Nkuzi Development Association is a non-government organisation that works on land and agrarian reform issues throughout the Limpopo and Gauteng Provinces. This Bill is particularly relevant to the Limpopo Province with its large rural population located mostly on the communal land of the three former homelands in the Province.

This submission is presented as a response to the draft Communal Land Rights Bill (CLRB) as per gazette number: 25562 of 17 October 2003.

The submission is in four main sections

1. Context – Gives an overview of some of the key challenges and considerations that Nkuzi believes should inform the development of such a Bill
2. Comments on the Bill – Detail comments on the Bill as currently drafted
3. Conclusion – This section summarises the key problems with the Bill
4. Recommendations – This section suggests a way forward and offers in broad terms an alternative approach given some of the fundamental weaknesses in the current draft.

The reform of tenure arrangements in communal areas is a major initiative that could have great benefits or disastrous consequences for the estimated 15million people who live in these areas. Beyond the direct impact on those living in communal areas the way this issue is resolved will strongly impact on development and the shape of democracy in South Africa as a whole. Such an important programme needs to be assessed in the context of the challenges to the whole of South Africa that we suggest are captured in the four points listed in the preamble as the purpose for which the constitution of South Africa was adopted. These can be summarised as:

• Addressing the legacy of the past;
• Building democracy based on the will of the people where all are equal before the law;
• Improving the lives of all citizens; and
• Building a united country that will be respected throughout the world. (Constitution of South Africa, 1996: pg 1).

The measure then of the effectiveness of the proposed Communal Land Rights Bill (CLRB) should be the extent to which it contributes to achieving the purpose of the constitution – essentially bringing about democracy and development. We have to ask ourselves whether or not this Bill, if enacted, will contribute to building the kind of democracy envisaged in the Constitution of South Africa.

Much has been written about the use and abuse of traditional authority structures as vehicles of control and oppression in colonial Africa. Mahmood Mamdani presents one particularly thorough analysis of the phenomena and its impact on postcolonial African democracies. Mamdani shows in his book Citizen and Subject (Mamdani, 1996) that the traditional authority structures as they are now in South Africa, and many other parts of Africa, are a construct of the colonial regimes specifically established to solve the "native problem" through indirect rule and what Mamdani describes as "decentralised despotism". Mamdani argues that one of the essential failings of most post independence African states has been the fact that they did not dismantle this decentralised despotism that kept people in rural areas ethnically divided as subjects who are seen as part of a tribe rather than as citizens. An essential characteristic of the decentralised despotism is the "clenched fist" of the chief who combines legislative, judicial, administrative and policing powers in one institution and even in one person.

Building democracy in South Africa requires the dismantling of the bifurcated state, overcoming the tribalisation of rural citizens, and ending the subjugation of rural people to the "clenched fist" rule of chiefs and farm owners. Rural people need to be allowed to participate as full citizens in the modern democratic state with the separation of the legislative, judicial and executive powers, just as the Constitution requires (Constitution, 1996. pg: 89). A key test of any new tenure legislation must be the extent to which it contributes to this process.

It appears that the government may now be facing a new form of the "native question", in the shape of the masses of the population that are totally marginal to the mainstream economy. The extent of this marginalisation is well illustrated by the example of the Limpopo Province where 89% of the population are rural, mostly located in the three former homelands (all on communal land) and only 22.7% of adults of working age are employed (Statistics South Africa, 2003). GEAR even in its best-case projections – which it is failing to meet – would hardly have created enough jobs to keep pace with population growth and this seems to be part of a wide acceptance by the government that an increasingly large number of the population will remain marginal and surplus to the economy. It is clear that the majority of the rural poor will not be accommodated within the economy of South Africa and moving to the urban centres will only result in them becoming part of the urban poor in the burgeoning informal settlements around the major centres. Given these circumstances there is a real risk that the government will be driven not by the noble intentions of development and strengthening democracy, but by the more cynical desire to abdicate responsibility for development in rural areas while ensuring political control.

