BRIEFING BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE MS SUE VAN DER MERWE, TO THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GOOD HOPE CHAMBER, CAPE TOWN, 01 JUNE 2005


INTRODUCTION

The UN Secretary General's Panel Report entitled "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", concluded that:


"Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and diseases by meeting the Millennium Development Goals".


The African continent is without doubt the continent most affected by poverty and underdevelopment and the connection between conflict and underdevelopment is more visible here than anywhere else. An analysis of countries in conflict or those that have recently emerged from conflict reveals a consistent pattern of low per capita income, absolute poverty, low life expectancy, low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development assistance (ODA) and often high levels of indebtedness. It is also clear that these countries are often rich in resources and strategically located. Placing Africa at the centre of the global development discourse is therefore critical.


That is why South Africa's foreign policy objectives are firmly anchored in an African Agenda, an agenda that is aimed at pushing back the frontiers of poverty and underdevelopment. The effects of conflict such as economic collapse, destruction of infrastructure, impoverishment of people, refugee flows and environmental degradation affect not only the countries and areas in conflict but also its neighbours and the continent as a whole. It has remained a major pre-occupation for our government to assist with the resolution of conflict and peace keeping where possible and within our capacity.


In this, the season of hope for the African continent, I would like to brief you today about some of the major developments in our efforts to bring peace and stability to our continent.


1. BURUNDI

    1. Background
      1. The Burundi peace initiative, initially led by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and later, after his passing on, by former President Mandela and now through the tireless efforts of Deputy President Jacob Zuma has resulted in the adoption of an Interim Constitution by the Transitional Government and the Burundian political parties.
      2. South Africa remains committed to the establishment of peace and security in the Great Lakes region and in playing a role post-conflict reconstruction programmes. The African Peace Mission in Burundi (AMIB) recapped as United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) must be credited for the return of stability in 95% of the country. As of 9 May 2005 the total SANDF troop contribution to Burundi (ONUB) was 1 297, including 376 VIP Protectors to the Africa Union Protection Force (AUPF). It is envisaged that a South African Observer Mission will participate in the monitoring of the elections.


1.2 Progress made towards elections

1.2.1 A regional Summit was held on 22 April 2005 in Kampala to pronounce on the possible extension of the Transitional Government due to the delayed elections. The Summit extended the term of office of the Transitional Government of Burundi to 26 August 2005, and also endorsed the following electoral calendar presented by the Chairman of the Burundi Independent Electoral Commission, Mr. Paul Ngarambe:
      1. The second phase in the Burundi peace process will be the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which will commence after the elections.
      2. The referendum on the Transitional Constitution that was delayed for months was finally held on 28 February 2005. A resounding "yes" vote where 91,63% of the registered voters endorsed a new power- sharing Constitution and indicated the willingness of the Barundi to end the civil war that ravaged the country and displaced the innocent people for years.
      3. South Africa provided logistical support to the Burundi Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) for the constitutional referendum held on 28 February 2005. An amount of RIO million has also been allocated from the African Renaissance Fund to the Burundi Peace Process. This allocation provided for election support and a South African Observer Mission to the legislative elections scheduled for 4 July 2005.
      4. A 20-member RSA Observer Mission is set to visit Burundi from 27 June - 9 July 2005 to monitor the elections. CENI also invited the Chair of the SA IEC to monitor the elections.
      5. Furthermore, in May the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), which had been feared would boycott the elections, indicated that its willingness to join the Burundi Peace Process.
      6. On 4 May 2005 President Ndayizeye signed a decree introducing specific measures to create a favourable atmosphere for the elections to take place in.
    1. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)
      1. Significant progress has been made with the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) in Burundi. Demobilised combatants have for example received vocational training to expedite the reinsertion process in their respective communities. The World Bank is providing US$ 84 million for this process.


1.4 Outstanding political issues

      1. Appointment of army, police and intelligence officers (CNDD-FDD) by President Ndayizeye which was scheduled for 13 May 2005;
      2. Resumption of participation in Cabinet meetings by CNDD-FDD ministers; and
      3. Inclusion of FNL in Burundi Peace Process.


1.5 Conclusion

      1. It would be important for South Africa, which contributed substantially to the Burundi Peace Process, to formulate its strategy for the post conflict reconstruction period so as to afford the Barundi to recoup the benefits of peace their country. In this regard it would be of vital importance to timeously identify suitable projects to promote peace, stability and development.


