REVIEWING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND THE DEFENCE REVIEW : TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE 21st CENTURY
1. AIM
The aim of this draft policy document is to outline the position of the Portfolio Committee on Defence on the review of both the South African White Paper on Defence (1996) and the South African Defence Review (1998). It seeks to highlight the key strategic challenges, which confront the South African national defence function in the 21st century and the extent to which these should be reflected in a review of the White Paper and the Defence Review.
2. KEY PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER AND THE DEFENCE REVIEW
The key premises underpinning the DoD's desired operational and human resource capabilities as outlined in both the Defence White Paper and the Defence Review are the following:
a. That the defence posture of the country should be primarily defensive (strategically defensive and operationally offensive) and that this should be reflected in strategy, doctrine and tactics. This marked a significant shift, in theory at least, away from the previous regime's doctrine of "Offensive Defence". Budgetary realities, however, had effectively forced South Africa's defence posture into a defensive mode - the creation of a defensive posture by default in effect.
b. The primary function of the national defence function would be to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that budgetary allocations should reflect this prioritization.
c. That a Core Force capability be maintained whereby the SANDF would have the ability to deal with a range of contingencies in the short to medium term and the ability to expand to appropriate levels in the medium-to long term should the threat scenario change significantly (the latter presupposing accurate intelligence of course).
d. That the SANDF would be responsible for executing a range of additional secondary functions if so ordered into service and provided the requisite finances were made available. These functions were identified as being regional security co-operation, international peace support operations, co-operation with the South African Police Services in the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and a variety of non-military tasks (maritime protection, air space and traffic control, disaster relief, maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, VIP air transport, Antarctic transport support, hydrographic services, medical services, and government communication security services).
e. The SAN DF had to be a balanced force - in terms of capabilities rather than balance between the budgets and force levels of the Arms of Service - in order to allow itself the ability to meet and cater for a wide range of contingencies.
f. A variety of transformational human resource programmes needed be instituted within the SANDF to ensure that the armed forces were capable of responding to the challenge5 of the new millennium. These included Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action programmes, Civic Education Programmes, Demobilization strategies, and programmes designed to enhance the role of the part time forces in the defence human resource equation
The focus on the Primary function was reflected in the final force design, which both parliament and cabinet approved in the form of a first report of the Defence Review in 1997 Initially four force design Options were proposed (DR, 1998, page 47) was chosen. Option 1 was finally approved by Cabinet although acknowledgement was made of the "ideal" vision enshrined in Option 2 (see Appendix 1).
A second report detailing the force structure required for the Department of Defence of the future Head Office organization and support structures), its human resource requirements, the role of the Reserve Force, the acquisition process and land and environment considerations was also tabled and approved by both parliament and Cabinet in May 1998 and the Defence Review was finally tabled in parliament as a composite document on the 22 May 1998.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGED STRATEGI C ENVIRONMENT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FUNCTION DURING THE 21st CENTURY.
White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review: 1995 - 1998
Both the White Paper on Defence (WPD) and the Defence Review (DR) contain a series of observations about the changed strategic environment within which South Africa found itself in the immediate years following the democratic elections of 1994. It must be borne in mind that these observations were made almost a decade ago and hence reflect the strategic realities that pertained in the country, the region and the international environment at the time.
These observations included the following:
a. The advent of democracy in South Africa and the requirement for South Africa to play an active role in regional and international for a.
b. The non-aggressive stance of South Africa towards the region (unlike the stance of previous governments - most notably the P.W. Botha administration).
c. The reorientation of security thinking towards "new thinking in security"(more commonly referred to as the "human security agenda" in the 21st century). The primary source of insecurity, both documents argue, remain non-military by nature (under-development, poverty, disease etc).
d. The changing nature of conflicts globally - a shift from inter-state conflict towards intra-state conflict.
e. The growing role of the UN Security Council in the resolution of conflicts particularly via the medium of peace missions.
f. The need for South Africa to play a more active role in regional security arrangements within the SADC region. Towards this end it would encourage a "common security" approach towards its regional security arrangements.
g. Domestic security, it observed, had improved dramatically since the pre-1994 period. Crime and poverty, however, remained enduring problems within South Africa and required strategies to address them.
