REPORT TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECURITY BREACH AT PRETORIA CLOSE MAXIMUM SECURITY CENTRE: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

17 NOVEMBER 2004

The purpose of this report is to inform the Select Committee on the security breach on Sunday 7 November 2004 in Pretoria C Max that resulted in the death of four people.

Pretoria C Max is a custody centre that is housing 211 sentenced inmates and 43 unsentenced inmates. The centre's kitchen is maintained with help of 19 inmates who are classified as medium security risks and therefore not C Max inmates. The centre has an establishment of 152 posts and an actual staff total of 133 DCS employees.

SECURITY BREACH: 7 NOVEMBER 2004-11-15

In the late morning of Sunday 7 November 2004 five inmates of Pretoria C Max attempted to hold hostage DCS Correctional Officials who were on duty on that particular section. The inmates were armed with a loaded pistol.

At the time of the attempted hostage taking with the intention of escaping, the Head of the Pretoria C Max - the late Mr Samson Gomba and an Acting Pretoria Area Co-ordinator for Corrections the late Mr AB Ndinisa were both on a working visit to the section. The two senior officials upon being confronted by the inmates refused to obey their instructions and instead tried to disarm them.

The inmate who was armed fired shots that took the lives of both officials. Mr S Gomba was certified dead in hospital a little later.

After the killing of the two officials it became clear to the five inmates that they were not going to be able to escape as they had planned. A disagreement arose between the five inmates with two refusing to associate themselves with the shooting incidents and according to the DCS officials who were held hostage, at least one DCS official had his life saved by the two inmates who were opposing their associates from going on with killings.

Three inmates including the one who was the gunner decided they must shoot themselves and take their own lives, as their sentences were too long anyway. The problem they had was that they were only left with two rounds of ammunition whereas those who wanted to die were three. Two of them then put their heads together and asked their friend to shoot them hoping to kill two with one bullet. As it happened only one inmate died and the other had a minor wound on the cheek. The gunner then shot himself and died.

SAPS INVESTIGATIONS

As murder is a criminal case, it is primarily the responsibility of the SAPS. The Department of Correctional Services has allowed SAPS investigators to continue with their investigations and has not received written reports from them. It is our understanding that detailed accounts of what happened, how and why will come out into the open in a court of law.

The Department of Correctional Services has its own internal investigation but this work has to follow the SAPS work which leads to prosecution. The internal investigation of the DCS is looking into wider issues.

Based on the SAPS investigation, we can confirm that an employee of DCS at Pretoria C Max has been arrested and charged with several counts related to organising the tragic incident. We can also confirm that the SAPS identified the owner of the weapon that was used on the same day of the incident. SAPS officials have confirmed that the three inmates who remained have been co-operating with the SAPS.

DCS SECURITY MEASURES

Following a similar escape attempt in June 2004, some security changes were effected in Pretoria C Max. These included the prohibition of handbags and parcels from passing beyond the first entry point of Pretoria C Max. The searching staff at the entry point was also increased. However, the biggest security weakness was the profile of personnel serving in Pretoria C Max. These personnel were not replaced.

After this latest security breach with tragic consequences, immediate measures have included the total overhaul of personnel staffing the first entry point and placement of officials from the Emergency Support Team of the Department. Other measures are currently underway and are of a sensitive and operational nature and will be known upon their implementation either by end of November or in December 2004.

The top management of the six geographic regions of the DCS met on Tuesday 16 November 2004 under the chairpersonship of the Commissioner and identified security measures that must be effected across the country in the short term to improve security. More comprehensive security measures are to be implemented over a longer period informed by a set of security

guidelines known as Minimum Security Standards.

In the carrying out of the function of security the ultimate test for DCS is its ability to perform this function without being compromised by security breaches. The DCS does have a security system but the current system has not kept up with the changing security environment and challenges facing the Department as outlined in the Correctional Services Act, 1998 (Act III of 1998) and the

Departmental White Paper.

