1.3 A Parliamentary Commission on Peace and Reconciliation (PCPR) was also established. It has the aim of consulting with community representatives, church groups and civil society on the revival of the peace process. During his visit to Angola in April 2002, Deputy President Zuma addressed the PCPR and reiterated South Africa’s commitment to assist Angola, when called upon, with regard to matters of national reconciliation.

1.4 It became clear that peace in Angola could only be guaranteed if massive amounts of humanitarian assistance are forwarded to Angola. It was estimated that there were in the region of 4,5 million of internally displaced people in Angola, 85 000 demobilising ex-combatants plus nearly 370 000 members of their families, as well as 480 000 refugees in neighbouring states, mainly Zambia, the DRC and Namibia. The UN has appealed for over US$400 million for the current year to provide emergency assistance to the IDPs, refugees and demobilising ex-combatants and members of their families and for their reintegration into society. following the civil conflict. They were mainly concentrated in towns where the food supply was totally inadequate. South Africa recognised that the future of democracy and good governance in Angola hinged on the success of the peace process. Following an appeal for humanitarian assistance by the Angolan Government on 13 June 2002, President Mbeki personally intervened and during his budget speech at the National Assembly on 18 June 2002, told the House:

"We stand ready to assist (Angola) in whatever ways possible so that together we can embark on an important course of economic recovery and development. At the request of the Government of Angola, steps are also being taken urgently to meet the humanitarian needs of the people who are gathered at assembly points from areas previously controlled by UNITA".

To this end a Committee was set up, in accordance with a mandate from Cabinet Lekgotla in July 2002, under the chairmanship of the Department of Social Welfare and with the active participation of the Department of Foreign Affairs to devise a strategy for South African humanitarian assistance to Angola. On the 31^st of October 2002, a large consignment of humanitarian aid was shipped to Angola.

1.5 Elections are expected for 2005. No specific date has yet been announced. It is still not certain if President Dos Santos will be a candidate or whether he (still) intends to resign (as he has announced more than a year ago). Reliable sources, however, reported late in July 2003 that the MPLA would probably nominate either the Secretary General of the MPLA, Mr Joao Lourenco, or the Prime Minister, Mr Fernando Dias de Piedade dos Santos, as candidate for the Presidential election. The same sources claim that President Dos Santos would continue serving as President of the MPLA. UNITA had its congress in June 2003 and Isaias Samakuva was elected as President of the Party. Fears that UNITA may split in factions, have so far failed to materialise.

Although the war is now over and the economy has shown signs of recovery, the economic destruction in Angola was enormous. The infrastructure in the interior has been totally destroyed and agriculture suffered the same fate. The Treasury has consequently came under heavy pressure and it has been reported that the civil servants have not been paid from November last year due to the drying up of resources. This includes the diplomats in foreign missions as well as the armed forces. Telephones have been cut in all Government Departments for months on end due to non-payment of accounts. A delegation from Angola led by the Finance Minister earlier this year visited the United Kingdom to negotiate a $1 billion loan in defiance of the IMF and World Bank conditions that Angola must not take out any loan as it could not currently service its debt with these institutions.

Despite finding one of the largest oil reserves in Angola, it will still not solve its financial problems. The oil has been mortgaged to foreign companies till 2011. The Foreign Minister has travelled the world with the view to raise funds for the country without success. The United States which had promised Angola financial support if the latter supported the resolution on Iraq seem to have reneged on its undertaking. The US is arguing that the vote was never taken on the issue of Iraq, and accordingly there are no obligatory legal responsibilities on its side. The United States is now arguing that if Angola needs financial support from the United States in the IMF it has to abide by its conditions, namely transparency and accountability about oil revenue.

The precarious nature of the Angolan economy may be further illustrated by the opinions aired during a donor's meeting held in Luanda on 29 July 2003. At that meeting the Head of UNDP, Mr Erik de Mul, observed that in general the Angolan government is not seen to be doing enough to improve the social conditions of its people. This is most evident in the lack of building and maintenance of infrastructure. Thus there is no signal from the authorities to show commitment. Mr De Mul noted that the only commitment he had witnessed from the Angolan elite was to fly first class.

The representative of the IMF was especially critical of the Angolan government saying that despite everything there was still a lack of transparency and accountability in government accounts and that the government was hesitant to diversify the economy away from the traditional revenue generating oil and diamond sectors.

The IMF was also concerned about the 3-digit inflation in Angola, which they cannot foresee declining because the government continues to overspend. Besides overspending, the actual spending does not go the areas that most require it and thus social and educational issues continue to receive a very small percentage of the budget. This is all compounded by the fact that the budget is not geared to diversifying the economy away from reliance on the oil sector.