The effect in practice of any legislation will be influenced strongly by the resources available for supporting its implementation and any bias in the way such resources are applied. This is especially the case with legislation like the CLRB that has such a large role for the government and the Minister in particular and deals with the rights of many people who have very few resources to take cases directly to court if the Minster is not acting in their interests. The experience of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) implementation has shown that important parts of legislation can simply be ignored by government, leading to an almost complete lack of their implementation (Lahiff, 2001. Wegerif. 2001). Section 4 of ESTA says, "the Minister shall make available resources" for on and off farm settlements that give farm occupiers long term tenure security. Section 26 gives the minister powers to expropriate land "for purposes of any development in terms of this Act" (ESTA, 1997). These clauses create a perception that farm occupiers will get secure tenure from the legislation, but the reality has been very different. In Limpopo Province section 4 of ESTA has not been used at all (Wegerif, 2001), and section 26 of ESTA has not been used anywhere in the country in the almost 6 years that the legislation has been in force. Section 17 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (LTA, 1996) creates specific obligations on the state to issue notices, within set time frames, when applications for recognition of labour tenancy rights have been made. Despite this obligation in legislation the experience of Nkuzi, and other NGOs that have assisted labour tenants to lodge such applications, is that the notices are in most cases simply not being issued. Meanwhile farm dwellers, who should be legally protected by such notices, remain under threat of eviction.

These experiences make the question of the government’s level of commitment to the implementation of the CLRB absolutely essential, and not just whether they are going to implement it or not, but in who’s favour? Will government resources be used to empower communities, especially marginalized groups such as women? Or will they support the empowerment of traditional authorities and other rural elites? The other possibility is simple neglect, which will always favour the better resourced and more powerful in communities who can assert their rights at the expense of others. The strong indications from implementation of legislation like ESTA, the LTA, and to a lesser extent the Restitution of Land Rights Act is that there will be woefully inadequate resources and commitment to ensuring effective implementation.

Many of the outcomes from the Bill, especially where things are not clearly stipulated and are left to community rules, will be shaped by the balance of power in these rural villages. Claassens shows in her aptly titled study "It is not easy to challenge a chief" how despite what a law may actually say it is assumed that the chief owns the land (Claassens, 2001. pg: 40) and indeed he appears to act as if he owns it with threats of evictions and other intimidation of people on that land. The widespread fear that rural people have of challenging the traditional authorities and individual traditional leaders is made clear from case studies by Claassens in the Limpopo Province and Ntsebeza in the Eastern Cape (Ibid and Ntsebeza, 1999). Ntsebeza explains that this fear is no surprise given the history of vicious state repression used to support traditional authorities in the past (Ntsebeza, 2001). The continued financial support of traditional authorities, the apparent reluctance of government to challenge them, and the allocation of further powers to them in this Bill further undermines rural peoples confidence and ability to challenge chiefs.

The capture of land and other resources in rural areas by economic elites, often using state and political power to support them, is well known. Communal grazing land is invariably utilised predominantly by a small percentage of the population of a village. Business opportunities go to those who are well connected. This is a natural process, but measures are needed to ensure that the marginalisation of those weaker and normally poorer in the society is not increased through any new interventions especially where stronger rights to land become available.

Tradable, yet secure, rights in land are important for development as they allow for new investment and for transfers of land to those who have the ability and interest to use it effectively. The cost in finance and other transaction costs, in particular delays, should not be too high or the trade in land rights will not happen.

It is important to balance this need for tradable land rights with the broader community interest in the land including the interests of future generations.

There are a range of other development challenges and factors that have led to underdevelopment in rural areas that need to be addressed. Strengthening tenure security and creating opportunities for commercialisation of land without addressing these will not bring the hoped for development benefits. Some key factors to be addressed are:

1. A history of forced removals leading to overcrowding that has not been addressed due to the slow pace of restitution and redistribution delivery;
2. The structure of the economy that favours investment in urban centres in industries and the service sector that can bring quick returns to investors;
3. The weak position of the agricultural sector caused by the nature of agriculture that makes it uncompetitive as an investment option in the current economic climate, the removal of subsidies and trade protection, while the sector has to compete with highly subsidised agriculture in other countries, and for the small farmer the dominance of the sector by a small group of large land owners who have built wealth and infrastructure over more than a century of massive state assistance including benefits such as free labour (through the labour tenant system) the removal of black farmers as competitors through forced removals, punitive taxes and other measures;
4. The need for improved infrastructure, technological improvements, access to finance, and access to markets and supplies;
5. Urban and large landlord bias in government policies and spending patterns.

In short tenure reform within communal areas needs to be part of a broader rural development strategy that will give rural people access to more land and resources and create an enabling environment for development.

