Reference A: Interim Setai Committee Report dated 16 August 2000

1. Staffing Situation. The staffing process in the SANDF continues apace. As at 15 February 2003, 79,05% of all SANDF members have been staffed.

SECTION 3: MAINSTREAM ISSUES

GENERAL OVERVIEW (3.1)

2. In the general overview the Committee outlines the integration and representivity guidelines.
3. As stated in the note to paragraph 3.1 of the report, there is some repetition and overlapping in the report. This necessarily gives rise to some repetition and overlapping in the response.

TRANSFORMATION, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (3.2)

Transformation: High Level Considerations (p. 21) (3.2.1)

4. The Committee observes that "one gets the impression that too little of the right value has been added to the Minister’s instructions on the way down". This point is contested.
5. As the Committee has noted, the Minister instructed that transformation take place. It was, however, a corporate decision with regard to the scale and scope of transformation and the timescales involved. As has also been observed, many people within the DOD regarded structural transformation (changing the organisation structures) as the primary effort. Human and structural transformation took a back seat.
6. With hindsight it is clear that the magnitude of the structural transformation was over-ambitious. It was under-resourced. The timescales were overly optimistic. The capacity of the people and the organisation to absorb change was over-estimated. In addition, the underlying new organisational concepts were radical, and in some instances untried.
7. A number of assumptions underlying the structural transformation and the subsequent right sizing did not materialise. Foremost among these was the non-approval of the preferred exit plan option. (Retrenchment). Furthermore, the funds for the structural transformation had to be found within the DOD. On top of this, Treasury radically cut the operating funds of the DOD over the FY1997/98 and FY1998/99 financial years.
8. The shift to the new organisation structures probably took place prematurely but there was not much choice. There were still unresolved but critical issues of integration. Insufficient time was allowed for the structuring and the structure approval process. These had a major influence on staffing, which itself was bound by an unwieldy process in order to achieve fairness. Staffing has subsequently been a nightmare. It has affected everyone in the organisation, from the top leadership right down to the lowest individual. Once again, with hindsight, a simpler, more practical and better phased staffing would have helped to avoid many ills.
9. The Committee has correctly identified the complexity of the new organisational structures. Layers of service agreements cannot substitute for simple command and control relationships, they can only complement them.
10. Any major change carries with it risks. It is also a very difficult period as people adjust to the new organisation and its implications. Plans are necessarily adjusted as experience is gained. It all requires vision, sensitivity and insight, a strong resolve, and resilience. (This issue is also discussed in paragraphs 13 to 17 and 37 to 38)
11. The SANDF still has to achieve normalised representivity levels in its advanced musterings, at entry level and amongst its middle management. This requires a continuously driven effort, but this objective will realistically not be realised over the short to near medium term.
12. The situation regarding ineffective/unutilisable members, especially at junior rank levels, who could be regarded as "surplus" to the SANDF’s operational requirements, has not changed since the initial report.
13. In order to attain the DOD’s vision to ensure effective defence for a democratic South Africa, the SANDF requires a bulk of young, fit and healthy soldiers, broadly representative of the population in terms of the Defence Review guidelines of 64,6% Africans, 10,2% Coloureds, 0,75% Asians and 24,3% Whites. The current service system has, as noted in paragraph 21 above, not provided appropriate mechanisms and enabling support systems to ensure the rejuvenation of the SANDF’s HR composition through the rapid throughput of young soldiers. The result is that a large number of the SANDF’s Privates, Lance Corporals and Corporals, as well as lesser numbers of other personnel in combat positions, are by far exceeding the reasonable age-rank utilisation criteria applicable to fighting soldiers in the respective ranks. This leads to such members being ineffective for operational utilisation and deployments and contributes to stagnation and low morale.
14. Through the integration of forces, the SANDF’s support posts are fully and even over-subscribed, leaving no internal options to accommodate such members as the closure of units takes place.
15. There is currently a large number of soldiers in the lower rank groups who do not meet the criteria for effective operational utilisation and deployments. These members therefore constitute a pool amongst whom reskilling and redeployment and/or alternative utilisation can occur, paving the way for the expeditious constructive reduction of the DOD’s personnel strength to the Defence Review target of 70 000, whilst at the same time enabling the recruitment of young, fit and healthy soldiers with appropriate utilisation profiles.
16. The large number of ineffective/unutilisable members act as a significant constraint on the DOD’s financial and infrastructure capacity to phase in larger numbers of youthful potential as part of the implementation of the SANDF’s new service system.
17. The SA Army’s response is given below by way of example:

1. The SA Army is a personnel intensive organisation. Over the period 1996 to 1998 the DOD embarked on the planning of transformation in the DOD and the implementation thereof. One of the results of this process was a DOD Force Design approved by the Minister of Defence on 5 March 1999 whereby the SA Army Force Design consisted of 32 000 Regular Force members.
2. Concurrent with the process of approval of the Force Design, the DOD embarked on a process to downsize the DOD and the Secretary for Defence approved an SA Army Post Structure of 24 800 Regular Force members, the so called "Crunch" Force Design Model. Not withstanding the reduction of the SA Army Force Design levels, it was expected of the SA Army to provide force levels for internal stability exceeding the capabilities retained in the SA Army Force Design. The SA Army pointed out the deficiencies to the DOD and proposed a Transitional Force Design. One of the reasons for this proposal was the fact that no exit mechanism for members exceeding the post structure of 24 800 existed. (±18 000 members were affected).
3. The Minister then approved the SA Army Transitional Force Design of ± 33 900 members on 15 June 2000. Not withstanding the "increased" Force Design, ± 8000 members still were surplus mechanism because the actual strength of the SA Army in June 2000 was ±43 000 members.

18. "A comprehensive review of the Transformation Process should be undertaken"
19. The Auditor-General has conducted a performance audit in the DOD and concluded that the DOD has achieved 83.6% success rate with the implementation of its formal transformation project.
20. The Plenary Defence Staff Council has decided that the original transformation project be closed and replaced by a process of continuous organisation development and improvement, supported by new strategies and supportive systems.

Lack of Funds (p. 21) (3.2.2)

21. The comment by the Committee that "severe budget cuts and the down-sizing create a threatening unemployment crisis within the SANDF" is concurred with.
22. For the SA Army, finance is not seen as the biggest factor but a major constraint. Within the SA Army no funding is available for transformation per se over and above the normal capital, operating and maintenance funding. Presently operating funds are being utilised merely to keep the SA Army going at an unsatisfactory level and with inadequate funds left for transformation. It is an irrefutable fact that the transformation per se of any organisation has a price attached to it. With respect to transformation, the SA Army recommends that all structural and other adjustments be made speedily to ensure that combat readiness is restored.
23. The lack of funds affects the SA Army SAAF, SA Navy, SAMHS and the functional divisions severely. The situation of the Army is discussed below in some detail by way of example.
24. Within the SA Army no funding is available for transformation. During 1997/98, the SA Army faced a series of major budget cuts – becoming a financial driven organisation rather than a "needs" driven SA Army. The result of budget "cuts" then and now, is a very expensive SA Army HR component – "eating up" two thirds of the allocated budget, leaving the Capital and Operating environment with only a third of the budget!
25. Considering the above, the ever increasing cost in respect of the HR component (the 9% salary adjustment of July 2002 and the envisaged 8% salary adjustment for July 2003 as an example), the SA Army will have to continuously downsize to maintain an affordable and sustainable force! However, this is obviously not the required solution, adequate financial resources need to be allocated to the SA Army on an annual basis allowing for at least a "balance". To enable this "balanced" picture in respect of the SA Army to materialise, either the HR component need to drastically downsize or the Capital and Operating Budget need to increase to remain in equilibrium with the HR component (50% HR; 25% Operating; 25% Capital).
26. The current Strategic Alignment exercise being executed by the SA Army for approval by the Minster of Defence during April 2003 is striving for

1. an affordable and sustainable SA Army (budget driven).
2. An Army Force of 23 000 Regular Force and PSAPs and ±6000 MSD members.