Another point of criticism raised by the IMF representative, was the issue of Angola’s external debt. Once again there is no transparency, nobody knows the extent of Angola's external debt and the Angolan authorities won’t reveal it.

Additionally, the IMF was of the opinion that there was a lack of willingness on the part of the government to address the issue of "dolarisation" of the Angolan economy. Perhaps this high degree of inertia on the part of the Angolan authorities, the IMF representative advanced, was because the elite benefited from earning dollars while the poor earned Kwanzas, which devalued at a rapid rate.

Contrary to general expectations, Isaias Samakuva obtained an overwhelming majority of the vote for the presidency of UNITA during the UNITA Congress at the end of June 2003. The announcement was made toward the end of the conference on the last day, following a process of voting claimed to be transparent and democratic.

Throughout the duration of the congress, proceedings had occurred in an orderly and very disciplined manner. Observers were unanimous that the voting process had been completely free and fair. Justino Pinto De Andrade, the President of the Electoral Commission, appointed to oversee the election, also received praise for the manner in which he conducted the process.

Following the announcement of the successful candidate for the presidency each candidate was given an opportunity to make a closing statement. In his speech Paulo Lukamba was magnanimous in defeat and undertook to continue promoting unity within the party.

Similarly, the third candidate Dinho Chingunji also mentioned that he would work for unity within the party. This candidate received the least number votes, although he noted in his speech that he would again contest elections for party presidency at the next congress in four years time.

Following the congress, the Political Commission of UNITA confirmed that Joaquim Ernesto Mulato, would be the Deputy President of the party.

At that meeting, which was chaired by Isaias Samakuva, it was also announced that Mario Miguel Kanhali Vatura would assume the post of secretary general of the party.

UNITA has also announced on Wednesday, 2 July that they intend to remain in the "Government of National Unity and Reconciliation" until the next election. The date of the next election (probably 2005) is still unknown and may only be decided during the MPLA congress in December this year.

The victory of Samakuva caught most observers completely by surprise, as Gato had been the expected to win (also by our Embassy in Luanda) prior to the commencement of congress. A reliable source told our Ambassador in Luanda, Mr Msimanga, that a smear campaign had been Gato’s downfall. In the run up to the congress a rumour had been circulated in the press that the Angolan government had struck a deal with Gato. According to the deal the MPLA would back Gato’s candidacy and in return Gato would support President Dos Santos’ campaign for national presidency in the next election.

Within the party, Gato’s opponents, who alleged that Gato had sold-out to the Angolan government following the Luena Accord, reinforced this rumour. It was believed that the Angolan government had spared Gato’s life after killing Savimbi in return for Gato’s co-operation.

Our Embassy in Luanda has also reported earlier that Samakuva was spending a lot of money before the election which has no doubt assisted in getting him elected. There is no certainty where he obtained the money. The Desk's (logical) guess would be from the French. Not only was he UNITA's representative in Paris for a long time, the French also refused to take any action against him, or limit is movements, as was required by UN resolutions at that time. As United States oil companies are paramount in Angola, it is not that easy for the French, which is also active in the area, to gain a foothold.

There were fears before the congress that UNITA will split in two factions. This possibility now seems remote as Gato undertook to remain loyal and promote unity within UNITA. Our Embassy reported that it was clear at the congress that Gato still commands respect, in the party and his call for unity may indicate that UNITA will not easily split into factions.

It has further been reported that Mr. Samakuva’s victory came as a surprise to the MPLA which had always maintained that GATO would win.

3.2 With regard to the Joint Commission, there have been preparatory meetings by officials in Pretoria (May 2001) and Luanda (August 2002). The first meeting of the Joint Commission was held on 27 and 28 February 2003 in Pretoria. The following topics were discussed:

An agreement on the waiving of visas for diplomatic and official passports was also signed during this meeting by the two chairpersons, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr N C Dlamini-Zuma and the Angolan Minister for External Relations, Dr J B de Miranda. During his visit, Minister De Miranda was also received by President Mbeki.

Officials from both countries had a "follow-up" meeting in Luanda between 9 and 11 July 2003 to discuss matters flowing from the February JCC meeting.

3.3 In general bilateral between South Africa and Angola have greatly improved in recent times as evidenced from regular visits between senior officials from both countries. Last year, there have been visits to Angola by the South African Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Water Affairs and Forestry, Home Affairs, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, as well as Minerals and Energy.

