UPDATED RESPONSE TO THE FINAL REPORT: MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (SETAI REPORT): AN ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS WITH TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

Reference A: Interim Setai Committee Report dated 16 August 2000

B: Final Setai Committee Report date 10 July 2001

Appendix A: Methodology

B: Executive Summary

C: Reserve Force Utilisation Statistics

Note 1: The response to the final report, as well as in this update report, is grouped under the same headings as the report. Repetition and overlapping in the report necessarily give rise to repetition and overlapping in the response. Paragraph numbers of the report are given in brackets, where appropriate.

Note 2: The normally printed text is the DOD Response to the Final Report, dated 28 September 2001. The bold print is the updated or revised information as at 28 March 2003.

INTRODUCTION

  1. The Ministerial Committee Inquiry Final Report dated 10 July 2001 refers.
  2. The final report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry is a wide-ranging and insightful assessment of developments in the DOD and SANDF over the last seven years. There are limitations and they are freely acknowledged in the report. However these limitations are insignificant compared to the overall strengths and value of the report.
  3. The report correlates in many ways with a number of internal surveys and other self-assessments in the DOD. This partly accounts for the progress made since the interim report and the progress which has been made since the study phase of the final report.
  4. A key finding of the report, which is referred to time and again, is the enormity of the task undertaken by the DOD and SANDF since 1994 to integrate disparate forces, restructure radically, embark on a human and cultural transformation; all against a background of untimely budget cuts and other resource limitations. The impact on the leadership, middle-management and the rank and file of all this simultaneous change is very evident.
  5. There is great interest by the parliamentary committees regarding the DOD’s follow-up response on the findings of the Setai Committee. The report has never been the subject of discussion between the DOD and the parliamentary committees, although they have received some feedback in the DOD Response to the Final Report, dated 28 September 2001.
  6. Many issues raised in the Setai Report have been being dealt with in detail during specific meetings with the JSCD or PCD, for example the following:
    1. Integration and Transformation in
      1. the SA Army;
      2. the SA Air Force;
      3. the SA Navy; and
      4. the SA Military Health Service.

    2. The current plan and budget.
    3. Readiness of the SANDF.
    4. The Defence Secretariat.
    5. Human Resource Strategy 2010.
    6. Command Management Information/IT Services (pending).
    7. The Reserve Forces
    8. The Military Justice System.
    9. Civic Education.
    10. The Military Strategy.

  7. The Joint Standing Committee Defence (JSCD) requested a briefing on the progress made on the findings of the Setai Committee Report from the DOD. The DOD has to present its response to the JSCD on Wednesday 9 April 2003.
  8. review of the situation

  9. The time-line of events before and after the Minister of Defence appointing the Setai Committee is as follows:
    1. Tempe Massacre: September 1999
    2. Appointment of Setai Committee: October 1999
    3. Interim Report: 16 August 2000
    4. Final Setai Committee Report July 2001
    5. DOD/SANDF Response September 2001
    6. MOD handing over of Report to PCD – Done in October 2001.
    7. DOD Response was subsequently handed over to the PCD.
    8. DOD/SANDF Follow-up status report May 2002
    9. Briefing outstanding. Called for now on 9 April 2003.

    SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

    TERMS OF REFERENCE (1.1)

  10. The Department of Defence supports the general objectives, specific aims, reports, powers and modus operandi of the Ministerial Committee, as laid down.
  11. PREFACE-METHODOLOGY (1.2)

  12. With regard to the methodology, the DOD concurs with the evaluation of the methodology given in the report. It is not without its shortcomings, particularly from a strictly legal or technical research point of view. However, by keeping the objectives in view, and by applying broad common sense and balance, the Committee has provided a constructive and credible basis for the DOD to act upon.
  13. The DOD accepts it in this light. It would serve no purpose to do otherwise. It would be valuable if all stakeholders and commentators did the some, so that the value of the report is not dissipated by individual attacks, rebuttals or misrepresentations out of context.
  14. Some notes on the methodology are given in Appendix A.
  15. The statement by the Committee that the report "is not definitive but merely highlights the problems within the Defence Force and makes recommendations on the process that should kick-off a more detailed process of change" is noted.
  16. The scope and scale of change and the externally imposed limitations, especially financial and human, have been alluded to in the introduction. There are a large number of change programmes underway within the DOD. From time to time these are reviewed, revised or re-aligned. The phasing between the programmes has been disrupted by various factors. Such is the nature of change in a large organisation with ongoing responsibilities and mandates to fulfil, and with significant external factors beyond its control.
  17. It is extremely difficult to judge at which stage the underlying assumptions and concepts of a particular programme are flawed or unattainable.
  18. The DOD therefore continues to evaluate and judge the success or failure of its change programmes. It continues to try to find ways to bridge the gaps between its mandate, stated defence policy, its total resource baseline, the demands placed on it by the security environment, its allocated financial resources and the resilience if its people to accommodate change and meet the demands placed upon them. Examples of such initiatives are, participation in the White Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Review (1998), the Military Strategic Appreciation (MSA) (1999), the Transitional Strategy (2000), the current Military Strategy, (2002), HR Strategy 2010 and numerous internal and external studies and audits.
  19. The process of change and adaptation in the DOD is ongoing. Of critical importance is that fine balances have to be struck between the various imperatives, visions, hopes and reality.
  20. SECTION 2: CHANGE – THE MILITARY IN TRANSFORMATION

    CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2.1)

  21. The DOD concurs with the background information given on change and the environment. Of particular note are the Committee’s references to
    1. the severe funding cut; and
    2. the dynamics of change and that its effect on the SANDF "cannot be underestimated."

    CHANGE AND FINANCE (2.2)

  22. The DOD considers the comments made by the Committee regarding the funding of the DOD to be of cardinal importance. It is agreed that the DOD in its transformation phase is in dire need of (additional) funding.
  23. There was a sharp reduction of the DOD’s budget in 1990. As far as the recent history of the DOD is concerned (post 1994), the most telling blow was the cut in FY1997/98. The operating budget (personnel excluded) was nearly halved. This came at a time when the various facets of change and transformation were heading for a peak of activity. As the Committee observes:
  24. "The SANDF had to find ways of funding all these changes from its "normal" budget – after it had been severely cut. Something(s) had to give in and it did. The effects and results are to be noticed in just about every sphere of activity and in the well-being of the military community. It also had a tremendous impact on transformation….."

  25. The present funding ratios of the DOD, including the Strategic Defence Package, are Personnel 37,3%, other Operating 23%, Capital 39,7% versus the transformation targets of 40%, 30%, 30% respectively. Two comments are relevant, viz

  1. The present understanding is that Personnel should be about 45%.
  2. The operating budget at 23% is clearly inadequate.

  1. The current funding rations of the DOD (FY2003/04), including the Strategic Defence Package are: Personnel 35%, other operating 23% and Capital 41%.
  2. Pending the full implementation of the SANDF’s new service system, which should right size the SANDF’s human resource composition and lead to significant savings, personnel expenditure can not be expected to decline as a percentage of the total DOD budget (currently at 53%, excluding the Strategic Defence Package (SDP, or 35% including the SDP). In terms of the DOD Human Resource Strategy 2010, it is envisaged that the new service system should be fully implemented by FY 2006/07. This will, however, require an appropriate Exit Management Framework to enable the continuous redeployment of members whose terms of contract expire and/or who can no longer be effectively utilised by the SANDF. Full implementation will bring about an effective, efficient and economical human resource composition. It is projected that the new service system will allow the DOD to annually save an average of R1,3 billion on personnel expenditure. This projection has been done for a full-time human resource composition of 70 000 (the recommended Defence Review guideline).
  3. The DOD is unaffordable at present. Its future sustainability is worse.
  4. Various factors that disrupted the process of the DOD adjusting plans and reducing budgets in a balanced way include the following:

  1. Increasing support to the SAPS in borderline control and the combating of crime.
  2. The inability to reduce personnel costs because of inadequate means of reducing personnel numbers.
  3. Loss of control of escalating upkeep costs because of aging equipment and through outsourcing against contracts.
  4. Various legacies of the past.

  1. The issue of the support to the SAPS is the subject of a project between the SANDF and SAPS. Starting in April 2003, a plan to progressively reduce the continuous support to the SAPS for crime prevention and borderline control will be phased over a six year period.
  2. The efforts to reduce personnel costs are being addressed in a holistic way and will be discussed under the heading "Management of ‘Surplus’ Human Resources."
  3. The high upkeep costs of ageing equipment will, in the case of the SAAF and SA Navy, be partially addressed when the new aircraft and vessels being acquired under the Strategic Defence Package (SDP) are taken into service. The outsourcing activities of the SANDF and elements of the current contracts are currently under review and revision. A review of the outsourced upkeep work of the SAAF has revealed that a savings of about RM240 can be achieved in FY2004/05.
  4. Matters Attended to and Completed

  5. Implementation of the Military Skills Development System (MSD). During January 2003, the first service tier of the SANDF’s new service system, ie the MSD, has been implemented with an intake of 1 347 personnel, comprising 58% Africans, 10 % Coloureds, 10% Asians and 22% Whites. A start has, therefore, been made towards the progressive rejuvenation of the SANDF’s human resource composition at a more affordable cost. Compared to the annual average direct personnel cost of R49 303 for a Private/Airman/Seaman in the current service system configuration, the cost of a MSD Private/Airman/Seaman amounts to only R36 203. The latter amount is inclusive of a bonus of R18 000 paid upon a member joining the Reserve Force after her/his two-year MSD service. As the bulk of MSD members will join the Reserve Force upon completion of their MSD service, the rejuvenation of the Reserve Force will also gain impetus. This will enable the SANDF to make greater use of the Reserve Force in the future in terms of the One Force Concept. The MSD therefore represents a significant cost-effective employment option for the SANDF.
  6. Exit Management Framework. During the period under review, the DOD has continued negotiations with the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) regarding a viable Exit Management Framework (EMF). During 2002, the DOD submitted proposals for the components of a viable exit mobility mechanism to the DPSA. The DOD emphasised that it requires an EMF to facilitate the once-off separation of un-utilisable members to create the necessary capacity to fully phase in the new service system. In addition, the same EMF is also required to provide the necessary mobility mechanism to make the new service system work. Currently, an EMF has, unfortunately, not been forthcoming. The DPSA has advised that, in view of the limited timeframe of the Framework Agreement for the Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service (Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Chamber Resolution 7 of 2002), due to be completed by 30 June 2003, the proposed EMF should be de-linked from the more immediate requirement for the Public Service to undergo a restructuring process in terms of the Framework Agreement’s provisions.
  7. The current Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service and parallel actions for the SANDF are part of a national plan. It will allow for redeployment within the broader public service.
  8. Downsizing. Through natural attrition (resignations, retirements, inter-departmental transfers, selective non-renewal of contracts, discharges, the Voluntary Severance Package and the Employer Initiated Package), as well as through limited recruiting to fill only critical posts, the DOD has since August 2001 succeeded to reduce its full-time HR composition from 77 667 to 75 192, amounting to a reduction of 3,2% over the period. It should also be noted that the DOD has managed to reduce its full-time strength from a peak of 101 353 in 1996 to the current strength of 75 192, representing a reduction of 25,9%. It is projected that the Defence Review target strength of 70 000 will be attained by 2004/5, by making use of the current reduction mechanisms mentioned above (excluding the Voluntary Severance Package and Employer Initiated Package which are no longer in effect) as well as the Transformation and Restructuring Package provided for by the Framework Agreement for the Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service.
  9. Downsizing and Restructuring. Besides the continuing downsizing by means of natural attrition towards the Defence Review target of a 70 000 full-time human resource composition, the current focus is to implement the Framework Agreement for the Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service in order to expedite the DOD’s restructuring. In addition, efforts continue to obtain an appropriate EMF as a precondition for the full implementation of the SANDF’s new service system.
  10. DOD Redeployment Agency. In order to reduce personnel spending and release more funds for operating purposes, the SANDF must continue to increase the capacity to phase in youthful potential at a more affordable cost. This can reasonably only be done through the reskilling and redeployment of personnel who can no longer be effectively utilised. In pursuance of the establishment of a DOD Redeployment Agency that can provide a "one-stop" service (aptitude assessment, counselling, reskilling and assistance to find alternative employment), a Request for Information was issued in January 2003 to determine the contribution of potential private partners toward a DOD Redeployment Agency. Submissions have been received from 15 potential private partners and are currently being evaluated.
  11. Redeployment Measures in Progress. In addition to the above measures, the DOD is continuing efforts to facilitate the redeployment of personnel as part of the process to create the necessary capacity to phase in youthful potential. The DOD is currently liasing with the SA Police Service (SAPS) regarding the redeployment of 200 members who can no longer be effectively utilised in the Infantry Formation and Military Policing Agency, with a view towards their utilisation in the static protection role within the SAPS or within the proposed Government Security Agency.
  12. CHANGE AND A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION COMPOSITION (2.3)

  13. The DOD considers the Committee’s description of the various military cultures in the DOD as particularly insightful. The concluding comment by the Committee is very apt:
  14. "Apart from the divergent military cultures, the expectations of the two groups, ie the statutory and non-statutory forces, also have to be forged into a common cause. This was and still is a formidable challenge".

  15. The DOD continues to face up to this challenge. Representivity is one of the formal strategic issues in the DOD and the outcome is seen as higher combat readiness. The codes of conduct for uniform and civilian members are taking firm root. The three facets of military professionalism, namely, combat competence, adherence to internationally accepted norms and values, and subordination to civilian political control are firmly entrenched in the DOD. It is embedded in the new structures and is the prevailing ethos in the SANDF.
  16. It is felt that the remaining problems are small when compared to the achievements. Given the commitment to dealing with the problems, the day is not far off when complete unity of spirit and purpose will be achieved.
  17. Since 1994, the SANDF has made substantial progress to align its representivity ratios with the national demographic ratios, especially regarding racial representivity. The representation of Blacks (ie Africans, Coloureds and Asians) in the full-time component has increased from 55,3% as at 27 April 1994 to 75,3% as at 15 February 2003. The representation of women has also increased, though marginally, from 19,7% as at 27 April 1994 to 20,9% as at 15 February 2003.
  18. The current composition of former forces in the Regular Force is as follows: 7,8% former APLA; 16,6% former MK; 43,5% former SADF; 23,6% SANDF (members with no former force affiliation); 8,2% former TBVC. Although the number of former Non-Statutory Forces (NSF) who integrated into the SANDF was disproportionately small compared to that of the former Statutory Forces (SF), it should be borne in mind that the numbers of both the former NSF and SF components are continuously decreasing as a result of natural attrition. The "former forces" in all groupings represent the inherited past. The focus within the SANDF ought to shift towards emphasizing that the new SANDF component with no former force affiliation who joined the SANDF after April 1994, represents the future. This component already comprises 23,6% of the Regular Force and continues to expand with each new intake.
  19. Compared to the initial report’s statistics of August 2001, the ratios of former APLA and former MK members have remained constant. In contrast, the ratio of former SADF members have declined from 45,8% to 43,5% and that of former TBVC forces from 11,2% to 8,2% of the Regular Force, due to natural attrition. Due to continuous recruiting, the SANDF component has increased from 18% to 23,6 % of the Regular Force.
  20. Three specific foci of racial representivity continue to receive attention, namely representivity in the SANDF’s advanced musterings, at entry level and at middle management level. (See 3.3.2 paragraph 202 to 228)
  21. CHANGE AND UNEMPLOYMENT (2.4)

  22. The problem of change and unemployment and the effect on supernumerary personnel has been one of the most painful experiences of the DOD in recent years. The comments of the Committee go to the heart of the matter.
  23. The DOD peaked at about 101 000 people after integration. At the time, when the target of 70 000 was set, it was seen in technocratic terms of affordability and sustainability within the drastically reduced budget. The long drawn out and radical restructuring and staffing then exacerbated the problem. The situation was, understandably, the most acute in the Army. Once the effects became visible, the Chief of the Army authorised the re-instatement of the "as was" posts to reduce the number of supernumeraries.
  24. The exit framework for former non-statutory force members has been the subject of high level attention. The problem regarding insufficient pensionable service of former Non-Statutory Forces members, is currently being addressed. The Cabinet approved the Policy on Recognition of Former Non-Statutory Force for the Provisioning of Pension Benefits in November 2000. This policy does not only address the need for providing for former Non-Statutory Forces members who are senior in age, but it also provides for other members of the former Non-Statutory Forces in accordance with their length of service in their respective former Non-Statutory Forces. Accordingly, it gives more recognition, to a large extent, to older members. The system was based on the fact that whereas older members do not have sufficient time to accumulate their pension benefits, younger members have the advantage of youth to do so.
  25. Pensionable Service of Former Non-Statutory Forces Members. The problem regarding insufficient pensionable service of former Non-Statutory Forces members, is currently being addressed. The Cabinet approved the Policy on Recognition of Former Non-Statutory Force for the Provisioning of Pension Benefits in November 2000. This policy does not only address the need for providing for former Non-Statutory Forces members who are senior in age, but it also provides for other members of the former Non-Statutory Forces in accordance with their length of service in their respective former Non-Statutory Forces. Accordingly, it gives more recognition, to a large extent, to older members. The system was based on the fact that whereas older members do not have sufficient time to accumulate their pension benefits, younger members have the advantage of youth to do so. During February 2003, the DOD briefed the Portfolio Committee on Finance as well as the Portfolio Committee on Defence on the above policy. The respective Committees were, however, not in favour of the policy’s provisions, despite these having been approved by Cabinet. As a result, there will now be short delay in getting approval for new provisions pertaining to the policy.
  26. Great progress has been made. However, the plan is now the subject of a dispute by one of the military trade unions. This will slow the implementation.
  27. The problem of finding alternative employment for veterans is receiving attention in the Redeployment Plan and the Human Resource Strategy 2010. The current Service Corps should play a significant role. The situation is more fully described in "Human Resources Strategy 2010."
  28. As an outcome of several multi-disciplinary planning workshops that were held during 2002, a position paper titled ‘The Service Corps Issue’ was developed, which clearly defines the focus, challenges and opportunities for a future National Service Corps organisation. The proposal was presented to all appropriate levels of authority within the DOD up to the Plenary Defence Staff Council. A presentation on the paper is scheduled in May 2003 to the JSCD. and Council on Defence.
  29. As a further refinement of the proposal, a workgroup from the Service Corps is currently defining a draft business concept which addresses the strategic intention, scope and business principles that could drive and govern the envisaged National Service Corps.
  30. It is imperative that the 1996 decision of the Ministers Committee regarding the establishment of a National Service Corps Commission be implemented without delay to provide the necessary guidance required, as stated above.
  31. It is important that all relevant role-players are adequately represented in the Commission and that it should remain constituted until such time that the most appropriate organisational and reporting structure is finalised and approved by Government.
  32. The DOD Human Resource Strategy 2010 specifically requires that the SANDF shall have no Privates older than 28 years, in order to maintain operational integrity and effectiveness. It also requires that the applicable age-rank utilisation criteria in respect of all other uniformed personnel should be complied with. The strategy acknowledges that, given the socio-economic realities of the country, it would be irresponsible to sever those members who do not comply with the rightsizing criteria, without ensuring their "soft landing" in civilian life. The strategy therefore requires the appropriate redeployment, reskilling and alternative occupational utilisation of the abovementioned groups of uniformed personnel, but also to empower any SANDF member who can no longer be effectively utilised. The strategy recommends public-private partnerships as the most appropriate way to undertake the continuous reskilling and redeployment of affected personnel on a sustainable basis.
  33. Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service. During 2002, the Framework Agreement for the Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service (PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2002) was promulgated. The Agreement at large applies to employees who are employed by the State and who fall within the registered scope of the PSCBC. Given that the DOD consists of both Public Service Act personnel and Defence Act personnel, the Agreement would in theory only be applicable to the former group of DOD employees.
  34. Given that the need for the rightsizing of the uniformed component to attain effectiveness, efficiency and affordability is probably greater than in the rest of the Public Service, due to the Constitutional commitments to be met by the SANDF, the Plenary Defence Staff Council decided to adopt the spirit of the Agreement also with regard to the uniformed component. This arrangement would allow the SANDF to proceed with restructuring and further manage the issue of surplus personnel according to the same time-scales as the rest of the Public Service. A Departmental Task Team has been established in terms of the provisions of the Agreement to manage the implementation thereof with regard to both Public Service Act personnel and Defence Act personnel.
  35. The process of matching and placement of employees and members according to the provisions of the Agreement has commenced, but has not yet been completed as a result of factors such as the military trade union’s questioning of the DOD’s implementation measures.
  36. Although there are employees and members who have provisionally been declared in excess, the definitive number of employees and members who are in excess, should still be determined. The DOD is still busy to execute the corporate process and to capture data on all personnel that are to be declared in excess. This data will be electronically transferred to the PERSOL database.
  37. The DOD acknowledges the dire need to apply PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2002 to transform and restructure the uniformed component such that there is compliance with representivity requirements in terms of race, gender and former force, especially at middle management and that there should be no compromise in the operational readiness of the SANDF.
  38. Detailed systems and processes have been put into place with the objective to complete the entire process by 30 June 2003. Because of the size and complexity of the DOD, as well as the possibility that a large number of staff members may be declared in excess, the constructive management of "surplus" human resources will continue to pose significant challenges to the Department.
  39. The following measures to empower the DOD to effect rightsizing and to manage its surplus human resources, still need to be addressed:

a. The completion of the implementation of the Framework Agreement on Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service (PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2002) by 30 June 2003.

b. The procurement of an appropriate Exit Management Framework, to be implemented after completion of the implementation measures of PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2002 and continuously thereafter, as an enabling mechanism of the SANDF’s new service system (also see paragraph 32).

c. The establishment of a DOD Redeployment Agency (the present Service Corps in a more dynamic guise). An accreditation and certification plan should also be available to accredit and certify SANDF members’ prior learning in order to facilitate their redeployment. These are short-term objectives that are being driven by the Service Corps.

  1. The continuous ad-hoc redeployment of unutilisable SANDF members serving in terms of the provisions of the current Flexible Term Service System, through the soliciting of available redeployment opportunities (see paragraph 35).

