1. Since South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, the international strategic and security environment-has changed dramatically. Security threats that were overshadowed by the possibility of direct superpower military confrontation (during the Cold War), have surfaced to dominate the international security agenda. Non-traditional security threats, new actors, and non-conventional methods of insecurity and instability confront the contemporary international system. Consequently, the world is as dangerous as it has ever been. However, the shift in emphasis of security issues has meant that existing security policies require updating.

2. Factors contributing to insecurity such as, poverty, underdevelopment, the spread of killer diseases, environmental degradation, the rise of international terrorism, the possession and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the growth of transnational crime are of a global nature but have implications for national security. The strategic environment is, therefore, moulded by a multitude of political, socio-economic, environmental and military trends that impact significantly on South Africa's defence and security policy.

The Global Context

3. The re-entry of South Africa into the international community of states and organisations has provided a critical opportunity to promote international peace and security within multilateral fora such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth, the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and the United Nations (UN). This is entirely consistent with South Africa's foreign policy objectives of promoting global peace and security.

4. Over the past decade a number of general trends and prominent characteristics of the international strategic environment have become clearly visible. These are:

a. Infra-state Conflict: The likelihood of inter-state conflicts has declined considerably with the termination of the Cold War. The vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are taking place within, rather than between, states. Subsequently, intra-state conflict has become a defining feature of the international security environment. Although occurring within states, the consequences of such conflicts in terms of refugee flows, the trafficking of small arms, and the disruption of trade; have profound spill over effects on neighbouring states. Equally, in situations where neighbouring states sponsor warring parties of an intra- state conflict, attempts to achieve a resolution are often frustrated.

b. The Contribution of Non-State Actors to Insecurity. The capacity of non- state actors to instigate and conduct armed conflict is significantly influencing the international strategic environment. Such actors include transnational criminal organisations, mercenaries, rebel movements, warlords and militias. The rise of international terrorism has highlighted the lethal capacity of non-state actors.

c. The Rise of International Terrorism: Events within the global security environment have compelled recognition that international terrorism poses a serious security threat. Indeed, terrorism has become less territorially defined and more global in reach. In addition, it assumes a level of anonymity that is increasingly driven by non-state actors. No country can be considered to be immune from acts of international terrorism and all are affected by the way in which the world responds to this threat.

d. Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): The threat posed by WMD, such as attacks by chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons, is no less of a concern than it was during the height of the Cold War. The difference is that these weapons are no longer confined to major powers. The possibility of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, acquiring WMD is undeniably a reality as material and technology become more readily available. Efforts to regulate the proliferation of WMD such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have indeed slowed down the spread of such weapons, it has, however, not stopped the production of WMD, especially by states that are not signatories of the NPT.

e. The Military Capacity of States: While most states have retained their national armed forces and reduced their military spending, some have strengthened their military capacity. At the global strategic level, military power continues to be exercised alongside the economic and political strengths of states. Of great concern is the use of such capacity to pursue unilateral (military) action in resolving disputes.

f. Unilateral Acts of Force: The reconfiguration of military power after the Cold War has produced a world in which major powers bestride the globe with a military capability that is unlikely to be contested in the near future. Such military strength provides these powers with the capacity to act unilaterally in fulfilment of their national security objectives and interests. Unilateral acts of force have the potential to weaken multilateral institutions established to promote global peace and security. Moreover, such acts are counter to the basic tenets of international law.

g. Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources: The contemporary international security environment is significantly influenced by the competition for access to scarce and strategic resources such as water, land. oil and gas. "Because an interruption in the supply of natural resources would have severe economic consequences, the major importing countries consider the protection of the supply of strategic resources a significant national security concern."' Some of Africa's conflicts are the direct result of foreign and domestic competition over access to such scarce and strategic resources that are found on the continent.

h. Mercenaries and Private Military Companies: The nature of the activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed conflicts has often been controversial. The controversy arises especially when mercenaries provide military services in violation of domestic and international norms. However, attempts to address this issue have been complicated by the difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as opposed to activities of private military and security companies. Mercenarism is a manifestation of unregulated military foreign assistance and has the potential to undermine legitimate constitutional democracies and the consolidation of collective security especially in the continent.

i. Globalisation: The cultural, economic, social and political processes of globalisation are characteristic of the hyper-mobility of information and capital. The fundamental driver of the globalisation processes is the rapid advancements in technology over the past decades. However, access to such technological advancements is a challenge for most people in the developing world, in general, and Africa, in -particular, in a globalising world, '...no country or individual, no matter how remote, remains unaffected by security-related developments.

j. North - South Disparities: While globalisation has increased opportunities for economic growth and development in some parts of the world, there has been an increase in the disparity between the rich and poor countries of the world. As a result there is now a major fault line regarding the levels of development and wealth between the countries of the North and those of the South, as the latter becomes progressively poorer. This trend has grave implications for the development and hence the security of countries in the South.

