2.At the outset, it must be emphasized that the RFC has continued to be consulted by the SANDF and most of its Divisions, in the development of the outcomes of Project Phoenix. The Army must be singled out in this respect, as RFC office bearers continue to be included as members of their working groups.

3.It is unfortunately necessary to repeat what the RFC continues to believe is the original terms of reference and that whatever the terms of reference assumed by the SANDF in defining and implementing Project Phoenix, the RFC's understanding of the Parliamentary Committee's over-riding terms of reference is clear - viz. That the condition of the Reserve Force is such that neither defence policy nor strategy is being adhered to. Consequently, it is necessary to define what resources are needed to ensure that the policy and strategy gaps are closed and that the Reserve Force is developed with sufficient resources to ensure its capabilities are of the required standard.

4.In summary, this can be reduced to three questions:

a.What Reserve Force of the appropriate capabilities do we need?

b.What resources need to be allocated to the Reserve Force and how will the resources be controlled and used?

c.What overall process is needed to answer these questions?

5.The RFC believes that Project Phoenix has not yet succeeded in answering these questions nor has it taken an approach to determine these answers. The RFC believes that providing answers within the confines of its present proposed affordable structure and consequently within the current SANDF budget, will not satisfy the original terms of reference. In other words, the Project Phoenix proposals do not define the desired Reserve Force Design (and its associated resources) but rather the designs that dovetail with the Regular Force design and fit into the existing budget.

6. During INDABA II, the RFC expressed the concern that the Defence Review is commonly accepted today as outdated and unaffordable, but that it has not been replaced with anything. This continues to allow a wide variety of interpretations as to what is "up-to-date and affordable" and which interpretations do not necessarily reflect the national consensus. It continues to concern the RFC that planning continues without this situation being rectified as the RFC originally recommended in the report to Indaba II.

7.The Project Phoenix proposals continue to remain silent on (except in the SAAF and SAMHS) the ring fencing of the Reserve Force budget allocations.

This implies the possible continuation of the debilitating and unacceptable practice of allocating only the residual financial resources to the Reserves.

8.The RFC strongly supports the efforts of the SAMHS regarding the establishment of a Reserve Officer Training Corps System (ROTC) where medical students enroll in the ROTC and receive military training during vacations. Progress has been made in this regard and the RFC suggests that other Services and Divisions investigate the possible inclusion of this system in their systems.

9. The impression that was gained that the Reserve Force development in SAMHS is proceeding on a fully consultative and integrated basis has been confirmed. SAMHS is to be commended on its approach.

10. As with SAMHS, the developmental and planning processes in the SMF are being conducted with full Reserve Force involvement. The proposals that the SAAF are putting forward come with the full support of the RFC and is to be complimented as well.

11. Unfortunately the RFC is not in a position to comment fully on the Naval planning as it has not been included to the same extent in the initial Naval Planning with respect to its Reserves as with the other Services and Divisions. Senior Reserve Force Officers are involved in developing C Navy's instruction in respect of the future Naval Reserve.

12. The SA Army in all its Project Phoenix planning occasions has included the RFC. As such, the RFC is engaged in almost daily consultation with the South African Army. The RFC needs to make the following comment in respect of the SA Army

a. The SA Army will of necessity include the bulk of the Reserve Force of the SANDF. As such the SA Army is very sensitive to budgetary changes. For this reason the SA Army has subordinated its planning to budget constraints.

b. The SA Army training budget does not make clear distinction between continuous and non-continuous training. If the SA Army intends to only present continuous training, it would not succeed in developing its Reserves within a reasonable time. Conversely if non-continuous training is included in its current training budget proposal, then it has seriously miscalculated what is required, in the opinion of the RFC. This issue is being discussed between the RFC and The SA Army.

c. In the opinion of the RFC, the SA Army should plan and execute joint training at formation level for the Army Conventional Reserves at the CTC sooner than 2009. The last meaningful training of this type was done in 1996 which means that eight years would have passed if such training were to be commenced in 2004 arid 13 years in the case of commencement in 2009.

d. The SA Army continues to make admirable progress in respect of short-term interventions and this is starting to bear fruit in terms of improving morale especially in the conventional infantry reserve.

13. The statement by President Mbeki "to phase out SANDF Commandos, at the same time as we create in their place a new system whose composition and ethos accord with the requirements of all rural communities", has necessitated planning by the SANDF. This statement has coincided with the Minister of Defence and C SANDF's expressed wish as early as June 2002, that the SANDF should withdraw from support to the SAPS and that the Army Territorials (Commandos) should be phased out. C SANDF then issued instructions for "Phasing out of the Commandos", the "Withdrawal from support to the SAPS and borderline control" and "Staffing members in the SAPS's Protection and Security Division" vide C SANDF Instructions 01/03, 02/03 and 04/03 respectively, and all dated 11 May 2003.

14. The decision by the Cabinet on 14 May 2003, to approve the phasing out of the Army Territorial Reserve system over the following six years has in effect lent authority for these initiatives.

15. The Reserve Force Council is in agreement that continued support to the SAPS by the SANDF needs to be ended for reasons expressed in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. In addition, continued support to the SAPS has created an incorrect mindset both with members of the SAN DF as well as with the members of the communities it serves, that the primary function of the Army Territorial Reserve is to support the SAPS. In this the necessity for the actual primary function of the Army Territorial Reserve, that of Rear Area Defence in time of war has been undermined. It goes without saying therefore that the Reserve Force Council supports SA Army's current planning to phase out the Army Territorial Reserves in accordance with the full import of the President's statement and the Cabinet's decision.