2. COTE D’IVOIRE

2.1 Background

2.1.1 On 28 March 2005 my colleague, Deputy Minister Pahad, briefed the United Nations Security Council on the progress being made by the AU mediation in resolving the crisis in Cote divoire. In his address, the Deputy Minister outlined the origins of the present conflict and leading up to the incident that precipitated South Africa's appointment as AU mediator. He also outlined the progress made since the mediation began in November 2004, as well as the outstanding issues, which were still obstructing the full implementation of the Road Map proposed by the AU mediation. The Deputy Minister confirmed that the three fundamental propositions of the mediation, namely:
      1. Following up on this address, President Mbeki hosted the key leaders of the Cote divoire on 3 April, including President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Diarra, and opposition leaders Mr Ouattara (RDR leader and former Prime Minister), Mr Konan Bedie (PDCI and a former lvorian President ousted in a military coup d'etat in December 1999), and Mr Soro (Forces Nouvelles). The outcome of this meeting was the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 6 April.
    1. Pretoria Agreement and its implementation
      1. In terms of the Pretoria Agreement, the parties committed themselves to an unequivocal and immediate ending of all hostilities in Cote divoire. The parties also reaffirmed their commitment to: (a) the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as well as Accra II and III; (b) the AU mediation Road Map; (c) UN resolutions on Cote D’ivoire; (d) the need for presidential elections in October 2005; (e) a respect for the sovereignty, independence, integrity and unity of Cote D’ivoire and (f) the creation of a climate conducive to lasting peace.
    1. Progress towards the elections
      1. On 13 April 2005, lvorian state television read the transcript of a letter from President Mbeki to the respective lvorian leaders concerning his determination on the issue of resolving the Section 35 issue, namely that:

        The lvorian Constitutional Council should accept the eligibility of the candidates that would be presented by the political parties that were signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
      2. Following this determination, President Gbagbo undertook a series consultations with the Young Patriots, women's groups, traditional chiefs, MPs and the military with a view to secure buy-in for the Pretoria Agreement and President Mbeki's determination regarding the issue of eligibility to the Presidency. All other lvorian signatories to the Pretoria Agreement undertook similar consultations. All the parties have since agreed to President Mbeki's determination and this can be regarded as a major turning point in the peace process.
      3. In a series of meetings on implementing the DDR process, the Chiefs of Staff of FANCI and the FAFN, together with Prime Minister Diarra met in Boauke on 14 and 16 April 2005. It was agreed that all heavy weapons would be withdrawn from the Zone of Confidence by 21 April 2005. In addition, the DDR process would commence officially the end of June 2005 and extend to 10 August 2005. This process is supported by a team of DDR experts from the SA National Defence Force. South Africa, in addition, is providing training for 120 close protectors for the New Forces.
      4. Any delay in disarmament will pose significant danger towards the implementation of the peace process. The pressure of the 30 October 2005 election deadline does not afford the lvorian government much time within which to complete the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and therefore it is critical that any delays (particularly delays in the DDR) are avoided.
      5. Any reoccurrence of violence could jeopardise the peace process. It is anticipated that both the UN and French (Licorne) peacekeeping forces will maintain their presence over the longer term to monitor the situation.
      6. During talks held on 18 May 2005 in Paris, an agreement was reached between the Rally of Republicans - RDR, the Democratic Party of Cote D'ivoire - PDCI, the Union for Democracy and Peace in Cote d'ivoire - UDPCI (founded by the former military General Robert Guei) and the Movement of Forces for the Future - MFA on the distribution of power in the event of an opposition win in the 30 October 2005 presidential polls. This agreement formalises an alliance between the opposition parties, which arose during the July 2004 Accra Summit. Although the deal does not provide for the naming of a consensus candidate, it does stipulate that candidates withdraw from the race after the first round in favour of the candidate with the majority vote. The opposition coalition pledged to support a single contender in the second run off polls. It is anticipated that Mr Ouattara (leader of the Rally of Republicans) and former Prime Minister Henri Konan Bedie (leader of the Democratic Party of Cote d'ivoire) will contest the elections.
      7. Cote d'ivoire has experienced many cycles of violence coupled with human rights violations etc. In addition, in view of the large immigrant community in the country, any eruption of violence could include elements of ethnic cleansing. This would not only have devastating consequences for the country but would also negatively impact Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso as they would likely be drawn into a regional conflict in light of the immigrant populations in Cote d'ivoire. Such a situation would also pose a threat towards Liberia's fragile peace process, which is meant to culminate in presidential and legislative elections in October 2005.
      8. The mandate and strength of the UN peacekeeping forces should change. The limited size and strength of the UN mission became evident after the events of November 2004, during which the lvorian armed forces killed French troops and the French responded by destroying the lvorian air force. These events also undermined the impartial stance of the French contingent and their presence is much opposed to by the loyalist and militia groups.
      9. The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General has recommended to the UNSC that the UNOCI should be increased by 2000 members. The mandate of the UN force should also be renewed for a longer period than the current one-month extensions.
    2. Conclusion
      1. Without doubt, the Pretoria Agreement represents a new hope for the lvorian people, who have long been yearning for a return to peace and stability in their country. It has indeed lent renewed impetus to the search for peace in la Cote d'ivoire. More than anything it has introduced a new sense of urgency in the implementation of previous undertakings.
  1. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)
    1. Background
      1. Since 1997, the DRC has been plagued by both intra and inter-state conflicts, which have resulted in the loss of over 3,5 million lives, mainly civilian, and left scores of others internally and externally displaced. South Africa's involvement in the DRC dates back to the latter half of the nineteen-nineties and the involvement of President Mandela and, at that time, Deputy President Mbeki in the negotiations on board the SAS Outeniqua.
      2. We have come a long way since then and have committed ourselves to assist within our means to contribute to the stabilisation of the DRC. As you are aware. South Africa's efforts to assist in the resolution of the conflict and in its subsequent peace process culminated in the signing in Pretoria of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, on 16 December 2002. At this crucial moment in the transitional process, the Transitional Government of the DRC requires our encouragement and support as it implements the remaining elements of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, most importantly with the conducting of free and fair elections.
    2. DRC roadmap
      1. In May 2004, President Joseph Kabila announced his roadmap of actions to be taken by the Transitional Government to organise elections by the agreed upon date. The greatest challenge facing the DRC at present is how to advance the elections, which must be held, according to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, within 24 months of the establishment of the Transitional Government, with two 6-month postponements permitted. Although some progress has been registered regarding the planning of voter identification and registration, it is crucial that outstanding legislation be passed expeditiously, and funds both from the DRC Government and international donors be availed for the conducting of the elections.
    3. South Africans assistance
      1. Pursuant to South Africa's commitment to assist the DRC to advance to elections in the second half of 2005 and with post-conflict reconstruction and development, our government departments are engaging their DRC counterparts on a series of issues, including governance and administration and defence and security.
      2. Logistical constraints and delays in passing the requisite electoral legislation have caused delay in the organisation of the elections for the initially scheduled date. Nonetheless, South Africa has offered assistance inter alia in the fields of election preparation (IEC), voter identification (Home Affairs), Police Training (SAPS), institutional capacity building (DPLG), public service audit and anti-corruption (DPSA), and the integration of the armed forces (SANDF).
      3. Substantial progress has been made with the conducting the first phase of the census of public servants in Kinshasa. An initial headcount has been completed, census questionnaires have been completed in respect of public servants and data is currently being captured on a database. A second headcount was planned for April, biometric information will be captured and temporary ID cards will be issued. The Kinshasa census should be completed by the end of June 2005.
      4. The second phase of the census, which will take place in the provinces, has begun and DPSA is assisting in this regard
    4. SA-DRC BNC
      1. I must also mention that beyond our conflict resolution efforts, we also have bilateral government-to-government engagements through the SA-DRC Binational Commission (BNC). Following the signing of the General Co-operation Agreement in Kinshasa in January 2004, which makes provision for the establishment of a BNC, the SA-DRC BNC was officially inaugurated by Presidents Mbeki and Kabila on 31 August 2004 in Kinshasa in the DRC. In accordance with the General Co-operation Agreement sectoral commissions, namely Politics and Governance, Defence and Security, Humanitarian and Social Affairs, and Finance, Economy and Infrastructure were established with technical committees.
      2. The second session of the SA-DRC BNC took place in Pretoria on 29 April 2005. At the conclusion of the BNC the following follow-up actions and progress were reported:
    1. Political outlook
      1. Concerning the DDR process, MONUC embarked on a forceful disarmament programme. Nine thousand and twelve (9012) fighters had voluntarily laid down arms by the end of March 2005 and a sizeable number were able to make use of reintegration programmes and jobs promised to them. More still needs to be done in this area to ensure that all combatants are disarmed and reintegrated into Congolese society. Within the SADC context, South Africa is working with the DRC and Belgian governments to create a new Congolese army.