k. Regionalism: The movement toward the consolidation of regional economic blocs continues, in the past years the expansion of the European Union bears testimony to this trend in international relations. Together with other regional economic blocs in the world, emphasis has been on the facilitation of intra-regional trade. Increasingly though, there is a noticeable movement toward the consolidation of regional collective security mechanisms.

l Information and Communication Technology (ICT): Modem information and communication technology and systems are critical for commerce, trade and military operations. At the same time the presence of such technology and systems creates its own set of security challenges. The international community through the UN has undertaken to pursue mechanisms that will promote international cyber-security.

The Continental Context

5. The African continent continues to find itself within an international system structured and driven along clear lineages of economic, political and military power. The inauguration of the African Union (AU) is, therefore, "a milestone in Africa's quest for a dignified and equitable place in such a world. However, the continent's achievement of such a place will be hugely influenced by its ability to maintain a peaceful and stable environment.

6. Proxy wars that were fought on the continent in furtherance of bi-polar competition during the Cold War have ended. Nevertheless, conflicts and the use of force have continued. While some of these conflicts are based on longstanding disputes, others are of a recent occurrence.

7. Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa emanate from, among other factors: Weak and dysfunctional states; poor political and economic governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; armed competition over scarce and strategic resources, (especially over land, water, energy and maritime resources); the involvement of the military in the political and economic governance of states; and unconstitutional changes of governments.

8. Of greater concern for the security of the continent and its people, are:

a. Poverty and underdevelopment;

b. Proliferation of small arms, light weapons and child soldiers;

c. Unlawful activities of mercenaries and non-state actors in armed conflict; and

d. Inter and intra-state conflict.

9. A further concern is the possibility that the continent can be used as a base for international terrorist groups, as well as a target for their activities. In addition, the trafficking in small arms, light weapons and drugs are detrimental to Africa's peace, security and development. Increased piracy along Africa's coast is also of concern.

10. Therefore, the institutionalisation of the AU and the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) are critical for a conflict-ridden continent. The mechanisms of the PSC are: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (EWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Peace Fund. The ASF will be established through contributions of a brigade per Region. This process is making significant progress.

11. In addition, movement toward the implementation of a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) will enhance efforts to secure the peaceful co-existence among AU member states. The CADSP pursues a broad understanding of security. The core value of the CADSP is summarised as the indivisibility of continental security. In other words, the security of each African country is inseparably linked to each other's and to that of the Continent as a whole. Accordingly, the CADSP prescribes how AU member states will collectively respond to threats.

The Regional Context

12. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the region as a whole has undergone substantial change, with considerable progress having been made towards the resolution of long standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices. However, post-war reconstruction has posed a challenge, particularly in regard to the socio-economic reconstruction and the integration of former combatants.

13. Much of the region continues to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people, an acute debt crisis, widespread disease and environmental degradation, and a proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These human security and developmental problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, i.e. environmental destruction, the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, and the illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, goods and small arms and light weapons.

14. The region also faces the problem of ensuring maritime security. Regional states with coastline borders generally lack the capacity to monitor maritime traffic. Consequently, it is possible for ships to engage in piracy and the smuggling of weapons, contraband, people and goods. Of particular importance is the protection of maritime trade, which is the mainstay of regional economies, and the region's maritime resources including fisheries, seabed minerals and energy resources.

15. The operationalisation of the security structures and institutions of the SADC is, therefore, of paramount importance. The finalisation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) on Politics Defence and Security (OPDSC) is a positive development in the co-ordination and implementation of SADC's security management. Another development to promote regional peace and security is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), which was signed by the SADC Heads of State in August 2003.

The Domestic Context

16. South Africa's domestic security environment has improved significantly since the inception of democratic governance. The security sector, in particular, has been transformed to display values of democratic governance that reflect the principles of transparency, accountability and representivity.

17. Nevertheless, South Africa's domestic security environment continues to be affected by endemic crime and criminal violence that affects all sectors of society and is influenced largely by foreign and local criminal syndicates operating within the country. The problem of crime continues to be exacerbated by the availability of illicit small arms in the hands of criminals. In addition, the domestic environment remains susceptible to the spread of killer diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and environmental degradation.

18. In addition, acts of terror have also affected the domestic security environment. Along with the threat of international terrorism, political, ideological and religious extremism, albeit not of the levels experienced in other states, require continuous monitoring.

Conclusion

19. The international strategic and security environment has, indeed, changed with the termination of the Cold War. For South and Southern Africa, the end of apartheid had a significant impact, leading to the termination of military aggression. In the perceived absence of a conventional military threat to South Africa and its people, non-military factors of insecurity that emanate at the global, continental and regional levels, are the main concern. Of these, poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance constitute the central factors contributing to insecurity in Africa.