There is currently a functioning system in most rural areas that offers a high level of tenure security to rural people. The system also gives access to land for young families regardless of their level of income and has shown itself in some circumstances to be adaptable to changing needs such as the increasing number of child headed households and the increasing number of women headed households.

Despite these positives there are also examples of abuse of the system and inconsistencies in the way tenure rights are handled and respected or not respected in different areas. There is undoubtedly a lack of legal certainty, which can lead to some insecurity and create difficulties with bringing certain types of commercial development to communal areas.

Problematic traditional leadership structures in some rural areas have abused the system. Even where traditional leaders are more progressive the system is inherently undemocratic and strengthening this runs counter to the need for democratisation and empowerment of people as citizens with full citizenship rights.

South Africa has a situation of two different tenure systems within one country: a strong freehold tenure system in "white" areas and a communal system with poorly defined legal rights in "black" areas. It is clear that we have to overcome such a division, yet titling in communal areas in Africa has not brought the desired benefits and in some cases has brought severe problems and increased landlessness. At the same time the major land issue in SA is redistribution of the freehold land still held by a very small number of white land owners and one of the obstacles to the required redistribution is the resistance of the current owners who rely on their strong freehold rights to hold onto land.

Given this situation it would make sense to establish a new tenure regime that tries to combine the best aspects of communal and freehold systems, that applies nationally, and weakens the grip of individual owners on "their" private land while strengthening the rights of those in communal areas. It should be possible in exploring this to learn from the examples of Tanzania and Mozambique that both have nationalised land, but allow for some individual rights and commercialisation of the land within certain limits that fall short of freehold. Thus one could deal with the dual tenure system, unlock land for redistribution, and develop a new tenure system that respects the positive in communal tenure systems while addressing some of it’s short comings.

Pg 2 - the Bill, according to this preamble, does not provide for transfer to individuals or for protection of existing rights in land, two key requirements for this Bill.

• Beneficial Occupation should not apply only to those occupying the land as at December 1997. People who live openly without force on land for a period of ten years, regardless of when that period starts should be able to gain beneficial occupation rights. This definition also raises a question about what happens if a person is no longer on the land, but has in terms of this definition beneficial occupation. (There is no mention anywhere in the Bill of the possibility of retrospective recognition of rights and claims for such rights if they have been taken away by the time the Act comes into affect).
• Community is very broadly defined, which could lead to a lot of contestation on the ground about what is a community.
• The Land Administration Committee definition makes it absolutely clear that it will be the traditional council that administers land. This is an unacceptable allocation of powers to structures that have shown themselves in many cases to be poor agents of development and unaccountable. Even where traditional councils function well and in the interests of their communities they remain essentially undemocratic. The Bill must encourage and strengthen democratic structures.

• sub-sections (2)(a) combined with (b) does away with Communal Property Associations (CPAs). This does not respect the rights of those who have received land through other land reform programmes and may lead to traditional councils in some areas trying to take control of land that has been granted to specific groups. While being aware that CPAs have their problems the replacement of them without any thorough investigation of what is wrong with them and what would be a good replacement is problematic.

• This section makes clear that land will always go to a community rather than to individuals, thus making ownership of land by individuals always subject to the process and approval of a community and in most areas the traditional council. This can have the benefit of protecting community interests in land, but could also be a major constraint to individuals getting ownership of land and gives enormous powers to the land administration structure – in most cases this will be the traditional council – especially as there are no minimum standards set for processes of making such decisions or for the content of the community rules.
• Subsection (b)(iii) is positive in that it should clarify and strengthen individual rights by the issuing of deeds of communal land rights to "person or persons entitled to such rights". However there is no clarity as to what rights these Deeds of Communal Land rights actual confer.
• The process of implementing all the requirements under subsection (b) will take a lot of time and resources highlighting the concern about the interim protection of people’s rights and the need for substantial resources to make this work.
• There is no process anywhere to ensure that people have a say in what happens to the land where they and the communities they are part of live. It will be possible for people to make inputs if they see the notice (published in the "prescribed manner", see section 16), but there is no provision to assist people to make inputs or to ensure that such inputs are taken into consideration.

• The cost and complexity of registering land in terms of the Deeds Registry Act has proven in many cases to inhibit the legal registration of transfers in land.