27. The envisaged affordable force design (SA Army Strategic Alignment exercise) of 23000 Regular Force and PSAP is a financial driven organisation and not a need driven organisation.
28. The SA Army external commitments (Regional Security role) are:

1. A ±700 strong protection force in Burundi.
2. 150 technical personnel serving with the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC, as well as observers in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
3. Apart from this, the SA Army is also committed to provide one more battalion for the expanded Op MONUC Force in the DRC as well as an additional battalion to monitor the cease fire in Burundi.
4. Allowing for rotation ("6 months in and then out"), it translates into approximately 12 000 fit and healthy SA Army troops (G1K1).
5. At the same time, the SA Army must supply 11 x Rifle companies for internal stability and border protection (11 x 155 = 1705 SA Army troops on a daily basis) – before allowing for rotation.
6. The current reality in respect of the SA Army HR capability is that it is over-stretched. Any deduction in force levels will only further over-stretch the SA Army - an even bigger "mismatch" between what is expected of the SA Army and what it can currently deliver. Looking at the medium to long term, it is quite clear that the current SA Army of some 34 000 members, is inadequate.
7. HR Strategy 2010 has not yet been fully implemented in the SANDF. It is the obvious approach to ensure a properly staffed SA Army in the future, but it does not take the current external realities of South Africa in consideration - a high unemployment rate, not sufficient job creation and a high criminality figure.

Governance and Management of Change (p. 22) (3.2.3)

29. The DOD recognizes the hardships created by the transformation process, particularly the structural transformation. It is a regrettable part of any major restructuring and downsizing activity. The disruption to individuals and their families in factors such as housing, transport and detached duties is inescapable
30. Communication is described by the Committee as "inadequate". This may be so, but a major focus was communication. It is difficult to combat dislocation, disruption and pain with communication. By its nature, large scale change is fertile ground for rumours.
31. Similarly, procedures are disrupted by large scale change. There has been an almost total re-alignment between specialist functions in the DOD and the line functions of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Service. With respect to the grievance procedure the delays are consistent with what is to be expected when a difficult change environment, as a source of grievances, is coupled to a radical restructuring and reduction of the personnel function, which is the main route for addressing grievances.
32. Significant progress has been made since the introduction of this process and the SAAF has established a formal strategic direction model to guide it towards achieving this end. Various strategies and supporting sub-strategies are in place, whilst an over-arching long-term Strategic Transformation Plan towards SAAF Vision 2012 has been developed for implementation during the current year. During its developmental stages this plan was presented to all the top-level forums in the DOD and was finally approved by the Council on Defence on 21 February 2003. The primary objective of this Strategic Transformation Plan is to enable the SAAF to achieve its transformation objectives, which in turn will ensure that the SAAF remains an organisation of national pride and a formidable source of combat ready air power.
33. In the Navy direction and clarity with regard to the transformation process and the future has been facilitated by such mechanisms as the Navy Review and the SA Navy Communication Plan.
34. Paragraph 3.6.2 deals comprehensively with the progress re communication.
35. As grievance procedures are an integral part of human resource management the Directorate Service Labour Relations is currently interfacing with the Chief Human Resources Policy with a view to streamlining grievance procedures or, if necessary, formulate new grievance procedures which will expedite the resolution of grievances.

The Role of the Secretary for Defence (p. 23) (3.2.4)

36. Given the geographical spread and sheer number of staffing decisions and interactions it would have been impossible for the Secretary to intervene. Since the transfer of the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate to the Secretary for Defence in 2000 there is greater vigilance over adherence to the staffing guidelines. This has been aided by a slackening in the tempo of staffing, as numerous organisations reach the end of this exercise. The achievement of representivity is clearly a process stretching over time. It has to be balanced against the maintenance of the defence capability and the rate at which knowledge can be acquired and transferred, and experience can be gained. The Committee gives more substance to this issue at paragraph 3.2.13. of the report (National and Regional Demographics).
37. The statement by the Committee "What seems to be lacking is planning and decisions on the top command level followed by the issuing clear and attainable instructions and orders" is noted. It is a moot point. Instructions and guidelines were issued. Great reliance had to be placed in the Service and Divisional Chiefs to restructure, get their structures approved and then staff in competition with the rest of the organisation. Given the wholesale nature of the changes it may have seemed as if planning and decisions were lacking. As far as engineering staffing results to achieve a particular target is concerned, this was virtually impossible. The whole situations was simply too fluid.
38. An example of the ongoing programme of issuing and updating instructions and plans are give below. It relates to representivity and affirmative action. See also the progress which is described in paragraph 173 to 181.
39. The Department of Defence (DOD) has committed itself to representivity as a strategic issue to effect the Constitutional imperative as stated inter alia in the Defence Review and the White Paper on Defence.
40. The first DOD policy in this regard was the DOD Policy on Equal Opportunities (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) issued as SANFO C Pers/1/98 dated 3 June 1998 and DODI Pol and Plan No 1/98 dated 1 June 1998. Representivity is specifically defined in this document as: "…. the extent to which the demographic composition of the DOD at all levels broadly corresponds with the demographic composition of all people in South Africa".
41. This policy also clearly states that one of the principles of Affirmative Action as being" "…to ensure that the DOD, its leadership in particular, is broadly representative of the population."
42. This benchmark policy of the DOD (presently under review) also prescribes that barriers to affirmation are to be identified and rectified and ensuring that responsibilities for achieving the DOD’s goals with AA are delegated to appropriate levels.
43. The EO and AA Policy was followed up by the DOD’s Affirmative Action Plan which was issued on 5 July 2000. This Plan deals extensively with representivity as an issue. All Services and Formations, were in terms of the Plan, required to submit their respective plans on AA to the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD) earlier this year. Currently their respective plans are being reviewed one by one in order to identify barriers to AA in the DOD with a specific look at representivity as an issue. This will also give an indication as to the holistic picture and the interventions needed to rectify shortcomings even if it is on policy level.
44. The AA Plan made specific mention of such possible shortcomings in the DOD structure and assigned responsibilities to Services, Formations and Directorates in dealing with these. One such a recommendation was that the "…. perception of racial and ethnic tension" should be managed. To this end the EOCD has drafted a policy on the prevention and elimination of racism in the DOD that was issued as DODI Pers No 12/99 dated 14 June 2001.
45. The Plan also called on the DOD to make AA a strategic issue and this was recently incorporated in the DOD HR Strategy 2010.
46. Various structures to give effect to the Constitutional imperative of representivity and EO were put in place – the establishment of the EOCD, DOD Gender Forum, DOD Disability Forum, AA Forum and the DOD EO and AA Advisory Board are but to name a few.
47. Generally it can thus be said that the DOD has addressed the issue of representivity sufficiently and that results will be more clear now that the AA plans are coming off line and structures are starting to function more effectively. There is no doubt that we have made very good progress in terms of representivity since 1994.
48. There are however small nuances that need some clarification; these being:

1. What is our understanding of "broadly representative"? Does it imply down to unit level and individual musterings? (This is not very clear in any of our mentioned policies and there is mainly a mentioning of management level and up). "Broadly representative" The Executive Summary of the EO/AA Policy states clearly that the Instruction give guidelines as to the DOD’s position towards Equal Opportunities. how it should be implemented to the lowest levels and how Affirmative Action is a management tool to be used to attain the goals of Equal Opportunities. "Broadly representative" also refers to the alignment and reflection of the DOD position to the demographics of the South African population.
2. Does it imply "economic active population"? Yes all the DOD population is economically engaged form the highest level to the lowest level worker., because Par 3 of the EO/AA Policy says that many years of enforced discriminatory policies in the Republic of South Africa resulted in the deliberate marginalisation of certain persons or categories of persons the historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI’s) or the designated groups .
3. What do we say about regional representivity as clearly stated in the Setai Report as a problem? How do we acknowledge the regional distribution of our Coloured and Asian members and employees in the Cape and Natal areas for instance? It is understood that regional representivity is a handicap particularly in the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, but also it is imperative that initiatives aimed at supporting the national transformational strategies are undertaken to improve the current situation, like transfers.
4. What do we do in terms of "empowerment" versus "representivity"? Very often we concentrate just on the latter whilst the former should be our ultimate goal if we truly grasp the aim of AA. It is crucial that Affirmative Action is implemented in the context of empowerment for the designated groups. This is an all-inclusive approach as follows:

1. Access to both developmental and military training.
2. Fair distribution of performance incentives.
3. Fair and objective appraisal of performance.
4. Acknowledgement of promotional imperatives to enhance representivity.
5. Mentorship coupled to on the job training.

49. There is thus indeed a need to fine tune the DOD’s effort in addressing these issues as a matter of urgency and the SETAI Report has triggered new lines of thinking in this respect for which the DOD is grateful.
50. The progress with regard to representivity has been addressed in 2.3 paragraphs 37 to 42.

Reinforcement of the Command Line Function (p. 25) (3.2.5)

51. The Committee has correctly identified one of the most difficult issues arising from integration and transformation. The situation has been described in paragraph 10 to 43 of this response.
52. It is acknowledged that it was not possible to manage the change is closely as one would like. However, major progress has been made.
53. It is so that there was a focus on the structural transformation, at the expense of human and cultural transformation. Neither of these last two factors was ignored. It should also be recognised that human and cultural transformation is a much longer process.
54. Currently all aspects of transformation are being reviewed and changes may be forthcoming.

Monitoring and Once-off Adjustments (p. 27) (3.2.6)

55. The Committee states that "What seems to be lacking is command intervention" when "unforeseen problems arise". The Committee also refers to a "need of high level strategic intervention. An illustration of this need, is the provision of funds and the changing of regulations".
56. It needs to be stated that strenuous efforts have been made to deal with problems, whether the solution is internal or external to the DOD. It should be noted that transformational changes, which affect the DOD, emanate from many quarters in government.
57. On the question of once-off adjustments the DOD has acted.
58. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integrates to "catch up". The PDSC carefully considered a review of ranks of former non-statutory forces in respect of the first 1994 intakes but decided that before this could be pursued an audit of ranking by way of staff tests is to be carried out. The aim of the audit is to determine, based on the principle of clear prejudice suffered, whether a re-ranking is indicated in respect of specific members. The audit is being done in respect of 1 936 members in the rank group Corporal to Major. The records of 369 members have been audited thus far and indications are that only four members may possibly have suffered prejudice ie 1% of cases audited. The PDSC has instructed that the audit be expedited and it is expected that it will be completed on or before November 2001.
59. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integratees to "catch up".
60. "The Committee recommended that once-off adjustments could be considered in respect of the revision of the ranking of integratees and for them to catch up with qualifying courses that they have missed."
61. From the 2 229 cases, a DOD Audit Board had determined 384 cases of possible prejudice, as opposed to clear prejudice previously contemplated by the Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC). After considering the submission of the DOD Audit Board to the PDSC on 17 February 2003, the PDSC made the following decisions:

1. That the Audit of Ranking process, conducted over a period of more than two years, be considered as concluded and that no other ranks of the first 1994 intakes or any other intakes be subjected to similar auditing processes.
2. That a distinctly separate and subsequent process be followed in respect of the 384 cases by an "Ad Hoc Rank Adjustment Board" in conjunction with the Chiefs of Services and Divisions. This process should determine possible future recommended ranks for these members which will have to be submitted to the PDSC and authorised by the Chief of the SA National Defence Force.

62. Some members of the former TBVC forces claim that because of incomplete records they were under-ranked during integration. The statement is disputed as members of a former Statutory Forces (in this case a TBVC force) were integrated with their existing ranks and remuneration.
63. In terms of the scientific results of formal effect analysis reports, there has been a significant upward trend with regards to all morale-affecting issues, as measured on the ground recently.
64. The Committee makes the point that "Staffing of the management echelon is not representative." This is true. However, transformation is not an event but a process and it would therefore be unrealistic to expect the DOD at this early stage of the process to be totally representative at all levels. (See also paragraphs 97 to 109).
65. The situation is however continuously changing towards the desired end state as the degree of empowerment of the members of the DOD picks up momentum.
66. Staffing boards are unavoidably bound to whoever applied for a specific post (the range of applicants per post, in most cases, in itself is not representative).
67. The process of empowerment is an evolutionary process (which translates into, inter alia, time). Despite the fact that this process is evolutionary the DOD should be credited for the concerted effort that is underway towards the empowerment of its members. The Committee’s finding that representivity and prescripts regarding equity, fairness and equal opportunities, are being ignored, is not true.
68. The functions performed by the members of the DOD, especially where the fighting side end of the organisation is concerned, are often directly concerned with life and death issues, making the appointment of appropriately empowered leaders imperative.
69. Certain matters in the staffing policy are presently being revised in collaboration with the SA National Defence Union. The amendments to the staffing strategy will include matters like the attendance of recognised Military Trade Unions as observers, formal correspondence in respect of letters of appointment and the releasing of members to report to his/her new unit.
70. The Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC) has approved the Fast Tracking Policy. The implementation of the policy is, however, dependent on an implementation instruction, which is currently being drafted by a work group. The policy is to fast track those members properly identified. This policy has only recently been received and could thus not be applied earlier. It must be pointed out that fast tracking is not to be seen as fast tracking for promotion purposes, but fast tracking for empowerment purposes.