  1. Staffing Situation. The staffing process in the SANDF continues apace. As at 15 February 2003, 79,05% of all SANDF members have been staffed.
  2. SECTION 3: MAINSTREAM ISSUES

    GENERAL OVERVIEW (3.1)

  3. In the general overview the Committee outlines the integration and representivity guidelines.
  4. As stated in the note to paragraph 3.1 of the report, there is some repetition and overlapping in the report. This necessarily gives rise to some repetition and overlapping in the response.
  5. TRANSFORMATION, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (3.2)

    Transformation: High Level Considerations (p. 21) (3.2.1)

  6. The Committee observes that "one gets the impression that too little of the right value has been added to the Minister’s instructions on the way down". This point is contested.
  7. As the Committee has noted, the Minister instructed that transformation take place. It was, however, a corporate decision with regard to the scale and scope of transformation and the timescales involved. As has also been observed, many people within the DOD regarded structural transformation (changing the organisation structures) as the primary effort. Human and structural transformation took a back seat.
  8. With hindsight it is clear that the magnitude of the structural transformation was over-ambitious. It was under-resourced. The timescales were overly optimistic. The capacity of the people and the organisation to absorb change was over-estimated. In addition, the underlying new organisational concepts were radical, and in some instances untried.
  9. A number of assumptions underlying the structural transformation and the subsequent right sizing did not materialise. Foremost among these was the non-approval of the preferred exit plan option. (Retrenchment). Furthermore, the funds for the structural transformation had to be found within the DOD. On top of this, Treasury radically cut the operating funds of the DOD over the FY1997/98 and FY1998/99 financial years.
  10. The shift to the new organisation structures probably took place prematurely but there was not much choice. There were still unresolved but critical issues of integration. Insufficient time was allowed for the structuring and the structure approval process. These had a major influence on staffing, which itself was bound by an unwieldy process in order to achieve fairness. Staffing has subsequently been a nightmare. It has affected everyone in the organisation, from the top leadership right down to the lowest individual. Once again, with hindsight, a simpler, more practical and better phased staffing would have helped to avoid many ills.
  11. The Committee has correctly identified the complexity of the new organisational structures. Layers of service agreements cannot substitute for simple command and control relationships, they can only complement them.
  12. Any major change carries with it risks. It is also a very difficult period as people adjust to the new organisation and its implications. Plans are necessarily adjusted as experience is gained. It all requires vision, sensitivity and insight, a strong resolve, and resilience. (This issue is also discussed in paragraphs 13 to 17 and 37 to 38)
  13. The SANDF still has to achieve normalised representivity levels in its advanced musterings, at entry level and amongst its middle management. This requires a continuously driven effort, but this objective will realistically not be realised over the short to near medium term.
  14. The situation regarding ineffective/unutilisable members, especially at junior rank levels, who could be regarded as "surplus" to the SANDF’s operational requirements, has not changed since the initial report.
  15. In order to attain the DOD’s vision to ensure effective defence for a democratic South Africa, the SANDF requires a bulk of young, fit and healthy soldiers, broadly representative of the population in terms of the Defence Review guidelines of 64,6% Africans, 10,2% Coloureds, 0,75% Asians and 24,3% Whites. The current service system has, as noted in paragraph 21 above, not provided appropriate mechanisms and enabling support systems to ensure the rejuvenation of the SANDF’s HR composition through the rapid throughput of young soldiers. The result is that a large number of the SANDF’s Privates, Lance Corporals and Corporals, as well as lesser numbers of other personnel in combat positions, are by far exceeding the reasonable age-rank utilisation criteria applicable to fighting soldiers in the respective ranks. This leads to such members being ineffective for operational utilisation and deployments and contributes to stagnation and low morale.
  16. Through the integration of forces, the SANDF’s support posts are fully and even over-subscribed, leaving no internal options to accommodate such members as the closure of units takes place.
  17. There is currently a large number of soldiers in the lower rank groups who do not meet the criteria for effective operational utilisation and deployments. These members therefore constitute a pool amongst whom reskilling and redeployment and/or alternative utilisation can occur, paving the way for the expeditious constructive reduction of the DOD’s personnel strength to the Defence Review target of 70 000, whilst at the same time enabling the recruitment of young, fit and healthy soldiers with appropriate utilisation profiles.
  18. The large number of ineffective/unutilisable members act as a significant constraint on the DOD’s financial and infrastructure capacity to phase in larger numbers of youthful potential as part of the implementation of the SANDF’s new service system.
  19. The SA Army’s response is given below by way of example:
    1. The SA Army is a personnel intensive organisation. Over the period 1996 to 1998 the DOD embarked on the planning of transformation in the DOD and the implementation thereof. One of the results of this process was a DOD Force Design approved by the Minister of Defence on 5 March 1999 whereby the SA Army Force Design consisted of 32 000 Regular Force members.
    2. Concurrent with the process of approval of the Force Design, the DOD embarked on a process to downsize the DOD and the Secretary for Defence approved an SA Army Post Structure of 24 800 Regular Force members, the so called "Crunch" Force Design Model. Not withstanding the reduction of the SA Army Force Design levels, it was expected of the SA Army to provide force levels for internal stability exceeding the capabilities retained in the SA Army Force Design. The SA Army pointed out the deficiencies to the DOD and proposed a Transitional Force Design. One of the reasons for this proposal was the fact that no exit mechanism for members exceeding the post structure of 24 800 existed. (±18 000 members were affected).
    3. The Minister then approved the SA Army Transitional Force Design of ± 33 900 members on 15 June 2000. Not withstanding the "increased" Force Design, ± 8000 members still were surplus mechanism because the actual strength of the SA Army in June 2000 was ±43 000 members.

  20. "A comprehensive review of the Transformation Process should be undertaken"
  21. The Auditor-General has conducted a performance audit in the DOD and concluded that the DOD has achieved 83.6% success rate with the implementation of its formal transformation project.
  22. The Plenary Defence Staff Council has decided that the original transformation project be closed and replaced by a process of continuous organisation development and improvement, supported by new strategies and supportive systems.
  23. Lack of Funds (p. 21) (3.2.2)

  24. The comment by the Committee that "severe budget cuts and the down-sizing create a threatening unemployment crisis within the SANDF" is concurred with.
  25. For the SA Army, finance is not seen as the biggest factor but a major constraint. Within the SA Army no funding is available for transformation per se over and above the normal capital, operating and maintenance funding. Presently operating funds are being utilised merely to keep the SA Army going at an unsatisfactory level and with inadequate funds left for transformation. It is an irrefutable fact that the transformation per se of any organisation has a price attached to it. With respect to transformation, the SA Army recommends that all structural and other adjustments be made speedily to ensure that combat readiness is restored.
  26. The lack of funds affects the SA Army SAAF, SA Navy, SAMHS and the functional divisions severely. The situation of the Army is discussed below in some detail by way of example.
  27. Within the SA Army no funding is available for transformation. During 1997/98, the SA Army faced a series of major budget cuts – becoming a financial driven organisation rather than a "needs" driven SA Army. The result of budget "cuts" then and now, is a very expensive SA Army HR component – "eating up" two thirds of the allocated budget, leaving the Capital and Operating environment with only a third of the budget!
  28. Considering the above, the ever increasing cost in respect of the HR component (the 9% salary adjustment of July 2002 and the envisaged 8% salary adjustment for July 2003 as an example), the SA Army will have to continuously downsize to maintain an affordable and sustainable force! However, this is obviously not the required solution, adequate financial resources need to be allocated to the SA Army on an annual basis allowing for at least a "balance". To enable this "balanced" picture in respect of the SA Army to materialise, either the HR component need to drastically downsize or the Capital and Operating Budget need to increase to remain in equilibrium with the HR component (50% HR; 25% Operating; 25% Capital).
  29. The current Strategic Alignment exercise being executed by the SA Army for approval by the Minster of Defence during April 2003 is striving for
    1. an affordable and sustainable SA Army (budget driven).
    2. An Army Force of 23 000 Regular Force and PSAPs and ±6000 MSD members.

  30. The envisaged affordable force design (SA Army Strategic Alignment exercise) of 23000 Regular Force and PSAP is a financial driven organisation and not a need driven organisation.
  31. The SA Army external commitments (Regional Security role) are:
    1. A ±700 strong protection force in Burundi.
    2. 150 technical personnel serving with the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC, as well as observers in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
    3. Apart from this, the SA Army is also committed to provide one more battalion for the expanded Op MONUC Force in the DRC as well as an additional battalion to monitor the cease fire in Burundi.
    4. Allowing for rotation ("6 months in and then out"), it translates into approximately 12 000 fit and healthy SA Army troops (G1K1).
    5. At the same time, the SA Army must supply 11 x Rifle companies for internal stability and border protection (11 x 155 = 1705 SA Army troops on a daily basis) – before allowing for rotation.
    6. The current reality in respect of the SA Army HR capability is that it is over-stretched. Any deduction in force levels will only further over-stretch the SA Army - an even bigger "mismatch" between what is expected of the SA Army and what it can currently deliver. Looking at the medium to long term, it is quite clear that the current SA Army of some 34 000 members, is inadequate.
    7. HR Strategy 2010 has not yet been fully implemented in the SANDF. It is the obvious approach to ensure a properly staffed SA Army in the future, but it does not take the current external realities of South Africa in consideration - a high unemployment rate, not sufficient job creation and a high criminality figure.

    Governance and Management of Change (p. 22) (3.2.3)

  32. The DOD recognizes the hardships created by the transformation process, particularly the structural transformation. It is a regrettable part of any major restructuring and downsizing activity. The disruption to individuals and their families in factors such as housing, transport and detached duties is inescapable
  33. Communication is described by the Committee as "inadequate". This may be so, but a major focus was communication. It is difficult to combat dislocation, disruption and pain with communication. By its nature, large scale change is fertile ground for rumours.
  34. Similarly, procedures are disrupted by large scale change. There has been an almost total re-alignment between specialist functions in the DOD and the line functions of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Service. With respect to the grievance procedure the delays are consistent with what is to be expected when a difficult change environment, as a source of grievances, is coupled to a radical restructuring and reduction of the personnel function, which is the main route for addressing grievances.
  35. Significant progress has been made since the introduction of this process and the SAAF has established a formal strategic direction model to guide it towards achieving this end. Various strategies and supporting sub-strategies are in place, whilst an over-arching long-term Strategic Transformation Plan towards SAAF Vision 2012 has been developed for implementation during the current year. During its developmental stages this plan was presented to all the top-level forums in the DOD and was finally approved by the Council on Defence on 21 February 2003. The primary objective of this Strategic Transformation Plan is to enable the SAAF to achieve its transformation objectives, which in turn will ensure that the SAAF remains an organisation of national pride and a formidable source of combat ready air power.
  36. In the Navy direction and clarity with regard to the transformation process and the future has been facilitated by such mechanisms as the Navy Review and the SA Navy Communication Plan.
  37. Paragraph 3.6.2 deals comprehensively with the progress re communication.
  38. As grievance procedures are an integral part of human resource management the Directorate Service Labour Relations is currently interfacing with the Chief Human Resources Policy with a view to streamlining grievance procedures or, if necessary, formulate new grievance procedures which will expedite the resolution of grievances.
  39. The Role of the Secretary for Defence (p. 23) (3.2.4)

  40. Given the geographical spread and sheer number of staffing decisions and interactions it would have been impossible for the Secretary to intervene. Since the transfer of the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate to the Secretary for Defence in 2000 there is greater vigilance over adherence to the staffing guidelines. This has been aided by a slackening in the tempo of staffing, as numerous organisations reach the end of this exercise. The achievement of representivity is clearly a process stretching over time. It has to be balanced against the maintenance of the defence capability and the rate at which knowledge can be acquired and transferred, and experience can be gained. The Committee gives more substance to this issue at paragraph 3.2.13. of the report (National and Regional Demographics).
  41. The statement by the Committee "What seems to be lacking is planning and decisions on the top command level followed by the issuing clear and attainable instructions and orders" is noted. It is a moot point. Instructions and guidelines were issued. Great reliance had to be placed in the Service and Divisional Chiefs to restructure, get their structures approved and then staff in competition with the rest of the organisation. Given the wholesale nature of the changes it may have seemed as if planning and decisions were lacking. As far as engineering staffing results to achieve a particular target is concerned, this was virtually impossible. The whole situations was simply too fluid.
  42. An example of the ongoing programme of issuing and updating instructions and plans are give below. It relates to representivity and affirmative action. See also the progress which is described in paragraph 173 to 181.
  43. The Department of Defence (DOD) has committed itself to representivity as a strategic issue to effect the Constitutional imperative as stated inter alia in the Defence Review and the White Paper on Defence.
  44. The first DOD policy in this regard was the DOD Policy on Equal Opportunities (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) issued as SANFO C Pers/1/98 dated 3 June 1998 and DODI Pol and Plan No 1/98 dated 1 June 1998. Representivity is specifically defined in this document as: "…. the extent to which the demographic composition of the DOD at all levels broadly corresponds with the demographic composition of all people in South Africa".
  45. This policy also clearly states that one of the principles of Affirmative Action as being" "…to ensure that the DOD, its leadership in particular, is broadly representative of the population."
  46. This benchmark policy of the DOD (presently under review) also prescribes that barriers to affirmation are to be identified and rectified and ensuring that responsibilities for achieving the DOD’s goals with AA are delegated to appropriate levels.
  47. The EO and AA Policy was followed up by the DOD’s Affirmative Action Plan which was issued on 5 July 2000. This Plan deals extensively with representivity as an issue. All Services and Formations, were in terms of the Plan, required to submit their respective plans on AA to the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD) earlier this year. Currently their respective plans are being reviewed one by one in order to identify barriers to AA in the DOD with a specific look at representivity as an issue. This will also give an indication as to the holistic picture and the interventions needed to rectify shortcomings even if it is on policy level.
  48. The AA Plan made specific mention of such possible shortcomings in the DOD structure and assigned responsibilities to Services, Formations and Directorates in dealing with these. One such a recommendation was that the "…. perception of racial and ethnic tension" should be managed. To this end the EOCD has drafted a policy on the prevention and elimination of racism in the DOD that was issued as DODI Pers No 12/99 dated 14 June 2001.
  49. The Plan also called on the DOD to make AA a strategic issue and this was recently incorporated in the DOD HR Strategy 2010.
  50. Various structures to give effect to the Constitutional imperative of representivity and EO were put in place – the establishment of the EOCD, DOD Gender Forum, DOD Disability Forum, AA Forum and the DOD EO and AA Advisory Board are but to name a few.
  51. Generally it can thus be said that the DOD has addressed the issue of representivity sufficiently and that results will be more clear now that the AA plans are coming off line and structures are starting to function more effectively. There is no doubt that we have made very good progress in terms of representivity since 1994.
  52. There are however small nuances that need some clarification; these being:
    1. What is our understanding of "broadly representative"? Does it imply down to unit level and individual musterings? (This is not very clear in any of our mentioned policies and there is mainly a mentioning of management level and up). "Broadly representative" The Executive Summary of the EO/AA Policy states clearly that the Instruction give guidelines as to the DOD’s position towards Equal Opportunities. how it should be implemented to the lowest levels and how Affirmative Action is a management tool to be used to attain the goals of Equal Opportunities. "Broadly representative" also refers to the alignment and reflection of the DOD position to the demographics of the South African population.
    2. Does it imply "economic active population"? Yes all the DOD population is economically engaged form the highest level to the lowest level worker., because Par 3 of the EO/AA Policy says that many years of enforced discriminatory policies in the Republic of South Africa resulted in the deliberate marginalisation of certain persons or categories of persons the historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI’s) or the designated groups .
    3. What do we say about regional representivity as clearly stated in the Setai Report as a problem? How do we acknowledge the regional distribution of our Coloured and Asian members and employees in the Cape and Natal areas for instance? It is understood that regional representivity is a handicap particularly in the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, but also it is imperative that initiatives aimed at supporting the national transformational strategies are undertaken to improve the current situation, like transfers.
    4. What do we do in terms of "empowerment" versus "representivity"? Very often we concentrate just on the latter whilst the former should be our ultimate goal if we truly grasp the aim of AA. It is crucial that Affirmative Action is implemented in the context of empowerment for the designated groups. This is an all-inclusive approach as follows:
      1. Access to both developmental and military training.
      2. Fair distribution of performance incentives.
      3. Fair and objective appraisal of performance.
      4. Acknowledgement of promotional imperatives to enhance representivity.
      5. Mentorship coupled to on the job training.

  53. There is thus indeed a need to fine tune the DOD’s effort in addressing these issues as a matter of urgency and the SETAI Report has triggered new lines of thinking in this respect for which the DOD is grateful.
  54. The progress with regard to representivity has been addressed in 2.3 paragraphs 37 to 42.
  55. Reinforcement of the Command Line Function (p. 25) (3.2.5)

  56. The Committee has correctly identified one of the most difficult issues arising from integration and transformation. The situation has been described in paragraph 10 to 43 of this response.
  57. It is acknowledged that it was not possible to manage the change is closely as one would like. However, major progress has been made.
  58. It is so that there was a focus on the structural transformation, at the expense of human and cultural transformation. Neither of these last two factors was ignored. It should also be recognised that human and cultural transformation is a much longer process.
  59. Currently all aspects of transformation are being reviewed and changes may be forthcoming.
  60. Monitoring and Once-off Adjustments (p. 27) (3.2.6)

  61. The Committee states that "What seems to be lacking is command intervention" when "unforeseen problems arise". The Committee also refers to a "need of high level strategic intervention. An illustration of this need, is the provision of funds and the changing of regulations".
  62. It needs to be stated that strenuous efforts have been made to deal with problems, whether the solution is internal or external to the DOD. It should be noted that transformational changes, which affect the DOD, emanate from many quarters in government.
  63. On the question of once-off adjustments the DOD has acted.
  64. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integrates to "catch up". The PDSC carefully considered a review of ranks of former non-statutory forces in respect of the first 1994 intakes but decided that before this could be pursued an audit of ranking by way of staff tests is to be carried out. The aim of the audit is to determine, based on the principle of clear prejudice suffered, whether a re-ranking is indicated in respect of specific members. The audit is being done in respect of 1 936 members in the rank group Corporal to Major. The records of 369 members have been audited thus far and indications are that only four members may possibly have suffered prejudice ie 1% of cases audited. The PDSC has instructed that the audit be expedited and it is expected that it will be completed on or before November 2001.
  65. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integratees to "catch up".
  66. "The Committee recommended that once-off adjustments could be considered in respect of the revision of the ranking of integratees and for them to catch up with qualifying courses that they have missed."
  67. From the 2 229 cases, a DOD Audit Board had determined 384 cases of possible prejudice, as opposed to clear prejudice previously contemplated by the Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC). After considering the submission of the DOD Audit Board to the PDSC on 17 February 2003, the PDSC made the following decisions:
    1. That the Audit of Ranking process, conducted over a period of more than two years, be considered as concluded and that no other ranks of the first 1994 intakes or any other intakes be subjected to similar auditing processes.
    2. That a distinctly separate and subsequent process be followed in respect of the 384 cases by an "Ad Hoc Rank Adjustment Board" in conjunction with the Chiefs of Services and Divisions. This process should determine possible future recommended ranks for these members which will have to be submitted to the PDSC and authorised by the Chief of the SA National Defence Force.

  68. Some members of the former TBVC forces claim that because of incomplete records they were under-ranked during integration. The statement is disputed as members of a former Statutory Forces (in this case a TBVC force) were integrated with their existing ranks and remuneration.
  69. In terms of the scientific results of formal effect analysis reports, there has been a significant upward trend with regards to all morale-affecting issues, as measured on the ground recently.
  70. The Committee makes the point that "Staffing of the management echelon is not representative." This is true. However, transformation is not an event but a process and it would therefore be unrealistic to expect the DOD at this early stage of the process to be totally representative at all levels. (See also paragraphs 97 to 109).
  71. The situation is however continuously changing towards the desired end state as the degree of empowerment of the members of the DOD picks up momentum.
  72. Staffing boards are unavoidably bound to whoever applied for a specific post (the range of applicants per post, in most cases, in itself is not representative).
  73. The process of empowerment is an evolutionary process (which translates into, inter alia, time). Despite the fact that this process is evolutionary the DOD should be credited for the concerted effort that is underway towards the empowerment of its members. The Committee’s finding that representivity and prescripts regarding equity, fairness and equal opportunities, are being ignored, is not true.
  74. The functions performed by the members of the DOD, especially where the fighting side end of the organisation is concerned, are often directly concerned with life and death issues, making the appointment of appropriately empowered leaders imperative.
  75. Certain matters in the staffing policy are presently being revised in collaboration with the SA National Defence Union. The amendments to the staffing strategy will include matters like the attendance of recognised Military Trade Unions as observers, formal correspondence in respect of letters of appointment and the releasing of members to report to his/her new unit.
  76. The Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC) has approved the Fast Tracking Policy. The implementation of the policy is, however, dependent on an implementation instruction, which is currently being drafted by a work group. The policy is to fast track those members properly identified. This policy has only recently been received and could thus not be applied earlier. It must be pointed out that fast tracking is not to be seen as fast tracking for promotion purposes, but fast tracking for empowerment purposes.
  77. Outsourcing (p. 31) (3.2.7)

  78. The problems quoted by the Committee confirm one of the findings of an internal investigation. A review of the outsourcing policy is underway in the DOD as part of the Transitional Strategy.
  79. In support of its endeavours to become more affordable and sustainable, the SAAF has embarked upon a number of ventures to investigate and research the feasibility of co-use of high-value assets, such as air bases (e.g. SA Airways diversion airfields). Others include the possibility of entering into selective Public Private Partnerships to reduce support costs (e.g. Air Force Base Hoedspruit, Mariepskop, Air Force Station Ysterplaat, etc). The envisaged saving of about RM240 per annum from FY2004/05 due to revising and renegotiating expensive outsourced upkeep work.
  80. IT Services (p. 31) (3.2.8)

  81. In the paragraph it is specifically stated that the "four Arms of Service each have their own dedicated IT language, that are not compatible". It is indeed a fact that the DOD has a number of different internal e-mail (intranet) systems that evolved prior to transformation in the different Arms of Service. With the advent of the Command and Management Information (CMI) sub-division with its mandate to manage the IT environment centrally, the problem of incompatible internal e-mail systems has been addressed by the roll out of 3 000 locations of a DOD standard intranet e-mail system. This task was completed on 31 August 2001. The present DOD systems can communicate with and through the new systems over and above the fact that 3 000 new users (mainly in the Defence HQ environment) will be able to communicate. Once the new system is fully operational the planning for a further roll out will commence. The plan is that all legacy intranet E-Mail systems will in due course be replaced by one DOD intranet e-mail system.
  82. Improvement of the DOD’s ability to manage the distribution of information to ensure effective communication a number of initiatives have been completed, or are in the process of being formalised. These include such tasks as the formulation of a DOD Information Strategy (DOD Info Strat) which will guide the establishment of a Defence Enterprise System. Both the Strategy and the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan are in the final stages of approval, with ratification of the Strategy expected by 31 March 2003 by the PDSC. It is expected that the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan will be ratified by the end of April 2003.
  83. In support of the DOD Information Strategy and the Defence Enterprise Information Systems Plan, the CMI Systems and Services Requirements portfolio is currently being compiled, which will establish a single comprehensive CMI systems and services development plan for the DOD. This plan will, as a major drive, focus on establishing the required DOD Information Infrastructure and relevant applications to support DOD requirements for communication to support information management and distribution. Cognisance should be taken that there is, with the exception of limited funding on the DOD SANDF Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP) for weapon system related Information Communication and Technology systems, no funding for investment to ensure that the transformation of the DOD and especially communications as forthcoming from the SETAI Report can be realised.
  84. The report states that the "general technology of the Department is behind other departments". This statement is not fully understood. If it refers to intranet E-Mail technology one will be inclined to agree. However this lack has been rectified with the new system that is in the process of being introduced. If the statement needs to be interpreted in a broader sense it will be very difficult to accept because the DOD has the use of a vast range of technologies in the information environment ranging from modern state of the art to old so called legacy systems. Whatever the case may be, it can be reported that CMI is in the process of developing a Master Information Technology Plan, which will ensure that the DOD acquires the appropriate information technologies within the constraints of the DOD budget.
  85. With reference to the standardisation of e-mail in the DOD, phase one, which resulted in the implementation of standardised e-mail for 3 000 users, has been completed. The final decision on the technology to incorporate the interim e-mail solution into the bigger Military Messaging System (MMS) is expected during the second quarter of 2003. The e-mail solution will then be increased to first 5 000 users, and eventually 10 000 users. The further roll out of e-mail is however under serious risk due to insufficient funding.
  86. It is also true that the DOD still has more than one logistical system. This has lead to duplication in maintenance of these systems as well as possible inefficiencies. A strategy is in place whereby the information needs of the DOD processes, including logistics, will be incorporated in the requirement statement for a Government Enterprise Application System that is currently developed by the Department of State Expenditure.
  87. It should be noted that the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) actually evolved from INFOPLAN, the old DOD IT Agency.
  88. Uncoordinated Initiatives (p. 31) (3.2.9)

  89. The insecurity and frustration resulting from the restructuring and staffing processes is regretted. It was the unfortunate result of the fluidity of the situation with regard to designing, redesigning, structuring, restructuring and the differing speed of advance of the various components of the DOD. For some components it was easy; for others it was extremely complex. Overall, it was a mammoth undertaking.
  90. Flow of Human Resources (p. 33) (3.2.10)