Department of Defence (DoD) perspective: 2004
In its presentations to the Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD) in the DoD identified a range of new factors of a non-traditional security nature in the strategic environment that have a bearing on the management of the national defence function. Amongst others these included the following:
a. The emergence of International Terrorism.
b. The possession of weapons of mass destruction by various states.
c. The phenomenon of "failed states" as a source of insecurity to the international community.
d. The use of force in a unilateral manner by major states in the international arena.
e. The enduring phenomenon of intra-state conflict.
f. The ongoing problem surrounding the use of mercenaries.
g. The pervasive problem of under-development and poverty at a regional, sub-regional and national level on the African continent.
h. The emergence of the African Union (AU) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the African continent and South Africa's leadership roles therein as mechanisms to anticipate and manage crises on the continent.
i. The strengthening of the conflict management institutions within SADC-most notably the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) - as processes whereby sub-regional crises can be managed.
j. The twin problems of crime and HIV/AIDS that to continue to affect domestic security within South Africa.
Portfolio Committee on Defence Perspectives 2004
The PCD acknowledges that the strategic environment of the 21 century has changed from that of the mid-i 990 period. Although these changes have not been as dramatic as those characterizing the end of the Cold War and the advent of democracy in south Africa they do, nevertheless, have implications for the management of South African Government policy in general and South African defence policy in particular.
Whilst the PCD acknowledges the new range of strategic factors identified by the DoD ii feels that the following issues need to be clarified and/or introduced into the reappraisal of the current strategic environment:
a. A number of the threats identified by the DoD need to be unpacked in more detail and their implications for defence policy elaborated more clearly. Many of these terms are "loaded" and admit to different interpretations depending on their political usage. Such terms include the following
1. International terrorism is a phenomenon of the international landscape but who qualifies as an "international terrorist" and what pro-active measures need to be adopted to address this differs from state to state. An objective definition of this term is required if the South African defence community is to respond honestly to this phenomenon. It is also not clear what the responsibility of the DoD is in dealing with this phenomenon, as the anticipation of terrorism and the countering of this phenomenon remains the primary responsibility of the intelligence community and its law enforcement agencies.
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are frequently cited as a source of global instability. Implicit in this argument, however, is the belief that (WMD) in the hands of the West European and North American states do not constitute such a threat and that those weapons held in the hands of non-NATO states do constitute such a threat.
There is little evidence, notwithstanding the ongoing assertions by the West that WMD are a threat to global security, that this threat is anywhere near the proportions suggested by these countries. Neither is it self-evident that weapons have fallen into the wrong hands by individuals who intend using them for their own political purposes
The argument regarding the existence of WMD has also been used to justify the invasion of countries (Iraq and Afghanistan) in violation of international law and contrary to multi-lateral international approaches towards conflict resolution with serious consequences for sub-regional and international security.
3. The phenomenon of "failed states" has been identified by both defence practitioners and governance experts since the early 1990s as constituting a non-military threat to domestic and regional security.
Whilst many states internationally possess weak structures, have poor governance records and are frequently wracked by intra-state conflict, it is not always apparent how these states contribute to global instability. Indeed, it is often strong states that constitute such a threat to regional and global security.
b. Non-military threats and the emergence of a broader human security agenda are seen cited as part of the new security architecture in a range of different government policy documents in the 21st century. The Review of the DWP and the DR needs to expand on the following.
1. In 2000 a National Security Council was established but no national security strategy existed at the time. The DoD is part of an intergovernmental working group investigating the formulation of a national security strategy. What is the role of the DoD in this process and how will this national security strategy related to both defence policy and defence strategy.