• This section confirms some of the concerns raised above, in that the community - in practice read traditional council – can accept or refuse any application for land ownership, operating in terms of unspecified rules, and with no guidance or criteria or route of appeal suggested if a decision should be unsatisfactory.
• It is unfortunate that there is no other option being offered to secure more individual rights other than freehold ownership and the rights contained in the new order rights are not made clear.

• Subsection (1) refers to the Minister "transferring communal land to a community or person" as per section 6, but section 6 does not allow for transfer of communal land to a person it says it must be transferred in its entirety to a community.

• Subsection (2) also refers to the Minster transferring land to a "community or person" in apparent contradiction of section 6.
• We welcome the stipulations in 18(1) and 14(2)(g) on the need to promote gender equality.
• We welcome the possibility of dealing with some key questions of gender and women’s access to land as contained in subsection (4)(b), but remain concerned that these provisions are only a possibility, they "may" be implemented, but they are not a requirement and "may just as well not be implemented.

• Subsection (1) sets no guidelines or principles for the process of making and adopting rules, simply referring to it being done in the "prescribed manner". We would suggest that some basic guidelines should at least be set. We further suggest that the process of drawing up the regulations that are going to be essential for the implementation of a lot of the Bill must be transparent with maximum consultation.
• There is a risk that as traditional councils will be performing land administration functions they will simply set their current rules for operation as the rules to be used and it appears that there is little that would stop this happening.
• A section needs to be added to stipulate that the rules and procedures for making the rules should comply with the constitution and principles in the Bill of Rights. This is implied in subsection(4)(d), but should be stated clearly.
• Subsection (5) highlights the importance of thorough consultation on the regulations as the "standard rules prescribed by legislation" could have a very strong impact and in practice will probably be the ones that will be imposed in many cases.

• The provisions for changing rules in a "general meeting" and in the "prescribed manner" are far too vague leaving them open to abuse.

• There is no process for a community to agree on the land administration committee of its choice, thus the provision in subsection (2) that a traditional council "may" exercise the powers of a land administration committee gives the choice in the matter to the traditional council – especially in the light of the definition of the land administration committee.
• There is a lack of clarity between the definition of the land administration committee (section 1) that says a traditional council is the land administration committee and subsection (2) that says they may exercise the powers and duties of the land administration committee. It would further appear from the definition that there is no choice about the traditional council being the land administration committee. The use of the term "may" in subsection (2) implies that the traditional council could choose to be or not to be a land administration committee, although it seems unlikely they would choose not to.
• The confusion continues in subsections (3) and (4) with references to the traditional council exercising the powers of the land administration committee and then acting as the land administration committee.
• It is not clear what Subsection (4)(b) is trying to achieve beyond the statement of an intention that is already contradicted by the different handling of Ingonyama Trust land in chapter 9.
• The composition of traditional councils in the exercise of the powers of the land administration committee has to comply with section 22(4 and (5) but not 22(3) that specifies "at least one third women". This is disappointing as it lowers the requirements for women’ participation compared to land administration structures in areas without traditional councils.

• It is strange and unfortunate that subsection (2) should exclude any traditional leader from participation in a land administration structure. If they are not wanted in such a role why empower them to perform the role as is done in section 21(2) and in the definition of a land administration structure? This will probably be irrelevant in most cases anyway as if there are recognised traditional leaders they will administer the land through the traditional council performing the role/being the land administration committee.
• What the provision of subsection (2) does is to leave no possibility of a middle ground in which there could be a role for a traditional leader within a more democratic structure. If a progressive traditional leader and traditional council are happy to have amore democratic structure administering land, but would like a role they have none, they either run it themselves or they are out.
• There is no requirement of a democratic process for the appointment of committee members again leaving it to undefined community rules. Basic principles of democracy and due process need to be specified in the legislation to set a framework within which regulations can be drawn up and to give the public an opportunity to challenge regulations and rules that go outside this framework and the principles.

• The protection offered by subsection (2), that prevents a land administration committee from disposing of land until ratified by the Land Rights Board, is welcomed as an important check on the power of the land administration committees.
• Of concern is that there is no requirement of consultation with or getting agreement from the community and those who will be affected by the disposal of land.
• Subsection (3)(a)(i) appears to contradict section (6)(b)(iii) in that it says the committee must "take measures towards ensuring" (a rather vague wording) the allocation of "new order rights to persons", whereas in section 6 the Minster is required to transfer new order rights to persons entitled to such rights.