  91. The Committee’s general comments on the flow of human resources are concurred with. To a degree the DOD was frustrated by the current HR Service System, which was adopted before 1994. It did not provide a suitable framework for the long-term HR health of the DOD. It also resulted in some unfairness and some other obstacles during the integration process. In addition, the non-approval of the preferred exit plan option (retrenchment) meant that the outflow of personnel was difficult to manage.
  92. Once again, the Redeployment Plan and the HR Strategy 2010 will provide a better HR management framework and the individuals leaving will be properly prepared and cared for.
  93. The flow of human resources is holistically addressed in the "Human Resources Strategy 2010."
  94. The DOD’s findings regarding the ineffectiveness, inefficiency and uneconomical configuration of the current Flexible Term Service System, as elaborated in the DOD Human Resource Strategy 2010, remains unchanged and requires to be addressed in terms of the provisions of the strategy.
  95. There is agreement with the statement at paragraph 3.3.12 of the Report that a defence force normally has a service system in terms of which Privates are employed on short-term contracts at a relatively low basic salary. Such Privates are trained, render service and most leave the force upon expiry of their contracts. Only a minority of each intake who perform better than their peers and have excellent development potential, are selected for further service.
  96. The intention with the Flexible Service System, implemented upon the discontinuation of the former SADF’s conscript system, was to achieve optimal affordability through a flexible means to adjust force levels rapidly up and down according to the available budget and threat perception. The Short Term Service System (STS) had to accommodate most of the Privates on a two-year contract basis. The intention was that the STS should comprise 40% of the Regular Force. Only the best performers were to have been selected for the Medium Term Service System (MTS) (at which stage they would already have advanced in rank and not have been Privates anymore). The MTS should have accommodated 40% of the Regular Force. Members should have migrated from the Short, through the Medium, to the Long Term Service System (LTS), with strict selection being applied at each stage. The aim of the LTS was that it should only contain the SANDF’s command and management leader corps, therefore not comprising more than 20% of the Regular Force. This did not happen.
  97. There was consistent pressure put on the SANDF not to terminate the service of Short Term Service members whose contracts expired, including those who did not prove to be good performers or members with good development potential. In addition, there were varied interpretations and implementation of the service system amongst the Services and Divisions. The continuous "roll-over" of such members’ contracts led to their exceeding the SANDF’s rank-age versus mustering requirements and becoming ineffective for operational utilisation.
  98. In addition, the integration process of seven former forces also contributed to swell the numbers in the LTS. This was, however, a negotiated and understandable arrangement, to give former Non-Statutory Forces members equitable career development opportunities.
  99. Since 1994, thousands of personnel who ought to have served only for short or medium contract periods, were translated to the Long Term Service System, bringing about a current Flexible Term Service System ratio where, as of 15 February 2003, only 8% of the Regular Force serve in the Short Term Service System, with 46% of members serving in the Medium Term Service System and 46% in the Long Term Service System.
  100. The incorrect implementation of the current service system has resulted in a legacy where there are many members, including Privates, who have indeed developed a mindset of life-long employment. Irrespective of their advancement prospects, which may be constrained as a result of age, area boundness, physical condition etc, such members still maintain a mindset that the SANDF should provide them with a life-long career.
  101. Phasing In of New Service System. Recognising the human resource flow dilemma, the Council on Defence during October 2000, approved the introduction of a new service system for the SANDF with effect from January 2003. Ito the new service system, only 20% of the Regular Force will be allowed to serve until retirement age, compared to the current service system wherein almost one half of the Regular Force are serving until retirement. The new service system, coupled to the provisions of the DOD HR Strategy 2010, requires that 40% of the Regular Force will comprise the Military Skills Development Service (MSD). Young, fit and healthy school leavers will be strictly selected to serve for a once-off two-year voluntary term in this component.
  102. During January 2003, the first intake of 1 347 MSD members reported for training (also see previous paragraph).
  103. All new recruits will be educated from day one that the SANDF cannot offer a life long career to all its members. It will be unambiguously communicated that most members will be reskilled and redeployed upon completion of their respective terms of contracts and that only the best performers with the best development potential may expect a longer term career, possibly until retirement.
  104. A selection process will see to it that only the best performers with excellent development potential within the MSD will be selected for the second component, ie the Core Service System (CSS) which will comprise 40% of the Regular Force. Measures such as flexible contracts, early exit options, a tenure in rank policy, the implementation of an inherent rank-age vs mustering policy (approved by the Minister of Defence on 23 December 2002) and a continuous vocational training system through a DOD Redeployment Agency, will ensure the rejuvenation of the SANDF’s HR composition and the curbing of stagnation. Only 20% of the Regular Force will serve in the Senior Career System (SCS) until retirement.
  105. Development of New Service System Components. With the MSD having been implemented, the current focus is on developing the detailed provisions of the remaining components of the SANDF’s new service system, ie the Core Service System and Senior Career System.
  106. Enabling Mechanisms. The various enabling mechanisms to make the new service system work, such as new conditions of service and service benefits for the new service system components, an appropriate Exit Management Framework and the establishment of the DOD Redeployment Agency, are either in the development stage or their development will commence soon, as part of the implementation programme for the DOD HR Strategy 2010.
  107. Migration to the New Service System. The process of migrating current members of the full-time uniformed component to the SANDF’s new service system (ie to either the Core Service System or the Senior Career System) should still be addressed. A voluntary migration dispensation is envisaged. Members will, however, have to comply with selection criteria to serve in the new service system, particularly the inherent rank-age vs mustering criteria, as approved by the Minister of Defence. Strict compliance with the latter criteria as an integral part of career management will constitute a critical factor to ensure the effective and efficient management of the new service system. This will enable the SANDF to avoid the recurrence of a build-up of non-compliant members who become un-utilisable in their musterings, leading to the deterioration of the SANDF’s deployment potential, as is currently the case.
  108. Command Functions and Responsibilities (p 33) (3.2.11)

  109. In this section the Committee focuses on the basic organisational design of the SANDF. The Committee presents their point of view and concludes with the remark "It is clear that a lot of soul searching is needed. Perhaps the Defence Force needs to dig deep in its tradition to address certain issues of a fundamental nature".
  110. The underlying philosophy or an organisation is a matter of choice. In the DOD the choice was made that Force Preparation and Force Employment should, in organisation terms, be separated. This means that the Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Service, prepare forces, and the Chief of Joint Operations employs the forces.
  111. Furthermore it was decided that in a given town or area the specialised functions such as personnel administration and common logistic support for all SANDF units in the area should be pooled in a General Support Base. The purpose was to reduce the cost of support.
  112. Some of the consequences of these decisions are what the Committee describes. However, the full picture is not given. For any organisation design there have to be compromises. Advantages and disadvantages of one approach have to be traded off against those of other approaches. In the case in point the DOD has opted for the advantages of the present system. The disadvantages are considered to be outweighed by the advantages.
  113. It takes time for any new approach to become established and have everyone accustomed to the different way of working.
  114. The situation on the ground is being monitored. Already there are actions to adjust the organisation and the way it works as experience and insight is gained.
  115. The present new system has reached a high stage of deployment. It may be inopportune to interfere. However, if the need for a major change becomes apparent the DOD is capable of exercising its judgement in collaboration with all stakeholders.
  116. Civilian vs Non-civilian posts (p. 35) (3.2.12)

  117. In paragraph 3.2.12 it is stated that "the issue of common posts is highly contentious and that civilians feel that ex-soldiers continue to be favoured over them in the filling of posts. A significant majority of them feel highly frustrated." It is unclear what is meant with the statement and it is therefore difficult to provide comments on the subject. It could be Public Service Act Personnel who complain about the staffing of demilitarised personnel but HR Support Centre in this regard has received no complaints. Cognisance should however be taken of the "Standing Principles for Post Classifications in the Department of Defence" (DODI 29/2000) which states that a common post is where any mustering can be considered for staffing.
  118. The definition of a common post has been determined and means a post that can be staffed by personnel from any occupational class within the military groupings or Public Service Act mustering depending on the classification of posts. Posts in the DOD are either that of a Military Practitioner in accordance with the military Personnel Management Code or a Public Service Act post in accordance with the Code of Remuneration. A DODI regarding the Standing Principles for Creating and Classifying Posts in the DOD has been promulgated.
  119. Arising from the DOD’s organisation design principles, the DOD developed a policy (DODI 71/2002) which differentiates between the criteria for the establishment of military versus civilian posts. Military posts are created in terms of the SANDF’s core business and responsibilities where military training and the profession of soldiering are prerequisite. Civilian posts are created for non-core business functions and to ensure that the role and functions of the Secretary for Defence (as Head of the Department and accounting officer) are adequately addressed.
  120. A DODI 19/2000, has been issued to regulate vacation leave, sick leave and the different types of special leave for SA National Defence Force members. This instruction was disseminated to all levels within the Department on 9 October 2000.
  121. In terms of the PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000, a Department of Defence Instruction to regulate vacation leave, sick leave and the different types of special leave for Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP) is at present being compiled. This instruction will have to be negotiated with Labour and upon acceptance thereof will be implemented within the Department of Defence (DOD).
  122. A new instrument for both PSAP and Military members are being developed for implementation for 2001/2002 and onwards by Director Service Systems.
  123. The policy with regard to Special Leave for the military is part of a DODI, which is still in the process of completion. The comparison with PSAP is, however, not valid as most military activities and training is done in groups where the absence of individuals could render the activity unsuccessful or cause gaps in training. This could have life threatening consequences. Consequently it may be "easier" to grant special leave to PSAP members. The special demands of military life have to be acknowledged.
  124. Leave dispensation for SANDF (military) members has been brought in line with that of the rest of the Public Service.
  125. With the promulgation of DODI 19/2000 it was stated that although the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), No 75 of 1997 did not apply to the SANDF, transverse changes may be imminent, with the result that DODI 19/2000 may have to undergo changes in due course.
  126. Since the promulgation of DODI 2000, Resolution No 7 of 2000 was introduced for PSAP members, which became effective from 1 July 2000. This Resolution was an initiative from Government to cut down on costs, increase productivity, and to ensure better administration.
  127. With the amendment of this DODI, the SANDF followed suit in supporting the broader Public Service approach in as far as these changes did not affect the operational capability and HR Strategy 2010. The changes incorporated in DODI 19/2000 (Edition 2), as approved in January 2003, includes the following:
    1. Changing from calendar days to working days. This change has been incorporated to avoid unnecessary expenses for the SANDF.
    2. Compulsory utilisation of leave. As from the start of the leave cycle on 1 January 2003, members will be compelled to utilise 10 consecutive working days leave per cycle. Leave not utilised after six months of the leave cycle will be forfeited. The exception is, leave that could not be utilised owing to operational exigencies, can be paid out to a maximum of 22, 26 or 28 working days. On resignation leave will also be paid out to a maximum of 31 working days.
    3. The capping of accrued leave. The leave accrued before 1 April 2002, will be added for purposes of payment on retirement, death, medical boarding or retrenchments.
    4. Discounting of leave. The discounting of leave will take place at intervals of five years and the formula will change from 365 calendar days to 260.714 working days.
    5. Sick leave. Sick leave will change from 120 days with full pay, 120 with half pay, and unpaid leave up to a maximum of 365 days. A member will now have 36 working days normal sick leave in a three-year cycle with the addition of three other categories of sick leave with effect from 1 January 2004. The one category is temporary incapacity. In this category a member can get 30 working days sick leave which could be extended if a medical practitioner finds the member temporarily incapacitated to perform his or her duties. The following category is permanent incapacity. This category makes provision that if a member, after an investigation, is found to be permanently incapacitated, the member will be placed in another post to accommodate his or her disablement, or be medically boarded. The last category, occupational injuries and diseases, was in the previous dispensation, but is now included as sick leave. The restriction of 240 days is lifted to make provision for an unlimited period. This whole provision for sick leave is more beneficial than the previous provision as a person's salary will no longer be halved or lost if he or she is sick for longer than 120 days. A further category, other than that applicable to PSAP has been added. The category, Leave for Military Training and Operational Injuries and Related Diseases will cater for illnesses as the name indicates.
    6. Maternity leave. Maternity leave is changed from, a limited two confinements, of 84 days per confinement, to an unrestricted number of confinements, and to a period of four months per confinement. This provision is also more beneficial than the previous provision.
    7. Deployment Leave. The previous provision of Rest Day Leave is changed to Deployment leave and the periods for qualifying for this type of leave has been shortened and limited to a maximum of 24 working days per cycle.

    National and Regional Demographics (p. 36) (3.2.13)

  128. The Committee makes the following statement:
  129. "The execution of the Minister’s instruction that the SANDF reflect the national population demographics at Unit level, as also within each rank, corps and mustering is problematic."

  130. This issue has been mentioned in paragraphs 99 to 110).
  131. Since 1994, the SANDF has made substantial progress to align its representivity ratios with the national demographic ratios, especially regarding racial representivity. The representation of Blacks (ie Africans, Coloureds and Asians) in the Full-time Component has increased from 55,3% as at 27 April 1994 to 75,3% currently. The representation of women has also increased, though marginally, from 19,7% as at 27 April 1994 to 20,9% currently.
  132. The optimal alignment of the SANDF’s representivity ratios is, however, not an easy or short-term endeavour. Despite recruiting, staffing, promotion and career development initiatives which are executed in compliance with the governing regulatory criteria, including the DOD Affirmative Action Plan, to enhance representivity, particular areas still deserve focused attention. These include the enhancement of representivity in the SANDF’s specialised musterings, which are predominantly White (eg pilots, engineers, technical officers and professional health workers); the enhancement of representivity amongst middle management, which is predominantly White and the enhancement of representivity at the entry level, which is predominantly African, especially in the SA Army.
  133. The enhancement of representivity in the SANDF’s specialised musterings enjoys high prominence, as witnessed by the implementation of the DOD Youth Foundation Training Programme with effect from April 2001. Through this programme a number of Black school leavers are annually sponsored by the SANDF to improve especially their Grade 12 Mathematics and Physical Science symbols through an intensive residential training programme. The aim is to be selected for appointment in the SANDF’s specialised musterings upon successful completion of the training programme. The number of candidates is limited by funds.
  134. Regarding the normalisation of representivity amongst middle management, it is accepted that efforts such as fast tracking, are to be utilised to expedite the process. The unique reality of the military domain is, however, that uniformed personnel, especially those in combat and technical musterings, cannot primarily be appointed directly from the public into middle management positions. In order to have credibility amongst peers and subordinates, such personnel ought to grow and progress through the ranks. Besides interventions such as fact tracking and direct appointments from outside, where feasible, the primary emphasis can therefore only be on the SANDF’s continuing recruiting efforts, which would lead to the normalisation of representivity amongst middle management over the medium to long term.
  135. It is agreed with the statement in the report that different population groups have certain predilections regarding which Service or even base or unit they want to serve in. Service in the SANDF is based on volunteerism and no individual can be compelled to serve in a particular establishment against her/his will. This very fact has, for example, led to the SA Army attracting more African recruits than recruits from other population groups. Recruiting efforts in respect of the SA Army should now, therefore, be focused on obtaining intakes which reflect a higher ratio of Coloureds, Asians and Whites.
  136. The reality of regionalism also influences the SANDF’s demographic footprint. The long established geographical presence of the SA Navy in the Western Cape and Durban, for example, has led to the SA Navy, proportionally amongst the various Services, accommodating the highest ratio of Coloureds and Asians. The DOD Affirmative Action Plan (see paragraph 103) recognises the above reality, stating that it is inevitable that the respective Services will have a more prevalent race group.
  137. The SANDF is committed to work ceaselessly to attain optimal representivity levels in all specific domains such as specialised musterings, middle level management and at entry level. The SANDF is availing its full ability to ensure that the normalisation of representivity throughout the organisation is legal, fair and just and that the process has integrity. Given the scope of the challenge, however, the normalisation of representivity in respect of all its potential permutations, such as the regional focus, will of necessity be a long term endeavour.
  138. The SAAF is committed to having a workforce that reflects the diversity of South African society. It has embarked on a strategy to transform its workforce to reflect the demographics of the country. However, due to a variety of reasons, among them the perceived lack of suitable candidates from the historically disadvantaged communities and the budget constraints under which the SAAF has found itself, the pace at which transformation has taken place has not been fast enough to satisfy the wishes of many
  139. The SAAF HR component does not reflect the total demographic composition of the South African Economically Active Population (EAP), although it is committed to rectify the situation The SAAF’s human resource race distribution per rank reflects a low percentage of Africans, Asians and Coloureds in the senior officer and non-commissioned officer ranks. The race distribution in the junior ranks is demographically more representative. This, however, is indicative of the uniqueness of the military rank structure that requires a mainly bottom-up staffing approach. Furthermore, the achievement of representivity in a technologically advanced environment is a slow process due to the lack of readily available technological expertise in the broad labour market.
  140. The SA Navy’s implementation of affirmative action has consistently striven to maintain a holistic perspective. It has been noted that the Durban area has a high component of Asian personnel, with Simon’s Town accommodating a greater number of Coloured members. Thus the targets have been interpreted in such a manner as to accommodate regional demographics.
  141. The committee recommended that "the SANDF should endeavour to place individual members as close as possible to their families, notwithstanding organisational requirements."
  142. This is the responsibility of career manager focus points located within the various Services and Divisions.
  143. The Committee also recommended that "large-scale marketing be conducted to attract suitable potential to the SANDF in order to facilitate the attainment of representivity objectives."
  144. It can be stated that in terms of the January 2003 intakes for the SA Army, SA Navy and SAMHS, sufficient responses were elicited from white candidates in order to meet the pre-determined targets as determined by the previously mentioned Services.
  145. Furthermore, in order to counter any possible shortfalls of whites at entry level, the Directorate Personnel Acquisition (DPACQ) is planning an extensive and focused marketing and recruiting effort on a Nation-wide basis which will include the following activities:
    1. The identification of predominantly white schools and the conducting of recruitment briefing to Gr 12 and 11 students in all the provinces.
    2. The distribution of career information packs, recruitment posters and application forms to all schools, including predominantly white schools, for display and use of by Career Guidance Teachers.
    3. Advertising in various career-related publications that are widely distributed to all schools, including Careers 2003/2004, Rainbow Careers, Reel 2 Reel (SABC Publication), and the A-Z of Careers.

  146. SANDF Representivity per Population Group per Province: September 2001
  147. Ser No

    Province

    Population Group

       

    African

    Coloured

    Asian

    White

     

    A

    b

    C

    d

    E

    1

    Western Cape

    19,3

    44,1

    1,9

    34,5

    2

    North West

    81,6

    4,8

    0,03

    13,4

    3

    Eastern Cape

    80,7

    9,2

    0

    10

    4

    Northern Province

    80,2

    1

    0,09

    18,6

    5

    Northern Cape

    54,6

    31,3

    0,1

    16,9

    6

    Free State

    69,8

    7,9

    0,05

    22,1

    7

    Gauteng

    61

    4

    0,7

    34,1

    8

    Kwa-Zulu Natal

    71,8

    3,7

    9

    15,3

    9

    Mpumalanga

    87,2

    1,6

    0

    11

    10

    Total

    60,7

    12,2

    1,2

    25,7

  148. The SANDF’s representivity per population group per province as at 15 February 2003, is reflected in the table below:
  149.  

     

    Ser No

    Province

    Population Group

       

    African

    Coloured

    Asian

    White

     

    A

    B

    c

    d

    e

    1

    Western Cape

    28,8

    34,6

    2,9

    33,8

    2

    North West

    81,4

    6,2

    0,02

    12,2

    3

    Eastern Cape

    81

    9,5

    0

    9,4

    4

    Limpopo

    79

    1,5

    0,1

    19,2

    5

    Northern Cape

    59,5

    25,5

    0,1

    14,8

    6

    Free State

    69

    9,4

    0,1

    21,3

    7

    Gauteng

    59,9

    5,2

    0,8

    33,9

    8

    Kwa-Zulu Natal

    74,2

    3,9

    9,1

    12,7

    9

    Mpumalanga

    89,3

    1,9

    0

    8,6

    10

    Total

    63,0

    10,8

    1,4

    24,6

    Command and Control Re-construction (p. 39) (3.2.14)

  150. The question of dealing with the effects of the changed organisation structure have been addressed in Section 2: Change – the Military in Transformation and also in the response to the heading Command Functions and Responsibilities (See 3.2.11 paragraph 155 to 160)
  151. At has been stated, the new system of command and control and support is in the process of implementation and adjustment. In due course the system will settle and the people who are responsible for delivering services will have adjusted to their new role.
  152. Effects of Re-structuring in Process (p. 39) (3.2.15)

  153. As has been discussed at paragraphs 10 to 13, paragraphs 73 to 77 and paragraphs 155 to 160 above, the new system is presently being implemented and teething troubles are being attended to.
  154. An aspect which has created a problem during implementation is the absence of the organisation wide IT system, adjusted to the new way of doing things. The shortage of funds is the main handicap.
  155. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (3.3)

    Integration (p. 40) (3.3.1)

  156. The extensive integration exercise is now virtually completed, bringing together all the defence forces into one unified DOD. Owing to the financial constraints and the heavy burden on training resources and facilities, there is a backlog in bridging training. The different Services have drawn up a plan to expedite the completion of this project. Integration irregularities are progressively resolved; eg wrong deployment of members according to their functional competencies through staffing and low ranking of some members through appeals and review of ranks especially the groups that integrated in 1994.
  157. The Military Psychological Institute will develop a battery to be used for psychometric testing with regard to the issue of counselling to separate members from the forces.
  158. Staffing (p. 42) (3.3.2)