Outsourcing (p. 31) (3.2.7)

71. The problems quoted by the Committee confirm one of the findings of an internal investigation. A review of the outsourcing policy is underway in the DOD as part of the Transitional Strategy.
72. In support of its endeavours to become more affordable and sustainable, the SAAF has embarked upon a number of ventures to investigate and research the feasibility of co-use of high-value assets, such as air bases (e.g. SA Airways diversion airfields). Others include the possibility of entering into selective Public Private Partnerships to reduce support costs (e.g. Air Force Base Hoedspruit, Mariepskop, Air Force Station Ysterplaat, etc). The envisaged saving of about RM240 per annum from FY2004/05 due to revising and renegotiating expensive outsourced upkeep work.

IT Services (p. 31) (3.2.8)

73. In the paragraph it is specifically stated that the "four Arms of Service each have their own dedicated IT language, that are not compatible". It is indeed a fact that the DOD has a number of different internal e-mail (intranet) systems that evolved prior to transformation in the different Arms of Service. With the advent of the Command and Management Information (CMI) sub-division with its mandate to manage the IT environment centrally, the problem of incompatible internal e-mail systems has been addressed by the roll out of 3 000 locations of a DOD standard intranet e-mail system. This task was completed on 31 August 2001. The present DOD systems can communicate with and through the new systems over and above the fact that 3 000 new users (mainly in the Defence HQ environment) will be able to communicate. Once the new system is fully operational the planning for a further roll out will commence. The plan is that all legacy intranet E-Mail systems will in due course be replaced by one DOD intranet e-mail system.
74. Improvement of the DOD’s ability to manage the distribution of information to ensure effective communication a number of initiatives have been completed, or are in the process of being formalised. These include such tasks as the formulation of a DOD Information Strategy (DOD Info Strat) which will guide the establishment of a Defence Enterprise System. Both the Strategy and the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan are in the final stages of approval, with ratification of the Strategy expected by 31 March 2003 by the PDSC. It is expected that the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan will be ratified by the end of April 2003.
75. In support of the DOD Information Strategy and the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan, the CMI Systems and Services Requirements portfolio is currently being compiled, which will establish a single comprehensive CMI systems and services development plan for the DOD. This plan will, as a major drive, focus on establishing the required DOD Information Infrastructure and relevant applications to support DOD requirements for communication to support information management and distribution. Cognisance should be taken that there is, with the exception of limited funding on the DOD SANDF Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP) for weapon system related Information Communication and Technology systems, no funding for investment to ensure that the transformation of the DOD and especially communications as forthcoming from the SETAI Report can be realised.
76. The report states that the "general technology of the Department is behind other departments". This statement is not fully understood. If it refers to intranet E-Mail technology one will be inclined to agree. However this lack has been rectified with the new system that is in the process of being introduced. If the statement needs to be interpreted in a broader sense it will be very difficult to accept because the DOD has the use of a vast range of technologies in the information environment ranging from modern state of the art to old so called legacy systems. Whatever the case may be, it can be reported that CMI is in the process of developing a Master Information Technology Plan, which will ensure that the DOD acquires the appropriate information technologies within the constraints of the DOD budget.
77. With reference to the standardisation of e-mail in the DOD, phase one, which resulted in the implementation of standardised e-mail for 3 000 users, has been completed. The final decision on the technology to incorporate the interim e-mail solution into the bigger Military Messaging System (MMS) is expected during the second quarter of 2003. The e-mail solution will then be increased to first 5 000 users, and eventually 10 000 users. The further roll out of e-mail is however under serious risk due to insufficient funding.
78. It is also true that the DOD still has more than one logistical system. This has lead to duplication in maintenance of these systems as well as possible inefficiencies. A strategy is in place whereby the information needs of the DOD processes, including logistics, will be incorporated in the requirement statement for a Government Enterprise Application System that is currently developed by the Department of State Expenditure.
79. It should be noted that the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) actually evolved from INFOPLAN, the old DOD IT Agency.

Uncoordinated Initiatives (p. 31) (3.2.9)

80. The insecurity and frustration resulting from the restructuring and staffing processes is regretted. It was the unfortunate result of the fluidity of the situation with regard to designing, redesigning, structuring, restructuring and the differing speed of advance of the various components of the DOD. For some components it was easy; for others it was extremely complex. Overall, it was a mammoth undertaking.

Flow of Human Resources (p. 33) (3.2.10)