• The inclusion of two people appointed by the House of traditional leaders indicates a continued bias in favour of traditional leaders especially when combined with the exclusion of elected officials (section 27(1)(g). The message is clear hereditary leadership have a role and those who are elected and accountable to an electorate do not.
• It is important to define the area of operation of the Boards, as in the current form the Bill gives no indication of whether they would cover several provinces or only several wards. This will be important in assessing the cost implications and their viability.

• It is not very clear what the purpose of the Land Rights Board is. It is said that they will advise the Minister, but how does this relate to the land rights enquiry and role of the land rights enquirer? There is no place where the Minister or the Director General is required to get advice from the Board.
• Similarly although it says that the Board will assist a community, it is not clear in which way it will assist and there is no mention anywhere in the Act of the possibility of a community appealing to the Board or the procedure for getting their assistance.#

• This is so broad it is hard to imagine it having the desired effect. There needs to be more thought given to overcoming the complicated obstacles to deliver and maintenance of services on what will be essentially private land.
• It would seem that the long established practice, in urban areas, of keeping roads, reserves and other communal spaces under municipal ownership for purposes of delivery of services and public utilities would be practical. Perhaps clear provision should be made for this or it should even be a requirement.

• This section makes the Bill applicable to all land gained by labour tenants or through section 4 of ESTA. How legal, practical or desirable is it to impose that?

• It is unacceptable to handle the Ingonyama Trust land and all land in KwaZulu Natal differently from land in other provinces. This appears to be discriminatory and potentially unconstitutional.
• This Bill places all communal land (In the Act as it stands this includes much land gained through land reform) in KwaZulu Natal under the Ingonyama Land Rights Board, which continues to have the same powers as the Ingonyama Land Rights Trust. This will effectively expand the area of control of the Ingonyama Land Rights Trust and impose a new tenure regime on many people who have certainly not been consulted and may not want it.
• The heading of the Ingonyama land rights board in perpetuity by the Ingonyama is apparently in contradiction with section 33(1) and section 23 and cannot be an acceptable institutional arrangement if we are trying to move towards a more democratic dispensation.

• There is no easy route to commercialisation of some of the land. The only real option seems to be to wait for the Minister to make and implement a determination (for which there is no time frame) and then for an individual to acquire ownership (if the community/traditional council agree) and then for that individual to set up business or sell to a businessperson or farmer.
• Potentially, given the powers in section 3 a community/traditional council could sell land or enter into leases, but there is no process suggested for applications or for approval of such a sale apart from the need for the land rights board to approve.

• Until a determination is made and implemented there is no protection for existing rights.
• There is also not provision for retrospective claiming of rights that may have been recently lost, perhaps even lost in order to prevent them being confirmed in terms of this legislation. The powers that some might gain through this legislation could provoke a spate evictions or other infringements of peoples rights to pre-empt the coming rights enquiries and determinations.

• There is no mechanism for individuals whose tenure rights in communal areas are under threat to apply for them to be secured.
• What is needed is a simplified and accessible mechanism through which individuals or groups whose rights are under threat can go to court to confirm the recognition of those rights and to secure the rights. They must be able to do this regardless of any government programme or process of Ministerial determinations.

• The main land problem in communal areas that has resulted from the forced removals and prohibition on black land ownership of the past.
• The Bill says nothing about redistribution and in this combined with the slow pace of land delivery through restitution or redistribution is creating the scenario where the Bill if passed into law will simply consolidate the grossly unequal land ownership patterns created by apartheid.

• The Bill perpetuates, especially in giving land ownership and control to traditional councils, the dual tenure system of strong individual freehold rights in former (often still) white areas and weak individual rights in former (almost 100% still) black areas
• The inequality of this approach combined with the lack of choice for citizens in communal areas and on land gained through land reform is unjust and could well make the Bill unconstitutional.

The CLRB in its current form must be rejected and substantial changes need to be made before it is considered again. There are too may flaws in the current draft from contradictory sections to fundamental flaws in the approach being taken.

There have been substantial changes in the various drafts that were gazetted in October 2002, on 8^th October 2003, and this draft gazetted on 17^th October 2003. These changes do not show a progression of thinking, rather through the dramatic nature of the changes they indicate a lack of a clear vision for what the Bill is really trying to achieve.