  159. The Committee’s report covers staffing under three headings, viz General Overview; The Staffing Process and Affirmative Action; and Staffing and PVs (Temporary Employment Contract), PFs (Medium Term Contract) and PEs (Permanent Employment Contract). Many issues relating to staffing have already been covered earlier in the report and therefore in the response. What follows is a summary of the responses on each issue and references to earlier responses.
  160. With regard to the general overview, it is acknowledged that the staffing process has been long and arduous. Given the scope of the changes to the organisation and the imperative to be fair to all, the staffing process had to be lengthy and administratively burdensome. The shift of units and structures and the resultant movement of people have had a big effect on the organisation and the lives of individuals. This is the price of change. Once it is over, and it is nearly over, the organisation will stabilise and more stability will return to the lives of the people affected.
  161. The process used to staff the Military Component of the DOD was withdrawn on 4 October 2001 and has been replaced with an interim procedure "Interim Procedure Instruction: Identification of Defence Act Members for Placement in Vacant Posts" promulgated on 23 January 2002, which makes provision for an informal ad hoc procedure that will be used for the unforeseen occurrences and the critical need to fill certain posts. Succession planning will play a major role in the formal placement process.
  162. On the question of the staffing process and affirmative action, a comprehensive response is given under the heading "The Role of the Secretary for Defence" (See 3.2.4. paragraphs 97 to 110) and also under the heading "National and Regional Demographics" (See 3.2.13 paragraphs 173 to 181).
  163. Three specific foci of racial representivity are currently receiving attention, namely representivity in the SANDF’s advanced musterings, at entry level and at middle management level.
  164. Representivity in Advanced Musterings. Despite the SANDF’s marketing and recruiting efforts, the representivity of Black persons in highly advanced musterings such as pilots, navigators, naval combat officers, professional health workers etc, is still low. The legacy of the former school dispensation, which did not place a primary emphasis on the study of Mathematics and Physical Science, is primarily to blame for this situation. As the re-orientation of learning towards a more technological focus will probably only start to deliver significant results over the long term, the DOD launched a Youth Foundation Training Programme (YFTP) with effect from April 2001. The programme, which was put out on tender, is currently managed by a Denel consortium. Its aim is to provide supplementary education to previously disadvantaged school leavers so that they can improve their Mathematics, Physical Science and Biology marks through re-writing these Grade 12 subjects, thereby qualifying for possible appointment in the Regular Force. The 2001 programme has 175 learners. It is planned to increase this number to 250 during 2002 and to retain the Youth Foundation Training Programme until the SANDF’s representivity requirements for advanced musterings have been met. The project is at present delivering positive results. There are presently 264 learners following the programme (2003).
  165. The SAAF also developed a strategy to recruit from within non-core business musterings to core business musterings such as pilots and technicians. Those musterings that do not provide scope and career opportunities, such as protection services, are the focus of this strategy. The SAAF has already successfully recruited and re-trained forty members from protection services to Pilot, Technical and Supply services.
  166. Although there has been a marked improvement over the past few years, SAAF HR statistics will reflect that the recruitment of Black persons suitably qualified to serve in the core-business and technical environments, has not been optimal. Potential candidates have, due to educational backgrounds, not been able to meet the stringent mathematics and science prerequisites required for entry into these musterings. With this in mind and to supplement the pool of potential candidates, the SAAF has been an active participant in the DOD Youth Foundation Training Scheme. Furthermore, to augment this programme, the SAAF has initiated Project Siyandiza aimed at instilling aviation awareness amongst the youth of the Country, specifically within the rural and disadvantaged communities of society. Whilst it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions with regard to the success of these initiatives, forecasts are promising.
  167. The SA Navy currently has 45 school-leavers participating in the DOD Youth Foundation Development Programme. These members become available for Officer selection for the Military Training for Officers Part 1 Course in 2002.
  168. Representivity at Entry Level. The SANDF comprises a predominantly African composition amongst the rank groups of Private to Corporal. Privates comprise 91,7% Africans, Lance Corporals comprise 80,5% Africans and Corporals comprise 68,2% Africans. Currently the Privates comprise 90,3% Africans, Lance Corporals comprise 83% Africans and Corporals comprise 75,9% Africans. An anomaly of the abovementioned magnitude is significantly at odds with the Defence Review representivity guidelines (64,6% Africans; 24,3% Whites; 10,2% Coloureds and 0,7% Asians). Recruiting drives for the SA Army in particular currently aims to address this imbalance.
  169. Representivity at Middle Management Level. The middle management in the Regular Force (rank groups Major to Colonel and Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1) comprises 53,6% Whites. Currently the middle management in the Regular Force (rank groups Major to Colonel and Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1) comprises 47% Whites. This ratio too is hugely at odds with the Defence Review representivity guidelines. Representivity at this level proves the most difficult to normalise, as middle ranking experienced officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers have to grow through the ranks to gain experience. Lateral appointments from outside into such posts are therefore very rare and limited to highly specialised and professional musterings. The DOD HR Strategy 2010 calls for the continuous implementation of the approved DOD Affirmative Action Plan to normalise representivity at this level.
  170. The problem of staffing PVs (Temporary Employment Contract members), PFs (Medium Term Contract members), and PE (Long Term Contract members) is noted. It is unfortunate that such individuals are regarded by the commercial world as "being in temporary employment. It may be possible to address the problem through HR Strategy 2010.
  171. SAAF Specialised Mustering. Despite the SAAF ensuring that recruitment, appointments, promotions and career development are executed in compliance with the relevant regulatory criteria aimed at representivity, there are a number of areas where the normalisation of representivity has not yet occurred. As already mentioned, not least among these are the technologically advanced or specialised musterings, such as pilots, navigators, engineers and aircraft technicians, where the representivity of Black members is still low.
  172. Another area for improvement is the middle management of the SAAF that is at present predominantly White and male. Despite the exodus of thousands of Whites from the Department since the early 1990’s, there are probably many reasons why this situation still exists, not least of which is the requirement to retain critical scarce specialist skills and expertise. The approved strategies of the SAAF will, however, continue to address this imbalance through appropriate high level interventions and/or programmes.
  173. The Air Force Board is committed to ensure representivity throughout the SAAF, particularly at senior and middle management levels. To this end individualised plans to enhance representivity and to ensure purposeful succession planning are monitored at the highest forums.
  174. SA Army Plan. The SA Army has committed itself to representivity as a strategic issue as stated in the Defence Review and White Paper on Defence. The SA Army has embarked on a Enhancement of Black Middle-Management Plan since 2000.
  175. Actions implemented within the SA Army to address Enhancement of Black Middle-Management representivity (officers). The point of departure to enhance black representivity within the rank groups Lieutenant to Major General is to address the shortages at entry rank level, namely that of Lieutenant, Captain and Major. For this purpose the SA Army scheduled five special courses over the period 2001 to 2003.
    1. Officers Formative Training: Focussing on candidates within the rank groups Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1 for possible appointment as Lieutenants, Captains and Majors.
    2. Junior Leader Group Training (Officers): Focussing on the rank groups Private to Corporal, to be appointed as Lieutenants.

  176. Results in respect of these special courses are as follows:
    1. Officers Formative Training: 130 black candidates (Sergeants – Warrant Officers Class 1) were on course at SA Army Gymnasium and completed their course. They were appointed as officers.
    2. Junior Leader Group Training (Officers): 206 candidates (Privates to Corporals) completed their course at the SA Army Gymnasium.

  177. Actions implemented within the SA Army to address the Enhancement of Black representivity within the rank groups Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1. Within the non-commissioned officers’ environment a shortage of members in the rank group Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class 1 is experienced.
  178. Large numbers of surplus Lance-Corporals to Corporals are becoming available as the matching and placement process continues and also as a result of the closing down of units. Candidates with the necessary potential amongst the "surplus" members (Lance-Corporals to Corporals) are being identified for "Fast Tracking" purposes:
    1. Lance-Corporals: to be appointed as Corporals.
    2. Corporals: to be appointed as Sergeants.

  179. According to the Committee’s report "what is lacking are plans and orders for the staffing process for their implementation - plans according to which the goal of representation and the problem of over-supply of personnel will be solved. Ideally, the plan should be made known to all concerned, in order to deal with the insecurity."
  180. Nominations/acceptance of preferred candidates and or preferred reserves are done in such a manner that is transparent; acceptances are done in terms of former force, race and seniority. When the members are not accepted on courses, they normally lodge grievances of which the former criteria is provided as a response to each grievance. The following representivity targets as per Economic Active Population (EAP), stipulated in the White Paper on Defence 1996 and Defence Review 1998, is strictly adhered to on Course acceptances.
  181. The Career Management function has been taken back to the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Military Health Service. However the acceptance of joint courses eg the ENSP and the JSCP are centralised at Directorate Personnel Functionaries (Section Development).
  182. SA Navy. Staffing process for uniformed members in the SA Navy has been centralised at level 3 in order to ensure holistic perspective and maintain statutory consistency (equity, Affirmative Action).
  183. Staffing of the PSAP component of SA Navy has been lagging due to complexity of process, non-finalisation of structure, Pool Manager concept (lack of role clarity) organised labour involvement.
  184. SA Navy has thus assumed full responsibility of PSAP staffing and has instituted a project team, finalised structures, and created and implemented a procedural methodology.
  185. Fast Tracking. The DOD PERS 0001/99 has been promulgated for implementation during October 2002 by career managers. It has to be borne in mind that fast tracking must not be interpreted as fast promotion, but it is a management tool to empower the disadvantaged target group so that they obtain the required skills to perform at senior managerial positions.
  186. Training of Personnel Functionaries. All personnel functionary curricula have been under investigation for some time. All functional directors, both within the policy making and support lines, have been involved in a total review of the curricula and have as functional specialists indicated that they would be involved in ensuring that contents are reviewed and assessed on a regular basis.
  187. It has been agreed in principle that the Personnel Service School will be handed over to the HR Support Centre structure to create a centre of excellence.
  188. Downsizing: Strategy and Best Practice (p. 45) (3.3.3)

    (Also see 3.3.13 paragraphs 303 to 308 and 3.3.16 paragraphs 321 to 328)

  189. The Committee comments "What seems to be lacking is an exit plan for such personnel. This is a serious problem and under the present circumstances of national unemployment, it needs special attention". In any downsizing this is the vital element.
  190. The further comments by the Committee under this heading are also valid, but do not appear to take into account the vital element mentioned above. It should not be thought that the DOD did not approach downsizing with a "best practice" as a basis. Many strategies and plans were adopted but they could not be properly executed due to the vital missing link of an approved exit plan.
  191. Since the establishment of the SANDF, the DOD has on several occasions, as part of the broad Public Service, attempted to obtain a suitable mandatory exit management framework/mechanism to enable it to downsize more rapidly to the Defence Review Full-time component target strength of 70 000. Such a framework/mechanism for the Public Service has, unfortunately, not been forthcoming.
  192. Through natural attrition (resignations, retirements, inter-departmental transfers, selective non-renewal of contracts and discharges, Voluntary Severance Packages and the current Employer Initiated Package), as well as through limited recruiting to fill only critical posts, the DOD has nevertheless succeeded to reduce its Full-time HR component from a peak strength of 101 353 in 1996 to a strength of 77 667, representing a reduction of 23% in September 2001 to the current strength of 74 978, representing a reduction of 26%. It is projected that the target strength of 70 000 will be attained by 2004/05, by making use of the current reduction mechanisms mentioned above.
  193. The Employer Initiative Package (EIP) system had a very important role in terms of to an exit mechanism for the DOD members. With the cessation of the EIP system, no similar mechanism was introduced whereby the supernumerary members could be exited from the DOD. The Resolution 7 of 2002 (in which the Transformation Restructuring Package finds its origin), will provide a temporary exit mechanism for excess members of the DOD only once the excess lists have been compiled. It thus leaves a vacuum in the interim for excess members to be exited. A need exists for a long term ongoing mechanism for the DOD in this regard.
  194. SA Army Plan. The SA Army approved post structure is the Transitional Force Design. A total number of 32 167 uniform posts and 4 156 PSAP posts. The SA Army HR Budget is equal to the number of "feet on the ground" - it is "ring-fenced" and no expansion is possible.
  195. HR Strategy 2010 is considered as the "kingpin" to down- and right size the force, rejuvenate the ageing SA Army and rectifying the ever-deteriorating health status of the SA Army. It is also the answer to ensure a properly staffed SA Army in the future. The strategy is contained in a DODI for implementation and execution. It is a fact that the SA Army is "overstretched" when it comes to its defence commitments and financial resources, but until the "green light" is not given from all the required role players, the SA Army cannot commence with implementation.
  196. The final output of the SA Army Strategic Alignment exercise to become affordable and sustainable, is not yet approved by the Minister of Defence for implementation and execution. An EMF mechanism to support HR Strategy 2010 is also not in place. Current SA Army HR capabilities and fin resources are over stretched and any sudden change (down sizing) will only aggravate the situation. Resolution 7 of 2002 is not the instrument to commence with the downsizing of the SA Army - it focuses on redeployment and enhancement of representation. Until the final "go ahead" is given by the Minister of Defence to commence with the planned alignment, the SA Army remains very much dependant on its current force levels to deliver the required output.
  197. Implementation of the New Service System (NSS) – Core Service System (CSS) and Senior Career System (SCS). The target date to commence with implementation is 1 September 2003. As already mentioned HR guidelines will be issued as soon as Chief Directorate HR Plan issue their guidelines for implementation. It will however be a career management intensive exercise - measuring and considering each and every SA Army member against the rank/age policy, years in service, years in rank, possible future contribution, gender, race etc. Without an EMF mechanism this will only result in a futile exercise - "shifting members from the current STS, MTS and LTS to the CSS and SCS.
  198. Implementation of the Military Skills Development System (MSDS). With the implementation of the MSDS January 2003 with a 450 MSD intake for the SA Army, as well as further planned intakes within this financial year (FY2003/04). For July 2003 - 1000 members and January 2004 - 1200 members.
  199. The SA Army is at last on course to add rejuvenation as well as fit and healthy soldiers to it's current Force. However, the effect, without an approved Exit Management Framework (EMF), will be an Army growing in strength requiring more and more funding from Government.
  200. The main focus of the HR Strategy 2010 is to rejuvenate the ageing and "medically unfit" force, as well as to become affordable and sustainable (a fin driven exercise). The main impact of any down and right sizing exercise within the SA Army will be in the rank groups Pte-Cpl (the majority ± 98% being Black members).
  201. The added thrust to rejuvenate the total SA Army Force can result in the redeployment of up to 18000 SA Army members. Leaving the new SA Army with a total of 23000 Regular Force and PSAP and 6000 MSDS members.
  202. SA Navy. In the Navy the differences between current personnel component composition and Organisation Structure has been minimised by following interventions:
    1. The organisation structure and personnel component composition were assessed.
    2. Alignment was optimised by Voluntary Service Packages, Employer Initiated Packages, Inter Branch Transfers (retraining), full implementation of Service System, limited recruiting, natural attrition.
    3. The post structure thereafter was modelled for optimised career progression.
    4. 960 training posts were created in order to facilitate training and retraining.
    5. The further refinement is occurring.

  203. The TRP Process for SA Navy practically concluded. The MSD component of 414 was selected strictly in accordance with Navy representivity targets. This initiative significantly impacts on realisation of representivity.
  204. Besides continuous downsizing through natural attrition, the current focus is on attaining greater personnel affordability through the rightsizing/rightshaping of the SANDF. This should lead to more funds becoming available for the operating budget over the medium term.
  205. The DOD HR Strategy 2010, approved by the Plenary Defence Staff Council on 20 July 2001, as well as the new service system concept for the SANDF, provides strategic direction. This includes the following provisions:
    1. The SANDF should have a bulk of young, fit and healthy soldiers to meet its operational and deployment commitments and to rejuvenate its human resources composition.
    2. There should be appropriate mobility and redeployment mechanisms to enable the SANDF to configure its HR composition in terms of the required ratios, affordability and efficiency.
    3. There should be a continuous reskilling, redeployment and alternative job placement process in which all soldiers whose tenures or contracts expire, or who can no longer be effectively utilised, can participate.

  206. On 24 January and 26 February 2003, the DOD also had the opportunity to workshop the DOD HR Strategy 2010 with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Defence. After some amendments to the strategy, a consensus was reached on the provisions thereof. It was also agreed that the DOD would continue to liaise with the above Committees, as the implementation of the strategy unfolds.
  207. To achieve the envisaged goals of the DOD HR Strategy 2010 would, however, require decisions with far reaching socio-economic consequences. The will at all levels in the DOD, including Ministerial level, to make the strategy work, will only be proven over a period of time as implementation unfolds.
  208. One of the determining factors of a defence force’s operational effectiveness is that the bulk of its deployable members should be young, fit and healthy.
  209. Regarding loss of expertise since the early 1990s the loss of operational and functional expertise continues to hamper the execution of operational commitments. This endangers the SANDF’s capacity to operate, maintain and support the weapons system that will result from the strategic defence package acquisitions.
  210. Geographically Displaced and Organisationally Dislocated Personnel (p.48) (3.3.4)

    (Also see 3.12.1 paragraph 518)

  211. The SAMHS’s Project RESILIENCE found that older personnel are generally more area bound, loath to leave their property unattended, are married and have family responsibilities, whilst they are generally less amenable to rigorous physical training. Older members in the SANDF generally have young families to support with wives being put in a difficult position to sustain their families while their husbands are deployed for extended periods. Wives in many cases are not suitably empowered to manage home financing. The problem of deployed single parents (especially women) is real and potentially seriously damaging to future youth development. The cumulative effect of the abovementioned factors, coupled to the number of personnel who exceed the required rank-age ratio, inhibit the SANDF’s deployment potential.
  212. Through the integration of forces, the SANDF’s support posts are fully and even over-subscribed, leaving no internal options to accommodate such members as the closure of units takes place.
  213. If such phenomena occur it can only be attributed to deviations from laid down administrative policies and procedures. This is also attributable to the closure of units.
  214. Equity Issues (p. 50) (3.3.5)

  215. The Committee’s comments are noted.
  216. Pensionable Service of Former Non-Statutory Forces Members. The problem regarding insufficient pensionable service of former Non-Statutory Forces members is currently being addressed. The Cabinet approved the Policy on Recognition of Former Non-Statutory Force for the Provisioning of Pension Benefits in November 2000. This policy does not only address the need for providing for former Non-Statutory Forces members who are senior in age, but it also provides for other members of the former Non-Statutory Forces in accordance with their length of service in their respective former Non-Statutory Forces. Accordingly, it gives more recognition, to a large extent, to older members. The system was based on the fact that whereas older members do not have sufficient time to accumulate their pension benefits, younger members have the advantage of youth to do so.
  217. During February 2003, the DOD briefed the Portfolio Committee on Finance as well as the Portfolio Committee on Defence on the above policy. The respective Committees were, however, not in favour of the policy’s provisions, despite these having been approved by Cabinet. As a result, there will now be a short delay in getting approval for new provisions pertaining to the policy.
  218. The SANDF still has to achieve normalised representivity levels in its advanced musterings, at entry level and amongst its middle management. This requires a continuously driven effort, but this objective will not be realised over the short to near medium term.
  219. Ranking and Qualifications (p. 50) (3.3.6)

  220. The Committee recommended that once-off adjustments could be considered in respect of the revision of the ranking of integratees and for them to catch up with qualifying courses that they have missed.
  221. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integratees to "catch up".
  222. During the integration process the ranks of integratees were determined by taking into account nine criteria agreed upon by the JMCC, which included their former force military qualifications. On being ranked the required future SANDF bridging, corps and development training were determined for each member. Such training is being monitored on a regular basis to allow integratees to "catch up".
  223. "The Committee recommended that once-off adjustments could be considered in respect of the revision of the ranking of integratees and for them to catch up with qualifying courses that they have missed."
  224. From the 2 229 cases, a DOD Audit Board had determined 384 cases of possible prejudice, as opposed to clear prejudice previously contemplated by the Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC). After considering the submission of the DOD Audit Board to the PDSC on 17 February 2003, the PDSC made the following decisions:
    1. That the Audit of Ranking process, conducted over a period of more than two years, be considered as concluded and that no other ranks of the first 1994 intakes or any other intakes be subjected to similar auditing processes.
    2. That a distinctly separate and subsequent process be followed in respect of the 384 cases by an "Ad Hoc Rank Adjustment Board" in conjunction with the Chiefs of Services and Divisions. This process should determine possible future recommended ranks for these members which will have to be submitted to the PDSC and authorised by the Chief of the SA National Defence Force.

  225. The SA Army has started with various initiatives to uncouple the current direct correlation between course qualifications and rank promotions with salary notches. Proposals have been made to move closer to the British system where by these aspects have been uncoupled to allow for non-money driven progression in rank which will undoubtedly serve the military requirements of the organisation much better. The SA Army plea as a matter of urgency to consider and implement the separation of course, rank and pay which will end the problem of members pushing to be promoted in order to better their income.
  226. Regimental Funds (p. 51) (3.3.7)

  227. The comments of the Committee are noted.
  228. It is intended to review the policy and practice of Regimental Funds.
  229. The Committee recommends that "all aspects pertaining to the institution, management of and control over regimental funds be taken under review, in order to determine whether such aspects are user friendly, equitable and understandable."
  230. Regimental fund deductions which in terms of the Implementation Measures for the regulation of Payroll Deductions, letter DS/CPP/DSS/R/104/B dd 23 January 2002 can be deducted from the salaries of members/employees provided that:
    1. These deductions do not exceed R150.00 per month.
    2. The unit has registered with the Directorate Personnel Payments and a Supplier Code has been activated to facilitate electronic payments.
    3. Membership is voluntary and a deduction can only be instituted on completion and submission of a duly signed debit order by the member/employee.
    4. Regimental funds/unit funds provide inter alia for unit social functions, tea/coffee, year-end functions, laundry and cleaning of facilities, barber/hairdressers, contingency funds, and extra messing

    Reserve Forces (p. 51) (3.3.8)

  231. The comment about "looking after cattle" may have arisen because many Army Territorial Reserve units that have been utilised to help control the foot and mouth disease outbreak, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, and have participated in maintaining the cordon and other related ops. Cattle rustling across borders could also be the responsibility of troops involved in borderline control.
  232. The allegations by Reserve Force members that some of them have not been issued with military identity documents, is correct. The problem was attributable to the fact that the equipment, including the special cameras that are used to produce the identity documents, had become unserviceable. This affected the issue of documents to both Regular and Reserve Force members in many regions. The matter is now being resolved through the acquisition of eighteen new cameras being deployed at Human Resource Satellites throughout the RSA. In addition, a project has been concluded in terms of which the issuing of military identity documents is linked to the PERSOL system to ensure that only bona fide members of the SANDF are being issued with military identity documents.
  233. It has been standard practice for many years not to issue military ID cards to Reserve Force personnel and these are issued only when reporting for service. They are retained on the personal file at the unit when the member is not called up. This is a standard mobilisation and de-mobilisation procedure to prevent possible misuse of the ID by persons who are not in service or called up for official duty. It is regretted that this should make them a "Laughing stock". They should have no use for such an ID when not physically rendering service.
  234. The Reserve Force comprises members of all the race groups. The 2001 pay roll from January to August reflecting the call-up details of the Reserve Force per race has been analysed. the average call-up ratio of the Reserve Force for 2001 until August comprised 37,7% Africans, 11,6% Coloureds, 0,3% Asians and 50,3% Whites. During this period, the call-up of Africans reached 40% during some months (January and August). The pay roll reflecting the call-up details of the Reserve Force from January to December 2002, per race, has been analysed (Appendix C attached). No unexplained unfair call-ups could be identified. Reserve Force Service is done on a voluntary basis and members’ call-ups depend on operational requirements and available funds for man-days. The Reserve Force members serve part-time and such service therefore does not offer employment per se. The utilisation of Reserves is being reviewed in terms of the Strategic Framework for the Reserve Force, which was approved by the PDSC, as well as in terms of Project PHOENIX.
  235. Issues which these plans address and the areas needing renewal and transformation include the following:
    1. Rejuvenating the personnel complement with younger, fit soldiers who are universally deployable in operational conditions.
    2. Addressing the lack of representivity in the leader group. The means to achieve this include recruiting former non-statutory force members into the Reserves, targeted recruiting of designated groups into the Military Skills Development system which had its first intake in Jan 2003 and the recruiting of Regulars who leave the full-time service into the Reserves.
    3. A structured and achievable training programme for units and individuals according to the readiness schedule.

