:

"It is a recommendation of the ITP that a detailed investigation into the implications of establishing a Transport Authority be undertaken".

It is unfortunate to note that we are still in the "recommendation" stage and that a "detailed investigation" into the "implications" be undertaken.

The TA should have been in existence by now!

On page 536, the ITP makes the following comment:

":….. the Gautrain, being a new concept directed at a specific corridor need, does not really address existing services problems at all".

 

 

This theme is taken further in the City of Tshwane Integrated Transport Plan 2004 - 2009. Para 7.6.2 of the report reads as follows:

The City of Tshwane has indicated its commitment to assist with the

successful implementation and operation of the proposed Gautrain.

This undertaking was given despite the fact that the (city) was not

pro-actively involved, or invited, in the feasibility and planning studies

undertaken for the project by Gautrans.

During the initial stages of planning, the former … Pretoria … Council

and related sub councils indicated that the transportation-planning

model being used by the province’s consultants appears to be too coarse

to provide suitable results. The Transport Division offered its own, and

more refined, metropolitan land use and transport model for assessing

the need for the proposed rail system and its integration with the

transport system in the Tshwane area.

It is significant that both of the Integrated Transport Plans of the two major cities to be linked by Gautrain (Johannesburg and Tshwane) can be described as non-commital towards the scheme. Neither of the ITPs express any noticeable approval of the scheme, either in terms of its motivation, justification, or the quality of its underlying research.

3. SHORTCOMINGS IN TRANSPORT LEGISLATION

The previous section has pointed out that existing legislation is not being observed. This section will point out a further item in the "plethora of problems" – namely that existing legislation is inadequate. A number of shortcomings are listed below:

Membership of TAs

The National Land Transport Transition Act (Section 10(10)) provides that the functions of the Transport Authorities should be performed by the municipalities. (The Transport Authorities will consist of councillors, advised by the existing "planning" departments of the various municipalities).

 

The municipalities have in general, failed to play a meaningful role in improving public transport. They have done little, if anything, to co-ordinate formal operators, to encourage joint marketing initiatives, to improve schedules, or to introduce through-ticketing arrangements. In the case of municipalities which have actually operated their own bus services, evidence exists of poor route selection, failure to adapt route patterns to reflect changing circumstances, inappropriate choice of vehicles, failure to respond to well - motivated requests from the public for better service, inefficient scheduling and a general failure to promote the cause of public transport in the areas under their control. These form part of the "plethora of problems" affecting public transport in South Africa.

The membership of the TAs as well as any committees appointed to "advise" them, should be broadly based and not be confined to technical and political appointments only. In many other sectors of the economy, such as the SABC, correctional services, housing, electricity generation, education, etc, the public are invited to serve on public bodies controlling those activities. However, few such invitations have been issued in the field of public transport, where decisions are taken without any meaningful input from the community.

Statutory passenger committees

In South Africa various "liaison" and "advisory" committees exist to promote the interests of passengers. However, such committees and forums lack authority. To overcome this, statutory (ie. created by an Act of Parliament) passengers committees should be established, similar to the passengers committees in Britain.

The function of these committees should be to monitor public passenger transport and to formally bring the concerns of passengers to the attention of the TA's.

Such committees should have full representation on the TA and should be adequately funded to enable them to carry out their functions effectively.

Public transport impact assessments (PTIAs)

Many municipalities allow low-density developments (such as housing, shopping centres, office parks and industrial parks) to take place without proper consideration for the provision of adequate public transport.

Many of these developments are merely based on the assumption that the development "has easy access to the freeway" or that "sufficient parking will be provided". This does not take the users of public transport into account. The mere provision of taxi ranking facilities is also inadequate in this regard. As stated elsewhere in this document the local authorities must ensure that minimum guaranteed levels of public transport be provided in all areas.

Legislation should be passed, requiring municipalities to carry out "public transport impact assessments" and to ensure that no developments be permitted without ensuring that a PTIA is carried out.

