REPRESENTING THE RESERVE FORCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

RESERVE FORCE COUNCIL (RFC) BRIEFING TO THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE ON THE RESERVE FORCE :13 SEPTEMBER 2005

 

  1. The Reserve Force Council (RFC) is pleased to be able to contribute to the debate on the Reserve Force.

  2. South Africa has decided to use its Defence Force for the first time since the Korean War in support of the United Nations. To this end the SANDF has decided to deploy the Reserve Force in support of its Regular Contingent. Such an expeditionary task is new to the SANDF and although it may be too early to judge with absolute certainty, early indications suggest that this marriage appears successful. As an autonomous body within the Defence Family, the RFC highlights the following based mainly on its experience in the international Reserve Force environment:

    1. The Defence Review. It has been said often before that the Defence Review is a robust document, which remains largely true.

    1. The RFC believes that this is especially true of paragraphs 49 to 52 of chapter 9 as well as chapter 11 of the Defence Review. The slow implementation over the nine years since the publication of the Defence Review, rather than its contents is largely to blame for the current dire position that the Reserve Force finds itself in to-day. The irony is that most of the SANDF shortcomings affecting the Reserve Force are addressed in the current White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.

      1. Having said the above chapter five of the Defence Review needs special mention. In terms of sub-paragraph 5.1 of chapter "there should be an appreciation of associated costs and risks". In the opinion of the RFC, not adequately budgeting specifically for this function in advance ito the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, will ultimately influence the sustainability of this task including the Reserve Force involvement therein.

      2. Consider at the same time the Reserve Force and its capabilities to support International Peace Support Operations requires serious revival and rebuilding because it is the opinion of the RFC that certain capabilities in the Reserve Force has exceeded the critical mass contemplated in sub-paragraph 46.4 of chapter 3 of the Defence Review.

      3. The RFC is also of the opinion that when the Defence Review was published, the rate and size of the SANDF involvement in International Peace Support Operations was not realised, nor was all the implications and the impact that such operations would have on the SANDF, realised. The RFC supports the idea that if the rate of SANDF involvement was to continue as it currently is, that paragraphs 34-36 of the Chapter 5, dealing with Force Design, be reconsidered.

      4. It is therefore the opinion of the RFC that serious consideration and resources is required to implement those aspects mentioned in the Defence Review affecting the Reserve Force.

    1. Sustainability. The RFC has always been convinced that sustainable defence generally must include the Reserve Force. The RFC recognises the fact that for International Peace Support Operations to be sustainable, the Reserve Force must be involved.

    2. The International Trends. The RFC through its contact with the International Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) have been privy to international trends in the use of Reserve Forces and wishes to share the following:

    1. Commonalities. As early as 2000, all NATO countries shared the following commonalities:

      1. They all faced Defence Budget cuts.

      2. They all were transforming as a result of the budget cuts, with the exception of Germany who were transforming also because of the inclusion of the East German Defence Force.

      3. Most of them were deployed in International Peace Support Operations, many of them using their Reserve Forces in varying roles.

        1. USA. According to Maj Gen Sandler, a frequent visitor to South Africa and in a briefing to the Portfolio Committee and current Minister of Defence in 2003, the USA was hesitant to use their Reserve Force prior to 1990 because they had been neglected and morale amongst the Reserves was perceived to be low to the extent that call up resulted in low turn-out rates. This perception was proved to be unfounded in 1990 when the Reserves were called up for participation in Gulf War I. The turn out of this call up exceeded all expectations to the extent that the Pentagon realised that its Reserve Force could be relied upon when really required for operations and since then no expeditionary operation has taken place by the USA without the involvement of their Reserve Force. Reserves have been used in all roles in accordance with their "Single Force Policy" although the majority of the support forces are Reserve members. Currently, the USA has started showing signs of "Reserve Force" fatigue as many members have been deployed more than once and some are being deployed for their third and fourth time. This has caused domestic and social problems and employers are also starting to harden their attitude to Reserve Force deployment. Ironically, the employers who are displaying much reticence towards Reserve Force Deployment are the Federal and State Government Departments.

        2. NATO. Other NATO countries follow the same general policy although some have slight differences. Some NATO countries have been involved in International Peace Support Operations since the 1950s in places like Palestine, Cyprus etc. In most cases they have been using their Reserve Forces as well either in general roles or specific specialist roles. Currently there are seven countries in NATO that still support a conscription system, but some countries such as Sweden are prohibited by law to use conscripts outside their national borders. Germany for instance, who provided a large portion of the KFOR force to Kosovo, used only Reserve Forces in their Psyops operations because it was centered on communication with own forces and the local population in Kosovo. Maj Gen Fabio Mini, an internationally renowned commentator on International Peace Support Operations and former CiC of Balkan International Peace Support Forces described the advantages of using Reserve Forces during International Peace Support Operations at a CIOR seminar in Vienna in 2004. He described the Reserve Force as a more mature force in their attitude towards traumatised local populations and who added a "softer edge" than more hardened militaristic Regular soldiers, which he preferred to use when dealing with civilians. Since 2004, with the bombings of Madrid and London as well as other natural disasters such as massive flooding in Germany during 2004, the European countries are becoming more introspective and appear to be reducing their focus on International Peace Support Operations in favour of Homeland Security. Europe and latterly the USA (who have created a Federal Department to deal with this aspect of security) do not regard Homeland Security as being solely directed towards international terrorism but see it as the management mechanism of the consequence of all disasters of which international terrorism is but one form of disaster. As an example, in the USA recently it was the Federal Department of Homeland Security that was made responsible to co-ordinate and manage relief to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. It is significant that the theme for the Summer Seminar for the CIOR at Rome in 2006 is "The Role of Reserve Forces in Homeland Security"

        3. RSA. Clearly the RSA situation cannot be compared directly with that of other countries as it differs in some aspects. However much can be learned from the experiences of other countries. Aspects that need highlighting are the following:

      1. Resourcing for Sustainability. Although this applies to the SANDF as a whole, this aspect is especially important for the Reserve Force who in the cases of some Army Formations, have passed below the level of critical mass. Sustainable International Peace Support Operations can never be reliant on the timeous repayments by the UN. The RSA will have to resource International Peace Support Operations up front and include the Reserve Force development in this.

      2. Role of the CSND. Although some may say that most of our Reserve Force members are unemployed, this is not a desired end state. The CSND needs a product to promote and the use of the Reserve Force in International Peace Support Operations makes the work of the CSND all the more important especially with the deployment of Reserve Force specialists that are so vital in such operations.

      3. Legal Framework. Further legislation is required to regulate the call-up of the Reserve Force, including their liability to serve. The definition of when they are deemed to be "in service" needs clarifying and legislation is required to provide protection from employees and creditors when called up for general Reserve Force duty and for International Peace Support Operations.

d. Domestic Security. The RFC is of the opinion that debate should be initiated in the role that the Reserve Force should play in this arena. Events in other parts of the World have caused Governments to look inwardly to domestic security (excluding the policing function) which includes the consequent management of disasters and other emergencies. The Reserve Force Councils recent visit to the CIOR summer convention held in Ghent during August 2005 afforded it the opportunity to experience the keen interest shown by NATO and Partners for Peace countries in this field.