16. It needs to be stressed that the RFC's over-riding concern is that of community safety and security. Any system that fails to guarantee the safety and security of all communities cannot carry the support of the RFC.

18. The decision to phase out the Army Territorial Reserve and the Withdrawal of the SANDF from the support to the SAPS as well as the concomitant instructions that were issued fail to clarify some concerns and factors that the RFC has identified and this together with a lack of communication has created more uncertainty and demoralization at ground level. These factors (expressed as questions) are:

a. Public debate in which the communities (and other affected parties) are to participate is still expected. The SANDF and the SAPS have developed an interdepartmental planning structure and have proceeded with planning. Is such public debate in which community opinion is expressed forthcoming and when will it commence?

b. Who is to provide rural security in the future? I.e. what is the definition and detail of President's vision for a "new system whose composition and ethos accord with the requirements of all rural communities."?

c. Does the SANDF perceive a requirement for Rear Area Defence? If so, who is to perform the Rear Area Defence function in time of war? Bearing in mind that this function is seldom if ever performed by conventional forces as the latest war in Iraq has shown once again.

d. How dependent is the SAPS on the transfer of Army Territorial Reserve members, in order to maintain rural safety, at least at the current level?

e. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the large majority of Army Territorial Reserve members are reluctant to join the SAPS reserve. If it is decided that the Army Territorial Reserve members will be required in the SAPS, how will the SAPS cope with supporting rural safety if the current Army Territorial Reserve members refuse to join the SAPS reserves.

f. It is estimated that some 20 000 Army Territorial Reserve members are unemployed and rely to varying extents on Army Territorial Reserve service and the concomitant support, i.e. salary, medical support et al, in order for them and their families to survive. Currently the SAPS do not remunerate SAPS Reserve members. If it is decided that the Army Territorial Reserve members will be required by the SAPS, will the SAPS remunerate the Army Territorial Reserve members to the same extent for service rendered?

g. If it is decided that the Army Territorial Reserve members are required by the SAPS, will the SAPS be able to support additional Army Territorial Reserve members logistically, i.e. motor vehicles, arms, signal equipment etc?

h. When is the phasing out of the Army Territorial Reserve system to commence? What are therefore the safeguards in place to prevent the current community and rural safety from unraveling in the interim period?

i. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that the possibility exists that the current "Commandos" may unilaterally decide to "privatize". What planning or proposals are in place to assure communities that their safety will not be compromised and consequently to what extent will the possible "privatization of the current Commandos" influence the current situation? It is expected that the number of personnel employed by private security organizations could then exceed the strength in the SAPS.

j.How will the two departments ensure sufficient leadergroup elements for the new system if the current Ieadergroup in the Army Territorial Reserve decides not to join the SAPS reserve?

k. The current Army Territorial Reserve follows a strong military culture. This military culture is vastly different from the SAPS and other departmental culture. What measures have been taken to facilitate this difference?

18. Transformation in the Reserve Force will continue to move at a slow pace unless more resources are applied.

19. There is still a gap between strategic needs and reserve allocation including finances, which needs to be closed.

20. It is still necessary to balance the DOD's philosophy and policy for the co-ordination plans of the Services and Divisions that will guide the approach to a well trained, organized and supported Reserve Force. This lack is most apparent in the Policy and Planning division. Alignment with policy at this level should cascade into the Services and respective Divisions.

21. It must be clearly understood that any major war of the future would be fought not by Regular Forces and not by Reserve Forces, but by a combination of both and that the readiness of both is of paramount importance. Both these capabilities are inextricably intertwined and therefore one affects the other.

22. Defence policy and structural arrangements should allow the Reserve Force to gain an acceptable degree of independence in dealing with their own structures, funding and training.

23. One of the most important requirements of the DOD is to develop a focused strategy on how to build a new generation leader-group.

24. The original Terms of Reference of Project Phoenix have not yet been fully answered.

25. There is an important need to put the necessary legal elements in place to support Reserve Force service. These elements range from the legal obligation to serve to employer release arrangements, insurance and relief from debt servicing whilst in military service.

26. It is recommended that;

a. the desired Reserve Force Design (and its associated resources) be determined irrespective of budgetary constraints as part of project Phoenix. Only then will decision makers know what is realistically required.

b. the Reserve Force budget allocations need to be ring-fenced 'in all divisions.

c. the necessary legal elements be put in place to support Reserve Force service. These elements range from legal application to serve to employer release arrangements, insurance and relief from debt servicing whilst serving in the Reserves.

d. the Defence Review should be formally reviewed as a matter of urgency.

e. the SANDF should plan and execute joint training at formation level for the Army Conventional Reserves at the CTC sooner than 2009.

f. a Reserve Officer Training Corps System (ROTC) be implemented in all Services and Divisions.

27. The RFC will be initiating its own process in due course, in order to assist with the issue of phasing out of the Army Territorial Reserve. It will be prepared engage the joint interdepartmental planning committee between the SAPS and SAN DF synergistically in order to resolve some of the issues that have given rise to the concerns expressed in this report.