It must be emphasised that PTIAs will be far more important from the passengers point of view than the environmental impact assessments that are currently carried out.

The "plethora of problems" in public transport in South Africa will continue until the shortcomings in transport legislation such as those listed above, are addressed. Short-distance high speed lines will make no difference to the problems.

The following section points out that additional guidelines are necessary to ensure that the PTIA process is effective.

4. PUBLIC TRANSPORT POLICY GUIDELINES

One of the "plethora of problems" in South African transport is that, despite the requirements of the NLTTA and the many other documents dealing with public transport policy, there are still no quantifiable policy yardsticks according to which public transport should be provided.

The result of this policy vacuum is that both formal and informal public transport throughout South Africa, is operating suboptimally.

The lack of adequate formal transport is a significant contributor to the overspending on cars and to the abnormally high growth in motor car usage.

Until specific guidelines for formal public transport are agreed on and adopted, it is futile to expect that by creating more infrastructure – as the Gautrain promoters suggest – the problem will be solved. The problems should be addressed by reorganising the way public transport is operated, according to the principles set out below.

Guidelines for mobility

The vast difference between the levels of mobility provided by private cars and public transport respectively has significant implications for urban transport policy, since one of the objectives of the government's transport policy is to introduce a certain degree of "equity" between all citizens. This means that the users of public transport should not be unduly disadvantaged when compared with the users of private cars.

In view of the "seamless" conditions experienced by car users, a possible guideline for mobility in an urban context is the time taken to travel a particular distance by car. Once this has been determined, the time taken to cover the same distance by public transport should be calculated and the relationship between the two times should be

established. Obviously public transport will usually take considerably longer than private transport. In many cases, it is faster to walk than to use public transport!

Most journeys by public transport should take no more than three times longer than the same journey by private car (and in many urban situations, less than this). Obviously there are certain circumstances where the rigid application of this rule may be inappropriate or unnecessary. The authorities should, nevertheless, be required to consider the need for minimum levels of public transport in all parts of the urban area in order to achieve this objective.

Parameters for Mobility

Once the above policy decision has been taken to provide minimum levels of mobility for the population, a number of parameters must be adopted in order to achieve them. Three basic parameters can be identified, under the following headings

Before discussing each of these parameters it should be borne in mind that it will be necessary to enter into a formal relationship with providers of public transport (by way of contracts and concessions) to ensure that they are provided. (The mere granting of operating licences will not necessarily ensure the minimum levels of service discussed below).

 

(i) Proximity to a transport route

This measure of performance relates to how near the population lives to a public transport route. Different transport studies have found that, in general, walking times of more than 15 minutes (roughly equivalent to 1 000 metres) are regarded as unacceptable. The community will tend not to use public transport under these circumstances unless it has no choice. A yardstick for a transport network should be that, say, 80% - 90% of the community should live within 15 minutes (1 000 metres) of a public transport route. The use of an 80% - 90% measure allows the use of a sparser route pattern in areas of low population density. In areas where road surfaces are unsuitable the routes may also have to be spaced further apart.

(ii) Availability of service

Availability consists of two elements - (a) frequency of service, and (b) spread of service.

This measure of performance relates to the number of services provided on a route within a given period. In general, waiting times should be as short as possible. During the peak a minimum frequency of 6 services per hour - equal to every ten minutes - would be acceptable (although lower levels may be justified on lightly loaded routes). As far as the off-peak is concerned, the frequency should never, even for low volume routes, be less than hourly; if the frequency falls below this figure, the public tends to regard the service as nonexistent. Minimum frequencies on normal routes should therefore not be less than once per hour at all reasonable times, including weekends. (On special routes serving factory areas or schools, for example, the above rules might not be necessary).