The latest draft reflects a political shift to strengthen the hand of traditional authorities. By virtually imposing a land ownership and administration role for traditional councils the CLRB is ensuring the continuation of the "clenched fist" of despotic rule in rural areas.

The CLRB continues to entrench a different set of laws and institutions and therefore political contradictions for rural and urban areas. In strengthening the role of traditional councils, or as an alternative encouraging each community to set up separate legal entities, with their own sets of rules and procedures the CLRB furthers the ethnic and tribal fragmentation of rural society. Far from dismantling the legacy of colonial rule that is essential for building democracy the CLRB reinforces the divisions that Mamdani has identified as the two main obstacles to democratisation in Africa, namely the "rural-urban and the interethnic"(Mamdani, 1996. pg: 296).

There is a great need to have a national debate about the form of tenure regime that is suitable for South Africa. Such a debate should not be limited to dealing with communal areas, but deal with land tenure for the country as a whole. It is only through addressing this question for the country as a whole that we can start to move towards a unitary tenure system for all that addresses the key concerns for the society. We need a new tenure regime that applies nationally, gives individual rights and allows for the encumbering and trade of such rights, but within limitations that safeguard the long-term interests of the family, the community and the country.

There is no redistributive component to the Bill whereas many of the land problems in communal areas relate to land shortages that have their roots in land dispossessions of the past. To strengthen rights to the little land that black communities have access to now without substantial redistribution will not address the key problem on communal land, which is over crowding, and will consolidate the apartheid created inequality in the distribution of land.

The Minister is being given too many wide-ranging powers with virtually no guidelines being set for the exercising of these powers. At the same time people livening in communal areas area being given no choice as to the tenure arrangements that they would prefer.

If the Communal Land Rights Bill makes it into law in its current form the rural poor will have insufficient powers in the law, and are unlikely to get the support from government, for them to be able to challenge the prevailing power relations in rural areas.

The CLRB in its current form does nothing to open up development opportunities or to strengthen democracy.

It appears the government, having decided that meeting the needs of the poor is not a viable option, is becoming more interested in maintaining the essential components of decentralised despotism than building democracy. The CLRB in its current form amounts to an abdication of responsibility for development in rural areas and a decision that democracy is not essential for rural people.

Take an incremental approach that moves towards a greater democratisation and creates opportunities for increased commercialisation while creating some protection against the risks involved for the rural poor. Importantly steps that will be very hard to reverse, such as the disposal of all communal land held by the government, should be avoided until there is a clearer vision of the kind of unitary tenure system the country needs.

Strengthen local level democracy by strengthening – and putting resources into - the role of elected local government, while also finding a role for traditional leaders and traditional councils.

Provide blanket recognition and protection for existing individual and group rights on communal land that can be protected by law. Specifically address rights of women within this to secure women’s rights to land that have not been recognised in the past due to the gender bias in customary systems of land allocation. For example recognising the right of a widow to inherit the husbands property and recognise land held by a married couple as the property of both if no pre-nuptial agreement exists.

Allow for individuals to lease out their property, with no requirement of community agreement, for periods up to ten years, and for such a lease to be mortgaged. Allow lease of communal land for business purposes for up to ten years by land board with consultation with anyone directly affected. Allow lease, with community support through a defined process including consultation and democratic decision-making, for period of up to 30 years of communal and individual land within that community.

Include a redistributive component that can link the solution of tenure issues in communal areas to the acquisition of more land.

Establish land boards for each community, as per current boundaries, chaired and managed by the Municipality with involvement of an elected Councillor and officials. Other members of the land board should be an elected community representative, the traditional council in the area where one exists, and specified level of representation for women and other marginalized groups.

Avoid the contestation over definition of community by using existing boundaries. One could build into the mechanisms for dispute resolution the possibility of reviewing these boundaries in the future.

These land board will handle land allocation, land disputes, the protection of individual land rights and the acquisition of more land to meet land needs within communities.

Have at a Provincial level a land commission to support and monitor the functioning of the land boards. This should be able to hear and rule on disputes regarding decisions of the land boards. One could use the infrastructure of the current land claims commissions as a base for this, which would also provide more security for the current staff of those commissions, as they will have a long-term role.

Initiate a wide-ranging national debate on an appropriate tenure system for the whole country.

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