81. The Committee’s general comments on the flow of human resources are concurred with. To a degree the DOD was frustrated by the current HR Service System, which was adopted before 1994. It did not provide a suitable framework for the long-term HR health of the DOD. It also resulted in some unfairness and some other obstacles during the integration process. In addition, the non-approval of the preferred exit plan option (retrenchment) meant that the outflow of personnel was difficult to manage.
82. Once again, the Redeployment Plan and the HR Strategy 2010 will provide a better HR management framework and the individuals leaving will be properly prepared and cared for.
83. The flow of human resources is holistically addressed in the "Human Resources Strategy 2010."
84. The DOD’s findings regarding the ineffectiveness, inefficiency and uneconomical configuration of the current Flexible Term Service System, as elaborated in the DOD Human Resource Strategy 2010, remains unchanged and requires to be addressed in terms of the provisions of the strategy.
85. There is agreement with the statement at paragraph 3.3.12 of the Report that a defence force normally has a service system in terms of which Privates are employed on short-term contracts at a relatively low basic salary. Such Privates are trained, render service and most leave the force upon expiry of their contracts. Only a minority of each intake who perform better than their peers and have excellent development potential, are selected for further service.
86. The intention with the Flexible Service System, implemented upon the discontinuation of the former SADF’s conscript system, was to achieve optimal affordability through a flexible means to adjust force levels rapidly up and down according to the available budget and threat perception. The Short Term Service System (STS) had to accommodate most of the Privates on a two-year contract basis. The intention was that the STS should comprise 40% of the Regular Force. Only the best performers were to have been selected for the Medium Term Service System (MTS) (at which stage they would already have advanced in rank and not have been Privates anymore). The MTS should have accommodated 40% of the Regular Force. Members should have migrated from the Short, through the Medium, to the Long Term Service System (LTS), with strict selection being applied at each stage. The aim of the LTS was that it should only contain the SANDF’s command and management leader corps, therefore not comprising more than 20% of the Regular Force. This did not happen.
87. There was consistent pressure put on the SANDF not to terminate the service of Short Term Service members whose contracts expired, including those who did not prove to be good performers or members with good development potential. In addition, there were varied interpretations and implementation of the service system amongst the Services and Divisions. The continuous "roll-over" of such members’ contracts led to their exceeding the SANDF’s rank-age versus mustering requirements and becoming ineffective for operational utilisation.
88. In addition, the integration process of seven former forces also contributed to swell the numbers in the LTS. This was, however, a negotiated and understandable arrangement, to give former Non-Statutory Forces members equitable career development opportunities.
89. Since 1994, thousands of personnel who ought to have served only for short or medium contract periods, were translated to the Long Term Service System, bringing about a current Flexible Term Service System ratio where, as of 15 February 2003, only 8% of the Regular Force serve in the Short Term Service System, with 46% of members serving in the Medium Term Service System and 46% in the Long Term Service System.
90. The incorrect implementation of the current service system has resulted in a legacy where there are many members, including Privates, who have indeed developed a mindset of life-long employment. Irrespective of their advancement prospects, which may be constrained as a result of age, area boundness, physical condition etc, such members still maintain a mindset that the SANDF should provide them with a life-long career.
91. Phasing In of New Service System. Recognising the human resource flow dilemma, the Council on Defence during October 2000, approved the introduction of a new service system for the SANDF with effect from January 2003. Ito the new service system, only 20% of the Regular Force will be allowed to serve until retirement age, compared to the current service system wherein almost one half of the Regular Force are serving until retirement. The new service system, coupled to the provisions of the DOD HR Strategy 2010, requires that 40% of the Regular Force will comprise the Military Skills Development Service (MSD). Young, fit and healthy school leavers will be strictly selected to serve for a once-off two-year voluntary term in this component.
92. During January 2003, the first intake of 1 347 MSD members reported for training (also see previous paragraph).
93. All new recruits will be educated from day one that the SANDF cannot offer a life long career to all its members. It will be unambiguously communicated that most members will be reskilled and redeployed upon completion of their respective terms of contracts and that only the best performers with the best development potential may expect a longer term career, possibly until retirement.
94. A selection process will see to it that only the best performers with excellent development potential within the MSD will be selected for the second component, ie the Core Service System (CSS) which will comprise 40% of the Regular Force. Measures such as flexible contracts, early exit options, a tenure in rank policy, the implementation of an inherent rank-age vs mustering policy (approved by the Minister of Defence on 23 December 2002) and a continuous vocational training system through a DOD Redeployment Agency, will ensure the rejuvenation of the SANDF’s HR composition and the curbing of stagnation. Only 20% of the Regular Force will serve in the Senior Career System (SCS) until retirement.
95. Development of New Service System Components. With the MSD having been implemented, the current focus is on developing the detailed provisions of the remaining components of the SANDF’s new service system, ie the Core Service System and Senior Career System.
96. Enabling Mechanisms. The various enabling mechanisms to make the new service system work, such as new conditions of service and service benefits for the new service system components, an appropriate Exit Management Framework and the establishment of the DOD Redeployment Agency, are either in the development stage or their development will commence soon, as part of the implementation programme for the DOD HR Strategy 2010.
97. Migration to the New Service System. The process of migrating current members of the full-time uniformed component to the SANDF’s new service system (ie to either the Core Service System or the Senior Career System) should still be addressed. A voluntary migration dispensation is envisaged. Members will, however, have to comply with selection criteria to serve in the new service system, particularly the inherent rank-age vs mustering criteria, as approved by the Minister of Defence. Strict compliance with the latter criteria as an integral part of career management will constitute a critical factor to ensure the effective and efficient management of the new service system. This will enable the SANDF to avoid the recurrence of a build-up of non-compliant members who become un-utilisable in their musterings, leading to the deterioration of the SANDF’s deployment potential, as is currently the case.

Command Functions and Responsibilities (p 33) (3.2.11)

98. In this section the Committee focuses on the basic organisational design of the SANDF. The Committee presents their point of view and concludes with the remark "It is clear that a lot of soul searching is needed. Perhaps the Defence Force needs to dig deep in its tradition to address certain issues of a fundamental nature".
99. The underlying philosophy or an organisation is a matter of choice. In the DOD the choice was made that Force Preparation and Force Employment should, in organisation terms, be separated. This means that the Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Service, prepare forces, and the Chief of Joint Operations employs the forces.
100. Furthermore it was decided that in a given town or area the specialised functions such as personnel administration and common logistic support for all SANDF units in the area should be pooled in a General Support Base. The purpose was to reduce the cost of support.
101. Some of the consequences of these decisions are what the Committee describes. However, the full picture is not given. For any organisation design there have to be compromises. Advantages and disadvantages of one approach have to be traded off against those of other approaches. In the case in point the DOD has opted for the advantages of the present system. The disadvantages are considered to be outweighed by the advantages.
102. It takes time for any new approach to become established and have everyone accustomed to the different way of working.
103. The situation on the ground is being monitored. Already there are actions to adjust the organisation and the way it works as experience and insight is gained.
104. The present new system has reached a high stage of deployment. It may be inopportune to interfere. However, if the need for a major change becomes apparent the DOD is capable of exercising its judgement in collaboration with all stakeholders.

Civilian vs Non-civilian posts (p. 35) (3.2.12)

105. In paragraph 3.2.12 it is stated that "the issue of common posts is highly contentious and that civilians feel that ex-soldiers continue to be favoured over them in the filling of posts. A significant majority of them feel highly frustrated." It is unclear what is meant with the statement and it is therefore difficult to provide comments on the subject. It could be Public Service Act Personnel who complain about the staffing of demilitarised personnel but HR Support Centre in this regard has received no complaints. Cognisance should however be taken of the "Standing Principles for Post Classifications in the Department of Defence" (DODI 29/2000) which states that a common post is where any mustering can be considered for staffing.
106. The definition of a common post has been determined and means a post that can be staffed by personnel from any occupational class within the military groupings or Public Service Act mustering depending on the classification of posts. Posts in the DOD are either that of a Military Practitioner in accordance with the military Personnel Management Code or a Public Service Act post in accordance with the Code of Remuneration. A DODI regarding the Standing Principles for Creating and Classifying Posts in the DOD has been promulgated.
107. Arising from the DOD’s organisation design principles, the DOD developed a policy (DODI 71/2002) which differentiates between the criteria for the establishment of military versus civilian posts. Military posts are created in terms of the SANDF’s core business and responsibilities where military training and the profession of soldiering are prerequisite. Civilian posts are created for non-core business functions and to ensure that the role and functions of the Secretary for Defence (as Head of the Department and accounting officer) are adequately addressed.
108. A DODI 19/2000, has been issued to regulate vacation leave, sick leave and the different types of special leave for SA National Defence Force members. This instruction was disseminated to all levels within the Department on 9 October 2000.
109. In terms of the PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000, a Department of Defence Instruction to regulate vacation leave, sick leave and the different types of special leave for Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP) is at present being compiled. This instruction will have to be negotiated with Labour and upon acceptance thereof will be implemented within the Department of Defence (DOD).
110. A new instrument for both PSAP and Military members are being developed for implementation for 2001/2002 and onwards by Director Service Systems.
111. The policy with regard to Special Leave for the military is part of a DODI, which is still in the process of completion. The comparison with PSAP is, however, not valid as most military activities and training is done in groups where the absence of individuals could render the activity unsuccessful or cause gaps in training. This could have life threatening consequences. Consequently it may be "easier" to grant special leave to PSAP members. The special demands of military life have to be acknowledged.
112. Leave dispensation for SANDF (military) members has been brought in line with that of the rest of the Public Service.
113. With the promulgation of DODI 19/2000 it was stated that although the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), No 75 of 1997 did not apply to the SANDF, transverse changes may be imminent, with the result that DODI 19/2000 may have to undergo changes in due course.
114. Since the promulgation of DODI 2000, Resolution No 7 of 2000 was introduced for PSAP members, which became effective from 1 July 2000. This Resolution was an initiative from Government to cut down on costs, increase productivity, and to ensure better administration.
115. With the amendment of this DODI, the SANDF followed suit in supporting the broader Public Service approach in as far as these changes did not affect the operational capability and HR Strategy 2010. The changes incorporated in DODI 19/2000 (Edition 2), as approved in January 2003, includes the following:

1. Changing from calendar days to working days. This change has been incorporated to avoid unnecessary expenses for the SANDF.
2. Compulsory utilisation of leave. As from the start of the leave cycle on 1 January 2003, members will be compelled to utilise 10 consecutive working days leave per cycle. Leave not utilised after six months of the leave cycle will be forfeited. The exception is, leave that could not be utilised owing to operational exigencies, can be paid out to a maximum of 22, 26 or 28 working days. On resignation leave will also be paid out to a maximum of 31 working days.
3. The capping of accrued leave. The leave accrued before 1 April 2002, will be added for purposes of payment on retirement, death, medical boarding or retrenchments.
4. Discounting of leave. The discounting of leave will take place at intervals of five years and the formula will change from 365 calendar days to 260.714 working days.
5. Sick leave. Sick leave will change from 120 days with full pay, 120 with half pay, and unpaid leave up to a maximum of 365 days. A member will now have 36 working days normal sick leave in a three-year cycle with the addition of three other categories of sick leave with effect from 1 January 2004. The one category is temporary incapacity. In this category a member can get 30 working days sick leave which could be extended if a medical practitioner finds the member temporarily incapacitated to perform his or her duties. The following category is permanent incapacity. This category makes provision that if a member, after an investigation, is found to be permanently incapacitated, the member will be placed in another post to accommodate his or her disablement, or be medically boarded. The last category, occupational injuries and diseases, was in the previous dispensation, but is now included as sick leave. The restriction of 240 days is lifted to make provision for an unlimited period. This whole provision for sick leave is more beneficial than the previous provision as a person's salary will no longer be halved or lost if he or she is sick for longer than 120 days. A further category, other than that applicable to PSAP has been added. The category, Leave for Military Training and Operational Injuries and Related Diseases will cater for illnesses as the name indicates.
6. Maternity leave. Maternity leave is changed from, a limited two confinements, of 84 days per confinement, to an unrestricted number of confinements, and to a period of four months per confinement. This provision is also more beneficial than the previous provision.
7. Deployment Leave. The previous provision of Rest Day Leave is changed to Deployment leave and the periods for qualifying for this type of leave has been shortened and limited to a maximum of 24 working days per cycle.

National and Regional Demographics (p. 36) (3.2.13)

116. The Committee makes the following statement:

"The execution of the Minister’s instruction that the SANDF reflect the national population demographics at Unit level, as also within each rank, corps and mustering is problematic."

117. This issue has been mentioned in paragraphs 99 to 110).
118. Since 1994, the SANDF has made substantial progress to align its representivity ratios with the national demographic ratios, especially regarding racial representivity. The representation of Blacks (ie Africans, Coloureds and Asians) in the Full-time Component has increased from 55,3% as at 27 April 1994 to 75,3% currently. The representation of women has also increased, though marginally, from 19,7% as at 27 April 1994 to 20,9% currently.
119. The optimal alignment of the SANDF’s representivity ratios is, however, not an easy or short-term endeavour. Despite recruiting, staffing, promotion and career development initiatives which are executed in compliance with the governing regulatory criteria, including the DOD Affirmative Action Plan, to enhance representivity, particular areas still deserve focused attention. These include the enhancement of representivity in the SANDF’s specialised musterings, which are predominantly White (eg pilots, engineers, technical officers and professional health workers); the enhancement of representivity amongst middle management, which is predominantly White and the enhancement of representivity at the entry level, which is predominantly African, especially in the SA Army.
120. The enhancement of representivity in the SANDF’s specialised musterings enjoys high prominence, as witnessed by the implementation of the DOD Youth Foundation Training Programme with effect from April 2001. Through this programme a number of Black school leavers are annually sponsored by the SANDF to improve especially their Grade 12 Mathematics and Physical Science symbols through an intensive residential training programme. The aim is to be selected for appointment in the SANDF’s specialised musterings upon successful completion of the training programme. The number of candidates is limited by funds.
121. Regarding the normalisation of representivity amongst middle management, it is accepted that efforts such as fast tracking, are to be utilised to expedite the process. The unique reality of the military domain is, however, that uniformed personnel, especially those in combat and technical musterings, cannot primarily be appointed directly from the public into middle management positions. In order to have credibility amongst peers and subordinates, such personnel ought to grow and progress through the ranks. Besides interventions such as fact tracking and direct appointments from outside, where feasible, the primary emphasis can therefore only be on the SANDF’s continuing recruiting efforts, which would lead to the normalisation of representivity amongst middle management over the medium to long term.
122. It is agreed with the statement in the report that different population groups have certain predilections regarding which Service or even base or unit they want to serve in. Service in the SANDF is based on volunteerism and no individual can be compelled to serve in a particular establishment against her/his will. This very fact has, for example, led to the SA Army attracting more African recruits than recruits from other population groups. Recruiting efforts in respect of the SA Army should now, therefore, be focused on obtaining intakes which reflect a higher ratio of Coloureds, Asians and Whites.
123. The reality of regionalism also influences the SANDF’s demographic footprint. The long established geographical presence of the SA Navy in the Western Cape and Durban, for example, has led to the SA Navy, proportionally amongst the various Services, accommodating the highest ratio of Coloureds and Asians. The DOD Affirmative Action Plan (see paragraph 103) recognises the above reality, stating that it is inevitable that the respective Services will have a more prevalent race group.
124. The SANDF is committed to work ceaselessly to attain optimal representivity levels in all specific domains such as specialised musterings, middle level management and at entry level. The SANDF is availing its full ability to ensure that the normalisation of representivity throughout the organisation is legal, fair and just and that the process has integrity. Given the scope of the challenge, however, the normalisation of representivity in respect of all its potential permutations, such as the regional focus, will of necessity be a long term endeavour.
125. The SAAF is committed to having a workforce that reflects the diversity of South African society. It has embarked on a strategy to transform its workforce to reflect the demographics of the country. However, due to a variety of reasons, among them the perceived lack of suitable candidates from the historically disadvantaged communities and the budget constraints under which the SAAF has found itself, the pace at which transformation has taken place has not been fast enough to satisfy the wishes of many
126. The SAAF HR component does not reflect the total demographic composition of the South African Economically Active Population (EAP), although it is committed to rectify the situation The SAAF’s human resource race distribution per rank reflects a low percentage of Africans, Asians and Coloureds in the senior officer and non-commissioned officer ranks. The race distribution in the junior ranks is demographically more representative. This, however, is indicative of the uniqueness of the military rank structure that requires a mainly bottom-up staffing approach. Furthermore, the achievement of representivity in a technologically advanced environment is a slow process due to the lack of readily available technological expertise in the broad labour market.
127. The SA Navy’s implementation of affirmative action has consistently striven to maintain a holistic perspective. It has been noted that the Durban area has a high component of Asian personnel, with Simon’s Town accommodating a greater number of Coloured members. Thus the targets have been interpreted in such a manner as to accommodate regional demographics.
128. The committee recommended that "the SANDF should endeavour to place individual members as close as possible to their families, notwithstanding organisational requirements."
129. This is the responsibility of career manager focus points located within the various Services and Divisions.
130. The Committee also recommended that "large-scale marketing be conducted to attract suitable potential to the SANDF in order to facilitate the attainment of representivity objectives."
131. It can be stated that in terms of the January 2003 intakes for the SA Army, SA Navy and SAMHS, sufficient responses were elicited from white candidates in order to meet the pre-determined targets as determined by the previously mentioned Services.
132. Furthermore, in order to counter any possible shortfalls of whites at entry level, the Directorate Personnel Acquisition (DPACQ) is planning an extensive and focused marketing and recruiting effort on a Nation-wide basis which will include the following activities:

1. The identification of predominantly white schools and the conducting of recruitment briefing to Gr 12 and 11 students in all the provinces.
2. The distribution of career information packs, recruitment posters and application forms to all schools, including predominantly white schools, for display and use of by Career Guidance Teachers.
3. Advertising in various career-related publications that are widely distributed to all schools, including Careers 2003/2004, Rainbow Careers, Reel 2 Reel (SABC Publication), and the A-Z of Careers.

133. SANDF Representivity per Population Group per Province: September 2001

Ser No	Province	Population Group
		African	Coloured	Asian	White
	A	b	C	d	E
1	Western Cape	19,3	44,1	1,9	34,5
2	North West	81,6	4,8	0,03	13,4
3	Eastern Cape	80,7	9,2	0	10
4	Northern Province	80,2	1	0,09	18,6
5	Northern Cape	54,6	31,3	0,1	16,9
6	Free State	69,8	7,9	0,05	22,1
7	Gauteng	61	4	0,7	34,1
8	Kwa-Zulu Natal	71,8	3,7	9	15,3
9	Mpumalanga	87,2	1,6	0	11
10	Total	60,7	12,2	1,2	25,7

134. The SANDF’s representivity per population group per province as at 15 February 2003, is reflected in the table below:

Ser No	Province	Population Group
		African	Coloured	Asian	White
	A	B	c	d	e
1	Western Cape	28,8	34,6	2,9	33,8
2	North West	81,4	6,2	0,02	12,2
3	Eastern Cape	81	9,5	0	9,4
4	Limpopo	79	1,5	0,1	19,2
5	Northern Cape	59,5	25,5	0,1	14,8
6	Free State	69	9,4	0,1	21,3
7	Gauteng	59,9	5,2	0,8	33,9
8	Kwa-Zulu Natal	74,2	3,9	9,1	12,7
9	Mpumalanga	89,3	1,9	0	8,6
10	Total	63,0	10,8	1,4	24,6

Command and Control Re-construction (p. 39) (3.2.14)

135. The question of dealing with the effects of the changed organisation structure have been addressed in Section 2: Change – the Military in Transformation and also in the response to the heading Command Functions and Responsibilities (See 3.2.11 paragraph 155 to 160)
136. At has been stated, the new system of command and control and support is in the process of implementation and adjustment. In due course the system will settle and the people who are responsible for delivering services will have adjusted to their new role.

Effects of Re-structuring in Process (p. 39) (3.2.15)

137. As has been discussed at paragraphs 10 to 13, paragraphs 73 to 77 and paragraphs 155 to 160 above, the new system is presently being implemented and teething troubles are being attended to.
138. An aspect which has created a problem during implementation is the absence of the organisation wide IT system, adjusted to the new way of doing things. The shortage of funds is the main handicap.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (3.3)

Integration (p. 40) (3.3.1)

139. The extensive integration exercise is now virtually completed, bringing together all the defence forces into one unified DOD. Owing to the financial constraints and the heavy burden on training resources and facilities, there is a backlog in bridging training. The different Services have drawn up a plan to expedite the completion of this project. Integration irregularities are progressively resolved; eg wrong deployment of members according to their functional competencies through staffing and low ranking of some members through appeals and review of ranks especially the groups that integrated in 1994.
140. The Military Psychological Institute will develop a battery to be used for psychometric testing with regard to the issue of counselling to separate members from the forces.

Staffing (p. 42) (3.3.2)