 

 

 

 

 

 

This parameter relates to the number of hours over which the services operate. The phrase "at all reasonable times" is capable of fairly wide interpretation. On some routes the term may mean a spread starting at 04:00 in the morning and continuing until midnight (indeed in some situations a full 24-hour service may be justified). On other routes or over weekends the spread may be narrower - say from 06:00 until 20:00 only. (It should be borne in mind that Metrorail services operate between approximately 03:00 and 23:00).

(iii) Area coverage

This term relates to the ability of the passenger to reach any destination served by public transport in the area, within a certain period of time. Although proximity and availability may be adequate, the routes may be such that users are forced to travel in a roundabout way to reach their destinations. This implies the introduction of "direct" routes between different parts of the city. (In the larger cities, some direct routes already exist, but do not operate frequently enough).

The public transport impact assessment process referred to in the previous section should cover all the issues mentioned above.

It is only after the foregoing policy parameters have been considered that the use of the most appropriate mode – whether midi-bus, diesel bus, trolley bus, light rail, heavy rail or high speed rail – can be addressed.

5. FEEDER AND DISTRIBUTION SERVICES

The promoters of the high-speed scheme acknowledge that "one of the factors that will be critical in the success of the Gautrain will be the effectiveness and efficiency with which potential passengers will be able to travel from door to door".

It is common knowledge worldwide that supporting road based services are vital for the success of any passenger rail service. In South Africa, however, such support is largely absent, except for a few purpose-built transfer stations. The interface between road and rail is usually ad-hoc, unco-ordinated and user-unfriendly.

In much of the area to be served by Gautrain (ie. Sandton / Midrand / Centurion) the problem is even more acute because formal public transport is almost non-existent. A few peak-only trips are run to and from the "townships", on routes that lack focus and are known only to the handful of passengers using them. These services can be described as "glorified lift clubs".

The core bus services of Johannesburg and Pretoria / Tshwane, would, in normal circumstances be expected to play a strong role in supporting the high-speed line, but in their present form they are in no position to make a contribution to the scheme. For many years, bus services in both cities have been crumbling steadily. Tshwane municipality has experienced a drop in passenger levels and no longer operates services after 14:00 on Saturday or any services at all on Sunday.

In Johannesburg, heavy passenger losses have taken place, with a 40% cut in bus trips since 1988. Judging from the large number of almost empty buses operating in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg (an area through which Gautrain will run), further substantial cuts are justified. Route patterns have failed to adapt to changing circumstances and probably only around 1% of all trips generated in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg are made on formal public transport at present.

UPDATE:

The Johannesburg Metro ITP gives this rather disturbing statistic on Metrobus (page 136):

"… there has been a 33 per cent reduction in overall departures – from 2 893 in 1999 to 1 928 in 2003".

Readers should be reminded that Metrobus is owned by the Johannesburg Municipality. It would be interesting to know how the city can carry out effective planning for public transport when its own bus service is underperforming like this.

The ITP also indicates a substantial reduction in Metrorail services (approx. 30%) between 1996 and 2000 (Table 3-103 )

These circumstances do not bode well for the success of Gautrain, whose promoters seem to be unaware of the gravity of the situation. They claim that "existing scheduled public transport services can act as feeders" at places like Johannesburg Station, Pretoria Station and Hatfield.

As far as bus services are concerned, it should be pointed out that few formal bus services stop within 500 metres of Johannesburg station, and those that do are unlikely to feed passengers into or away from the high-speed line. Furthermore, the frequencies on formal bus services in Johannesburg are now so low that they are unlikely to make any contribution to passenger levels on Gautrain, which will run every 10 minutes (para 6.3.2).

Similar comments apply to Pretoria and Hatfield (Hartbeesspruit?) stations. In Pretoria the situation is actually worse, because Pretoria Station has always had the disadvantage of being over a kilometre from the city centre. The "station" feeder bus route to the CBD has been steadily cut over the years.

Hatfield station is also "out on a limb" in terms of formal public transport.

