Honourable Members of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services

1. On 13 March 2005, two nurses namely Sister Mirriam Mahlope and Sister Kelebogile Kgarodi, who were on duty at the Emthonjeni Correctional Centre’s Hospital, were allegedly robbed, raped and seriously assaulted in the Hospital Section of Emthonjeni Correctional Centre. As soon as an alarm was raised by one of the nurses, members arrived at the scene and medical assistance was given to both the victims and they were subsequently taken to a private hospital which is near the institution.
   
2. Both nurses have been discharged from hospital. Ms Kelebogile Kgarodi, has been temporarily transferred to the Office of the Regional Commissioner: Gauteng and is already back at work. Although Ms Mirriam Mahlope has also recovered physically, she is still receiving counseling and has not yet returned to work.
   
3. Two offenders, namely Thabo Amos Masinga and Derrick Mgidi, were arrested shortly after the incident for allegedly committing these crimes. They last appeared in the Magistrate’s Court: Pretoria-North on 25 May 2005 on charges of attempted murder, rape and robbery. Their next court appearance date is 26 July 2005.
   
4. Following this incident, the Regional Commissioner appointed an Investigation Task Team to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the factors that enabled the commission of the security breaches. The Task Team was to submit proposals to institute corrective measures as well as to make recommendations pertaining to disciplinary steps if necessary.
   
5. The Task Team found, inter alia, that although both the offenders mentioned above (Masinga and Mgidi) made up the plan to attack the nurses, only Offender Masinga executed the plan. It was only Thabo Masinga who assaulted the two nurses, raped Sister Kelebogile Kgarodi and robbed both of them. It was found beyond doubt that Sister Mirriam Mahlope was not raped.
   
6. It appears as if Offender Thabo Masinga used the practice that was in use (where offenders were utilized to call other offenders for visits) to get out of the unit where they are detained to attend to family visits.
   
7. Offender Thabo Masinga took a sharpened wire with him and walked to the hospital section where he threatened the nurses, assaulted them and tied them up with their stockings. Offender Thabo Masinga also raped Ms Kelebogile Kgarodi.
   
8. On his way to the hospital section, Thabo Masinga was not searched or questioned about his motives of going to the hospital.

2. Summary of Findings:
1. Emthonjeni Correctional Centre started to operate as a youth correctional facility in 1999. The Centre was built by a private company, under the supervision of Africon on behalf of the Department of Public Works. The facility consists of five units (A, B, C, D and E) which are supported by a centralized hospital, multi purpose hall, a school, recreation hall, the workshop and a hall where other skills are learnt. Two open areas exist where outdoor sports activities are performed, such as soccer. The whole of the facility is managed from an administrative block.
   
2. The facility has an electric fence as an outside perimeter and all the security gates are controlled from controlling panels inside the units, central walkway and/or main control room. The facility was built with the specific purpose to manage it along the principles of unit management. The Centre has the potential to be among the best Centres in terms of a secure environment.
   
3. Emthonjeni Correctional Centre has a Norment Integrated Security System which excludes the use of keys in the facility. All gates are controlled by means of technology by members working in control rooms. There are seventy cameras (cctv) installed in the facility to manage the access of inmates and members in the facility. Coupled with the cctv’s are loudspeakers that are installed in strategic positions. Any person who would like to have access to a specific gate will have to buzz the member working at a control panel and after determining the identity of the person as well as the purpose of the access, the access gate would be opened.
   
4. Although there are some circuit cameras installed in the Hospital Section, they do not have the ability to cover all the areas in the section. The area in which Offender Thabo Masinga initially overpowered Ms Kelebogile Kgarodi is not serviced by a camera whilst the camera (No 31) facing the security gate at the Hospital Section, was out of order. Other cameras at the Hospital Section were also out of order. The rotation on the cameras in the Main Control Room would have, (even if it was recording) not been able to detect the incident.
   
5. No panic buttons were installed at the "secluded areas" such as the Hospital -, the Social Work – or the Educational Section. Even though these areas are supposed to be safe environments due to the Norment Integrated Security System, such incidents of 13 March 205 could have been prevented if such buttons were installed and in use.
   
6. At the time of the incident under discussion on 13 March 2005, several of the cctv’s were out of order or were not working properly. Besides the explanation of the status of the cctv’s, it was also determined that the access gates at the Central Walkway Control Panel could not be effectively managed by the main control room due to the absence of cctv’s at the panel. There is only one camera at this area in the panel, and it is directed to the door of the control panel where the member is working. No cameras exist at the different gates that lead from this panel.
   