      2. Following the announcement by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), on 31 March 2005, that they would unconditionally abandon the armed struggle and return to Rwanda, and following the passing of MONUC's deadline (I April 2005) for more than 15 000 militia to surrender their weapons to MONUC and DRC government forces (FARDC), approximately 12000 have entered the disarmament and reintegration process.
      3. The DRC Security Sector Reform is a major concern in the run-up to the elections. Loyalties to armed factions serve as an impediment to the extension of state authority/sovereignty over the entire country. The Mai-Mai militia and former rebels from RCD-Goma (Rally for Democracy of the Congo) have been blamed for renewed clashes between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in the north-eastern DRC.
      4. Many ex-militias have chosen to reintegrate in the communities, rather than military integration, since a stipend is offered for community reintegration. However, there is concern that once the stipend given to ex-militias to hand over arms is exhausted, the ex-combatants will be tempted to rejoin armed groups or engage in acts of banditry.
      5. MONUC remains concerned that while arms have been handed over, the militias have not provided full disclosure of details concerning heavy artillery in eastern DRC. This could result in further conflict should the reintegration process not be properly handled.
      6. A positive step forward in the area of military integration is an Agreement on the DRC's defence integration that was signed between South Africa and Belgium in Brussels in September 2004. The Ministers of Defence of Belgium, the DRC and South Africa met in Kinshasa on 12-14 December 2004 to discuss the integration of the FARDC. The SANDF has sent personnel and equipment to the DRC, in order to train and identify personnel for the new FARDC.
      7. As a result of electoral delays, the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, threatened to withdraw from the Transitional Government, claiming that progress with the implementation of the Global and All- Inclusive was proceeding too slowly.
      8. President Mbeki travelled to the DRC on 12 January 2005, following the outbreaks of violence, in order to attempt to prevent Mr Bemba's withdrawal. Subsequent discussions were held in South Africa, which proved successful in preventing the threatened withdrawal. Vice- President Bemba remains part of the Transitional Government.
      9. During his most recent visit to the DRC on 15-16 May 2005, President Mbeki discussed the state of preparation for the general presidential and parliamentary elections, and the issue of their postponement. He met with various role-players in the transition process, including Vice-Presidents; a prominent religious leader; Speaker of the National Assembly; representatives of political parties; representatives of Mai-Mai; representatives of civil society; and, a group of Congolese women. The following issues were raised in all the discussions with the stakeholders:
    1. Conclusion
      1. The DRC has embarked on an irreversible transitional process, albeit at a slower pace than required or anticipated. Continued support by the South African government is essential in sustaining and consolidating the reconstruction process. South African personnel continue to be deployed to the DRC. It is envisaged that general elections will take place by 31 December 2005, failing which a second 6-month postponement may be requested as provided. South Africa is actively assisting in the required logistical preparations. South Africa's financial assistance to the DRC remains a challenge that must be urgently addressed, if South Africa is to realise its objective of assisting the DRC achieve successful reconstruction and development. South Africa has made an initial contribution of approximately R25 million, which it secured through the African Renaissance Fund, to initiate South African governmental support in the DRC transitional process. This money will be used to leverage donations from other international partners.
  1. SUDAN
    1. Background
      1. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), marked the dawn of a new era in the Sudan. It brought hope to end one of the oldest conflicts on the African continent.
      1. South Africa's assistance
      1. In this regard, as part of our commitment to assist with the resolution of the conflict in the Darfur region, South Africa has deployed 39 Military Observers to the AU Mission in Sudan (Darfur), as well as 101 civilian police members, 241 protection force and around 350 armed military personnel, to strengthen the work of the AU in Darfur. However, more troops are expected to be deployed as Cabinet in its meeting of 28 April agreed to respond to the AU request to deploy more troops in Darfur.
      2. As Chair of the AU Sudan Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee, South Africa regards post-conflict reconstruction as of the utmost importance in peace missions. We will place a lot more emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction since it is evident that the continent is moving into a phase where post-conflict reconstruction will take centre-stage. In this regard, South Africa will also be promoting the role of NEPAD as a useful tool for reconstruction.
      3. The activities of the Post-Conflict Committee are continuing. Ministers from member countries of the Committee visited North and South Sudan 22 - 26 March 2005. Based on the findings of this visit, a Comprehensive African Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction in the Sudan, with clear and time-bound actions is being finalised, which will also be co-ordinated with reconstruction efforts funded by donor countries.
      4. The AU recognises the inevitable need for its Member States, though themselves poor and beset by challenges almost as daunting as Sudan's, to embrace our duty to fully assist our Sudanese sisters and brothers in the tasks that lie ahead.
      5. One of the first challenges in the implementation of CPA is development and institution building in South Sudan. To this effect, the DFA-SPLM/A-UNISA Capacity and Institution Building Project for South Sudan was launched on 5 February 2005 in South Sudan with the active participation of a large delegation of senior South African government officials, led by Deputy Minister Pahad, which was also the first orientation and training session of senior SPLM/A cadres.
      6. A further orientation/capacity building/training visit by a large SPLM delegation, led by the First and Second Vice Chairmen, took place in South Africa, 30 March - 8 April, during which the delegation interacted with a wide range of government and other relevant institutions. The SPLM/A group was placed in South African government departments as part of an experiential work programme. This and other capacity building exercises, which is aimed at supporting the CPA, will assist the SPLM/A in developing skills that would enable them to play a positive and meaningful role in a united Sudanese government.
      7. The training exercise raised an interest in the project not only among South African Government Departments but also internationally. This has been positive in that interest to fund the project has been raised by some donors. For example, Switzerland, through our Mission in that country, has requested a briefing on the project.
      8. Furthermore, South Africa through our Mission in Khartourn has received a request from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) to provide a two-week training exercise to senior official of the Police from both the GoS and the SPLM/A during the month of June.
      9. The second request came from the USAID, through our mission in Nairobi, to provide training to six Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) for legal professionals, who comprise the total staff of the Secretariat of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development. In addition to the above, the Mission in Khartourn reported that during the past week, it has been invited to meetings by various donor countries from the United Nations Development Programme to discuss the project.
    1. Challenges with the implementation of the CPA
      1. Unfortunately, the implementation of the CPA is already behind schedule. The Interim Constitution, which is required for the implementation of other provisions of the CPA should have been concluded by the end of March, but was delayed as the Government of Sudan (GoS), the SPLM/A) and the opposition forces could not agree on the formula for representation in the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC).
      2. After the signing of the CPA, many observers believed that the politics of exclusion witnessed during the Naivasha peace process would be corrected during the NCRC process. However, both the SPLM/A and the NCP have adopted the principle of "sufficient majority" and have made the assertion that any participation in the NCRC would be subject to endorsement of the CPA. Failure to adhere to that would disqualify the party’s nomination and participation in the NCRC process as well as any future elections. Thus the restrictive "bilateral" nature of the CPA with regard to the Constitutional process is proving to work against the all-inclusive (CODESA-type) approach towards democratisation in the Sudan.
    2. Current developments in Darfur
      1. Security situation