There are some discrepancies in the Gautrain report as to service frequencies. Para 5.11.2 refers to a 20 minute frequency on "feeder" routes and a 10 minute frequency on "distribution" routes. It is not clear what the difference between a feeder and a distribution route is! Para 6.3.5 refers to bus frequencies of 30 minutes at Sandton station "because of the large number of passengers terminating" there. It seems that a frequency of 5 minutes would be more appropriate under the circumstances!

The Gautrain report says that 66 buses and 80 mini-buses will be necessary to perform to feeder functions.

The immediate redeployment of existing buses operating in the Johannesburg area can obviate the need for large numbers of additional feeder buses to serve the high-speed line. A considerable amount of work has already been done by commuters organisations to draw up a network of formal road - based public transport routes, not only in the area to be served by Gautrain, but extending across the Witwatersrand region. This proposed network, which goes beyond the "broad brush - stroke" proposals of the ITP, can play a significant role in raising the level of awareness of public transport in the area, an essential requirement for the success of Gautrain. The proposals have been ignored by both provincial and metropolitan government.

In 2005 the Gautrain website was updated to include maps showing the actual feeder services that are contemplated. A close inspection of these routes will show that they are inadequate in all cases and do not conform to the minimum requirements for routes set out in para. 4 above.

 

 

 

(Another 2005 innovation on the website is a "kiddies corner". If the promoters of the scheme were serious about promoting public transport they would be taking steps to make children aware of existing public transport. This is not happening).

6. CULTURE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Most high-speed rail lines worldwide have two things in common. Firstly, they are usually at least 200 km long. Secondly they have been introduced into a pre-existing culture – or awareness – of public transport.

Gautrain shares neither of these features. Firstly, at 60 km it will probably be the shortest stand-alone high-speed line on earth. Other, shorter high-speed lines may well exist, but they are same gauge as the surrounding rail transport systems and are perceived to be part of a public transport network. Most high-speed lines have been introduced to link cities hundreds of kilometres apart, with reasonably strong pre-existing flows of public transport passengers and with a potential transfer of airline passengers to rail a significant factor. This does not apply with the Gautrain scheme.

Secondly, Gautrain is being introduced into an area that has one of the lowest levels of "public transport awareness" anywhere.

If its promoters were serious about improving public transport, much would have been done by now to create a culture of public transport in the region. This has not happened. Two examples of specific suggestions that have not been acted upon by the authorities are described below.

The SACO Proposal for a Soweto-Pretoria Bus Route

In 1996 The South African Commuters Organisation (SACO) started submitting proposals for a demonstration-project bus route linking Soweto with the Union Buildings in Pretoria. These proposals were directed, firstly to central Government and secondly to Gautrans itself. The covering letter to Gautrans reads:

"Gauteng’s two major cities, Johannesburg and Pretoria, as well as the corridor linking them, are characterised by escalating levels of traffic congestion, much of which is due to the lack of adequate public transport.

In keeping with the need to initiate demonstration projects to test public reaction, SACO submits the attached proposal for a formal public transport route between the two cities.

The response of the Gauteng Department of Transport to this proposal is awaited with interest."

The proposal included a route pattern, schedules and anticipated financial results. There was no response to this suggestion.

The Soweto Bus Report

Late in 2001 a CSIR report was submitted to Gautrans recommending improvements to the formal bus service in Soweto and surrounding areas. The report drew attention to the many problems affecting public transport in Gauteng and more specifically, Soweto. Over a period of many years, bus services in Soweto have been in a state of decline. The few services that remain, operate only during the morning and afternoon peak. There are virtually no off-peak services and few Saturday and Sunday services. Although there are many routes (thereby giving the impression that route coverage is dense) each route has only one or two trips a day. This means that the routes lack focus and are impossible to market effectively. They are known only to a small number of passengers who use them mainly as lift clubs – linking a specific suburb with a specific place of employment at a specific time of day.