7. Only loudspeakers serve this panel which can be used from the main control room. Due to the obvious security risk posed by the use of the loudspeakers only, the Management of Emthonjeni decided to utilize a member in the Centre Walkway Control Panel over weekends to control the access of inmates to and from the visiting area. It was at this very Central Walkway Control Panel that access was given to Offender Thabo Masinga to go to the hospital. The official who performed duty at the Central Walkway Control Panel did not assess/determine the validity of Offender Masinga’s presence in the hospital.
   
8. All the information gathered indicated that the access gate to the hospital was always left opened in the past. Almost all the statements of the members and inmates who were questioned on this matter agree thereto. The reason for this security breakdown, could not be explained by any official, including the Head of Emthonjeni and his assistant. In fact, by way of the statement of the Head of Emthonjeni Correctional Centre, it was practice to open all the gates from Gate 2 inwards to the facility during recreation time over weekends.
   
9. The investigating team found that, although the Norment Integrated Security System was able to record events on a 24-hour basis, the system was never used according to its full capacity due to: (a) lack of proper training; (b) lack of proper logistical support and planning.It was also found that the system installed at Emthonjeni is outdated to the extent that it is not a digital system but an analogue one. The systems at Malmesbury -, Goodwood - and Empangeni Correctional Centre have already being upgraded to digital systems. It is only the system at Emthonjeni that has not yet been upgraded.

1. Weaknesses related to Technology Support: Ineffective functioning and utilisation of technology support measures. Inadequate training of Correctional Officials on the optimal functions of the technology system installed. Technology maintenance measures unsatisfactory. The Central Walkway Control Panel cannot be effectively managed from the Main Control Room due to the fact that there are no cameras installed at the access gates leading to and from this panel;
   
2. Weaknesses related to officials: The members working in the Main Control Room were not performing their duties as expected from them. The access gate to the hospital was left opened which posed a serious security risk as was demonstrated by the incident of 13 March 2005. The Management of Emthonjeni Correctional Centre, with specific reference to the Head and Assistant Head of the Centre appeared not to have a hands-on approach as far as the management of security is concerned. They seem not to have a clear understanding of the role of the technology available to them in maintaining a secure environment within the facility. A further concern was that Management was not personally involved in ensuring that the maintenance of the systems are kept up to date; and the Norment Integrated Security System at Emthonjeni Correctional Centre is outdated and is in need of upgrading to minimize the costs of maintenance.
   
3. Even though members were informed about security measures during assemblies and by means of notices on the notice boards, no proof could be found that the Management of Emthonjeni was seriously involved in the monitoring of the instructions to sharpen up the security arrangements of the facility. The failure to close the access gate at the Hospital Section can serve as an example to this statement. The only deduction that can be made is that some of the members working at Emthonjeni were not committed to perform their duties according to prescribed rules and regulations.
   
4. Managerial Weaknesses: The Management of the facility was not having a hands-on approach to ensure the effective running of the institution. Several journals which have been perused, confirmed the understanding and deduction as set out above that members at Emthonjeni were ignorant of their expected work performance. It was also found that the Head and Assistant Head of Emthonjeni Correctional Centre were informed by female officials (including one of the victims, Sister Mirriam Mahlope) that they are not working under safe circumstances. The information given to Management was never regarded as serious enough to introduce measures to create a safe environment. The policy pertaining to the detention of offenders in Youth Centres dictates that offenders should be transferred to facilities where adult offenders are detained once they have reached the age of 21 years: Provided that the detention of such offenders may be prolonged until the finalization of a specific programme or educational course. Offender Thabo Masinga’s date of birth is 19 December 1983, whilst Offender Mgidi was born on 10 February 1984. This means that both of these inmates were older than 21 years on the date of the incident on 13 March 2005. No proof could be found that they were engaged into educational and/or other programmes that could have prevented their transfer to a correctional facility where adult offenders are being detained. Both inmates should have been transferred to facilities which housed adult offenders.
   
5. Weaknesses of a wider context: At the time of the investigation the Centre had 135 officials 49 of the officials were females. It is consequently expected from these female officials to perform the same duties as their male counterparts. The danger arises when female officials have to work on one-to-one basis with male offenders. The mixing of male and female officials is in itself still manageable though it is fast proving a major burden to male officials in other management areas as well.