20. Consequently, security can no longer be viewed within its traditional and narrow interpretation as militarily securing the state and the ruling government. Security encompasses as its objectives not only the "absence of war, but also the eradication of poverty and the pursuit of sustainable economic development, social justice and democratic governance.

21. The inter-relatedness and transnational nature of many contemporary security threats dictates that solutions are beyond the control or capability of any single state. A resolution to many of the present days security threats require collaborative action among states within multilateral fora and collective security mechanisms at the international, continental and regional levels.

1.A changed-strategic environment compels collective action to address threats to international peace and security. The security and development of South Africa is inextricably linked to Southern Africa and the continent Africa therefore remains the focus in the conduct of our defence policy and relations. South Africa is accordingly committed to and deeply involved in strengthening continental and regional structures, in particular the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and in the implementation of socio-economic development programmes like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). South Africa's promotion of global peace and security within multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations (UN), is pursued by collective and consultative decision-making

Approach to Collective Security

2. South Africa's policy of promoting collective security must, firstly, be located within a broadened understanding of security. Accordingly, a human security conceptualisation of security as freedom from 'fear* and 'want has been adopted in the policy formulation processes of South Africa's national security. This approach has been adopted in the 1996 White Paper. It is an approach that, however, does not negate or supplant 'state security' with the adoption of a 'human security' approach.

3. Indeed, the security of our citizenry cannot be attained primarily by military means. Threat assessments in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era reflect a range of non-military sources of insecurity. These include among others: poverty, underdevelopment, the spread of killer diseases, environmental disasters, etc.

4. As these pertain to threats that are development-oriented, security and development become inseparably linked. Despite perceptions to view human security as separate from state security, the more appropriate understanding of security is captured in the final report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security, that states:

5. Moreover, this conceptualisation of security has shifted from viewing security solely from a national perspective. Undoubtedly, many of the non-military threats that confront South Africans have critical regional implications. These are threats that result from spillover effects or are threats that have dire consequences for our neighbouring states. Therefore, addressing the insecurity of our people cannot be pursued unilaterally.

6. Within this conceptualisation of security, the DOD is but one of the instruments of the state that may be employed to promote national and international security However, in the context of some security issues, the DOD may assume the lead role, while with regard to others: it may be employed purely in a supportive capacity.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

7. Today's security challenges require a reliable capacity for the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment for peacekeeping and law enforcement in areas of conflicts around the globe. The UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) launched in the mid 1990s is a database of military, civilian police and equipment made available by member states, for rapid deployment to UN peacekeeping operations' The UN Stand-by Arrangements System requires states to have either regional or global capabilities available to the UN either free of charge or through a system of reimbursement This poses a great responsibility on both the UN and regional organisations to mutually support each other's efforts to collective security.

8. The experience with UN peacekeeping operations in the last decade or so, especially in Bosnia and Somalia, warranted a shift from classical peace keeping to peace building. As a result, the UN in March 2000 appointed a high level team of experts to undertake a thorough review of UN peacekeeping operations. The mandate of the Panel was to make "specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the UN in conducting such activities better in the future." The Panel's report, referred to as the Brahimi Report, included organisational and operational reform proposals, both on a long-term and a short-term basis.

9. One of the main conclusions of Brahimi Report was that a purely military approach to peacekeeping that ignores the human security aspects of post-conflict peace building does not produce a complete resolution of the conflict and lasting peace. The Brahimi Report also linked the issue of stand-by arrangements to regional co-operation. It argued that what should be made available to UN military planners by member states was a brigade type force necessary to deter spoilers of peace processes.

10. The African Standby Force (ASF) is intended to augment efforts not only of the AU but also of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO). It builds on the work of the Brahimi Report, to ensure the strategic deployment o\ multidimensional stand-by arrangements necessary for effective deployments. In principle, the South African Government has in its International Relations Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster priorities endorsed the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, but has not yet committed to UNSAS.

Reforming the UN Security Council

11. Changes in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War and a three fold increase in UN membership since its inception in 1945 warrant a change to the composition of the UN Security Council not only to reflect these realities but also to make it more legitimate, credible and effective. South Africa supports the recommendations of the Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change on the reform of the UN Security Council Representation of the developing world in an expanded UN Security Council will provide a forum for Africa to shape and influence the international security agenda.

Continental Security Mechanisms

12. Although significant progress has been made to resolve conflicts in the African continent, threats of unconstitutional changes of governments, weak states, lack of good governance and human rights violations will undermine sustainable economic development as envisaged by NEPAD. The Constitutive Act of the AU and the protocol of the PSC attempt to address these security challenges.

