BACKGROUND

The Auditor General is a Chapter Nine institution in terms of the South African Constitution and as such is accountable to the National Assembly (Sect. 181(5))

Up until now, the NA has not decided upon or established a mechanism/s in terms of the Constitution (Sect. 55(2)) through which Chapter Nine bodies should account.

In July 1999 Professor Hugh Corder recommended that the National Assembly (NA) either allocate oversight responsibilities to existing committees or establish a committee specifically for the purposes of Chapter Nine accountability to the NA.

The Oversight and Accountability sub committee of the NA’s Rules Committee has long contemplated the situation and as recently as May 2003 has deliberated on the methods and extents of the NA taking up its oversight obligation regarding these institutions.

All the while, the AG has for its part continued to operate under provisions of pre 1994 legislation (the Auditor General and Audit Arrangements Acts) which require the AG to account to an Audit Commission. This Commission comprises 11 members, 8 of whom are members of Parliament (NA and NCOP) and 3 being members of the public who are chosen for their specific knowledge/experience on audit/accounting matters.

Since the new constitution in 1996, there has been some awkwardness regarding the identity and role of the Audit Commission. This being caused by:

• The latitude of decision-making and advice-giving exercised by the Commission which possibly encroaches on the management autonomy the Constitution gives to the Auditor General.
• The uncertainty on the part of the Auditor General regarding which specific responsibilities he/she should account to the Commission for.
• The extent to which the Commissions oversight mandate actually complies with the NA’s constitutional mandate – or if indeed it is acting on behalf of the NA..
• The fact that the Commission has members who are not representative of the NA.
• The high cost of the Commission due to its wide ranging involvement and the need to pay members for their time because of the participation of outside professionals as members.

THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE BILL

In amongst the many matters addressed at the time of processing the new law which will govern the affairs of the Auditor General it was seen as important and opportune to also address the accountability arrangement issue.

In this regard, the Bill proposes to give direct and practical expression to Section 181(5) of the Constitution through the creation and mandating of a NA committee to which the Auditor General will account. Notwithstanding any considerations that the Accountability and Oversight sub committee might have towards a single NA committee to oversee all Chapter Nine bodies, the provisions of this Bill advocate a separate NA committee to oversee the Auditor General. Argument for a dedicated Committee (i.e. not for other Chapter Nine bodies) are based on the particular character and nature of the Auditor /General function which sets it apart. The arguments include:

• As its work concerns the (quality of) work of the Executive Government it has issues of independence which go beyond those of other Chapter Nine bodies.
• The nature of its work is more technically specific than that of the other Chapter Nine bodies. This requires an oversight committee that dedicates its attention to the particular understanding and knowledge that would be necessary.
• It is the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures most important and single biggest supplier of oversight information. As such it is an integral part of the conventional ‘accountability chain’ prescribed by the Constitution.
• In terms of its size and resources it is substantially bigger than all other Chapter Nine bodies – e.g. its budget, infrastructure and personnel.
• As the only Chapter Nine body which does not receive its funding through any Vote, there is a particular oversight requirement regarding its income and expenditure.

The above considerations make it desirable that members of the oversight committee are able to concentrate their attention on the specific attributes of the Auditor General and to become appropriately knowledgeable in this regard.

The view that SCOPA be mandated as the committee to oversee the Auditor General is disregarded due, firstly to the fact that SCOPA already experiences severe capacity constraints, and secondly because this could blur the distinct and separate roles played by it and the Auditor General in the ‘accountability chain’.

Regarding the establishment of a NA committee through law - as opposed to through the rules of the NA. It is noted that in the case of the Joint Intelligence Committee, there is precedence of legislation being used to establish a parliamentary oversight committee.

The Public Audit Bill goes a little further in that it outlines the proposed committee’s oversight mandate. This is done with specific consideration to the special nature of the Auditor General function as indicated above.

All practical considerations of the new committee’s establishment would conform with existing NA rules and practices.

Finally, it is suggested that the provisions in question, regarding the introduction of the new Committee and its replacement of the existing Audit Commission, only be effected at the start of the third parliament – i.e. after the 2004 general elections.