During the month of April there were comparatively few incidences of violence, however the security situation in Darfur still remains volatile. Reasons for insecurity are:
      1. Humanitarian Situation

        2. During the month of April the number of persons affected by the conflict rose to 2.45 million, including 1.86 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), according to the UN Office for the Co- ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

      2. Deployment of AMIS in Darfur

During its 28" meeting, the AU PSC decided to increase the number of troops in Darfur to a total of 6 171 military personnel and 1 560 civilian police personnel by the end of September 2005. This comes after the realisation that the current force of 2 372 is over-stretched to effectively implement its mandate.
  1. Conclusion
    1. Many challenges remain to be addressed but it is clear that substantive progress has been achieved in all these areas of conflict. We have progressed towards breaking the vicious circle of instability and underdevelopment not only through our joint efforts but also as a result of the willingness of a new generation of African leaders that are prepared to take responsibility for the destiny of the continent.
    2. Africa is, indeed, currently engaged in profound and fundamental processes of renewal. This is part of the second wave of democracy to sweep the continent in recent years beginning with the liberation of South Africa in 1994. The over-arching objective is to break the vicious cycle of political instability, poverty, and underdevelopment, as well as to strengthen Africa's capacity to defend and advance her interests in the global arena. The key building blocks of this strategy are increased political unity and concerted action through the AU, and accelerated socio-economic transformation through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is the AU' programme.