13. The objectives of the PSC are to provide peace, security and stability in Africa by promoting democratic governance, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities, and to develop a common defence policy, institutions of the PSC that will fulfil these objectives are the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund, the Continental Early Warning System, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the African Standby Force (ASF).

14. The ASF concept envisages one brigade-size force per region for each of the five regions. The establishment of these regional stand-by brigades implies close and continuous co-operation in these security mechanisms. The advantages emanating from this will be a greater transparency in the region and continent as well as a collective African approach to resolve and address African problems in an effective manner.

15. The Continental Early Warning System is to provide political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators to be used to analyse developments within the continent and recommend the best course of action. The early warning information shall be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to advise the PSC on potential conflict and threats to peace and security in the continent.

16. In addition, pursuant to article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which calls for the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent, the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), provides a framework to enhance a common vision of defence and security on the continent. The CADSP will ensure collective responses to threats on the continent and protect member states from internal and external aggression. The CADSP will also inform all future developments related to non-aggression and mutual defence pacts.

17. The protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) stipulates that the AU must maintain close co-operation with the UN Security Council.

Regional Security Mechanisms

18. Given the improved security situation in the SADC region in the past decade, the challenge remains the institutionalisation of the objectives of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) particularly the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO). A general thrust of SIPO is to operationalise the objectives of the SADC Protocol on Politics and Security, which entered into force at the beginning of 2004.

19. The OPDSC, which has two legs, namely, the lnter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the lnter-state Politics, Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) was formally established in 1996 by the SADC Heads of State and Government, and is responsible for co-ordinating policies and activities of SADC in the areas of politics, defence and security. The objectives of the OPDSC include inter alia to protect the people and region against instability resulting from breakdown of law and order; prevent infra-state conflicts, and external aggression by promoting collective security through mediation, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, both within and between SADC member states.

20. The signing of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003 was a significant step in enhancing regional security. The MDP embodies the defence and security principles contained in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security by mandating a collective response to peace and security in the region. The pact provides a mechanism to prevent conflict between SADC countries, as well as with other countries, and for SADC member states to act together against aggression by external forces. However, the pact allows for enforcement action to be taken only as a last resort, and with authorisation by the AU Security Council and UN Security Council.

21. The regional approach to the implementation of the African Stand-by Force is contained in a Modality Report, which was approved by the SADC Summit Heads of State and Government in Mauritius in August 2004. The implementation process is currently underway. Following the decision to fully operationalise the ASF by 2010, SADC will be called upon to provide a standby brigade for the ASF.

22. Each state in SADC will contribute to the standby brigade. As the largest UN troop contributing country in the region, South Africa will be expected to make e meaningful contribution to the establishment and maintenance of the SADC regional brigade.

23. Similarly, the establishment of a regional early warning system and the integration thereof with continental system will require concerted effort by and co- ordination with member states to ensure its effectiveness. In Southern Africa progress has been made at the level of the ISDSC and its subordinate structures in establishing a regional early warning centre.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Poverty and Underdevelopment

24. Poverty and underdevelopment are inextricably linked to security. In the case of Southern Africa, there are huge disparities between the wealthy and poor members of the SADC community. As a result they are constrained in terms of making meaningful contribution towards a common security in the SADC region. Unless we address poverty and underdevelopment we will not be able to deal with real issues of security. As the Commission on Human Security puts it "[e]radication of poverty is thus central to ensuring the security of all people, as well as the security of the stated.

25. The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ has an exhaustive list of challenges, which inter alia includes, combating the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, national disaster management, negative effects of globalisation, redressing imbalances in the accessibility of resources and the eradication and alleviation of poverty in the region. To a large extent, the objectives of the SIPO are articulated in the NEPAD strategic framework which principally seeks to address poverty and underdevelopment in the African continent South Africa remains committed to the NEPAD process and the UN Millennium Development Goals to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment in the region and the continent.

Unconstitutional Changes of Government

26. African Heads of State and Government have committed themselves to condemn and to reject unconstitutional changes of govemment'2 Hence one of the core principles of the Constitutive Act of the AU is the "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

27. Likewise, SADC member states have made significant strides in the consolidation of democratic practices and institutions. In July 2004, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government adopted a Protocol on Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Poverty and inequality can only be addressed in an environment where people are free to participate in the democratic process. South Africa will continue to share experience with transitional democracies in the region, continent and globally on security sector transformation, governance practices and approaches to civil-military relations in general.

Mercenarism

28. The participation of South African nationals in mercenary activities around the world will undermine South Africa's commitment to values of human rights and international law as expressed in the Constitution.'3 Therefore South Africa cannot turn a blind eye to mercenary activities by its nationals or knowingly allow it to happen.