  236. There have been such allegations in the past that whites are "favoured" with longer call-up periods than black members. Investigations have not been successful in establishing any racial bias in such instances. Where it could be established that such different periods had occurred, there were logical explanations. For example, a trained white personnel clerk who was called up for 30 days continuous service in a clerical capacity at the unit HQ as opposed to black troops who were needed only for specific short duration operations in support of the SAPS. The fact that many white leader group individuals (eg Officers Commanding, Regimental Sergeant Majors) are often visible at the unit on an ongoing basis. They receive pay only for the hours worked (non-continuous service). They even put in time with no pay, which may be misconstrued by black troops as favouritism. (The spirit of voluntarism as opposed to a "job" has not yet taken root in all the newly joined Reserve Force members.) Isolated instances of "favouritism" as described in the report may well have occurred but without further detail it cannot be investigated.
  237. Through the Navy Review an end-to-end redesign of the Reserve Forces has been ordered. The Review has called for a holistic investigation to be conducted into the role, functions, utilisation, training and geographic distribution of Reserves and Reserve Units. The attainment of representivity in the Reserve component will be facilitated by the naval utilisation of the MSD mechanism.
  238. It is not sure what is meant by the recommendation that "the utilisation of the Reserve Force should be investigated with regard to role and legal status of members so deployed." The role of the Reserves is quite clear and the legal status of Reserve Force members, as well as their service rendering is clearly set out in the Defence Act and General Regulations.
  239. Compensation for Injuries (p. 52) (3.3.9)

  240. SANDF members are only liable for compensation when a permanent disability is sustained. The WCL5 form (Final Medical Report) is the most essential document. In this form the grades of disability, after the stabilisation of the condition/injury, are given. On grounds of this the Compensation Commissioner decides if a member must be compensated and how much such a member will receive. If compensation is granted it is corresponded via the HR Support Centre to the specific HR Sup Satellite who in turn correspond with the member/s concerned at that member/s unit to inform the member/s. It should be noted that the Compensation Commissioner is at present approximately six months behind with the processing of post due to having implemented a new system at the Department of Labour. The HR Support Centre (DPM - Section Medical Administration) is closely monitoring all claims submitted to the Compensation Commissioner thereby ensuring that the necessary follow up actions take place to obviate the delays as mentioned.
  241. The applicable acts covering the compensation for injuries are the Workman’s Compensation Act, 1941 (Act No 30 of 1941 as amended) and the Act on Occupational Health and Safety, 1993 (Act No 85 of 1993). Injury administration was addressed in an article that was published in the now defunct SALUT and in DOD Bulletins and a follow up article is to be published in a forthcoming issue of the SA SOLDIER. Furthermore all the HR Support Satellites are in possession of the HR Support Centre Standing Operating Procedures on Injury Administration.
  242. The HR Support Centre, Directorate Personnel Maintenance (DPM), cannot comment on the situation in respect of the two members mentioned in Paragraph 3.3.9. If their particulars (Force number, name and injury) are supplied to the HR Support Centre (DPM) their specific cases will be investigated and resolved.
  243. It is recommended that "It is recommended that the issue of members to whom disability benefits are due, be reviewed with the objective of resolving it once and for all. It is likely that if left unresolved, the matter may result in litigations against the DOD."
  244. SANDF members are only liable for compensation when a permanent disability is sustained. The WCL5 Form is the most essential document in this regard. In this form the grades of disability after the stabilisation of the condition/injury are given. On grounds of this, the Compensation Commissioner decides if a member must be compensated and how much such a member will receive. If compensation is granted it is corresponded via the HR Support Centre to the specific HR Sup Satellites which in turn correspond with the member/s concerned at that members unit. It should be noted that the Compensation Commissioner is still approximately six months behind with the processing of post due to having implemented a new system at the Department of Labour. The HR Support Centre Directorate Personnel Maintenance is closely monitoring all claims submitted to the Compensation Commissioner thereby ensuring that the necessary follow up actions take place to obviate the delays as mentioned.
  245. The applicable acts covering the compensation for injuries are the Workman’s Compensation Act, 1941 and the Act on Occupational Health and Safety, 1993. Injury administration was addressed in an article that was published in the previous SALUT and in the DOD Bulletins. The HR Support Centre (DPM) is in the process of formulating a follow up article for publishing in a forthcoming issue of the SA Soldier. Furthermore, all the HR Sup Satellites are in possession of the HR Support Centre Standing Operating Procedures on Injury Administration.
  246. The HR Support Centre is well aware of the frustrations experienced by the long lead time in the processing and finalisation of claims once submitted to the Compensation Commissioner. To expedite the processing of claims by the Compensation Commissioner, members of the HR Support Centre (Directorate Personnel Maintenance) held a meeting on 3 May 2001, as well as follow up meetings on 16 October 2002 with senior officials of the said department to address the expediting of the finalisation of claims. All claims from the HR Support Centre to the offices of the Compensation Commissioner are at present still delivered by hand in order to speed up the process. Two members of the HR Support Centre visit the Compensation Commissioner once a week to assist with the processing of claims.
  247. In addition to the above information, it must be emphasised that the HR Support Centre (DPM) cannot react in respect of the member who got injured in 1996 in a vehicle accident as mentioned in Paragraph 3.3.9, until such time as the member’s particulars are provided. It should be further noted that the second mentioned member who is a quadriplegic from 2 Military Hospital, is according to the Act on Occupational Injuries and Diseases, not entitled to any compensation as his/her injury was not as a result of his/her duties, but occurred while the member was off duty.
  248. Housing (p. 53) (3.3.10)

  249. The situation with regard to married quarters is viewed in a very serious light. There is indeed a very serious shortage. The situation is as result of the following factors:
    1. The transition from a National Service based to a volunteer based organisation has increased the demand dramatically. No additional funds have been made available.
    2. Insufficient DPW resources for upkeep have meant that married quarters are falling into a state of disrepair. In some significant cases whole blocks of flats have had to be vacated because they have become dangerous for human habitation.
    3. During transformation the footprint of the SANDF has necessarily had to shrink. This has resulted in large-scale migration of service personnel. The lack of additional housing is beyond the control of the DOD. It is an unfortunate, but unavoidable state of affairs.

  250. State policy that, with a few exceptions, housing is a personal matter has undermined what has always been regarded as a pillar of life in the services.
  251. The fact that "duty buses" are also almost totally excluded by state policy means that transport becomes a problem for people who cannot find lodging close to their base. (Also see 3.11.1 paragraph 509 to 514)
  252. Single quarters are generally sufficient in number, but, once again, the lack of DPW funds for upkeep has resulted in unsatisfactory living standards.
  253. "Strategic high-level intervention is essential. This is a situation that rolls on from day to day without relief, while budget years come and go."
  254. The deteriorating condition of military houses is part of a larger problem of the deteriorating condition of DOD controlled facilities. The total requirement for funding to rectify the problem of maintenance backlog is estimated at approximately RBn4. This problem has received substantial attention at strategic level. Intervention at ministerial level has been requested.
  255. Discussions between the Ministers of Defence, Public Works and State Expenditure have been scheduled for 28 March 2003 in order to try and obtain additional funding for the DOD to address the backlog of maintenance of its facilities.
  256. Every effort has been made through the available channels (Regional Facilities Integrated Manager, Department of Public Works) and through use of own resources to improve the quality of working and living spaces within the SA Navy. It however remains a major problem to maintain and acquire facilities for utilisation by the SA Navy. Feasibility of utilising the Private Funding Initiative route was implemented to expand and improve infrastructure within the Fleet Command. An investigation has been launched to determine future needs for infrastructure within the Navy Education Training and Development environment and is now in the process of being implemented.
  257. It is important to divide housing into two groups. Firstly married quarters and secondly single quarters. There is a serious shortage of military housing. The situation in both cases in Thaba Tshwane area is deteriorating. The SANDF does not receive enough funds/support from the department of public works to maintain flats, single quarters and houses. It must be noted that the SANDF changed from a National Service system to volunteer system. That means that all married members could qualify for houses. In the past it was only for permanent force members. The commanders cannot take the blame for this. There is more than enough accommodation for unmarried members, but the condition of the single quarters are also deteriorating. It is important not to generalise the situation, because the situation in the SANDF differs between units. The only solution for this is to motivate the soldier to buy his or her own house, and to increase the housing subsidy.
  258. Former Auxiliary Service Members (p. 55) (3.3.11)

  259. The Committee’s comment describes a sad and difficult situation. It is agreed that a DOD regulatory framework needs to be created in order to assimilate former FAS members.
  260. A DOD regulatory framework has been implemented in order to assimilate former auxiliary service members.
  261. "Professional Career Privates" (p. 56) (3.3.12)

  262. The Committee’s comments are valid. The problem is, however being dealt with comprehensively.
  263. The Redeployment Plan and the Human Resources Strategy 2010 addresses this problem. (Also see Exit Plan (3.3.16 paragraph 322 sub-paragraphs b and c)
  264. Inter-departmental Transfers (p. 58) (3.3.13)

  265. The question of inter-departmental transfers is included in the Redeployment Plan and HR Strategy 2010.
  266. During 2001, various meetings were held between senior representatives of the SANDF and the Departments of Public Service and Administration, Justice, Transport and Correctional Services, as well as with the SA Police Service, the Johannesburg Metro Police, the SA Revenue Service and Spoornet. The aim of these meetings was to investigate various redeployment options.
  267. Discussions between the SANDF and the stakeholders mentioned in the paragraph above, as well as with potential donors, continue to identify redeployment opportunities for those members who can, for the reasons discussed above, no longer be effectively utilised by the SANDF.
  268. "A further in depth study in this regard is required."
  269. The Directorate Personnel Separation (DPS) is currently involved in the inter-departmental transfer process with the SAPS. An instruction is on place to extend this process to other state departments. Negotiations are underway with the Correctional Services. Approaches from the National Treasury, Department of Arts and Culture were referred to Directorate Personnel Separation (DPS) by the Inter Departmental Task Team (DTT). The process has now also been extended to include the Johannesburg Metro Police.
  270. Director Personnel Separation foresees that this process will snowball and would go a long way in alleviating the problems in the broader context. DPS however requires a broader mandate to empower it to extend the process to all the other interested state departments.
  271. Directorate HR Plans and Director Service Systems have been approached for the compilation of inter alia a policy as well as an instruction which empowers Directorate Personnel Separation to execute and extend the process. It is foreseen that the process will continue after the posts on the National Data Base of the Inter Departmental Task Team has been completed.
  272. SA Navy. A specific initiative was instituted in 1999/2000 in the Navy to facilitate the Inter Branch Transfer (IBT) of members within Protection Services to other musterings of their choice where vacancies were available. This was implemented with considerable success. This has caused a personnel shortfall within Protection Services, which is now being addressed.
  273. Through the Integration Process in the Navy approval has been granted for a considerable number of Inter Branch Transfers, irrespective of the availability of vacancies. The Inter Branch Transfers of Former NSF members are now finalised.
  274. The Navy is committed to not staffing members in supernumerary capacities as far as possible. Therefore, Inter Branch Transfers cannot be approved in instances where such action would result in the member being placed in a supernumerary position. However, the principle is still in force.
  275. Women in the Defence Force (p. 58) (3.3.14)

  276. The Committee notes that the Army stands out as "scoring high on the number of women but very low on their empowerment." The Chief of the Army’s comments are given below.
  277. The SA Army is not in a position to comment on this issue as far as the others services are concerned, with respect to the SA Army, however the following:
    1. We do not agree with the notion that women in the SA Army are not being empowered. As with affirmative action, gender equality will also improve with strides as time progresses.
    2. The approach to the utilisation of females should be handled with sensitivity and on an individual basis on its own merits.

  278. The SA Army went through an exercise to determine where women can be appointed and utilised productively without discrimination. Today many women have been appointed in all kinds of posts throughout the SA Army. A number of women have for instance qualified as gunners on the G5 and G6 in the artillery and a woman has been appointed as the officer commanding of an infantry combat unit.
  279. The uniformed women in the SA Army comprises 7% versus the male composition of 93%. The Army strives to reach at least 30% women representivity by 2010. Therefore the Army has embarked on an "Enhancement of Women Representivity" plan. The Army already went through an exercise where women are appointed and utilised productively without discrimination. Women are already appointed in officer commanding posts in units at the SA Army Infantry Formation and at the SA Army Engineering Formation. A number of women are already qualified as gunners on the G5 and G6 and appointed in posts in units within the SA Army Artillery Formation.
  280. The enhancement of women within the middle- to senior management level are also addressed by a selection process of women candidates within the rank group Private to Sergeant for Officers Formative course during January 2003 to be appointed as officers in successfully completion of their course in May 2003. Within the planning of the Military Skills Development System, 30% women have been recruited via this system and are presently undergoing training at SA Army Gymnasium and 3 SAI Battalion in Kimberley.
  281. U. According to the SA Air Force another area for improvement is gender representivity in middle and senior management of the SAAF which is at present predominantly male. The approved strategies of the SAAF will address this imbalance through appropriate high level interventions and programmes. A positive sign is the appointment of the SAAF’s first Black female Officer Commanding (Colonel) and White female director (Brig Gen).
  282. SA Navy. A number of strategies aimed specifically at increasing gender representivity have been initiated in the SA Navy. These form the elements of an action plan, which will be ongoing for the next five years, although the most critical components of these strategies and plans will be implemented across the next twenty-four months. The action plan delineated below, is reflective of the greater initiative to create gender equity within the SA Navy:
    1. All ships, with the exception of submarines, are open to women.
    2. A critical application of the premises of equal employment and equal opportunities is the unrestricted access for either women or men to posts and appointment within the SA Navy, irrespective of the mustering/occupational class or rank level of the particular post. Thus, access to all sea-going roles within the SA Navy for both women and men, subject to their ability to satisfy the inherent post/job requirements, is critical to the establishment and maintenance of gender equity within the SA Navy.
    3. In order to ensure equity, an instruction has been issued which makes active provision for the equal access of women and men to sea-going posts in the SA Navy, at all rank levels. Inter alia, the following special measures are being taken to ensure that
      1. women are actively encouraged to be employed within the sea-going environment;
      2. the necessary education, training and development is provided to women within the sea-going environment;
      3. naval female role models are used within the recruiting, selection and staffing processes; and
      4. Naval platforms are converted, where necessary (in accordance with the stipulated prescripts) to accommodate women at sea.
      5. Special attention is being given to recruit women at a rate of at least 30% of the annual intake.

  283. Senior Non-Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers. With regard to the non-commissioned officers and warrant officers appointments the situation improved rapidly. Women serve in all non-commissioned officers and warrant officers appointments except for level two appointments (Service /Division Sergeants Major). It is foreseen that the latter will change soon, because there is no prohibition for women serving in these posts.
  284. Merit Bonuses (p. 59) (3.3.15)

  285. A method of rewarding work significantly better than that of peers has been an ongoing problem for a number of years. Strong prescripts with regard to the numbers of recipients per rank and population group have in the last two years, re-engineered the spread of the merit bonus provisions. The pool of personnel who received performance rewards during the 1999/ 2000 performance reward cycle, comprised 25,8% Africans, 14,8% Coloureds 2,2% Asians and 57,4% Whites. Contrasted against the abovementioned figures, the pool of personnel who received performance awards during the 2000/2001 performance reward cycle, comprised 47,7% Africans, 14,2% Coloureds, 1,4% Asians and 36,5% Whites. During the last assessment cycle (2001/2002) the personnel who received performance awards comprised 54,43% Africans, 11,76% Coloureds, 1,82% Asians and 31,99% Whites.
  286. The top structure did a lot to improve the system. The lack of funds/budgeting is the reason why some of the achievers on ground level did not receive the bonus. This caused unhappiness between members about the new system and is the reason why they do not trust the system.
  287. SA Navy. Within the SA Navy, officers commanding and divisional officers are not assuming the full responsibility for ensuring valid and reliable assessment of their personnel. Distorted values are allocated in order to avoid conflict. This results in unwarranted expectations which are dashed by subsequent moderation committees. As such, numerous naval orders have been formulated to address the issue and divisional officer seminars been instituted.
  288. With regard to the PSAP component, an audit was conducted into the centralised award of merit bonuses for SA Navy personnel. As result, the awards of merit bonuses are now decentralised.
  289. Exit Plan (p. 60) (3.3.16)

  290. Comment on the Exit Plan was given in paragraphs 232 to235 and is further expanded upon in "Human Resources Strategy 2010."
  291. Reference to an Exit Plan and the expected involvement of the Service Corps was also highlighted. The Plenary Defence Staff Council of 16 July 2001 also approved the following:
  292. a. The migration of the Service Corps to become the DOD Redeployment Agency, and the development of a DOD Redeployment Programme in principle. All relevant stakeholders (eg the Service Corps, Services, CFO, CJ Training, the National Defence Liaison Council, donors, organised business, developmental institutions, the Department of Labour and the Department of Education) will jointly function to drive the DOD Re-deployment Programme.

    b. The commencing of a redeployment programme for Privates aged 40 years and older, not later than the first quarter of 2002.

    c. Decided that an offer be made to the focus group (Privates 40 years of age and older) on a voluntary acceptance basis.

  293. A business plan to make use of donor funding offered by the Federal Government of Germany, to enhance present non-core technical training capacity within the DOD and in particular Service Corps, is currently being drawn up to finance the specific areas of concern referred. A Memorandum of Understanding was compiled and signed between the Federal Government of Germany and the Republic of South Africa. A second intake of clients has already reported for training at the Service Corps Centre for Advanced Training, and substantial material assistance has been forthcoming through the German Agreement.
  294. Other business plans are in the process of initiation to obtain donor funding for potential assessments, non-technical non-core training and the update of facilities that cannot be covered by existing funds within the DOD.
  295. During January 2003 the DOD issued a Request for Information to potential Service providers to assist with the establishment of a DOD Deployment Agency. A number of responses have been received and are currently being studied.
  296. To determine the extent of the "re-organisation" that ought to take place in the Service Corps, a DOD workshop will take place on 13 September 2001. This workshop will take place under the auspices of CJ Support and will be attended by all role players and stakeholders within the DOD. The aim of this workshop will focus on the future role of the Service Corps as a Resettlement Agent for the DOD. (Also see paragraph 49)
  297. It can be expected that quite a large number of Level 2 PSAP members will be in excess to the TRP baseline structure after the completion of the matching and placement process. It is also possible that a small number of uniformed members (rank group LCpl - Cpl) be in excess to the SA Army TRP baseline. It can also be expected that the number of Uniform and PSAP members will refuse to be transferred as a result of the Matching and Placement Process. The Resolution 7 of 2002 stipulation that "if a member refuses to participate in the process, he/she is deemed to have resigned", will then be tested.
  298. The bulk of the Rifleman/Privates within the SA Army should be between the age bracket 18 - 22 years. Only 0,28% of all SA Army Privates/Riflemen are within this age bracket. Considering the picture within the rank groups LCpl and Cpl the same ageing factor is to be detected. The main reasons for this ageing factor are the Minister of Defence moratorium placed on contract terminations (1995), a very small annual inflow of new troops (only 400 members per annum since 1998) as well as the advanced age of certain NSF members when they integrated in 1994 - 2002 (which they obviously cannot be blamed for).
  299. Apart from the rank groups Pte-Cpl, the rank/age distribution with regard to all rank groups are currently being investigated by the SA Army.
  300. Skills Training and Adult Based Educational Training (ABET). One of the main focus areas of the Government of South Africa is the upliftment of its people. Within the PSAP environment, a very large number of PSAP members, especially Level 2 and 3 and certain cases Level 4, have a very low level of education a legacy of the era prior 1994. An audit to determine the required levels of adult based educational training in respect of SA Army PSAP members is in process. Adult based educational training programme is in process and will be enlarged within the financial framework to accommodate more groups.
  301. Remuneration and Allowances of Technical Personnel (p. 62) (3.3.17)

  302. The remuneration of technical personnel is part of an advanced initiative undertaken by the Technical Personnel Advisory Committee (TPAC). Director Engineering Services heads an investigation which has already been provisionally presented to officials of the Department of Public Service Administration involved in these initiatives throughout the Public Service. The SA Navy and the SA Air Force technical fraternity are already benefiting from retention type allowances or bonuses which are coupled to specific scarce musterings.
  303. The Committee recommended "that consideration be given to offering incentives to certain categories of professionals in order to attract/retain their services"
  304. SA Navy. During the last year the following two retention schemes were implemented in the SA Navy:
    1. Special Medium Term Service System (SMTSS). This system was developed to provide the Navy with some form of retention mechanism for combat officers. At the same time the scheme was developed in such a way that it provided combat officers with an incentive to obtain the required sea-going qualifications. The scheme is presently in its infancy, a year after implementation, but its positive impact is readily apparent. One hundred and seventeen qualifying combat officers have signed the contract and at this stage it is clear that the resignation rate is slowing down, and that more officers are taking the responsibility to become qualified and medically fit in order to remain at sea. In this regard it is also to be noted that for the first time the Navy qualified at 30 bridge watch-keeping officers in one year.
    2. Technical Incentive/Retention Scheme. The Technical Incentive/ Retention Scheme was implemented in March 2002 and 338 technical officers/ratings signed the contracts. The aims of this scheme are similar to those of the combat officers and similar results are being noted.

  305. SAAF. During the past few years the SAAF has embraced a number of initiatives aimed at the retention of expertise. Besides introducing retention incentive schemes that are elucidated upon below, the SAAF has also produced a comprehensive action plan aimed at addressing soft issues that impact upon morale. The incentive schemes are as follows:
    1. Military Aviation Career Incentive Pay (MACIP). This scheme was developed to provide the SAAF with some form of retention mechanism for pilot/navigator aircrew. The scheme was implemented during 2001.
    2. Airspace Control Incentives. Again, this scheme provides the SAAF with a retention mechanism for Mission Controllers and Air Traffic Controllers. The scheme was implemented during 2002.
    3. Technical Incentives. This retention mechanism has been developed over a period of approximately 18 months and was finally approved by the Minister of Public Service and Administration on 24 February 2003 and the Treasury on 25 February 2003. The Incentive Scheme is to be implemented as of March 2003 backdated to 1 April 2002 for qualifying members.
    4. Allowances. The payment of Military Circumstantial Allowance, Deprivation Allowance, Danger Allowance and Special Danger Allowance are further measures that are part of ongoing investigations that should lead to the promulgation of a comprehensive set of DOD Instructions. Throughout, the SAAF will remain an active participant in the process.

    Lengthy Assignments (p. 62) (3.3.18)

  306. The Committee’s comments are noted and will be addressed as far as possible. (See also 3.3.4 paragraphs 253 to 255 and 3.12.1 paragraph 518).
  307. INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (3.4)

    Racism (p. 63) (3.4.1)

    (Also see 3.2.4, paragraph 104)

  308. The Committee made a finding that "Racism undoubtedly does exist in the SANDF"
  309. Racism does not only exist in the SANDF but also in society and it is possible that it is evidenced in various ways. However, these are isolated occurrences and should not be seen to be the norm nor that it is in any way condoned.
  310. The attitudes of people are in most cases a product of history. The SANDF cannot escape the collective (and very different) political and historical origins of its constituents. Until such time as there are no longer members from diametrically opposed historical pasts, there will remain possibilities of different racially based perspectives and approaches among the constituents of the SANDF. This will have to be accepted as a fact of the new South Africa. The flipside of the coin is, however, probably of greater importance. For every incident of `racism’ (however you may define it) there are probably 10 or even a hundred `incidents’ of positive cooperation and joint sharing of the new challenges and responsibilities (which will invariably go by unrecorded). SANDF members (who joined after 1994 from the `new’ South Africa), furthermore, are found to be almost 100% `racism’ and bias free. This has been evidenced over and over again in units such as the Army Gymnasium and 3 SAI Training Depot where new intakes of the Voluntary Military Service are trained annually. These youngsters, being truly part and product of the real `new’ South Africa train and bond together as real comrades in arms, like brothers and sisters, devoid of any racial bias or such demonstration of any kind whatsoever.
  311. In certain instances some actions may be perceived to have racial connotations but are divorced from racism and are in fact rather the result of other factors e.g. criminality.
  312. We perceive our commanders to be sensitive to this issue and that they manage it to the best of their abilities.
  313. When accusations of racism are handled, the accepted law practise of the application of the cautionary rule must be applied.
  314. Racism does exist in the SANDF and will also exist in the future. This will have to be accepted as a fact. When white or black warrant officers/non-commissioned officers enforce discipline it could be seen by some subordinates as discrimination/racism and this causes some of the warrant officers and non-commissioned officers to be sensitive and even neglect to enforce discipline in the SANDF. It will not help the organisation to deny it. It is important to accept that racism does exist and help/support policies to solve the problem. The attitude of people/soldiers in most cases is very positive.
  315. The Directorate Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Action (EOCD) is addressing racism and discrimination in the following ways:
    1. An evaluation questionnaire was designed and is now being used to determine the implementation of the EO and AA policy at ground level. Areas of concern are identified and brought to the attention of officers commanding/managers. The EOCD also assist in interventions if so requested.
    2. Human and cultural awareness development seminars were held throughout the country and special emphasis was place on racism, discrimination and sexism.
    3. Research was done in respect of discrimination on the ground of disability and gender and interventions were recommended.

    Perspective Pertaining to Diversity and their Impact on the Realisation of a Common Military Culture (p. 67) (3.4.2)

    The Committee make the following comment:

    "Military culture is in a crisis because there have been no exercises to build the much talked about one army concept."

