The trends that informs the international security environment as identified in the draft of this chapter will firstly be reviewed with the following considerations:

- A re-sequencing of these trends to reflect the order of priority from a South African and DOD perspective;

- The removal of loaded terms such as ‘failed or failing states’, while retaining the issues of International Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction with revised descriptions of these international security issues to reflect the concerns / inputs raised by the PCD and civil society; and

- The inclusion of a sound and comphrensive "threat analysis" with an emphasis on a future assessment.

In addressing the implications that these issues of a changed strategic environment has for the DOD, greater emphasis will indeed be given to the role of peace missions within government policy in general and defence policy in particular.

Issues raised by the PCD and civil society that have already been included in this chapter include the following:

- A conceptualisation of Security that articulates an integration and balance of human security with military or state security. (maybe this part needs to be moved to the next chapter).

- Requirement of DOD to advance regional and continental security regimes and arrangements, in compliance with government policy;

- Need to operationalise the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and deepen the AU’s security capabilities; and

- The need to expand early warning and intelligence capability on both a national and continental level.

Issues that were not considered and will be incorporated into this chapter include the following:

- To outline the commitments and responsibilities for South Africa and the DOD, in particular, in the operationalisation of regional and continental security regimes and arrangements; and

- To list the key agreements (bilateral, multilateral or trilateral) signed since the 1996 WP was written, and indicate the DOD’s responsibilities to uphold and capacity to service, them. Hence a need for a twin component of the chapter titled: Defence Diplomacy.

As expressed by the PCD and civil society, this chapter will explain the following:

- South Africa’s implied National Security Policy;

- The DOD’s role within an intergovernmental working group that is charged with the formulation of a National Security Strategy;

- The need for a "National Peace and Stability Strategy" that integrates ‘traditional’ state security with ‘human’ security concerns;

- Expanding on the move towards a defensive posture that prioritises confidence building within the region;

- Explaining the implications that the National Security Policy has for the DOD;

- Devolving the above chapters into a coherent set of defence policy implications; and

- The role of the DOD within both security structures and key agreements.

The draft of is chapter has already identified and included the following issues raised by the PCD and civil society:

• The need to revisit the distinction between primary and secondary roles to justify a continued focus and priority to functions that were deemed to be of a collateral nature, in particular participation in peace missions. Hence the ‘Missions-based Approach’ – need to be explained; and
• The need to integrate peace missions within broader human security and civilian orbit; (see draft chapter three, section on conceptualisation of collective security);

Issues that were identified by the PCD and civil society and will be included in a revised chapter include the following:

• With regards to the implications for the DOD in placing greater emphasis on peace missions, this chapter will seek to articulate the need to provide specific equipment and personnel for participation in peace missions (this will be explained in greater detail in the next chapter); and
• Identification of key military strategic objectives and resultant anticipated missions.

This chapter provides answers to the following questions:

• How does the DOD propose striking a balance for the funding and planning for such functions as conventional deterrence and peace missions?
• Will the increased emphasis on peace missions adversely affect the retention of the SANDF’s conventional deterrence capability?
• Does the SA Army (and other Services and Divisions) possess the requisite resources and equipment to undertake expanding peace missions given that within the current African context peace missions are "primarily a landward-based endeavour".
• Provide a costed framework of required defence capabilities, linked to the military strategic objectives and anticipated missions.

This chapter explores both Human Resources as well as Materiel Resources. With the ambit of Human Resources issues that have already been identified for their inclusion into this chapter are as follows:

• The progress of transformation and an assessment of representivity targets;
• The status of Human Resource Strategy 2010 and its implementation;
• The need for an accurate assessment of required force levels for both the regular and the reserve force;
• The issue of Veterans and the implementation of the Veterans Act (But suggest a separate policy process to deal with this);
• The status of the Reserves and the need for them to be revitalised;
• The need for a scientific assessment to determine the impact of HIV/Aids on the combat readiness of troops;
• Progress in implementation of civic education within the DOD;
• The need to restructure the Service Corps as part of an overall demobilisation strategy; and
• The need for an independent Grievance procedure within the DOD.

Issue under human resources that would have to be considered are:

• The extent to which Reserves are being considered for deployment in peace missions.

Regarding Materiel Resources, the following issues will be considered.

• The importance of retaining and developing Defence Industrial Technological capabilities (But suggest a separate policy process to deal with this);
• The need to examine the control regime that governs the transfer of technology and defence materiel.
• The need to examine possible arenas where efficiency improvement and savings can be effected within the DOD; and
• The need to consider defence conversion issues in particular base closure and land restitution

This chapter undertakes to firstly provide:

• An introduction of new legislation, in particular the Defence Act 2002, that prescribes defence governance structures;
• An explanation regarding the creation of an Integrated Head Office;
• An explanation in the creation and functioning of the Integrated Governance structures and the Cluster System, and moreover to articulate the role and participation of the DOD within these structures; and
• An explanation on the creation and functioning of structures and institutions of accountability.

Secondly this Chapter provides:

• An examination of the South African model of civil-military relations and the relevant structures responsible for its implementation inclusive of the Executive and Legislature;
• An overview of political control mechanisms;
• An overview of administrative control mechanisms, within the context of the Defence vote, Defence Programme and Budget and Defence reporting process;
• Accountability relationships, namely:

1. SCOPA
2. Auditor General
3. Audit Committees
4. National Treasury