Although such limited operations help to keep the financial shortfall to a minimum, they play no part in developing public transport or giving it a social role, as required by the policy documents of the Government.

 

The CSIR Soweto bus report therefore proposed an expanded bus service, based on the following principles:

A significant feature of the CSIR plan is that it promoted co-ordination with other operators, such as Metrorail and Metrobus. It would be an important contribution to the objectives of the high-speed line in that it would feed into the line at places like Johannesburg CBD, Rosebank, Sandton and Midrand.

Up to the time of writing (late 2005) there has been no progress in implementing the report's recommendations. One of the reasons for this is that, since the mid-1990’s there has been a national "moratorium" on awarding bus contracts. (One of the consequences of this moratorium is that the modal share of buses for the journey-to-work in South Africa has fallen from 12% in 1997 to less than 9% in 2003, according to the National Household Travel Survey released in late 2005).

Not only is it inconsistent to have a "moratorium" on bus improvements while simultaneously promoting high speed rail, but it is also not clear how the objectives of transport policy can be achieved anywhere in South Africa when formal road-based public transport is being crippled in this way. It makes a mockery of the Gautrain proposal and undermines all transport planning and travel demand forecasting in South Africa. This is part of the incoherent approach to public transport policy in South Africa.

Until the authorities themselves start to observe the requirements of the NLTTA, the "plethora of problems" in public transport will continue to undermine the regional and the national economies.

7. Alternatives to high speed rail

Most cities that have "good" public transport systems make use of a variety of modes. These include heavy rail, light rail, trolley buses, duo buses, midi-buses, mini buses, metered taxis, etc. Not only does the Gautrain report fail to consider alternatives, but it condescendingly dismisses existing Metrorail and diesel bus services. The attitude of the promoters of Gautrain can therefore only be described as unhelpful to the objectives of the NLTTA.

The use of light rail on the airport branch is suggested in the next section of this document. Another form of transport that deserves much closer investigation is the duo bus, a development of the electric trolleybus, in that it is also fitted with a diesel engine to give it complete flexibility.

The duo bus should be considered suitable for the objectives of the high-speed scheme. Duo buses operate what is believed to be the busiest bus route in the world, in Quito, Ecuador where an average of 175 000 passengers per day are carried.

Although duo buses can operate on their own right-of-way or in normal streets, their ideal domain would be in a bus-way situation. These buses would not only attract passengers, but would also serve areas away from the high speed line without requiring passengers to transfer. The capital cost would also be considerably lower. Unfortunately, no official interest has been shown towards duo buses in South Africa.

Since Gauteng makes up a substantial percentage of the South African economy, it is the duty of the authorities to take the lead in carrying out proper investigations into alternative, practical forms of transport that will benefit all cities in South Africa and not only a specific corridor in Gauteng.

8. AIRPORT LINK

 

The Gautrain proposal includes the construction of a branch line linking the airport with Sandton. There is a strong need to link the airport with other centres of activity, such as the Johannesburg CBD and Sandton, but the concept of a high-speed line is questionable when more appropriate and cheaper options are available.

Firstly, the airport is only one kilometre from Isando Metrorail station and should have been linked long ago by means of a connection to the existing rail network, thus offering access to both Johannesburg CBD and Pretoria.

Secondly, a private railway siding already exists between Isando station and the AECI factory at Modderfontein, a distance of 8 km – almost halfway to Sandton. AECI is known to be releasing some of its property for residential purposes, and the possibility of adapting this line to accommodate light rail vehicles, and extending it through Linbro Park and Alexandra to Sandton, should be properly investigated.

This suggestion combines a number of desirable, creative and imaginative features that the high-speed proposal lacks. A light rail line between Sandton and the airport will provide far more accessibility to more people for a wider variety of purposes than the high-speed proposal.