141. The Committee’s report covers staffing under three headings, viz General Overview; The Staffing Process and Affirmative Action; and Staffing and PVs (Temporary Employment Contract), PFs (Medium Term Contract) and PEs (Permanent Employment Contract). Many issues relating to staffing have already been covered earlier in the report and therefore in the response. What follows is a summary of the responses on each issue and references to earlier responses.
142. With regard to the general overview, it is acknowledged that the staffing process has been long and arduous. Given the scope of the changes to the organisation and the imperative to be fair to all, the staffing process had to be lengthy and administratively burdensome. The shift of units and structures and the resultant movement of people have had a big effect on the organisation and the lives of individuals. This is the price of change. Once it is over, and it is nearly over, the organisation will stabilise and more stability will return to the lives of the people affected.
143. The process used to staff the Military Component of the DOD was withdrawn on 4 October 2001 and has been replaced with an interim procedure "Interim Procedure Instruction: Identification of Defence Act Members for Placement in Vacant Posts" promulgated on 23 January 2002, which makes provision for an informal ad hoc procedure that will be used for the unforeseen occurrences and the critical need to fill certain posts. Succession planning will play a major role in the formal placement process.
144. On the question of the staffing process and affirmative action, a comprehensive response is given under the heading "The Role of the Secretary for Defence" (See 3.2.4. paragraphs 97 to 110) and also under the heading "National and Regional Demographics" (See 3.2.13 paragraphs 173 to 181).
145. Three specific foci of racial representivity are currently receiving attention, namely representivity in the SANDF’s advanced musterings, at entry level and at middle management level.
146. Representivity in Advanced Musterings. Despite the SANDF’s marketing and recruiting efforts, the representivity of Black persons in highly advanced musterings such as pilots, navigators, naval combat officers, professional health workers etc, is still low. The legacy of the former school dispensation, which did not place a primary emphasis on the study of Mathematics and Physical Science, is primarily to blame for this situation. As the re-orientation of learning towards a more technological focus will probably only start to deliver significant results over the long term, the DOD launched a Youth Foundation Training Programme (YFTP) with effect from April 2001. The programme, which was put out on tender, is currently managed by a Denel consortium. Its aim is to provide supplementary education to previously disadvantaged school leavers so that they can improve their Mathematics, Physical Science and Biology marks through re-writing these Grade 12 subjects, thereby qualifying for possible appointment in the Regular Force. The 2001 programme has 175 learners. It is planned to increase this number to 250 during 2002 and to retain the Youth Foundation Training Programme until the SANDF’s representivity requirements for advanced musterings have been met. The project is at present delivering positive results. There are presently 264 learners following the programme (2003).
147. The SAAF also developed a strategy to recruit from within non-core business musterings to core business musterings such as pilots and technicians. Those musterings that do not provide scope and career opportunities, such as protection services, are the focus of this strategy. The SAAF has already successfully recruited and re-trained forty members from protection services to Pilot, Technical and Supply services.
148. Although there has been a marked improvement over the past few years, SAAF HR statistics will reflect that the recruitment of Black persons suitably qualified to serve in the core-business and technical environments, has not been optimal. Potential candidates have, due to educational backgrounds, not been able to meet the stringent mathematics and science prerequisites required for entry into these musterings. With this in mind and to supplement the pool of potential candidates, the SAAF has been an active participant in the DOD Youth Foundation Training Scheme. Furthermore, to augment this programme, the SAAF has initiated Project Siyandiza aimed at instilling aviation awareness amongst the youth of the Country, specifically within the rural and disadvantaged communities of society. Whilst it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions with regard to the success of these initiatives, forecasts are promising.
149. The SA Navy currently has 45 school-leavers participating in the DOD Youth Foundation Development Programme. These members become available for Officer selection for the Military Training for Officers Part 1 Course in 2002.
150. Representivity at Entry Level. The SANDF comprises a predominantly African composition amongst the rank groups of Private to Corporal. Privates comprise 91,7% Africans, Lance Corporals comprise 80,5% Africans and Corporals comprise 68,2% Africans. Currently the Privates comprise 90,3% Africans, Lance Corporals comprise 83% Africans and Corporals comprise 75,9% Africans. An anomaly of the abovementioned magnitude is significantly at odds with the Defence Review representivity guidelines (64,6% Africans; 24,3% Whites; 10,2% Coloureds and 0,7% Asians). Recruiting drives for the SA Army in particular currently aims to address this imbalance.
151. Representivity at Middle Management Level. The middle management in the Regular Force (rank groups Major to Colonel and Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1) comprises 53,6% Whites. Currently the middle management in the Regular Force (rank groups Major to Colonel and Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1) comprises 47% Whites. This ratio too is hugely at odds with the Defence Review representivity guidelines. Representivity at this level proves the most difficult to normalise, as middle ranking experienced officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers have to grow through the ranks to gain experience. Lateral appointments from outside into such posts are therefore very rare and limited to highly specialised and professional musterings. The DOD HR Strategy 2010 calls for the continuous implementation of the approved DOD Affirmative Action Plan to normalise representivity at this level.
152. The problem of staffing PVs (Temporary Employment Contract members), PFs (Medium Term Contract members), and PE (Long Term Contract members) is noted. It is unfortunate that such individuals are regarded by the commercial world as "being in temporary employment. It may be possible to address the problem through HR Strategy 2010.
153. SAAF Specialised Mustering. Despite the SAAF ensuring that recruitment, appointments, promotions and career development are executed in compliance with the relevant regulatory criteria aimed at representivity, there are a number of areas where the normalisation of representivity has not yet occurred. As already mentioned, not least among these are the technologically advanced or specialised musterings, such as pilots, navigators, engineers and aircraft technicians, where the representivity of Black members is still low.
154. Another area for improvement is the middle management of the SAAF that is at present predominantly White and male. Despite the exodus of thousands of Whites from the Department since the early 1990’s, there are probably many reasons why this situation still exists, not least of which is the requirement to retain critical scarce specialist skills and expertise. The approved strategies of the SAAF will, however, continue to address this imbalance through appropriate high level interventions and/or programmes.
155. The Air Force Board is committed to ensure representivity throughout the SAAF, particularly at senior and middle management levels. To this end individualised plans to enhance representivity and to ensure purposeful succession planning are monitored at the highest forums.
156. SA Army Plan. The SA Army has committed itself to representivity as a strategic issue as stated in the Defence Review and White Paper on Defence. The SA Army has embarked on a Enhancement of Black Middle-Management Plan since 2000.
157. Actions implemented within the SA Army to address Enhancement of Black Middle-Management representivity (officers). The point of departure to enhance black representivity within the rank groups Lieutenant to Major General is to address the shortages at entry rank level, namely that of Lieutenant, Captain and Major. For this purpose the SA Army scheduled five special courses over the period 2001 to 2003.

1. Officers Formative Training: Focussing on candidates within the rank groups Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1 for possible appointment as Lieutenants, Captains and Majors.
2. Junior Leader Group Training (Officers): Focussing on the rank groups Private to Corporal, to be appointed as Lieutenants.

158. Results in respect of these special courses are as follows:

1. Officers Formative Training: 130 black candidates (Sergeants – Warrant Officers Class 1) were on course at SA Army Gymnasium and completed their course. They were appointed as officers.
2. Junior Leader Group Training (Officers): 206 candidates (Privates to Corporals) completed their course at the SA Army Gymnasium.

159. Actions implemented within the SA Army to address the Enhancement of Black representivity within the rank groups Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1. Within the non-commissioned officers’ environment a shortage of members in the rank group Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1 is experienced.
160. Large numbers of surplus Lance-Corporals to Corporals are becoming available as the matching and placement process continues and also as a result of the closing down of units. Candidates with the necessary potential amongst the "surplus" members (Lance-Corporals to Corporals) are being identified for "Fast Tracking" purposes:

1. Lance-Corporals: to be appointed as Corporals.
2. Corporals: to be appointed as Sergeants.

161. According to the Committee’s report "what is lacking are plans and orders for the staffing process for their implementation - plans according to which the goal of representation and the problem of over-supply of personnel will be solved. Ideally, the plan should be made known to all concerned, in order to deal with the insecurity."
162. Nominations/acceptance of preferred candidates and or preferred reserves are done in such a manner that is transparent; acceptances are done in terms of former force, race and seniority. When the members are not accepted on courses, they normally lodge grievances of which the former criteria is provided as a response to each grievance. The following representivity targets as per Economic Active Population (EAP), stipulated in the White Paper on Defence 1996 and Defence Review 1998, is strictly adhered to on Course acceptances.
163. The Career Management function has been taken back to the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Military Health Service. However the acceptance of joint courses eg the ENSP and the JSCP are centralised at Directorate Personnel Functionaries (Section Development).
164. SA Navy. Staffing process for uniformed members in the SA Navy has been centralised at level 3 in order to ensure holistic perspective and maintain statutory consistency (equity, Affirmative Action).
165. Staffing of the PSAP component of SA Navy has been lagging due to complexity of process, non-finalisation of structure, Pool Manager concept (lack of role clarity) organised labour involvement.
166. SA Navy has thus assumed full responsi