2. To what extent is the process of formulating a national security strategy take into the account the broader definition of human security? Would it not be more appropriate, to depart from Cold War terminology, to call such a strategy a National Peace and Stability strategy in light of the expanded definition of security in the 21~ century
c. The WPD calls for the adoption of a common approach to security (WPD, Chapter 3, ages 14 - 5). The concept of common security is based on the adoption of a range of Confidence and Security Building Mechanisms and measures that seek to address the fears of weaker states in various sub-regions by building trust in these regions. SADC has, however adopted a collective security arrangement 'via the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security that is known as the Mutual Defence Pact. Collective security differs from common security in that is focuses on the reciprocal responsibilities of member states to one another the event of an attack on these countries by forces external to the sub-region.
The Review of the WPD and the DR needs to outline the responsibilities structures and procedures whereby this would work and the responsibility of the DoD in this equation.
d. South Africa has played a prominent role in the establishment of the AU's Peace and Security Council and the NEPAD peace and security strategy. What are the contents of these strategies in broad outline and what commitments are expected from South Africa and the DoD in executing these responsibilities (commitments to the Africa Standby Force for example)?
e. The WPD mentions a range of international commitments, which South Africa has towards various international treaties, protocols and conventions (PD, Chapter Seven, pages 28 - 31). In the time that has elapsed since the drafting of the WPD it has also signed a range of other international agreements. The WPD and the DR need to list these key agreements and indicate their capacity to service and uphold them. Examples of new political commitments, include the following:
1. Reinstatement of full membership status in the United Nations;
2. Admission as member of the Conference on Disarmament;
3. Readmission into the Commonwealth of Nations
4. Admission into the Non-Aligned Movement and current Chairperson (2001-2003).
5. Admission as member of the Organization of African Unity and first chair of the African Union;
6. Founding member of the New Partnership for African Development;
7 Admission as member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
South Africa is also been signatory to the following arms control and disarmament protocols and agreements:
1. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Cases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol);
2. Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention);
3. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War;
4. Antarctic Treaty;
5. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty);
6. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty);
7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
8. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty);
9. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;
11. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
12. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects;
13. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;
14 African Nuclear-Weapons- Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba);
15. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; and
16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction.
4. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
White Paper on Defence and Defence Review perspectives: 1996 - 1998
The White Paper on Defence outlines the broad principles and values upon which South Africa's civil-military relations will be structured. It examines such issues as the following.
a. Constitutional provisions governing civil-military relations (CMR).
b. The authority and powers of the different branches of government in ensuring military subordination to civil authority ranging from the powers of the President, the legislature, the Minister of Defence, the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force.
c. It examines the roles and responsibilities of government to the armed forces and vice versa.
d. It examines the DoD's relations with civil society.
The DR, however, outlines the proposed organizational structure of the DoD in more detail. The following recommendations made in the DR (Force Structure, chapter 9), which have a bearing on CMR, are pertinent and need to be revisited. These include the following:
a. The establishment of an integrated Head Office whereby certain functions would be shared between the C/SANDF and the Secretary for Defence (Force Structure, Chapter 9, pages 53 - 53). The rationale for this is to ensure better civilian-military interaction within the Head Office, avoid duplication of costs and provide for more effective spending of DoD monies.
b. The DR outlines the proposed Force Structure of the DoD (DR, Chapter Nine) with regard to command and control, corporate responsibilities and even location of individual units.
Department of Defence perspectives: 2004
The DoD has indicated that they would examine the organizational changes that have occurred since the inception of the Secretariat and the separation of the offices of the CISANDF and the Defence Secretary.