29. The 1996 Constitution explicitly declares that the defence force is the only lawful military force in the Republic and security services established other than the Constitution, may be established only in terms of national legislation. The Constitution also prevents South African nationals from participating in national and international armed conflicts.

30. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 gives effect to these constitutional obligations by prohibiting South African citizens within South Africa and outside its borders from rendering any foreign military assistance in an armed conflict. In addition, military-related services or assistance and/or any action that has the result of furthering the military interests of a party to an armed conflict are subject to regulation. Regulated activities include advice, training, personnel, financial, logistical, operational support, medical services, security services or any action aimed at overthrowing a state or undermining its constitutional order. South Africa is not party to the AU and UN conventions on mercenarism.

International Terrorism

31. International terrorism is likely to dominate the global security agenda in the coming years and a comprehensive international approach to prevent and combat this threat will remain an international priority.l4 32. South Africa has sought to support efforts by the AU and the international community to eliminate terrorism by strengthening co-operation with other countries through sharing of information; implementing UN Security Council resolutions, and acceding to and ratifying multilateral and regional counter-terrorism conventions.

33.In order to prevent instability resulting from acts of terrorism and pursue a collective approach, African countries have agreed to review their domestic laws with a view to prosecute those who support, finance and carry out acts of terrorism. As a result the South African Government has promulgated the Protection o1 Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (Act 33 o1 2004).The legislative framework has further been complemented by the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Counter-Terrorism Working Group mandated by Cabinet to oversee the implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and AU decisions to combat acts of terrorism in the region and the continent.

Disarmament and Arms Control

34. Under the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) African countries committed themselves to preserve Africa as a nuclear weapons free zone. Consequently, South Africa has acceded and ratified international and regional instruments on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control and passed legislation to implement these obligations. The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (Act 87 of 1993) created the South African Council for Non- Proliferation as a statutory body to control the export and import of South African dual-use technology, material and equipment which could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced weapons systems.

35. Similarly, control over conventional arms falls within the ambit of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC). The National Conventional Arms Control Act (Act 41 of 2002) mandates the NCACC, a committee of Cabinet Ministers, to regulate trade in conventional arms. Conventional arms as defined in section 1(vi) of the Act are specified in the Regulations to the Act and incorporate munitions, dual-use goods and technologies, and all services related to such conventional arms.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

36. African countries have committed themselves to prevent the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. African countries have supported relevant SADC, AU and UN conventions aimed at the total eradication of small arms and light weapons through inter alia the harmonisation of legislation; strengthening regional and continental co-operation; institutionalisation of programmes aimed at preventing, controlling the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Africa. 37. South Africa has supported and actively participated in global, continental and regional efforts aimed at the eradication of illicit small arms and light weapons·15 Regionally. the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms. Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001) is one such initiative. The Protocol calls on members o SADC community to enact national measures and legislation to ensure pr controls over the manufacturing, possession and use of small arms and weapons.

38. The Firearms Control Act (Act 60 of 2000) gives effect to the SADC protocol providing for the operational control of all illegal firearms and stocks in South At Although, SAPS is tasked with the implementation of the Act, effective co-ordination takes place with other departments including the DOD to ensure its proper implementation.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

39. To facilitate national implementation of the UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, the Government enacted the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act (Act 36 of 2003) to provide, amongst others, for the surrender, forfeiture to the state and destruction of anti-personnel mines in the Republic. It also provides for international co-operation with the United Nations and other international organisations in their efforts to clear landmines in the SADC region and the rest of the continent. South Africa is one of the few countries in the world with an implementing legislation and the latter serves as an international best practice model for other countries to follow.

Conclusion

40. The broadening nature of security that includes human security suggests a need to forge a new approach to collective security. Global threats posed by poverty and underdevelopment, poor governance, mercenarism, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms proliferation: small arms and light weapons and anti-personnel mines are interconnected and transnational in nature, cutting across departmental responsibilities. The increasing polarisation between poor and rich countries poses severe threats to peace and stability in the world.

41. The security trends predominant in the global, continental and regional context are of a non-traditional military nature. As these security trends transcend states, South Africa's commitment to multilateralism means that they will be dealt with collectively through the multilateral structures at global, continental and regional levels.

42. Consequently, South Africa will continue to support the regional, continental and global security arrangements and initiatives such as the AU PSC and the operationalisation of the ASF, Early Warning System (EWS), MSC, Peace Fund, the Declaration on Common African Defence and Security Policy and the reform of the UN Security Council. Similarly South Africa remains committed to the implementation of the SADCSIPO and ensuring that the regional peace and security initiatives such as the regional early warning system and the SADC Brigade are linked to and into the continental security arrangements.