1. Corrective measures pertaining to the two offenders who allegedly committed the crimes as well as the inmate that misused his position of trust and assisted Offender Masinga to get out of his unit be immediately instituted;
   
2. Implementation of a new system of escorting inmates to- and from visits to replace the so-called "runners" (who are offenders) that were used;
   
3. Members working at the visitors’ room over weekends will be placed on a semi-permanent basis and adequate training provided;
   
4. Disciplinary steps to be taken against members who acted negligently in the incident;
   
5. A permanent member be utilized at the Centre Walkway Control Panel, during the week as well as over weekends as interim measure whilst revisiting of the post establishment of the centre is awaited, To further compliment this process, members will make use of two way radios to enhance the communication between the visiting room and the units/court yards;
   
6. CCTV’s be installed at the Central Walkway Control Panel to ensure effective monitoring of officials and members entering and leaving this panel;
   
7. Measures be put in place to upgrade the standard of searching as well as the frequency thereof;
   
8. Strategies be formulated to facilitate the utilisation and placement of female officials in the workplace.
   
9. The installation of panic buttons at all the secluded areas where female officials are working be installed as a matter of priority;
   
10. Follow-up on the progress of the repair on the breakages be done on a daily basis. Added to the progress report, it is important that an action plan be developed to ensure the implementation of the Maintenance Plan on the Norment System.
    
11. The Norment Integrated Security System is not a digital system but an analogical one. The matter be referred to Head Office for consideration of upgrading the system at Emthonjeni to a digital system. This will have to include the installation of a monitor, to assist in the playback of recordings from the Security System;
    
12. All duty sheets, including duty sheets for the weekends, must be updated and checking and controlling measures put in place in this regard;
    
13. The procedure in identifying of offenders who reach adulthood be aligned to ensure that they are transferred timeously to other institutions once they turn 21 years; provided that this period may be extended until the completion of programmes and/or educational courses;
    
14. Both the Head and Assistant Head of Emthonjeni Correctional Centre must be brought before a disciplinary hearing to explain their lack of commitment in managing Emthonjeni Correctional Centre, and where applicable be reassigned.
    
15. Regional
    

The following progress has been made pertaining to the decisions made:

1. A new contract has been awarded to Sondolo IT who will have to install two additional cameras (cctv’s) at the Central Walkway Control Panel;
   
2. The same company will be responsible for the upgrading of the Norment Integrated System into a digital system with the capacity to record and play the recorded events back on DVD. Part of the specifications of the contract include the efficient training of officials to operate the system in full. The contract of installing and upgrading of the system should be completed by March 2006;
   
3. Panic buttons have already been purchased and the delivery is awaited;
   
4. The rotation of personnel at Baviaanspoort Management Area which includes Emthonjeni Correctional Centre, is also nearly finalized;
   
5. The appointment of Chairpersons and initiators to finalize the disciplinary process is nearly completed;
6. Security breakdowns have been attended to;
   
7. The maintenance of the Norment Integrated Security System, as long as it is still in place, will be followed up frequently;
   
8. Other administrative measures, such as the transfer of offenders at the age of 21 years, updating of duty sheets, amendment of post establishments, contingency plans and effective management of the weekend duty list, are either finalized or are the in the final stages of finalization; and
   
9. Case studies are in the process of compilation for distribution to other management areas to ensure that lessons learnt can be effectively used to prevent similar incidents in future. In the process, the clear message will go out that female officials should not be working alone with male inmates in remote areas.
   
10. The Regional Commissioner has completed phase one of training Area Commissioners and Heads Correctional Centres on the improvement of security, managerial effectiveness and improving effectiveness of work units. A second phase has already been initiated where Area Commissioners and Heads of Correctional Centres are required to train employees based on detailed guidelines provided by the Regional Commissioner.
    
11. The Regional Commissioner assigned Deputy Commissioner Mr Mandla Mkabela to temporarily take charge of the Baviaanspoort Management Area, to assess the overall security and administration of the Management Area, and to rectify on the spot those areas that could be immediately rectified.
    
12. An experienced Area Commissioner has been transferred to Baviaanspoort as the Management Area had suffered frequent changes of Area Commissioners in the past, partly resulting in lowering of good governance.
    

5. End of report

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