Portfolio Committee on Defence Perspectives: 2004
The PCD proposes that the following areas be examined in the chapter on CMR/Defence Governance:
a. The rationale behind the failure by the DoD to act on the recommendations in the DR for the creation of an integrated Head Office.
b. The PCD is aware that certain functions within the Head Office are in the process of being integrated and proposes that migration path for this process be outlined in more detail within the Review of the Review.
c. The extent to which the civilization process of the Defence Secretariat has proceeded apace and the challenges faced in managing this process.
d. A high level of interaction and integration exists between the activities of the national security community and the diverse national security policy processes and parliament and government. This is markedly different from the pre-1990 period where parliament's role in the management of the national security function was largely marginalized, where the policy capabilities of civilian government departments where under-developed and where a strong tradition of departmental autonomy prevailed.
The tasking of the armed forces if and when they are required to be employed either within or without the territory of South Africa. The coordination of security and defence policies and activities within the broader sphere of government policy and business. This is accomplished, at a Ministerial level, via the six new Sectoral Clusters that are co-ordinated by the Cabinet Secretariat within the OP. These clusters consist of Governance, Economy and Employment, Peace and Stability, International; affairs and Defence, and Social.
The DoD interacts mainly with two of these clusters - the International Relations and Defence Cluster (where defence plays a supportive role to government's diverse foreign policy initiatives) and the Peace and Stability Cluster (where defence plays a supportive role to the internal efforts aimed at securing peace and stability within South Africa - most notably its role in supporting the SAPS). The PCD proposes that the activities of the DoD in these arenas be outlined in more detail and their implications for civil-military relations expanded upon.
5. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS THE WPD AND THE DR
The WPD and the DR:1996 - 1998
Both the Defence Review and the DWP maintain that the primary role of the SANDF is:
" to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary" (WPD, Chapter Four, page 16)
The fact that this position was adopted at the time of the drafting of the WPD and the DR reflected a political compromise whereby the new government sought to extract the SAN DF from more manifestly political functions and the SAN DF sought to focus on its more traditional roles and tasks.
In terms of this position other defence functions such as participation in peace missions, support to the police, participation in regional security missions and humanitarian assistance are to be executed with the collateral utility (the spare capacity) of the SAN DF. This meant in effect that the planning and budgeting for the force was focused on the ability of the force to provide the country with conventional deterrence capabilities. This was reflected in the final force design, which was approved, by the DoD and the equipment, which was attached to this force design.
The WPD and the DR also stated the following regarding the other roles and functions of the DoD:
a. It saw DoD participation in Peace Missions as being limited.
b. It saw DoD participation in Support to the Police as being of a temporary nature with a phased withdrawal of the SAN DF from this role.
The DoD's Perspective: 2004
The DoD acknowledges that the changed strategic environment demands a more flexible approach to the 'rigid primary and secondary" concepts of the Defence Review (DoD briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Defence, Cape Town, 12 October 2004). It also recognizes that South Africa's foreign policy commitments will require a greater investment in peace missions as evidenced by the country's commitment to contributing forces to the SADC Brigade of the African Standby Force.
A reappraisal of the roles and functions of the DoD would also require, by definition, a reappraisal of the force design of the SAN DF - particularly the alignment of the costed and the affordable force design options.
The PCD's perspective 2004-10-24
The PCD's perspective on the re-examination of the defence roles and functions is as follows:
a. How does the DoD propose striking a balance for the funding and planning for such functions as conventional deterrence and peace missions? Some formula needs to be determined in this regard
b. Will the increased emphasis on SANDF participation adversely affect the retention of the SANDF's conventional deterrence capabilities?
c. The DoD needs to determine what are the likely costs of its participation in peace missions.
d. An inter-departmental workgroup has been established between the DoD and the Department of Safety and Security (DoSS) to compile plans for the anticipated withdrawal of the SAN DF from a police supportive role by 2009~ The Review of the Review needs to provide details on progress made in this arena as the savings accrued from such a withdrawal could be redirected to the execution of the SANDFs peace mission commitments
e. Participation in peace missions is, within the current African context, a primarily Iandward-based endeavour. Does the SA Army possess the requisite resources and equipment with which to participate in an expanding peace missions scenario?
f. The DR maintains that South Africa's defence posture will be:
" based on a strategic defensive posture with sufficient capabilities to protect military and economic assets against offensive actions by an aggressor" (DR, Chapter Two, page 9
In light of changed continental and sub-regional realities where a greater emphasis is being placed on mutual defence co-operation (see the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lome, 2000 and SADC's Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, Lesotho, April 2003), and the defensive aspects of national defence, is this posture still appropriate to the changed strategic environment?