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION

1. South Africa's National Security Policy (NSP) has undergone a marked overhaul since the end of apartheid. The NSP of the apartheid government was based on maintaining a repressive and undemocratic state and countering anti-apartheid resistance, both internally and externally. This goal was pursued through extensive use of military and police force.

2. The government of a democratic South Africa has adopted a fundamentally different approach to its NSP. "In the new South Africa national security is an all- encompassing condition in which all citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of democratic governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.

3. Accordingly, South Africa's national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental matters. The objectives of South Africa's NSP thus entail:

a. Consolidation and maintenance of democracy.

b. The achievement of sustainable economic development.

c. The pursuit of social justice.

d. Ensuring a peaceful and safe environment by addressing the levels of crime, violence and political instability.

e. Achieving security within the principles of collective security, non- aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

4. The basis for South Africa's NSP is founded on constitutional principles, the country's national interests, and governmental priorities as espoused through the Cabinet Makgotla and the Ministerial and Director' General Cluster system of governance

5. The 1996 Constitution provides the most authoritative basis for an interpretation of South Africa's NSP. Section 198 of the Constitution states that the following principles govern the NSP:

a. National Security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, in peace and harmony and to be free from fear and want, to seek a better life;

b. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, national or internationally, except as provided for in-terms of the constitution and national legislation;

c. National Security must be pursued in compliance with the law including international law; and

d. National Security is subject to the authority of parliament and national executive.

6. South Africa's NSP is also influenced by the national interests. SA's Key National Interests are as follows:

a. The security and survival of South Africa, its values and institutions and the safety of its people;

b. Sustainable economic growth and development in South Africa and the region;

c. A peaceful and stable international environment; and

d. international engagement with and participation in the international community.

7. While South Africa's Constitution and national interests provide clear direction for the formulation of a NSP, guidelines for its implementation are central to governmental priorities provided for by the Cabinet Makgotla and the Cluster System of governance at Ministerial and Director General level. The main clusters applicable to the DOD are the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), and the Justice, Crime Prevention and Safety (JCPS) clusters.

8 Some of the most significant changes in government policy since the inception of a democratic government are reflected within the IRPS and JCPS priorities. Critical defence-related cluster priorities that provide direction for South Africa's NSP include:

a. Transform the foreign, defence and intelligence organisations.

b Crime prevention and combating organised crime.

c. Ensure South Africa's acceptance into the community of nations and establish relations with other countries.

d. Promote international peace, security and stability (including international crime prevention and management).

e. Prioritise commitment to the interests and development of Africa.

f. Promote South-South co-operation and the transformation of North- South relations.

g. Reform and strengthen the multilateral rules-bound political, economic, security and environmental organisations in order to advance the interests of developing countries.

9. While the South African government has managed to achieve a number of its cluster priorities since 1994, some have been more difficult to be realised. Key challenges for a successful achievement of defence-related priorities are:

a. Support the AU PSC in its efforts to contribute to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace keeping in Africa;

b. Promote and strengthen multilateralism at regional, continental and global levels. Play and active and leading role in the implementation of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism:

c. Ensure AU structures and programmes are implemented, operationalised and consolidated;

d. Enhance the capacity of the intelligence structures, and the SANDF;

e. Improve efficiency in both ports of entry and in respect of border control; and,

f. improving intelligence, visible policing and social partnerships, particularly in dealing with priority crimes.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOD/SANDF

10. National security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition, which includes the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature.

11. in addition to the accepted military function of defence against external armed aggression, national security policy and priorities thus imply that government will require the DOD/SANDF to participate in and contribute to the combating of a range of non-military threats to security. These may include crime, terrorism and the effects of natural disasters.

12. South Africa's national security policy and cluster priorities also reflect a strong commitment to regional and continental peace, stability and development. This manifests in government's commitment to NEPAD, the AU and SADC and their structures and mechanisms.

13. Government's commitment to international peace and security and manifestations at regional and continental levels consequently imply a long term DOD/SANDF involvement in collective defence and security including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence ( operation. These include the PSC, ASF, Continental and Regional Early Warning, and the SADC Brigade.

14. South Africa's national security policy and priorities thus have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of the SANDF.

CHAPTER 4

ROLE FUNCTIONS ,OBJECTIVES AND MISSIONS

Introduction

1. The principal strategy, as provided for in the 1996 White Paper (WP), stipulates the use of political, economic and military co-operation and other non-violent means as preferred approaches in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, with the deployment of the SANDF as a measure of last resort. This strategy allows for the participation in collective security mechanisms and peace missions.

2. In view of the above strategy and given the involvement of South Africa institutions such as the UN, AU and SADC and their subordinate mechanisms, t role and functions of the SANDF have been reviewed to verify their validity within this emerging security environment.

3. This chapter articulates the role and functions of the SANDF within this context and specifically addresses the issues of a conventional capability, the review primary and secondary functions, and is concluded with a discussion on objective and missions.