  316. Military culture is under pressure. It is being re-enforced on basis of the code of conduct, rules of war and the values of the SANDF and is propagated in a top down approach and shall eventually lead to improved Esprit de Corps.
  317. The "one force concept" was conceived to eradicate the distinction between regular and reserve force personnel.
  318. Whilst the reality of existing, historically based, racially different outlooks will have to be accepted, the focus in the SANDF is currently placed on programs designed to promote multi-cultural understanding, aimed at ongoing reconciliation of members originating from different sides of the struggle. This is a constant command communication theme e.g. inclusive recreation days in the Army, as opposed to exclusive senior officers only, golf days. Contingency plans containing ready mechanisms to deal swiftly and effectively with any negative fall-out, which may originate from racial bias. Such plans cover the whole spectrum of contingencies, i.e. from disciplining negative behaviour to post trauma counselling and assistance of both victims and bystanders as well as transparent public relations methods to handle the media in order to focus them on balanced and accurate reporting.
  319. All the members in the SANDF did not have the same understanding of the difference between "Military Culture/Military Customs and Traditions" and the executing of it in a military disciplined environment. With the implementation of the Code of Conduct in 2000 the situation in the SANDF improved dramatically. In some units there is still a perception of "us" and "them". Senior officers from different HQ/Divisions visit units on a regular basis. The majority of the soldiers do their best to understand the meaning of "Military Culture".
  320. According to EOCD the following interventions took place with regard to diversity and the impact on a common military culture:
    1. The Policy on a Shared Value System for the DOD was drafted and distributed for final inputs before approval and promulgation.
    2. DOD Shared Values, the Codes of Conduct, the Vision and Mission of the DOD as well as Leadership and Ethics are included in the Human and Cultural development Curriculum.

  321. Leadership, Command, Management Principles, Policies, Philosophies and Practices (LCAMPS). The function of the LCAMPS is to institutionalise the leadership, command and management philosophy within the SANDF. The primary role is therefore leadership development at all levels within the SANDF. All the Services and Divisions have LCAMPS programmes.
  322. SA Army. As an example, the SA Army LCAMPS programme is given. The Full Range Leadership Programme is applied as the Meta Model for the operationalisation of LCAMPS. The LCAMPS Section is a new section that has been able to add value to the Army Division as follows:
    1. The development of awareness relating to Transformational Leadership and the role of people in the creation of teams which are of value to the organisation.
    2. The training has encompassed 2600 people through the Basic Leadership program followed by 800 through the Advanced Program.
    3. Self-assessment of leadership is encouraged and a 360 degree Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire is used to provide feedback to individuals for developmental purposes. This questionnaire is reliable and valid.
    4. Research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the program during an operational training deployment at the Combat Training Centre. 900 people took part in the research. The section is planning to do the same research in a deployed setting in Burundi and other deployment areas.
    5. The concept of continuous improvement is contained in the SA Excellence Model where the Army is at present developing capacity to be able to assess outcomes and performance.
    6. The SA Army also sends people on the Total Quality Management Certificate at UNISA to reinforce the concept of continuous improvement and customer service which is an integral part of the LCAMPS culture change imperative.
    7. As the centre for excellence, all members in the section are trained facilitators and have experience in organization development.
    8. Two Full Range Leadership Programmes, which included the accreditation of facilitators, were presented to members of the Infantry School by May 1999.
    9. One Models for Management and one Basic Negotiation Skills Programme to members of 21 Battalion.

  323. The focus of the section is to eventually reach all leaders in the SA Army with the programme to bring about a lasting organisational culture for the SA Army according to the LCAMPS philosophy. This training programme is very successful and is still one of the SA Army’s highest priorities.
  324. SAAF. During the past year the SAAF has undergone a culture change where the previous values of the organisation were subjected to validation in terms of the continuous changing environment. As a result, a new set of values for the SAAF were formulated and adopted.
  325. The SAAF has embarked on a vigorous program to institutionalise LCAMPS within the organisation. The focus areas of this program have been that of managerial, human development and research responsibilities. It is endeavoured through proper research, to ensure the development of the human resource component to sustain Air Power Excellence. Since 1994, some 3300 members of the SAAF have been subjected to Full Range Leadership training. The courses presented have ranged from the basic course, through the advanced and on to the full programme.
  326. SA Navy. The SA Navy is committed to the establishment of a common naval culture based upon its core business. Thus the values of such a culture are drawn from the customs of the sea, and the maritime-related mission requirement. Such values are inculcated during all military training learning opportunities in such subjects as officership, military ethics, and leadership.
  327. Implementation of the LCAMPS initiative represents another intervention aimed at facilitating the establishment of a core naval culture.
  328. The Workshop on Racism conducted by the SA Navy in January 2001 was an important initiative aimed at allowing a broad distribution of naval members to air their views, and to forge a common understanding with regard to issues of racism, organisation culture and communication.
  329. Force Numbers. A presentation was made to the Minister of Defence on 22 March 2001 with the aim of providing a solution for solving the current disparity in force number allocation.
  330. The approved option entails the re-allocation of force numbers according to certain principles, but without changing the format of the force numbers. The option requires the allocation of force numbers based on the principle of Date of Birth plus 16. In essence, after such re-allocation, every employee in the DOD should have a force number based on this principle. The estimated cost will be approximately RM 2,7. This excludes the non-IT costs.
  331. The matter has been submitted to CMI and SITA (according to DOD policy) for supplying the computerised solution. A Project Charter and Plan were formalised, in an endeavour to get to the solution.
  332. It is to be noted that the project does not cover the matter of APPOINTMENT CODES. Appointment codes emanate from the payroll environment and are indicative of the employees’ contracts with the DOD.
  333. After a comprehensive investigation where all factors were appreciated regarding the issue of force numbers, the Minister of Defence decided that it is not feasible to go ahead with the project.
  334. Customary Marriages. Changes to SANDF prescripts (General Regulations) required by the adoption of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (Act No 120 of 1998) were promulgated on 26 February 2001. Changes to accommodate dependants not previously included in the household of a member are also addressed.
  335. Other Customs. The prescripts "DOD Policy and Procedure on Personnel Losses" (C PERS/12/98) and the Standing Operating Procedure for "Personnel Losses and Funerals" (4/01/2001) and DODI 3/98 (PSAP Losses in the DOD) have addressed all known matters regarding special considerations during funerals. Traditional matters are handled with sensitivity as for as possible, ie the accompanying of a corpse in transit by relatives. Without more specific requests being made known it is not possible to comment on African customs not being catered for. An incumbent at the level of Assistant Director on the staff of the Director HR Policy handles cross cultural matters and diversity, as they become known.
  336. Absenteeism. The Committee make the following comment:
  337. "On grievances concerning AWOL commanding officers are told that they must apply this regulation with circumspection. It should be noted however, that members complain that often this rule is not applied with flexibility. In most cases, members will be reported AWOL despite the fact that they will have reported to their seniors that they may might be late arriving."

  338. The withholding of salaries of members due to absenteeism is prescriptive and is found in section 128 (3) of the Defence Act, Act 44 of 1957 as amended. It is stated in the Act that the pay of any person subject to the Code shall be withheld as from the date upon which such person has been absent without leave (Not applicable to Public Service Act Personnel).
  339. To prevent unnecessary time delays in re-activating member’s salaries after returning from AWOL, the following processes have been instituted since 2000:
  340. a. Salaries are suspended after three days of consecutive absenteeism by means of a PERSOL transaction taken at the HR Support Satellite.

    b. Once the member has returned from AWOL a transaction is captured and approved by the HR Sup Sat within 24 hours after return: This transaction is captured once it has been confirmed that the member was on AWOL over that period.

  341. Should the member, however, return to work with either a sick certificate or proof of official leave of absence, a transaction is captured and approved within 24 hours after return:
  342. Should the reason of absence be leave (of any nature) a leave transaction is captured and approved immediately as the above mentioned transaction effectively activates the member’s salary.
  343. The salaries of members who have been on AWOL for less than 30 days should not be affected and should be paid out on the relevant pay days. The following exception however applies: Members who go on AWOL before system closure and return thereafter will not receive their salaries programmatically. Directorate Personnel Payments however, receives daily focus reports from SITA to aid with this in order to ensure that payment takes place on pay day or within seven working days after the PERSOL transactions mentioned above have been captured and approved.
  344. Any arrears salaries of members who have been on AWOL for longer than 30 days will not be paid out programmatically once all the relevant transactions as mentioned above have been captured and approved. These transactions will however re-activate the member’s salary for the next month programmatically.
  345. The DOD implemented policies to rectify all problem areas. AWOL is no longer a matter of great concern in the SANDF. The procedures to discharge soldiers who go AWOL are in place, but the administrative process is very lengthy.
  346. Discrimination (p. 76) (3.4.3)

  347. The Committee’s comments on discrimination are useful and add to the DOD’s understanding of this very important issue. Efforts to eliminate discrimination in any form are ongoing. It is felt that at this stage the overwhelming majority of members of the DOD are extremely sensitive to discrimination and act accordingly. More and more, sub-conscious forms of discrimination are entering into the awareness of individuals and they are taking appropriate corrective action.
  348. Efforts to eliminate discrimination in any form are a high priority for all appointed warrant officers. Warrant officers are extremely sensitive to discrimination against any soldier. The majority of members of the DOD are extremely sensitive to discrimination and act to eliminate it.
  349. The successful transformation of the organisation and its people remains one of the highest priorities in the SAAF. The Air Force Board has declared its strategic intent to establish the SAAF as a provider of combat ready air power by means of transforming its people and its organisational architecture through dynamic strategic leadership. Through this process a future SAAF in which an empowered organisation and empowered individuals will form the nucleus is envisaged.
  350. Sport, Morale and Cohesion (p. 78) (3.4.4)

  351. The former Directorate Sport has been transformed in to the Directorate Physical Training, Sport and Recreation (DPTSR) in SAMHS. Therefore, the directorate is now responsible to manage all three main functions at corporate level.
    1. Recreation. The SANDF Policy on Recreation (DODI SG No 7/2000) was approved and promulgated on 08 August 2001. Visible successes were achieved at International and SADC Sport events as well as at sport initiatives in Peace Support deployment areas.
    2. Physical Training. The SANDF Policy on Physical Training (DODO SG No 6/2000) is in its final promulgation stages. The objective is to submit the DODI to the Plenary Defence Staff Council for approval in July 2003.
    3. Sport. The ‘to-be" SANDF Sport System and Core sorts codes was submitted to and approved by the Military Council on 6 August 2001. The approved sport system will form the core of the new SANDF Policy on Sport. Although the "to-be" SANDF Policy on Sport has still to be finalised, planning will be based on the new sport system for the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 financial years. It is envisaged that the Policy on Sport will be ready for promulgation during November 2003.
    4. The SANDF hosted the first ever International Military Pentathlon tournament.
    5. The SANDF team won the most medals of all the teams participating at the first Africa Military Games held in Kenya.
    6. Finances. The former compulsory sport capitation fee deduction system was abolished on 31 March 2001. A new voluntary military sport club membership system was designed and implemented on 1 April 2001. This situation has resulted in a major loss of income from this resource at all levels (currently only ± 25% have applied for membership). Therefore, if more State resources are not allocated to the sport function, the funding of SANDF sport is at risk and also the providing of sport opportunities.

  352. The SA Navy is currently implementing a plan to inculcate core sports programmes particular to navalised disciplines and in order to promote mass participation in sport. Naval Pentathlon and sailing have been introduced at Military Training for Ratings Part 1.
  353. Interpretation of Doctrines (p. 79) (3.4.5)

  354. The Committee’s suggestions on doctrine and policy are noted. Currently all documents of this nature are subjected to a standard process of editing and approval. The next phase will be a process of narrowing down all orders and instructions and transferring procedures etc to manuals.
  355. Erosion of Commanding Officers Authority (p. 80) (3.4.6)

  356. The Committee’s description of developments which "tend to undermine the authority, status and esteem of the commanding officer" is accurate. It is a consequence of the unification of disparate forces and the cultural diversity of the SANDF. It was to be expected. It was not ignored. On the contrary, it has been an aspect of change management which has demanded a lot of command attention at all levels. Patience, understanding flexibility on the part of all concerned has been the order of the day with much success, but some failures.
  357. As regards forums for military personnel, there is indeed a need to review and assess the effectiveness or otherwise of these forums. Such review or assessment must be done against the backdrop and the cultural diversity of the SANDF.
  358. Presently, the Directorate Labour and Service Relations (DLSR) has not established factual material on problems with regard to these forums. However, a need was felt that these forums should be revisited to determine their relevance given the fact the DOD is constitutionally required to allow for military trade unions to deal with military issues, which are consultative issues in terms of Chapter 20 of the General Regulations.
  359. As regards military labour relations the DOD holds the view that labour relations issues must be dealt with as one of the DOD’s strategic issues. This view is based on the fact the constitutional court has made it imperative for the DOD to allow for a collective labour voice for military personnel.
  360. The trade union methodology of consultation, negotiation and bargaining is still in its infancy in the military. At present there are clear tensions across the lines of the employer and the registered unions. It should, however, be emphasized that complying with the real needs of the military should be the prime concern of the command line. This is emphasized in LCAMPS doctrine and training. The Committee’s view that Officers Commanding will "completely ignore" or "intimidate" forums or unions who voice these needs is not in accordance with new leadership training and practice. Specific examples will be followed up in due course as the union movement grows in maturity.
  361. "The time is ripe to review the functioning of both forums and labour unions."
  362. As the grievance procedure is an integral part of the DOD policies, Directorate Labour and Service Relations is currently exploiting various options in order to streamline existing grievance procedures to expedite the resolution of the grievances.
  363. The chain of command relating to the settling of grievances is still too diffuse and time-consuming.
  364. Forums and Labour Unions. With regards to forums for military personnel, there is indeed a need to review and assess the effectiveness of otherwise of these forums. Such review or assessment must be done against the backdrop of the cultural diversity of the SANDF.
  365. Military labour issues must be dealt with as one of the DOD’s strategic issues contained in the HR Strategy 2010. The constitutional court has made it imperative for the DOD to allow for a collective labour voice for military personnel.
  366. In terms of the desired end state of the above strategy, one of its goals is that: The HR Strategy 2010 has envisaged that the DOD labour relations centre of excellence should be established and be operational by 01 January 2004.
  367. SA Navy. Determining the role and functions of forums and organised labour within the SA Navy, as also interacting with these role-players, represents a new challenge, as also a new method of conducting business. As such, during this process of acclimatisation it is expected that such relationships are not optimal. Considerable effort has been expended in improving the interaction between the organisation and organised labour through role clarification, the inclusion of organised labour on all forums, boards and meetings where their role has been identified as being relevant, as also through such mechanisms as bilateral talks.
  368. The implementation of two SA Navy mechanisms, viz the HR Review Board and the monthly bilateral organised labour/organisation forum have greatly enhanced the relationship between organisation and organised labour.
  369. MEDICAL AND HEALTH MATTERS (3.5)

    The Spread of HIV/AIDS (p. 82) (3.5.1)

  370. Posting and Deployment of HIV Positive Members. The report mentions that the posting and deployment of HIV positive members away from their home environment is a contributing factor to HIV transmission. This argument is supported.
  371. During the last year, level 1, 2 and 3 warrant officers attended Masibambisane’s HIV training Programme/Seminar: The programme/seminar provided for:
    1. Master trainers
    2. Education of warrant officers
    3. Training with regard to Occupational Health and Safety.

  372. To supply reasons or justification for this utilisation and pattern of deployment does not lie within the scope of the SAMHS but must be addressed by the various Services.
  373. The SAMHS utilises its members as close to their home environment as possible with the exception of Special Forces and members detached to units for operational duty.
  374. Due to international regulations, the SA Navy is prohibited from utilising HIV/AIDS members at sea. Sufficient posts exist ashore in order to productively utilise these members.
  375. Procedures for the Performance of HIV Tests. According to the report, some members feel that they are being stereotyped into being HIV positive, that they are tested without proper procedures and that unauthorised people take an active role during examinations.
  376. The performance of organisational initiated HIV tests currently only occurs during the Concurrent Health Assessments. These tests were performed every six months from March 2000 and include a total assessment of the health status of the individual.
  377. With regard to members being stereotyped the following:
    1. The Concurrent Health Assessments are performed 6 monthly and comprise of Medical, Oral Health, Psychological, Social and Fitness assessments. The HIV tests are just one part of the process, namely the Medical assessments.

  378. With regard to HIV testing without following proper procedures the following:
    1. HIV testing must always be performed according to policy.
    2. Guidelines in this regard are available in the DOD Instruction on the Management of HIV/AIDS, the SAMHS Order on the Management of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (including HIV) and in published guidelines on Concurrent Health Assessments.

  379. The performance of HIV tests, whether initiated by the organisation, for medical reasons or on request of the patient must always include pre- and post-test counselling and written informed consent.
  380. With regard to unauthorised personnel taking an active role the following:
    1. In the initial Concurrent Health Assessments the SAMHS personnel conducting the assessments experienced a lot of difficulty to control the members of Services to be assessed.
    2. Following these problems the SAMHS specifically requested that platoon commanders play an active role in the Concurrent Health Assessment process to ensure the maintenance of discipline and order in the ranks.
    3. If such members played a role in the actual performance of tests, this would be a serious breach of confidentiality. and should be addressed. This issue will be raised in the planning for the following Concurrent Health Assessments.

  381. Clear and Focussed Strategy Aimed at Raising Awareness. The Masibambisane "Beyond Awareness" Campaign addresses this issue comprehensively.
  382. Guidelines for the Management of HIV Infected Members. The health management of members who are HIV positive is documented fully in the SAMHS Order on the Management of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (including HIV).
  383. Members who feel that they are being discriminated against or victimised also have recourse to action as outlined in the DOD Instruction on the Management of HIV/AIDS.
  384. The transfer or redeployment of members who are HIV positive follow normal personnel transfer procedures, but can be supported by a report from a Social Work Officer, specifically where it involves improving family support systems where necessary.
  385. Further recourse with regard to the management of personnel who are HIV positive is impossible within the limitations of medical confidential information. Without the member disclosing his/her HIV status to Officers Commanding, the member has to accept that (s)he will be managed within the restrictions posed by his/her Medical Category and/or Health Status Code.
  386. Education and Training of Members on Risk Reduction and HIV Management and Prevention. The HIV Training Programme has been designed to address this issue in its entirety. This programme provides for:
    1. The establishment of regional HIV 'consultants' (Master Trainers) in the medical and psychosocial environment (at least two members per region).
    2. The establishment of regional HIV Educational Officers in the psychosocial environment.
    3. The education of all SAMHS health care personnel.
    4. The training of Occupational Health and Safety Officers (one per workplace) that can act as.
      1. HIV Workplace Programme managers.
      2. Coordinators and trainers of Peer Group Educators.
      3. Advisors with regard to prevention of occupational exposure in the workplace.

    5. The training of Peer Group Educators (one per 100 members).
    6. The HIV Training Programme is currently in process and the programme is scheduled to reach 80% of all DOD employees by the end of 2002.

  387. The risk of HIV transmission through contact with sex workers is addressed by cooperation with the South African Civil Military Alliance to Combat HIV/AIDS through a "high area transmission project" that is currently in the initial stages of planning.
  388. Provision of Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres. All SAMHS Medical Facilities currently are able to provide Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) Services.
  389. The HIV Training Programme has been designed to significantly improve the VCT Services offered by the SAMHS.
  390. Status of Military Hospitals (p. 85) (3.5.2)

  391. Not all the issues in the interim report have been resolved, but a tremendous effort went into obtaining information, especially with respect to the newly established General Support Bases. Not all the issues could be solved on a local level and negotiations conducted with the Department of Public Works and other relevant parties are an ongoing process. This was made visible to the MTEF Committee as one of the unfounded aspects of the Defence Budget for FY2003/04.
  392. Issues receiving attention plus a progress report on 2 Military Hospital in Cape Town are the following:
    1. Nurses: There are about 140 vacant posts (these include a few new posts) that have not yet been advertised. Currently employing nurse agency staff to cover compensates for this shortage. This is not ideal for many reasons, the expense, the inability of the agencies to provide properly trained nurses, lack of ownership and commitment from these nurses. The financial implications in the current financial year are R1,8 million. The staffing procedure is in process, all the nurses currently in the employ were migrated and 90% of them have received their letters of appointment into the new structures. The rest of the vacant posts will be advertised during the latter part of September 2001. After all these vacant posts have been filled, the out-sourcing of nursing services should be minimised drastically.
    2. Occupational Health and Safety: 2 Military Hospital functions without an Occupational Health and Safety co-ordinator. Therefore the obligatory Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) committee has yet to be established, and the Infection Control nurse has been tasked to fulfil both roles. The danger is that both important issues are dealt with in an incomplete manner, without the proper attention deserved by these issues. An OHS co-ordinator needs technical expertise in this field to function properly, and it is not an over and above pastime. It must be made known that a properly trained team of Occupational Health and Safety Officers will be placed at 2 Military Hospital. These posts will be advertised during the latter part of September 2001 and will thus alleviate this pressing issue.
    3. Support Service Appointments: These include data typists, ward and clinic secretaries and patient administration personnel. There has been provision for additional posts in all of these areas, all which have been advertised, but not yet staffed. The staffing process in all the fields have been completed and 80% of all these posts will be staffed, not later than the end of October 2001.
    4. Cleaning: Fifty-seven cleaners currently service the hospital, less than half the number required to clean the facility. The result is that the cleanliness is poor, and control of infections more difficult. This problem will soon be eliminated, as an out-sourcing process has begun, all specifications for the cleaning of the whole complex have been drawn up and the tender process will start in due course.
    5. Catering. All the kitchens in the hospital and the club will be out-sourced and the GSB at Youngsfield has gathered specifications and is preparing documentation for the final tender process. With respect to Halaal and Kosher foods, private companies were contacted and will provide these meals on a cash basis, where the petty cash system will be utilised.
    6. Department of Public Works and the General State of Repair: The hospital is 25 years old and in dire need of a coat of paint, as well as major maintenance and repair. This includes flooring, skirting boards and ceilings. The latter comprises separate metal plates that fall out of the ceiling, sometimes onto staff and patients. The local Regional Facilities Integrated Management is doing it’s utmost best, but the Department of Public Works does just not have the funds to address all the problems at once. A consulting group was appointed to investigate the total maintenance of 2 Military Hospital. This was done under the auspices of the Department of Public Works and C Log and the maintenance problem will be alleviated.
    7. Department of Public Works and Occupational Health and Safety Exposure: The issues of the boiler and air conditioning system that posed a serious OHS danger have been addressed. There is however the outstanding issue of a proper Poltech air sampling to ensure and document that the problems have been resolved. This sampling must be authorised and funded by Department of Public Works; an action that is outstanding. Until the sampling has been completed, no medical surveillance plan can be written. The next negotiation will be for Department of Public Works to commit funds towards this medical surveillance, before it can be performed.
    8. Department Public Works Autoclaves: 2 Military Hospital has submitted an urgent request, with proper staff work to Department Public Works for replacement of one autoclave immediately, and another two in the next financial year. This is urgent since the autoclaves are old and temperamental and unreliable. Department of Public Works have processed this request, but are still negotiating funding. The local Regional Facilities Integrated Manager (RFIM) is keeping close watch over the process.

  393. The following issues at 2 Military Hospital still require attention:
    1. SAMHS and Capital Equipment: The equipment is ageing, technology is growing rapidly, and accepted standards of care are moving into technologically advanced techniques. This situation coupled with consistently low budget allocation to A-class equipment has caused three of the theatres to be closed since they are not equipped.
    2. GSB and Protection Services: There are no visible protection services, the GSB cannot supply any protection, leaving the staff, patients, and equipment vulnerable. The local GSB will be contacted through the GSB Steering Committee and will the problem be addressed.