3.4 Additionally, there has been a visit by the South African Deputy President (as mentioned in 1.3 above), several Deputy Ministers and even exchanges between Provincial authorities of both countries. A delegation from the Angolan "Bie" Province visited the Free State between 12 and 15 March 2003. The South African Military authorities also enjoy excellent relations with their Angolan counterparts and regular exchanges occur between the two.

South Africa has the following priorities in respect of its relations with Angola:

A number of Government departments have been participating in the work of an inter-departmental committee established by the Minister of Social Development in May 2002 to co-ordinate arrangements around the issue of an appeal for humanitarian contributions for the people of Angola. Undertakings to provide financial contributions and in-kind assistance have been received from a number of departments and civil-society institutions.

The Department of Agriculture has contributed of maize seed and 200 spades to be utilised during the planting season. The Gift of the Givers Foundation has contributed 50 tons of maize meal and 10 tons of bottled water, with further contributions of in-kind assistance to follow. The South African Secret Service has donated R200 000, which was to be used for medicines. The Department of Education has donated R10 000 and Transnet has donated R500 000 to the Fund as well. The Department of Foreign Affairs has donated R1 million to the Fund. The Department of Transport has organised Delmas Shipping Lines to transport the goods from Durban to Angola for free.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr NC Dlamini Zuma, officially handed over the first of the humanitarian assistance to the Angola’s Ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Mr IFM dos Anjos. The symbolic hand-over ceremony took place on 28 October 2002 at the offices of the Department of Social Development. This consignment arrived in Luanda at the end of November 2002, but unfortunately was held up at Angolan customs up to July 2003, in spite of direct appeals to the Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs by Minister Dlamini Zuma and to his deputy by the South African Ambassador in Luanda.

Angola has close relations with its neighbours and further afield with The United States and Portugal. It considers itself to be a regional power and does not hesitate to intervene politically or militarily in the region if its interests are felt to be at stake.

It has a Defence pact with the DRC, Zimbabwe and Namibia and also sent troops to the DRC to assist President Kabila. Previously it intervened militarily in the Congo (Brazzaville) and helped to install President Sassou-Nguesso in power. However, it seems that relations with Zimbabwe have cooled down considerably following differences over strategies in the DRC.

Angola was also prominent in efforts to resolve the recent crisis in Sao Tome and Principe. Apparently it was very much against he request for South Africa to also play a role in the mediation process.

With the United States, relations became increasingly closer over the past few years and the Angolans were very upset when President Bush did not visit Angola on his recent African tour.

The United States have been heavily involved in Angola for more than twenty years, first only politically and then increasingly economically.

During the cold war the United States supported UNITA, but as it became increasingly clear that the Angolan coast contained lakes of oil, American oil companies, especially Chevron, became involved in undersea oil exploration and also managed to come to an understanding with the MPLA Government.

Following the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola in 1989, the independence of Namibia the year after, and the end of the cold war in 1991, relations between the USA and Angola improved somewhat and were consolidated during the first elections in Angola in 1992.

From 1992, the import of Angolan oil into the United States increased dramatically and it is today estimated that between nine and ten percent of US oil imports come from Angola. US oil companies control more than eighty percent of the oil production (in cooperation with the Angolan State oil firm "Sonangol").

With the close economic cooperation came close political cooperation and the United States quietly and gradually shifted its support from UNITA to the MPLA. The MPLA also changed from a Marxist regime to a government open to private enterprise. The result was that when UNITA resumed hostilities in 1998, it received no support or encouragement from the United States, who, in fact, supplied training to Angolan troops. It was also alleged that the accurate bombing of UNITA bases at the towns of Bailundu and Andulo in September 1999 was only due to the availability of American satellite photos of the towns.

American involvement in and policy towards Angola is dictated by its oil interests and it is very likely that American dependence on Angolan oil will increase. It has been said that the United States consider the instability of the Middle East – and the major source of their oil – to be permanent, while the problems in Africa are considered to be temporary and surmountable. A major concern of the United States therefore is to shift its oil sources from the Middle East to Africa as much as possible.

In view of these close relations, the MPLA Government felt insulted by the attitude of their largest trading partner which President visited Africa but excluded Angola from his itinerary. The US Embassy in Luanda explained that the reason President Bush could not visit Angola was that the country does not meet the safety and security requirements for the President of the US to visit.

What deepened the chagrin of the MPLA leadership, was that the current US Administration has put the energy needs of the US foremost in its conduct of foreign policy. Accordingly, with Angola providing so much of the energy needs of the US, they should also have been afforded the opportunity to host President Bush.