6. HUMAN RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
The PCD maintains that human resource requirements constitute on of the most important challenges confronting the DoD during the context of the current MTEF. Key issues, which the Review of the Review will have to address, include the following:
a. A reappraisal of the represenitivity targets proposed by the Department in terms of race, gender and force of origin (DR, Chapter 10, pages 69-72). The progress made in achieving those targets since 1998 will require re-examination, revision and reflection in the revised Review.
b. Demobilization continues to be a vexing problem within the DoD. To date no visible national or departmental demobilization strategy appears to be in place. This has serious consequences for both the morale and the combat readiness of the force (a situation that the defence trades unions are already exploiting). A broad demobilization framework needs to be included in the Review of the Review to provide guidance to the subsequent development of a DoD demobilization strategy.
c. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the DoD participated in a conference in June 2002 in which the question of the Defence Reserves was discussed. A project was created known as Project Phoenix to examine the revitalization of the Reserves. The Review of the Review will need to indicate was progress has been made with regard to the following:
1 The phasing out of the Commando system
2. The transformation of the leadership cadre of the Reserves.
3. The extent to which the Reserves are being considered for deployment in peace missions so as to relieve the burden of this deployment on the Regular Force.
4. The viability of the service packages proposed in the 1998 DR for Reserve Force personnel
d. Progress made with Veterans administration.
e. The Status of Human Resource Strategy 2010 and its implementation.
7. CONVERSION ISSUES
Demilitarization of any post-conflict situation raises the prospects of meaningful defence conversion occurring. Conversion is de fined as the reorientation, reskilling and reutilization of redundant defence material for developmental and socioeconomic purposes. Four types of conversion can be identified:
a. Human Resource Conversion where former military personnel are demobilized, reskilled, reoriented and reskilIed for gainful employment in the civilian economy.
b. Arms Conversion where former defence industrial facilities are converted into facilities for civilian use.
c. Base Conversion entails the conversion of former military facilities and the properties upon which they were established into facilities, which could be used, by communities or other civilian government departments.
d. Community Economic Adjustment entails the rendering of assistance to communities whose livelihood has been dependent on military facilities, which have now been earmarked for closure.
The DoD's perspective: 2004
The DoD has formulated a Base Closure and Community Realignment Strategy in collaboration with the Department of Public Works. Ultimately the DoD is responsible for the closure of military units, the land clean-up attendant to this process and the inventory clean up and consolidation that must precede the return of any military facility to the Department of Public Works.
PCD Perspectives 2004
The PCD believes that base closure and conversion can constitute a valuable contribution by the DoD to the country's broader developmental initiatives. It recommends that the Review of the Review include detail on the following:
a. The number of military bases and facilities closed since 1998.
b. The number of military bases and facilities earmarked for closure in future.
c. The current status of the DoD's base closure strategy.
d. The status of defence properties earmarked for return to the Department of Public Works
8. DEFENCE LEGISLATION
Since the drafting of the Defence Review a new Defence Act has been promulgated. The broad parameters of these needs to be reflected in the Review of the Review
BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
Since the completion of the DR in 1998 the MTEF process has been adjusted. The Review needs to reflect how the DoD proposes aligning itself with this new budgetary process.
FOOTNOTES
(1.) The consultative approach to the Defence Review received much critical acclaim from those individuals who participated in the process - ranging from pacifist groupings through to ex-servicemen's leagues - as well as from parliament, the media and international commentators. The breadth and depth of consultation exceeded any similar policy process in South African defence planning history and remained possibly the most consultative process on defence policy ever attempted by a modern democracy.