    Specialised Diets (p. 86) (3.5.3)

  394. The Committee raises the issue of specialised diets not being provided for in the contracts for outsourced catering. This is deficiency which will have to be addressed in future specifications for tenders. In the meantime special meals can be obtained on a cash basis from local caterers. This option will be made known throughout the DOD.
  395. Although the chefs in some messes will try their utmost to accommodate members with regard to special diets, these are not always served by messes due to the following reasons:
    1. Chefs are not trained in the principles of therapeutic nutrition. Therapeutic nutrition is a specialised field, which requires inputs from registered dieticians. Training for chefs in this field will require additional training time as well as trainer expertise, which is not currently available at the training facilities.
    2. With regard to special diets for religious reasons, the SANDF does not have the prescribed separate facilities to prepare food according to religious regulations. Where possible, special requirement will be provided but it cannot always be guaranteed.

  396. As far as possible within the current constraints (ration scales, facilities) individual messes within the SA Navy accommodate members with special requirements.
  397. Access to Medical Benefits (p. 86) (3.5.4)

  398. The General Regulations Chapter XV (Medical Matters) is the regulatory policy on inclusion of Dependants for medical purposes. Female members, with children born out of wedlock, are required to submit a letter of proof from their doctor who delivered the baby or the hospital where the child was born. If the required documentary proof cannot be obtained it is a requirement that such a female member must have the necessary DNA test conducted. Male members, with children born out of wedlock, are also required to undergo DNA tests to proof paternity. In the event of the tests results being positive the SANDF will reimburse the said member for his costs incurred to have the DNA tests conducted up to an amount of R1200. The SANDF does not include children without any substantial proof due to limited resources (Money, Medical Personnel and facilities)
  399. At present the DOD is investigating the possibility of replacing the DNA test with Tissue testing, which is far cheaper. The possibility of the DOD footing the bill with regard to the required DNA test is also at present under investigation.
  400. The report does not clearly state that when the DNA test is negative (therefore paternity cannot be proved), tensions develop. The matter regarding dependants will be developed further when multiple spouses, life partners, etc are further debated within the Public Service as a whole. At present the SANDF follows the Public Service guidelines.
  401. The issue of access to medical benefits by unmarried members' dependants is a complicated one. It would appear that the only constitutional rights applicable are contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 - Chapter 2 of Rights Sec 27 the aspects related to Health Care and the manner in which it is to be achieved, and Sec 28 regarding children.
  402. The new policy of life partners and the Act on Customary Marriages still needs to be investigated and implemented.
  403. Section 27 - Health care, food, water and social security
    1. Sec 27(1)(a) states that "Everyone has a right to have access to health care services..."

  404. In this respect the SANDF member's right will not be denied as he/she does have access to the Military Health Service. The member is also free to use any other health service at own cost.
  405. It has to be borne in mind that these health care services are provided "within available resources" and is fully compliant with the constitutional requirement:
    1. Sec 27(2) states that "The state must take reasonable legislative, and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights."

    i. This aspect of Sec 27(2) is fully discussed in the constitutional case of Soobramoney v Min of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), which dealt with the aspect of the provision of certain health care services and of persons who qualified "within its available resources" for these services.

    ii. The court made it clear that these available resources could only be allocated and utilised correctly if it is subject to proper guidelines and criteria. This will ensure that only persons who met the relevant criteria would be entitled to utilise the health care services in question.

    iii. The importance of this case is that the SANDF opinion General Regulations XV.14(1)(c) is constitutional in this respect. This forms the basis of the required guidelines and criteria for the Military Health Services with regard to who may benefit, and on which grounds these services may be provided.

    Authority of Medical Personnel vs that of the CO (p. 87) (3.5.5)

  406. Under no circumstances will it be tolerated that any officer commanding overrules a medical decision made by a doctor with regard to any member of the SANDF. If such cases exist, they must be reported to be examined in detail to prosecute any Officer Commanding that may be found guilty of such an offence.
  407. Approval of Medical Discharges: Psychological Grounds (p. 87) (3.5.6)

  408. Currently the guidelines used for the psychological discharge of any member of the SANDF are the international guidelines prescribed by the DSM(IV)R. Although these guidelines are not culturally specific to Southern Africa, there is no alternative. On several occasions in the past six months, decisions made by psychiatrists to medically board members on psychological grounds, were challenged by members and representatives of members. All these cases were referred to private, independent psychiatrists who were considered to be of a similar cultural background as the member in question. Up to date all of the decisions recommended by these independent doctors were followed by the SAMHS, even if it meant that the member had to be re-instated into service.
  409. Previously the notification with regard to the final approval of the Surgeon General of a medical discharge had involved a considerable time delay. As from February 2001 this process has been streamlined. Currently the process involves a more holistic look at every member that is to be medically boarded and a detail Social Work evaluation is included. Even with the inclusion of more information, all medical board results are now available within 1 month after the board has been done at unit level. A few exceptions exist where the processing of the board at unit level is not carried out correctly, but the general time limit, which applies to the majority of medical boards, is now one month.
  410. A specific delaying factor used to be that of informing the relevant Service and of that Service informing the unit and member involved. This problem has been addressed successfully.
  411. It is the right of any member considered during a medical board to appeal the decision through the Office of the Surgeon General. These appeals are attended to in conjunction with the co-operation of the member involved, as well as measures taken that are acceptable to all parties involved.
  412. Every member seen at a medical board has to be informed of the possible outcome and reason for the board being done and then has to sign consent for the board to be done and to certify that the contents of the medical board are correct and can be conveyed to the relevant authorities for approval. The member can then stipulate any concerns or aspects that they wish to be included such as an appeal.
  413. COMMUNICATION (3.6)

    Language Policy (p. 88) (3.6.1)

  414. Using Afrikaans only when giving instructions is a problem to persons not understanding Afrikaans at all. The latest draft of the DOD Language Policy, which is currently being circulated throughout the Department of Defence for inputs and comments, promotes multi-lingualism in the Department.
  415. In terms of the existing language policy, the guidelines are:
    1. Considerations in Selecting the Official Language to be Used. In selecting the official language to be used for the purpose of command, control, management and training, the following criteria apply:
    2. Applicability. The language best understood by the majority of the target group or required for technical reasons.
    3. Effectiveness. Where minority groups of the target population do not sufficiently understand the applicable official language selected, they shall be communicated with in an official language they sufficiently understand, or which is required for technical reasons.
    4. Final Test. The final test is whether all who must understand the communication in fact do so."

  416. In the executive summary of the proposed Language Policy the following is stated:
    1. "Commanders at all levels must ensure that their orders and instructions, whether verbal or in writing, are understood by all concerned and, where English presents a problem, use may be made of translators.
    2. The SANDF is committed to multi-lingualism amongst its members and where a member does not understand a policy, order or instruction, the member is responsible for requesting timely assistance from his/her superiors."

  417. The language policy has been approved and published in DODI 54/2001 , dated 18 December 2001, ie describes the multilingual language policy for the Department of Defence. The policy contains the following:
    1. English shall be the thread language of the Department of Defence. The other official languages, referred to as link languages in the document, may be used where the situation warrants or demands it.
    2. Important documents affecting all members and employees of the DOD, such as leave policy and remuneration policy, shall be translated into various official languages on a rotation basis. This will be done by the DOD Language Service Centre.
    3. The Department of Defence may not discriminate directly or indirectly against any member/employee on the grounds of language.
    4. Communicators shall ensure that what they want to communicate is, in fact, understood by their target group(s).
    5. Recipients of communications shall ensure that they understand them and, if not, they shall bring this fact to the attention of the originator.
    6. Linguistic diversity shall be managed with the same fairness and sensitivity as other aspects of diversity within the Department.
    7. The Department recognises the equal status of all the official languages of our country, and undertakes to promote the acquisition of these languages among the members and employees of the DOD.
    8. The Department shall undertake the training of language facilitators (interpreters, translators and trainers) and shall make use of facilitation and enablement measures where required.
    9. The language rights applicable to all members of the DOD shall be respected.
    10. This policy shall be continually monitored, reviewed and revised in the light of national policy and changing circumstances.

  418. Instructors accept that English is the only thread and combat language for the SANDF. In some units there are soldiers who are not comfortable with English/Afrikaans. This hampers the effectiveness and productivity of some lectures. Instructors use the language best understood by the majority of the group and in many cases uses both or even more languages during official lectures. It remains the responsibility of the leader to ensure that their subordinates understand the communication.
  419. SA Navy. As noted in the Report, English is the official language within the DOD. Within the SA Navy, this policy has been strictly complied with, with English being the recognised, mandatory operational language. Within the training environment specific emphasis has been directed at ensuring that all instruction, as also class participation, occurs in English.
  420. Organisation Development initiatives (teambuilding seminars, planning work sessions, climate survey interventions etc) have encouraged members within units in the Navy to use English as the language of communication (eg within messes, when socialising together) in order to foster greater understanding and trust between members.
  421. Communication (p. 90) (3.6.2)

  422. Communication in the DOD is a command function. Corporate Communication is a facilitator of communication in the department and as such provides the tools for commanders to use when exercising this command function.
  423. One of the strategic objectives of the Corporate Communication Division is to empower over time commanders at all levels and thereby add value to the command function.
  424. Feedback from the Services and Divisions indicates that since the time of the Tempe incident two years ago communication by commanders at all levels with subordinates has improved significantly. It nevertheless remains a fact that some commanders communicate better and more often than others. It is hoped that as the achievement of the Corporate Communication division’s empowerment objective progresses, internal communication will improve even more dramatically.
  425. As pay is often a cause of problems and misunderstanding, the following are been done to provide more information to members on ground level:
    1. Three articles have been published in the DOD’s monthly magazine regarding sound financial management, know your pay advice and inland accommodation expenditure.
    2. An info bulletin will be published shortly regarding the stoppage of salaries for members on AWOL.
    3. During this financial year a video on salary administration will be produced as well as booklets on personnel maintenance aspects during peace support operations, salary advices, departmental debt and resettlement.

  426. The perspective of C Army is given below:
  427. The SA Army concurs that communication within the SA Army is not effective and feels that this is yet another symptom of a lack of expertise of commanders, particularly at lower levels. It is, however, important to make communication part of management tools.
  428. More guidelines and special courses will be provided to make communication more effective in the SA Army. This aspect is handled as a priority matter at present and positive results have been achieved already. There is a saying `one swallow does not make the summer’. In many cases single incidents are blown out of all proportion. (Compare 7 SAI shooting of one person with killing of 2 people in Durban GSB). Because complaints from the ground are mostly untested when outside stakeholders such as the media react to them, the true facts are seldom, if ever, printed with the same enthusiasm when found to be contrary to the sensational claims originally made.
  429. C SANDF has an extensive programme of visiting headquarters and units throughout South Africa to maintain direct communication links with people at grass roots level.
  430. SA Army. C Army has an Army Council with all his Chief Directors twice a week. During these meetings important issues on strategic level are communicated and discussed. Information on these issues is then filtered down to level 2 structures. C Army also holds a meeting with the Army Command Cadre once a month whereby he communicates issues in the Army with level 3 commanders in respect of decisions taken and instructions to be filtered down to level 4 for execution. An extended Army Command Cadre is conducted 3 times per year, whereby C Army communicates issues with regard to the SA Army to all level 4 commanders (eg unit and GSB commanders).
  431. C Army also embarks twice a month on an extensive visiting programme to units, accompanied by SSO Communication and IG Army to address members pertaining to issues and to resolve matters on the ground. This action has resulted in diffusing many uncertainties on the ground and created a more informed and relaxed environment in units.
  432. Policy directives and Standard Working Procedures on communication has been compiled and distributed to units. All level 3 communication officers conduct staff visits at their level 4 units and feedback reports are given to commanders with suggestions on how to improve communication in the units. All level 3 communication officers attend their own formation command cadres where they get the opportunity to brief commanders on the latest guidelines and issues in the communication environment. Several periods are allocated to communication on specific courses eg Officer Formative course, Junior Command and Staff Duty course and Senior Command and Staff course to empower commanders with communication skills.
  433. To strengthen the communication capability within the SA Army, the L CAMPS project contributed significantly to create conditions for meaningful two-way communication. C Army has said many times that "we must keep our people informed, requiring communication as never before."
  434. SAAF. Effective communication throughout the SAAF has always, and will remain, a prominent area for attention of the Air Force Board. Numerous mediums of communication such as newsletters, news flashes, bulletins, publications, road shows, etc are utilised, not least being personal communication by the Chief of the Air Force and all other members of the Air Force Board. As recently as 24 to 28 February 2003, the Chief of the Air Force personally led a road show to all SAAF bases/units throughout the RSA to brief members on the SAAF’s Transformation Plan towards Vision 2012. The attendance of and response to this road show has been overwhelmingly positive.
  435. C Navy and Surgeon General have similar programmes.
  436. "The policy and practice pertaining to the use of IT and other technology in communication should be reviewed."
  437. This aspect has already been addressed in 3.2.8. See paragraph 131 to 134.
  438. "The Committee was convinced that there is a need for simple, clear, unambiguous, fair, timeous and transparent two-way communication that is disseminated effectively to all levels of the SANDF" and "Furthermore, the committee recommends that an investigation be launched into the use of information and multi-media technology in order to facilitate the free flow of information in the SANDF"
  439. It is the understanding of the DOD that this section refers to communication as a command function and the role of corporate communication. In the initial response to the report (Reference C), the DOD referred to the link between communication in the DOD as a command function and as a facilitator of communication, which provides the tools for commanders to use when exercising this command function. The direct face-to-face communication between commanders and their subordinates remains the most important tool of all. Prospective commanders and their management cadres are trained in communication on the training courses, such as the Junior Command and Staff courses and the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme.
  440. Empowerment of Commanders. The empowerment of the command and management cadre is intended to improve the overall communication in the DOD. This is done by the provision of research-based training, knowledge and advice in respect of communication to the command and management cadres, which may add value to their own communication efforts. Specific information and communication products eg bulletins and DOD publications are also provided which can be used to enhance communication efforts.
  441. Internal Communication Plans. Internal communication in the Services and Divisions has been enhanced by specific divisional internal communication plans which are required by the PDSC since 2002.
  442. Communication Audit. As for the future, a communication audit is being planned for the FY2004/05 to scientifically audit internal communication in the DOD. This will assist in identifying the actual internal communication problems and barriers which exist in the DOD, their causes and the most effective ways of solving these.
  443. Transparency (p. 92) (3.6.3)

  444. Greater transparency in the DOD is a positive development. Fairness is enhanced and the impact of "the organisation" on individuals is reduced. It has taken time to adjust. From a strategic, operational and security point of view, the initial over-eagerness towards transparency has been tempered to a more rational and correct approach.
  445. It may be noted that transparency has been enhanced by a speedy implementation of the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act by the DOD. The DOD is frequently singled out for praise by the watchdogs of this Act.
  446. MILITARY JUSTICE (3.7)

    Legal System (p. 92) (3.7.1)

  447. The Constitutional Court will be giving its judgement in the near future on issues, which have been challenged. In the meantime, the functioning of the military justice system must be continued. It is heartening that the Committee recognise this.
  448. It is pleasing that the Committee has noted that their recommendation that black military judges be appointed has already been implemented.
  449. The challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation establishing the military prosecuting authority was put to rest by the Constitutional Court’s decision (October 2001) upholding the constitutionality of that legislation.
  450. The challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation regulating the service of magistrates has been analysed. The system established with respect to the military judiciary does not suffer from the defects identified in respect of the legislation germane to the magistracy. Some lesser points (eg the principle that a judicial officer my only be tried by a judicial officer) will be addressed in the draft Military Discipline Bill.
  451. The new Military Discipline Bill has been written and processed through the State Law Advisor. It is expected that the Bill will be submitted to Parliament in the second half of 2003.
  452. A representivity ratio of 50:50 is mostly maintained in the fulltime military judges. The Court of Military Appeals is fully representative.
  453. The Reserve component of the Military Legal Service is growing steadily and shows appropriate demographic proportions.
  454. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS (3.8)

    Constitutional Aspects (p. 93) (3.8.1)

  455. The issues of the draft Defence bill and the rationalisation of the two Defence Committees are outside the province of the DOD.
  456. The President has assented to the new Defence Act, No 42 of 2002. It has been published for general information in the Government Gazette of 29 February 2003. It will take effect as a date to be determined by the President.
  457. Military Ombudsman (p. 93) (3.8.2.)

  458. The Committee makes the following remark:
  459. "The large number of complaints received by the Office of the Public Protector and by Inspector General (DOD) suggests a need for an independent ombudsperson or committee."

  460. The question of an ombudsman is the prerogative of Parliament. As the SANDF is an "interested party" it would be inappropriate to comment. The issue is scheduled as a separate subject of discussion before the JSCD on 4 June 2003.
  461. As a means to achieving fairness with the minimum of delay, a SA Navy Human Resources Review Board has been instituted on a trial basis for the hearing of grievances. Members are encouraged to utilise this Board in order to present their grievances. This provides a human interface to what has hitherto been an administrative process. Within the SA Navy a trial Human Resources Review Board has been instituted for the hearing of grievances. Members are encouraged to utilise this Board in order to present their grievances. This provides a human interface to what has hitherto been an administrative process. The SA Navy once again stresses the importance of the Divisional System. Through divisional officer seminars the use of divisional lines is being inculcated once again into the organisation.
  462. POLICY MATTERS (3.9)

    The Army Battle School: Lohatla (p. 94) (3.9.1)

  463. The Committee makes the following statement:
  464. "Units of various corps of the Army are being relocated to other stations. This raises the question whether the school should not be totally closed down."

  465. The comments by C Army are as follows:
    1. The Combat Training Centre is a training institution of vital importance for the SA Army as well as the SANDF. Live ammunition field training is indispensable to the Army.
    2. Various joint exercises have taken place at the Combat Training Centre, eg "Blue Crane" and joint training with the French and British Armies.
    3. Various practical modules for courses are done there and in future it will play an important role in international peace support operations (PSO) training.
    4. The closing down of the Combat Training Centre is totally out of the question.

  466. The SA Army Combat Training Centre is the leading landward warfare training institution in Africa. The SA Army Combat Training Centre is to conduct high quality, professional common training by means of courses and exercises to produce exceptional combat ready training officers, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers capable of maintaining the leading edge in the African theatre.
  467. SA Army Combat Training Centre is the only facility which can accommodate Brigade level live firing exercises which include joint formation level training in terms of SAAF, SAMHS etc. The use of the range and facilities for foreign forces training such as USA and UK, which is utilised to benchmark our own doctrine and capabilities internationally. The terrain and facilities are all situated in one area and therefore ensure that all facets of training can be exercised by means of live firing exercises. The area is ideal for training in the Peace Support Operations (PSO) environment. The terrain allows for the exercising of not only Chapter 6 PSO but also for Chapter 7 Ground/Air joint exercises can also take place, specifically live firing exercises without any major challenges regarding safety of own forces.
  468. The closure of the Combat Training Centre is non-negotiable at this point in time.
  469. Utilisation of Military Police (p. 95) (3.9.2)

  470. Military Police are utilised in terms of Sec 87(g) of the Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957 as amended) read with General Regulations Chapter X1, In effect it means that the Military Police are utilised to police own forces as well as offences (which can include any offences committed by any member of the community) related to DOD property or land or premises under its control. However, members of the SANDF utilised to combat crime in support of the SAPS, do so in terms of Sec 3(2)(d) of the Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957 as amended) and these functions should not be confused with the functions of the Military Police as indicated above. All Military Police are trained with regards to their jurisdiction and mandate and carry an appointment certificate indicating this jurisdiction. Functions thus executed by Military Police, including Military Police Intelligence Services, are according to this jurisdiction and mandate. Where Military Police is utilised to combat crime in support of the SAPS in terms of Sec 3(2)(d) of the Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957 as amended), it is specifically indicated like that and are they briefed accordingly. This however does not occur frequently. The utilisation of Military Police is thus not perceived as problematic.
  471. The Committee questions of the ongoing support the SANDF gives to the SAPS. The response is as follows:
    1. In the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review (1998), the need for the SANDF to assist the SAPS for a period is acknowledged. An exit plan is also called for.
    2. For the present, support to the SAPS is vital in the fight against crime and the stability of rural areas. It is all correctly mandated.
    3. Currently, high level discussions are taking place between the SANDF and SAPS to plan a medium term exit framework as referred to in sub-paragraph a, above.

  472. The phased withdrawal of the continuous support (crime prevention and borderline control) provided by the SANDF to the SAPS will officially start on 1 April 2003. The process is phased over a six year period. The capacity of the SAPS has been expanded and will increase further. Care will be exercised to ensure that a capacity gap does not develop. The SANDF will support intelligence based operations of the SAPS and will always be ready to respond in an emergency.
  473. With regard to the Committee comments on junior intelligence functionaries the following:
    1. The tendency by junior intelligence functionaries to romanticise their job is nothing new and Defence Intelligence has had to contend with it over many years. Experience has taught that as the individuals develop, they outgrow this tendency.
    2. Collection internally by Defence Intelligence is properly mandated and is done in support of the SAPS. The administration with regard to the payment of informers is meticulously executed and continuously monitored to ensure that policy is adhered to.
    3. The point raised of dividing lines between SANDF intelligence organisations and other intelligence agencies, as was mentioned, is an age-old issue. It, however, manifested itself more regularly on the operational level. The cure for this lies purely in a good division of responsibilities and clear communication of such responsibilities. This issue is continuously under discussion in the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee in order to ensure that departments operate within their mandate.

    Broader Policy Framework (p. 97) (3.9.3)

  474. Performance management has been introduced in the DOD for uniform and civilian personnel. All the level 2, 3 and 4 plans include measures of performance. Likewise, the delegations of authority to individual commanders and staff officers are in the form of performance agreements.
  475. The DOD has introduced during August 2000, a continuous performance improvement programme based on the criteria of the South African Excellence Model (SAEM). The Minister of Public Service and Administration announced the application of the SAEM for the government’s Batho Pele excellence programme. Further, Part 06 of the DOD’s Strategic Plan: Improved Service Delivery was revised to integrate Batho Pele Principles with the SAEM. However, it would take a number of years to institutionalise an excellence culture within the DOD based on output and outcome qualities.
  476. In pursuit of excellence and the institutionalisation of dynamic strategic leadership in the SAAF, the Excellence Model of the South African Excellence Foundation (SAEF) has been adopted as a management tool. Initially the model of the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) was adopted in 1999 and used mainly as a measurement system by the Inspector General of the Air Force during the evaluation of bases/units for the annual SAAF Prestige Awards. Subsequently the SAEF model has been used as both management tool and measurement system, focussing on the eight fundamental principles of excellence, namely: results orientation; customer focus; leadership and constancy of purpose; management by processes and facts; people development and involvement; partnership development; public responsibility; continuous learning, innovation and improvement.
  477. With the adoption of the SAEF model in the SAAF, the sharing of best practices has been enhanced thus contributing to savings within the organisation. In the process the SAAF’s strengths and areas for improvement have been identified and a system provided to convert these opportunities into action that involves every member within the organisation. The model provides a powerful way of reflecting the culture and performance of the SAAF, both internally and externally. It is expected that this can lead to the enhancement of acceptance of ownership of the outcomes of the SAAF at all levels within the organisation.
  478. Education, training and development of broad policy issues surrounding transformation, HR development, equity and affirmative action are being institutionalised through a co-ordinated effort of the CJ Training and EOCD. The management of cultural diversity and civic education has been centralised with the EO and AA office which shall ensure internal control of such matters.
  479. Equity. The following were achieved since 2001:
    1. EO and AA Policies. The following progress was made:
      1. The DOD policy on Fast Tracking was promulgated.
      2. The DOD Policy Instruction on Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action was reviewed and approved.
      3. A DODI on pregnancy and related matters has been registered and will be presented for approval to the PDSC in April 2003.
      4. A DODI on sexual orientation has been registered and will be presented to the PDSC in April 2003.