4. As stated in the previous Chapter, the Constitution provides that the "primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles o international law regulating the use of force." As also previously cited, the 1996 WP also states that the "primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression."' However, an anomaly exists in that the defence of South Africa against external military aggression is also referred to as the "primary function."

5. To "defend and protect" does not only mean engagement in war or protection against inter-state threats of force, but also includes military diplomacy and participation in peace missions. "Protect" also highlights the SANDF's responsibility towards the people of the country in terms of protection against environmental and non-military threats. Viewed in this context, the role of the SANDF should be taken as synonymous with the "primary object" expressed in the Constitution.

FUNCTIONS OF THE SANDF

Defence in a Changing World

6. As detailed in Chapter 1, issues that currently dominate the international security agenda include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability in regions composed of weak states, non-military threats to security and the role of international organisations in security management. Africa in particular is characterised by a perceived low probability of a foreseeable external military threat. Rather the greater threat to the continent is socio-economic impoverishment and underdevelopment. Despite significant advances in collective security management through the AU and regional bodies, political instability, intra- state conflict and non-state military and para-military threats have continued. This poses significant challenges to the present functions of the SANDF.

7. South Africa's inherent right to self-defence in terms of international law and the UN Charter is undeniably and irrevocably a key component of the mandate of the SANDF. The central premise of South Africa's principal defence strategy is to ensure national security by securing the regional, continental and international environment The inter-relationship between self-defence and of promoting security, especially in southern Africa, has become critically important to the strategic direction and functions of the SANDF.

8. The functions of the SANDF are furthermore influenced by the increasing importance and prominence of collective security arrangements in conflict management on the African continent.

9. Finally, the use of defence resources in support of the people of South Africa and other government departments will also remain a permanent feature of the security landscape. This is, however, undertaken within the inherent capacity of the SANDF.

The Posture of the SANDF

10. A defensive non-threatening posture best accommodates international law and domestic legal and policy imperatives guiding defence. This posture also impacts on the nature of missions the SANDF is likely to conduct in future. It is projected by a high level of involvement in collective security structures, numerous bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements and the promotion of regional and continental security through participation in peace support missions. However, this does not eliminate capabilities that enable tactically offensive actions.

Defence Functions of the SANDF

11 Constitutionally20 .the present functions of the SANDF are:

a. service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;

b. service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and states;

c. service in the preservation of life, health or property;

d. service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;

e. service in upholding law and order in support of SAPS: and

f. service in support to departments of state for socio-economic upliftment.

12. The non-threatening defensive posture of the SANDF, the imperatives of self- defence, promoting security and the statutory obligation towards the people of South Africa and the above-mentioned functions are entirely consistent. What has emerged, however, is that the focus in the execution of these functions has changed due to changing national priorities. In terms of present governmental policies that favour actions to stabilise intra-state conflict, rather than actions to deter or prevent inter-state conflict, the SANDF is primarily occupied with the function of compliance with international obligations.

Reviewing Primary and Secondary Functions

13. The 1996 WP states that the functions of the SANDF do not carry equal weight. The "Primary" function of the SANDF is the defence of South Africa against external military aggression. All other functions are "Secondary". Consequently, "the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its primary function." However, in terms of present governmental policies, service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic (including participation in collective security arrangements and peace missions) has assumed primary importance.

14. In the 1998 Defence Review it was assumed that equipping and preparing the SANDF for its "primary" function would enable the execution of the "secondary" functions. The change in focus and the increasing prominence of certain "secondary" functions have, however, brought this assumption into question.

15. Given the distinction between the functions and the realities of a change in the environment and focus, innovative measures are necessary to ensure an effective, efficient and economical SANDF. The distinction between primary and secondary functions should, therefore, be discarded. All of the functions should be given an appropriate prominence in the objectives and missions of defence.

Objectives

16. Grouping and combining the above functions, as well as Government prescripts, result in five defence objectives. These objectives, which are not prioritised, are the ends to be achieved by the DOD. The defence objectives are as follows:

a. Defending and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, as well as supporting its people, by maintaining cost-effective defence capabilities, prepared and equipped to participate in operations as ordered and funded by Government.

b. Contributing to global security through the promotion of regional and continental security initiatives by regional defence co-operation and participation in peace missions.

c. Ensuring good governance of the DOD by effective, efficient and economical management, administration and accounting within the regulatory framework and Government policy.

d. Ensuring continuous improvement of defence capabilities by means of quality command and control, by developing the people and by improving the equipment and facilities of the DOD.

e. Implementing the "One-Force Concept" by adequately resourcing and utilising both regulars and reserves, as well as by rejuvenating and right- sizing the human resource composition of the DOD.