Alexandra is one of South Africa’s more depressed areas and would benefit from having an attractive, modern transport service running nearby. If the promoters of Gautrain feel that it would be an embarrassment to international passengers, or a security problem, to have surface transport running near Alexandra, or if they are apprehensive about possible objections from existing taxi operators, then they should say so, to allow these issues to be addressed at the appropriate level of Government.

Light rail is far more suitable for South Africa’s current and long-term transport needs than high-speed rail, since a light rail scheme can be replicated in other cities in South Africa. This will not be possible with a high-speed scheme.

 

UPDATE

Recent information received indicates that an additional station may be built

on the airport branch at Modderfontein.

 

If trains are now going to make an additional stop, the advantage of a higher

speed will be diluted , and there will be no point in having a wider gauge. The

airport branch may as well be built to the 1,067 metre gauge from the start.

Another reason for using 1,067 metres is that the Tembisa/Leralla line can be

extended to Midrand, thereby allowing through trains to operate from that

area to Sandton and elsewhere.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9. THE IMAGE OF METRORAIL AND BUSES

Metrorail

The promoters of Gautrain seem to have a low opinion of the image of Metrorail services. They do not seem to regard Metrorail as part of the solution to the "plethora" of problems facing public transport in South Africa. If this is the case, they should be more specific and say so, because this is a problem with implications for all cities where Metrorail operates. The image of Metrorail can, and should be improved as a matter of national priority. It is not a solution to throw extra layers of infrastructure at a problem that simply requires better organisation to solve. No country has two layers of rail infrastructure – one for the upper class and another for the "lower ranks". Most rail systems merely provide different classes of comfort within the same train. Indeed, most metro systems worldwide do not even have different classes.

South Africa cannot afford the luxury of building new "upmarket" rail transport infrastructure while its existing rail infrastructure suffers from unresolved problems. (These include low levels of investment, lack of co-ordination with other modes, unreliable services, poor security, etc.) These problems need to be dealt with first.

Buses

The promoters of Gautrain have a similarly dismissive attitude towards buses, as quoted in the Sunday Times of 1 December 2002:

"Taxis and buses, while an important component of the entire public transport infrastructure, are road-based. A train – with the dedicated right of way which this mode of public transport enjoys – stands back for nothing".

 

There is no reason why buses and taxis cannot be given "dedicated rights of way" that will render them far more effective.

If Sections 4 and 5 of the NLTTA were being properly observed by provincial and local governments throughout South Africa, combined with the additional recommendations set out in this document, the problems resulting from the low image of rail and bus systems would have been largely overcome by now. As a result the "plethora of problems" would be considerably alleviated.

Soccer World Cup 2010

The promoters of the Gautrain scheme have gone to considerable lengths to align the project with South Africa’s successful 2010 World Cup Soccer bid.

It should be pointed out, however that Gautrain will serve only one stadium – namely Securicor Park in Pretoria/Tshwane (previously known as Loftus Versfeld).

Other stadiums, such as FNB (where the opening and closing ceremonies are expected to be held), Rand Stadium and Ellis Park can only be reached by requiring passengers to transfer from the high-speed rail service to another service (either rail or road ).

As stated in para 8, the more transfers that are needed, the lower the overall average speed, and the less justification there will be for having a non-compatible gauge.

10. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The Gautrain report refers in many places to the feasibility of the project. As is typical with projects of this size, there are many considerations that go beyond the immediate cash flow of the project. These include time savings, congestion costs, employment creation, reduced accidents, higher property values in the vicinity of the project, and others.

Although many figures are quoted in the Gautrain report, it fails to give a concise summary of the overall financial position. The reader is therefore left somewhat "in the dark" as a result. To assist those who may wish to know more, this document provides the following figures (which are by late 2005 considerably out of date):

ANNUAL CASH OUTLAY

R

Million

1.

Repayment of capital and interest over 25 years at 10% (R7 billion ÷ 9,077)

 

771

2.