    2. Disability Equity. The following in respect of disability equity:
      1. The Disability Forum was established and meetings were held on a regular basis.
      2. The Disability Section embarked on programmes to raise awareness in the DOD in respect of disability issues. The Disability Section also facilitated the celebration of the International Day of Disabled Persons on 2 and 3 December 2002.

  480. Contained within the Equity Plan of the DODI is a challenge for the Forces/Divisions to at least have a 2% contingent of the Force consisting of disabled people - accompanied by an individual development and career plan.
  481. The SA Army is a combat environment requiring G1K1 medical fit personnel to execute the tasks. Disabled members will be accommodated in the SA Army, supported by a development and career plan. The current percentage of disabled Personnel is 0,32%. It allows for a growth of ± 85 members. Future recruitment in respect of PSAP will focus on the recruitment of disabled people - posts to accommodate them, coupled with a ETD and career plan will be the output to be delivered. The SA Army is in support of the DOD Equity Plan and will focus on the recruitment, development and careers of the current disabled personnel and also those to be recruited within the PSAP environment to reach at least a percentage of 2% disabled members in the SA Army.
    1. Gender Equity. The following was achieved:
      1. The DOD Gender Forum Constitution as well as letters of appointment for gender forum representatives were approved by the PDSC.
      2. The gender focal point is in the process of establishing a hotline in conjunction with the Military Police Agency where cases of sexual abuse can be reported. Training will be given to the personnel that will be managing the hotline so that they should be able to handle cases of sexual abuse professionally.
      3. 20 candidates of a mixed gender will be trained on a basic sexual harassment course to be able to assist the officers commanding in the units on cases of sexual harassment.

  482. The culture of performance management is slowly but steadily taking root in the DOD.
  483. EDUCATION AND TRAINING (3.10)

    Training Institutions and Training Courses (p 97) (3.10.1)

    (Also see the references to the Youth Foundation Training Programme in 3.2.13 paragraph 177 and 3.3.2 paragraphs 202 to 203

  484. The importance of education training and development ETD in the present SANDF is fully recognised. A picture can be formed of what is happening by looking at the responses by the SAMHS, Army and Navy.
  485. Surgeon General comments as follows:
    1. That curricula be reviewed as a priority and course materials is to be updated. In the SAMHS Training Formation this activity is a priority.
    2. That course leadership (Directing Staff) is made representative as soon as possible. That ex-NSF members, who have taken courses elsewhere, be incorporated as course instructors. During the staffing process representatively in the SAMHS Training Formation, this factor was the most important imperative. To reach this goal "head hunting" was done not only in the SAMHS but also in other Services.
    3. That for certain courses, external instructors be invited to participate in training. The SAMHS Training Formation is implementing a system of external examinators to overcome this issue. Instructors from other institutions to ensure cross pollination will enhance the external examinators system.
    4. That potential instructors, irrespective of whether they are from statutory forces or not, be identified and sent for training elsewhere to enhance their knowledge of the modules they will be teaching. After the staffing of instructors, the different units received instruction to retrain the trainers. The programme is implemented.
    5. That alternative external providers, in respect of some courses, be identified and accredited so that some members may complete their training requirements there. Some members could be identified to take their senior staff courses abroad. The SAMHS Training Formation identified specific areas where these services can be utilised. Two are currently under planning viz. Reserve Forces Training in the health areas and training in Peace operations for the Military School.
    6. That an exchange programme involving both students and instructors be developed with institutions abroad. The SAMHS Training Formation are closely involved with USA, UK and the Netherlands to upgrade skills.

  486. Chief of the Army focuses on "acceptance on courses". The SA Army currently experiences a huge backlog in respect of course attendance. This is the root cause of many complaints related to the non-acceptance on courses. The SA Army has recently realised that the traditional tendency to introduce more courses to dissolve this backlog is no longer a viable solution; therefore other innovations are presently afoot to attain this end, consequently the situation should change for the better in the near future. (Also see 3.3.2 paragraph 216 to 217 and 3.3.16 paragraph 322)
  487. The imperative to rectify past imbalances resulted in the strict application of the Economical Active Population Distribution statistics when accepting SA Army members on military development courses; 64% Africans, 24% Whites, 11% Coloured and 1% Asians are accommodated on all courses.
  488. The backlog with regard to Africans on courses since 1998 has been addressed by presenting extra courses and applying fast tracking which accommodated them. However, the concept of fast tracking cannot currently be implemented as it was intended, because the rule regarding a minimum period of three years in a specific rank is still applied.
  489. The SA Navy is currently in the process of re-appreciating all Navy specific learning opportunities, in order for them to become client specific, and outcomes based. The principles of Recognition of Prior Learning, assessment, development, and selection, and Just In Time are being incorporated. This is in keeping with the mandatory ETD process prescripted for the DOD.
    1. In instances where students have been unable to meet entry prerequisites of learning opportunities, special opportunities have been created in order to facilitate the attainment of required entry levels of competence. Illustrative examples in this regard are the Paragon Generation Programme utilised for seven COQ-1 students during 2000, and the DOD Youth Foundation Training Development Programme.
    2. Instructors from the Royal Navy have been made available to present particular bridging courses within the Tactical environment, both communications and diving.
    3. Exchange programmes with other Navies are being pursued vigorously (France, Germany, USA, India, selected South American countries).
    4. Through the Integration Process, bridging and progression training of former NSF members has been identified as a priority. This will facilitate the use of these members within the ETD environment, as also as appropriate role models.
    5. In order to facilitate the acquisition of computer literacy, both MTO-1 and MTR-1 have created specific components of the curriculum in order to allow such competence acquisition. The PLATO system is utilised extensively in this regard.

  490. The SAAF is committed to comply with national imperatives regarding representivity. Over the years there has been a steady increase in the numbers of Black members undergoing functional and developmental training at SAAF training units, with a commensurate decline in the numbers of Whites. This should, however, be seen against the background of a declining force structure and overall decrease in personnel numbers.
  491. "The Committee recommends a number of amendments to the current training policy and practice."
  492. Substantial progress has been made.
    1. At the Defence College the old an entirely new programme, namely the Executive National Strategy Programme (ENSP), has replaced Joint Staff Course (JSC).
    2. Senior Command and Staff Training in the SANDF was recently revised and brought into line with current requirements of the DOD.
    3. The Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme have replaced the former Senior Command and Staff Courses of the Services. This is presented at the war College, Thaba Tshwane.
    4. Currently, four of the African Directing Staff (DS) have attended foreign courses before being appointed at the SA National War College.
    5. Greater representivity has been achieved at both colleges. The General Officer Commanding of the War College is an African Brigadier General.
    6. At the War College there are four foreign members from respectively Zimbabwe, Pakistan, India and Botswana. Four of the directing staff are coming from Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and the united Kingdom.
    7. It is envisaged that in future Directing Staff will be exchanged on a regular basis between the SA National War College and its counterparts in other African countries, and selected officers will still attend foreign courses as part of the preparation for employment as Directing Staff at the College.

  493. There are many members in the SANDF more than eight years without attending courses. This situation is not good and causes negativity amongst these members. There is a big backlog and some members wait for years before being accepted on courses. These members are very frustrated and negative because there is no career for them. The situation differs between Services and Corps. There is a will to learn and to improve competencies. Many soldiers are busy qualifying themselves outside the department by attending classes after hours by Technical Colleges/Universities and institution.
  494. As part of the DOD ETD transformation and change requirements an ETD first report was published in 1997. This report clearly reflected non-commissioned officers and warrant officers as a sorely neglected and historically deprived group regarding the accessibility and availability of professional learning opportunities in the DOD. To remedy this shortfall project LOYAL was embarked on in 2001 with the mission to develop top level learning opportunities for non-commissioned officers and warrant officers, including access to tertiary education. This initiative will significantly lessen the gap in development requirement between officers and non-commissioned officers and warrant officers
  495. Project LOYAL is in the process to develop a curriculum compliant to current day requirements and demands for human development, upliftment and capacitating a previously disadvantage grouping into a much better future dispensation.
  496. The development of departmental education and training policy is also at an advanced stage. This policy should address most of the issues referred to in the report.
  497. A Training Staff Council has been established to ensure that training at all levels and in all Services and Divisions meets the departmental requirements and that of the employee and the members of the SANDF.
  498. Training is being developed to meet the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) requirements. Although this is a tedious process, it is being experienced that both the leadership and subordinates are enthusiastic to ensure the successful implementation of the NQF.
  499. The curriculum for the formative training of young officers is also currently under revision to bring it in line with current DOD demands and the NQF. A new curriculum is expected to be implemented during 2004.
  500. LOGISTICS (3.11)

    Transport Problems (p. 100) (3.11.1)

  501. The Committee refers to the problem that individuals have in commuting between their homes and units.
  502. "To address transport problems or transport requirement of members of the SANDF, it could be advisable to explore some schemes that do exist for instance in KwaZulu-Natal, Durban specifically."

  503. When conscription or wartime service is prevalent the military are often allow free public transport or transport at reduced rates. There have been remnants of the past or gestures of goodwill from the public. This is not the case at present.
  504. DOD members were exempted from the payment of bus fares up and until 1998 in the Durban area. Since 1998 uniformed members must pay the applicable bus fares when travelling on Municipal buses.
  505. It is foreseen that should the DOD negotiate with municipalities, metro rail and other transport service providers to exempt uniformed members from paying bus fares, taxi associations and private bus companies might not accept this, as it would deprive them of an income. Resistance from taxi associations has been experienced. There is no easy solution.
  506. With the signing of the PSCBC Collective Agreement Resolution No 3 of 1999, the approach was that the "…employee shall generally take responsibility for the costs of commuting to work. In exceptional circumstances, the employer may proved transport for a commuter. In such a case the employee shall pay the amount provided by (the) agreement.
  507. It should be noted, that duty buses are still utilised to take members to work and back if readily public transport is not available. Units requesting the transport must apply according to the criteria as contained in DODI 5/99 (updated 29 May 2001) for justifying the use of duty buses in the DOD.
  508. PSYCOLOGICAL, SOCIAL WORK AND RELATED SERVICES (3.12)

    Personal Problems (p. 100) (3.12.1)

  509. Personal problems are by their nature sensitive issues. A key element of the DOD’s armoury in solving personal problems is the Directorate of Social Work. This Directorate has personnel posted throughout the DOD to assist officers commanding.
  510. The person in an environment is a fundamental and central concept in Military Social Work, and thus requires social work officers to promote a balance between the needs of the individuals, and the demands of their environment. This dual perspective describes the Directorate Social Work’s responsibility with the DOD as pertaining to the individuals within this organisation. By promoting the optimal adaptation between individuals/family and the organisation, the Social Work Officer is able to fulfil her/his mandate, which is to promote the mission readiness of the DOD.
  511. It is Directorate Social Work’s responsibility to develop appropriate policies and intervention programmes, which addresses both the needs of the individual and the organisation. The output of this promotes the employee and workplace well being.
  512. Specific Welfare Issues Raised. In situation where individuals have specific problems, social work officers use the casework method to address them. See also reference to Project RESILIENCE at 3.3.4 paragraphs 253 to 255.
    1. Transfers. Social work officers have been in a position to assist members in this regard by submitting reports, which highlighted the individual’s plight to the Officer Commanding. More often than not Officers Commanding have complied with this request and the individuals in question have been could be transferred. However the protracted staffing process has negatively affected this assistance due to the limited posts which people are expected to apply for.
    2. Detached Duties. The protracted staffing process and budgetary constraints have also affected the question of detached duties. Social work officers assist members in such cases by proposing that S&T should be forfeited. In situations where it is not possible for the member to be on detached duties because she/he would be under-utilised, Social Work Officers have submitted a plan of action indicating for how long will the individual person need in order to resolve the problem at hand. Social work officers have also assisted the members to mobilise the support of extended families in order to come up with workable solutions.
    3. Accommodation. Social work officers have also assisted individuals who need military accommodation because of the transfer to other provinces in this regard. Social work reports highlight the urgency of the member to acquire accommodation and recommendations are made for such a member to be treated as priority. Military accommodation is very scarce.
    4. Squabbles and Assaults. Officers commanding and supervisors to intervene have called Social Work Officers in many cases where squabbles and assaults have occurred. Social Work Officers have assisted in this regard by investigating the underlying cause and have provided debriefings and follow-ups to repair what ever damage that have been caused by such incidents. The availability of Social Work Officers in the units have unabled them to put their fingers on the pulse of the organisation. All issues raised by members, whether as perceptions or as fact has been brought to the command cadre’s attention. Social Work Officers always strive to fulfil their advisory and advocacy role to the best of their abilities.

  513. The decentralised Social Work Service found within the DOD is provided by Social Work Officers from all our country’s racial groupings. Every member is acknowledged as having a unique value and potential irrespective of their origin, ethnicity, sex, age, religious beliefs and economic or legal status. Members are treated with respect and dignity.
  514. Directorate Social Work requests that full details of members who have experienced problems mentioned in the report, be submitted so as to be able to make the necessary interventions and follow-ups.
  515. Some Assault Cases (p. 101)

  516. The assault cases mentioned by the Committee are noted.
  517. The alleged assault by a Military Police Warrant Officer on a fellow student at Army Battle School as well as the utterance made refers (paragraph 3.12.1). The Chief of the Military Police Agency is not aware of such an alleged offence. The Chief of the Military Police Agency has convened an internal investigation and progress will be reported. In early 2002 the Warrant Officer concerned appeared before a military judge, were found guilty and fined R700.
  518. The DOD in no way tolerates or endorses any form of ill treatment or violence against individuals. The incidents that have occurred weigh heavily on the collective conscience of the DOD.

APPENDIX A TO

CSANDF/R/106/15

DD APRIL 2003

METHODOLOGY

1. The following quote from the DOD’s response to the methodology are given to put these notes in context:

a. With regard to the methodology, the DOD concurs with the evaluation of the methodology given in the report. It is not without its shortcomings, particularly from a strictly legal or technical research point of view. However, by keeping the objectives in view, and by applying broad common sense and balance, the Committee has provided a constructive and credible basis for the DOD to act upon.

    1. The DOD accepts it in this light. It would serve no purpose to do otherwise. It would be valuable if all stakeholders and commentators did the some, so that the value of the report is not dissipated by individual attacks, rebuttals or misrepresentations out of context.

2. Notes on Methodoloy

    1. Statistical Sample. Section 1.2 (p 12) notes that the sample who appeared before the Committee "were privates and members of the lower ranks, mainly of African origin…. The number of senior members who presented themselves was disappointing, especially whites". The sample interviewed thus cannot be considered to be representative of the greater population in which it is situated, and this compromises the complete validity of the inferences drawn and the findings reported.

    1. Non-Quantification of Findings. As the problems are not quantified, the findings should not be seen as being encountered on large scale. What should be noted is that some of the incidences did take place, the prevalence of incidence, however, are not indicated.
    2. Anecdotal Evidence. Much of the data presented is anecdotal in nature, with individual case histories being utilised as a departure point for discussion. While this is useful, without the support of quantitative data, such qualitative anecdotes make any generalisation from the specific instance to the greater population impossible. This is further compounded by the journalistic style of the text. While such a style might well have been selected in order to enhance readability, it compromises the usefulness of the data.
    3. Correlation and Causality. While it is a fundamental principle of research that correlation between two variables does not imply causality, but only implies a relationship between the two variables, numerous instances exist within the Report, where correlation of two variables has been interpreted to read as causality.
    4. Evidence in General. The report in para 1.2. (page 11) outlines the methodology of gathering information in camera and not allowing cross-examination. It is submitted that this leaves the report open to criticism on the ground of fairness and one-sidedness. The fact that the Committee itself did not take statements under oath, allow cross-examination of witnesses or give interested or involved parties an opportunity to cross-examine (to establish the veracity of the evidence tendered) means that some finding of the committee are based on hearsay.
    5. Specialist Support. The work of the committee may have been made easier if it had been accompanied by a Military Law Officer, as well as a Personnel Officer that were competent in Service Systems and Personnel Administration matters. The reason for this is that these officers would have been able to direct the Committee to get a better perspective of the allegations on the ground. These officers would have known where to look for clues and confirmation at units and formations.

APPENDIX B TO

CSANDF/R/106/15

DD APRIL 2003

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE (p. 105)

1. TRANSFORMATION, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

    1. A Comprehensive review of the Transformation Process should be undertaken (paragraphs 3.2.1 – 3.2.5, as well as 3.3.4).

Response: Currently under review.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Complete. Auditor-General report.

1.2. With reference to the Transformation Process, it is recommended that all structural and other adjustments be made speedily to ensure that combat readiness is ensured/restored paragraph 3.2.1. – 3.2.5.)

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Structural Transformation complete. Organisation development continues.

1.3. The compatibility of the "IT-languages" used by the various Arms of Services, should be ensured (paragraph 3.2.8.).

Response: In progress, partially resolved.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. ICT Master plan near completion. Standardisation of e-mail in DOD in progress, partially resolved.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Implementation of standardised e-mail for 3 000 users and then to be increased to 5 000.

2. HUMAN RESOURCES

2.1. The policy and practice regarding the following issues should be reviewed.

Response: Not available. Prognosis is not clear.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No mechanism promulgated by the DPSA that allows the DOD to proceed with "retrenchments" of DOD members.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Public Service Transformation Restructuring Package (TRP) in progress.

Response: Under revision.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. The process used for staff the Military Component of the DOD was withdrawn on 4 Oct 01 and has been replaced with an interim procedure, which makes provision for an informal ad hoc procedure that will be used for unforeseen occurrences and the critical need to fill certain posts. Succession planning will play a major role in the formal placement process.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Stabilised.

Response: To be addressed.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Completed – Voluntary.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Progressing. (Project PHOENIX.)

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Completed.

 

Response: No satisfactory solution in sight.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No change.

Response: To be addressed.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No information.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Regulatory framework implemented.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Members are in process of being redeployed to other State Departments. These redeployments are being effected by means of an Inter-Departmental transfer in order for the member to retain his/her pension benefits and other service benefits, such as accrued leave. Inter-Departmental transfers to the Department of Correctional Service and the SAPS have already taken place. Negotiations are in process regarding the transfer of members to SARS, Transnet and Metro Police.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Continues. Part of Transformation Restructuring Package.

Response: Under review.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Complete.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Process far advanced.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. In respect of SAAF and SA Navy – complete.

2.2. It is recommended that the SANDF should endeavour to place individual members as close as possible to their families, notwithstanding organisational requirements (paragraph 3.2.13).

Response: Noted.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003 No change.

2.3. It is recommended that large-scale marketing be conducted to attract suitable potential members to the SANDF in order to facilitate the attainment of representivity objectives (paragraph 3.2.13).

Response: Various initiatives underway.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Good progress.

2.4. It is recommended that consideration be given to offering incentives to certain categories of professionals in order to attract/retain their services (paragraph 3.2.17).

Response: Will be addressed.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. In progress.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Implemented in SAAF and SA Navy.

3. INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

3.1. The policy and practice pertaining to the following issues relating to Institutional Culture, should be reviewed:

Response: In progress

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Progressing.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Good progress.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002.

    1. DOD Instruction completed.
    2. The SANDF hosted the first ever International Military Pentathlon tournament in Africa.
    3. Brig Gen Lindile Yam was appointed as Director Physical Training, Sport and Recreation.
    4. The SANDF team won most of the medals at the first Africa Military Games in Kenya.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Process of mediation to get negotiations with unions on track nearly finalised.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Progressing.

3.2. It is recommended that an inter-departmental task team be mobilised to study cultural interfaces in the civil service and make recommendations. The objective should be to bring the DOD in line with other departments (paragraph 3.4.2).

Response: Noted.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Progressing.

4. MEDICAL AND HEALTH MATTERS

4.1. The policy and practice pertaining to the following issues should be reviewed:

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. A DOD policy on HIV/AIDS is now in place addressing all the areas how to effectively manage HIV in the workplace, to reduce the transmission of HIV, prevent discrimination an to provide appropriate care and support to those who are infected and affected by HIV. In addition the policy makes provision for HIV/AIDS education and prevention programmes, monitoring, surveillance and research and coordination and inter-sectoral cooperation. Masibambisani, the "Beyond Awareness" campaign was launched with donor funding from the USA and is being rolled out.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Good progress.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Repair of 1 and 2 Military Hospitals is high on the DOD priority list. Building already started to upgrade 3 Military Hospital.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No significant progress.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003 No change.

Response: Fully explained. New developments are the policy on life partners and the Act on Customary Marriages.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No change.

Response: Noted.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No change.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No change.

5. COMMUNICATION

5.1. The policy and practice pertaining to the following issues should be reviewed:

Response: Under revision.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Finalised.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Finalised.

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Master plan nearly completed. Standardisation of e-mail in DOD in progress, partially resolved.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Good change.

6. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

The committee recommends that the constitutionality of certain aspects of the MDC be taken under review (paragraph 3.7.1).

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. In a number of cases the constitutionality of the military prosecution authority was challenged. The Constitutional Court decided during October 2001, that the military prosecuting authority is constitutional. Further constitutional challenges on other ground may be expected.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. The constitutionality of the legislation upholded.

7. LEGISLATION/ REGULATIONS

7.1. The committee recommends that the consideration be given to the possible rationalisation /amalgamation of the present two (2) parliamentary committees dealing with defence matters (paragraph 3.8.1).

Response: No comment.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No comment.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No comment.

7.2. The committee recommends that consideration be given to the appointment of a dedicated, independent ombud for the DOD (paragraph 3.8.2).

Response: No comment.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. No comment.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No comment.

8. POLICY MATTERS

8.1. The continued existence of the Army Battle School at Lohatla should be reviewed (paragraph 3.9.1).

Response: Done.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Done. The Army Battle School at Lohatla remains.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Done. Non-negotiable.

9. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

9.1. The committee recommends a number of amendments to the current training policy and practice (paragraph 3.10.1).

Response: In progress.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Substantial progress has been made. For example, the following:

  1. At the Defence College the old Joint Staff Course (JSC) has been replace by an entirely new programme, namely the Executive National Strategy Programme (ENSP).
  2. The Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme have replaced the former senior command and staff courses of the Services. This is presented at the War College, Thaba Tshwane.
  3. Greater representivity has been achieved at both colleges. The General Officer Command of the War College is an African brigadier general.
  4. At the War College there are four foreign members from respectively Zimbabwe, Pakistan, India and Botswana. Four of the directing staffing is coming from Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and United Kingdom.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. Good progress.

10. LOGISTICS

10.1. The committee recommends that the possibility of reduced fares for members of the SANDF using public transport be investigated (paragraph 3.11.1).

Response: Could be considered.

Update to response – 6 May 2002. Met resistance from taxi associations.

Update to response – 28 March 2003. No change.

Date: 28 March 2003

 

APPENDIX C TO

SANDF/R/106/15

DD APRIL 2003

NUMBER OF RESERVE FORCE MEMBERS UTILISED IN 2002 PER RANK AND RACE

RANK
CODE

RANK

NUMBER IN RANK

ASIAN

AFRICAN

COLOURED

WHITE

TOTAL

02

LT GEN

0

0

1

0

2

3

03

MAJ GEN

0

0

0

0

8

8

04

BRIG GEN

0

0

0

0

25

25

05

COL

2

1

6

0

102

111

06

LT COL

10

2

6

3

348

369

07

MAJ

19

5

15

4

629

672

08

CAPT

7

0

19

8

577

611

09

LT

9

0

87

10

891

997

10

2LT

6

0

6

4

180

196

11

WO1

5

2

8

19

473

507

12

WO2

7

7

14

35

331

394

13

S SGT

12

13

27

37

417

506

14

SGT

16

18

118

96

1,091

1,339

15

CPL

39

26

472

205

1,469

2,211

16

L CPL

29

21

946

330

939

2,265

17

PTE

278

173

8,231

2,139

5,086

15,907

20

CPLN

5

1

6

2

73

87

TOTAL

444

269

9,962

2,892

12,641

26,208

% OF TOTAL

 

1.69%

1.03%

38.01%

11.03%

48.23%

100.00%