17. Military Strategic Objectives, derived from the Defence Objectives and which will be reflected comprehensively in the Military Strategy of the SANDF will include the following:

a. enhancing and Maintaining Comprehensive Defence Capabilities. By enhancing and maintaining a comprehensive portfolio of capabilities, the SANDF will be able to provide self-defence in accordance with international law against any external threat of aggression, which endangers the stability of South Africa.

b. promoting Peace, Security and Stability in the Region and the Continent. The provision of external deployment and support, regionally and continentally, to enhance peace, security and stability in support of decisions by the Executive.

c. Supporting the People of South Africa. Supporting the population of South Africa in operations and activities other than war, when the responsible state departments do not have adequate capacity to do so.

Missions

18. The funding of a defence capability commensurate with functional realities and Constitutional imperatives constitutes a major challenge to government and the DOD, especially given that differences exist in terms of focus and priority.

19. Confronting this challenge without eroding capabilities that are necessary for self-defence is only possible through the implementation of an approach, which addresses the functions at an executive level. Functions and the resultant objectives are heterogeneous in nature. For example, to defend the Republic implies countering a conventional threat or a non-conventional threat, amongst others. These could occur simultaneously or in isolation. Each threat will necessitate a different approach and force design. Similarly, service in the preservation of life, health or property could entail disaster relief, search and rescue or other tasks as ordered by the Executive.

20. Functions and objectives can, therefore, be divided into more homogeneous groupings of tasks, called missions. These missions can subsequently be prioritised and categorized. The SANDF can therefore prepare to execute all missions, taking into account the mission priorities; instead of only concentrating on primary functions. This negates the debate on primary and secondary functions and the resultant anomalies in terms of funding and force preparation.

21. Prioritising and categorizing the missions can be done in terms of the expected impact of failure in execution and the probability of occurrence. By evaluating these two parameters and applying good military judgement and experience, these missions will provide direction for the design and structure of the DOD and specifically the SANDF, given budgetary constraints.

22. The functions, objectives and proposed missions are shown in Table 1

a. Shape. Political, economic and military co-operation with other states are fostered to promote peace, security and stability. In this context it is important to establish a common security regime and to participate in regional defence co-operation, as well as in confidence and security building measures.

b. Contain. Imminent conflict must be contained by means of diplomacy, mediation and arbitration under the auspices of an international or regional body.

c. Respond. Should it be required, the SANDF will respond to the threat as ordered by Government and as expected by the people of South Africa.

24. Military Strategic Concepts, derived from the Defence Concept and which will be reflected comprehensively in the Military Strategy of the SANDF will include the following:

a. Mission-Essential Training. The SANDF is to educate, train and develop its soldiers in the essential knowledge and skills required to execute the tasks necessary to accomplish its missions. This implies preparing for missions as per priority and as allocated to force elements.

b. Mission-Trained Force. A force, as a subset of the SANDF, at all times prepared and supported to execute identified missions (within the parameters of the selective engagement concept).

c. Selective Engagement This concept implies that the SANDF will execute all the prescribed missions, as ordered, but will be selective in terms of the extent to which operations and tasks, emanating from these missions, will be executed. This concept implies that calculated risks will have to be taken. The Chief of the SANDF will advise the National Executive (the President and Cabinet), who ultimately decides on the extent of the operations.

d. Strategic Positioning. The SANDF is willing to proactively establish a sound security environment, supported by influencing political and military foreign- relations actions, and the pre-placement of appropriate military capabilities.

CONCLUSION

25. Meeting the challenges of the role and functions of the SANDF in the next decade will entail the following:

a. Adopting an approach, which acknowledges that defence tasks are more diverse than the six functions listed above. The SANDF should, therefore, be prepared and capacitated to execute all ordered missions, which are subject to change over time.

b. In view of the constitutional imperative to defend South Africa, the maintenance of an appropriate conventional defence capability is a given. In the perceived absence of an immediate conventional threat, innovative applications of these capabilities in other higher profile missions should be developed, e.g. providing personnel with more than one skill and preparing units to act in more than one role.

c. Establishing and maintaining a robust suite of defence capabilities to enable the effective execution of any mission the SANDF might reasonably be called upon to execute.

d. The SANDF should only be employed within the means that Government is prepared to fund. Compliance with this principle is only possible if selective engagement in deployment is achieved through a process of consultation between the Minister of Defence (as advised by the C SANDF), and Cabinet.

e. In order to maintain the SANDF in the most economic, effective and efficient manner, the Reserve component of the SANDF must be given its rightful place. This implies involving the largest possible part of South African society in Defence matters (the "Citizen in Uniform" concept)

f. Implementing this policy through a comprehensive Defence Strategy, which, as one of its elements, should include a Military Strategy drafted by the Chief of the SANDF.