The current security system follows a general approach and security

measures are not deliberately talking to, and supporting, one another. This situation leads to much unevenness and inconsistency in the application of security measures per security function which further impedes the ability of the DCS to correctly identify the nature of security breaches and the cost effective allocation of resources to the security functions where they are most needed.

Security services in any organized security environment such as the DCS must be rendered at predetermined levels of standard depending on the value attached to the function "prize" protected, known or assumed threats as well as the impact of such threat being successfully carried out. Security measures that are predetermined and deliberately set at levels of quality are referred to as "minimum standards" for that institution of security.

The purpose of Minimum Security Standards (MSS) in a modem correctional environment can be described as a holistic, coordinated and synchronized approach to security based on a thorough understanding of the security challenges facing correctional centres.

A need has been identified for the DCS security system to be directly informed by the security challenges we face. Clear and predictable security measures and standards make it easy to identify and understand where and when security breaches occur. Clear pillars of security are vital when it is necessary to address security breaches enabling the DCS to clearly identify which pillar/s of security have been breached in each particular security incident, as well as how and why such a security breach took place.

In the MSS five key pillars of security have been identified which are supporting one another and when operating together constitute our security system. Each of these pillars must be put under serious scrutiny in any institution whenever a security breach has occurred. The pillars of security in the Minimum Security Standards are:

Pillar 1 - Personnel Security measures

It is vital that the role of personnel in effective security must be clearly defined. An institution may have the best of physical and procedural measures in place but if the staff are grossly negligent or colluding in crime no amount of security measures will help and the security system will not be effective. The DCS has started planning and developing its internal "Integrity Verification System"

which will be used to identify criminals within the DCS and also to prevent criminals from getting employment in DCS. A draft institutional policy for the establishment of such an Integrity Verification System is currently being internally consulted.

Pillar 2 - Physical Security measures

Physical security measures such as walls, fences, access and exit control points, etc. form the very first line of our defence against the threat of escapes. These physical measures must, however, be directly proportional to abilities and threats posed by the subject of protection - in our case the ability and risk offenders at a specific centre posed.

Pillar 3 - Technological Security measures

Technological security measures such as CCTV are a very important and useful in any security system to assist security personnel and managers in the effective performance of their security tasks. Technologies are also very effective to support investigations into security breaches. It just, however, be emphasized that technological measures alone are very expensive and have limitations. It is important therefore that these must be utilized as part of a range of security measures (pillars) and not as stand alone measures.

Pillar 4 - Information Security Management

Information management allows for the cost effective deployment of all security measures. When this measure is under-utilized, implementation of other security measures tends to be either too low or too high compared with the nature and source of the threat. Accurate information about the threat is the key to informed decisions and the extent of utilization of all other resources of security. There must be a reliable system of collecting, verifying and reporting or utilisation of information about the threats in support of decision making.

Pillar 5-Procedural Security measures

It is important for any security system to be backed by a set of clear and concise security procedures to guide staff in the day to day execution of their security duties. Given the restrictive nature of the correctional environment, the security controls in a correctional centre have to be tight. Procedural security measures such as regular patrols, frequent searches of cells, inmates

and other persons entering or leaving correctional facilities must be clearly regulated and the procedures must spell out the circumstances in which such methods are to be used and the manner in which they are to be conducted. We are certain that as we begin to implement security measures informed by these five pillars of security, security breaches will be minimised and

ultimately eliminated. Such an holistic approach to security will enable a clear recognition of the

strengths and weaknesses from one Management Area to another and depending on the nature of the threat various strategies such as for example the further strengthening of stronger pillars to compliment less strong pillars of security can be implemented. It will also allow for the flexible management of resources taking into account the nature of the threat against the availability of

resources. The introduction of MSS will also enable the DCS to enhance its ability to effectively monitor, control and manage the quality and intensity of security measures.

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