Maintenance and operating costs (Executive summary

para 9)

325

   

1 096

ANNUAL CASH INCOME

 

60 000 passengers a day x 320 days x R30 a trip

576

Cash shortfall

520

Based on the above figures the cash shortfall (subsidy requirement) will be R520 million a year, or about R1,5 million a day.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Gautrain report claims however that the following indirect savings will be achieved:

 

R

Million

Time savings

933

Congestion savings

283

Accident savings

16

 

1 232

When the indirect savings of R1 232 million are set off against the cash shortfall of R520 million, the positive difference is about R700 million. This "positive" difference, in the opinion of the Gautrain promoters, makes the project "viable / feasible / bankable".

It should however, be pointed out that the cash income is based on 60 000 trips a day – a figure which is unlikely to be achieved. A figure of nearer 20 000 is likely, given the absence of a "culture" of public transport, as explained elsewhere in this document. (The Gautrain promoters have since raised their estimates from 60 000 to 104 000 (late 2005 – 120 000 !) passengers a day. This is more than the 80 000 passengers carried daily on the entire Johannesburg Metrobus service). Furthermore the time savings of R933 million are based on a time saving of 45 minutes per trip – a somewhat optimistic figure!

The fact that there has been virtually no significant debate about the socio-economic and financial implications of Gautrain, reflects a disturbing national lack of concern about urban transport economics in South Africa.

 

2005 UPDATE

According to the Tshwane ITP, the capital cost of the scheme has now risen to R13 billion (other more recent sources say R20 bn.) The above figures are based on the original cost estimates of R7 billion.

11. THE ROLE OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY

Although the problems associated with the informal taxi industry fall outside the scope of this document, they contribute to a sub-optimal transport situation and will need to be addressed by Government in a more focused way.

Much publicity has been given to the proposed "recapitalisation " programme which has been generally welcomed by all. Government pronouncements also refer to the need to "formalise" the industry. The word "formal" is not defined anywhere in legislation, however – a shortcoming that will need to be addressed soon.

A recent (late 2005) development is that municipalities will be responsible for ranking facilities and routes – a function that falls within the scope of the proposed Transport Authorities in any event. However, as stated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of this document, the municipalities have failed to apply any noteworthy expertise in their administration of formal public transport in S.A. so far. It is therefore not clear how they will administer the operational aspects relating to the informal sector!

It is apparent that there is no coherent national policy for the informal taxi sector. In these circumstances, this document repeats its earlier recommendation that urgent steps be taken to introduce an integrated formal network of routes, not only in every city, but also in rural areas, in which previously-informal operators can take part through the contract system. This process will need to be phased in to allow the entire community to become accustomed to the new system and will need to be fine-tuned on an ongoing basis.

The commuters organisations’ network of routes referred to in para 5 would be quite suitable for operation by recapitalised vehicles.

 

 

 

12. COMMUNICATION with, AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PUBLIC

The Gautrain report states that "co-operation with all stakeholders is considered to be essential". It is strange, therefore, that the Project Review Committee consists only of Government Departments, Municipalities, and operators.

The Gautrain report claims that "all role-players have indicated their broad support for the project" although "there has been some opposition by people who clearly did not understand the project concept and goals". (para 8.1.2)

The Gautrain scheme is, quite predictably, enjoying the support of those "role players" who will participate in construction activities, supply of equipment, consultancy work, financial and legal deals and the various spin-offs associated with a project of this size.

However, this does not alter the fact that this scheme is merely the latest chapter in South Africa’s long history of weak public transport research and planning. In its present form the scheme will make no difference to the "plethora of problems " experienced by public transport users in South Africa.

13. SUMMARY AND conclusions

 

 

 

 

 

 

14. RECOMMENDATIONS

(As at late 2005 there is no indication that any meaningful progress has been made with regard to the above).

Enter into contracts with transport companies (this includes taxi associations) to operate the above network.