A Critique of Human Resource Strategy 2010 Within the Context of the SANDF’s Readiness Levels

Introduction
This research brief provides a brief critique of the SANDF’s Human Resources Strategy 2010. It is placed within the context of the SANDF’s readiness levels as highlighted by them to Parliament last year. The brief is structured chronologically and highlights areas where there may be problems, weaknesses, and lack of clarity and to provide suggestions for ways to amend such issues. Lastly there are some general comments.

Introduction (page 2)

The introduction section to the strategy lacks any or sufficient mention of ways to deal with such critical challenged facing the SANDF, such as morale broadly, integration, racial, gender, disability, language and HIV/ AIDS. It also fails to mention any aspects of the broad transformation process.

Chapter 1, Methodology (page 5)

No mention is made of any lessons that may have been learnt from the integration process as well general international best practice. The latter would most informative if it could highlight useful experiences that the SANDF and its predecessors have learnt not only from the United Kingdom, but also Russia, Germany, Cuba, Angola and so on.

Chapter 2 (page 6)

• ON page 6, paragraph 1, should be changed to say that currently there is likely conventional threat to South Africa, but that this should be quantified and expanded to include the capacity of other states, including neighbouring ones to threaten the Republic.

• On page 6, the first line of the last bullet refers to "change fatigue" and then on the second last line to differing expectations regarding affirmative action. This implies a certain lack of understanding of government’s core values, policies and laws and is not suitable for a defence force, which is based upon a clear line command and control. It may be best to delete such statements, as they exist anywhere in the Strategy.

• On page 7, the first few lines in the last paragraph state that the SANDF has not moved sufficiently towards the White Paper envisaged Regular and Reserve Force ratios as mandated. Such a statement needs to be unpacked much further.

• On the last 3 lines of page 7, the impression formed by the comments on the Reserve Forces is that the Reserve Force is at the edge of collapse and any attempts to transform and sustain it may be too late. Solutions need to be given by the SANDF on rather how to "save it". It is also important to ask what is being done to train, maintain, sustain and deploy the Reserves so that they are at sufficient readiness levels. Mention is made further on about the role of something similar to the United States’ Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) (end of page 16), what if anything is being done to a similar effect by the SANDF?

• Page 8, paragraph 2 refers to "undefined and unquantified" RegF and ResF. However this goes against what the White Paper and the Defence Review stipulate.

• Page 10, paragraph 4 states "personnel reduction is not guided by a clearly defined establishment." What then guides it? How can Parliament be assured that former members of MK and other NSFs are not being targeted in particular for this?

• Page 10, paragraph 5 states there is a "lack of an enforceable Exit Management Framework". What is being done to retrain, prepare and assist exiting personnel? A suggestion could be for the DOD to approach the DPSA for assistance in redeploying such valuable and skilled personnel.

• Page 10, paragraph 7 refers to ad-hoc closure of bases and units. This is a politically problematic statement as it is the responsibility of the DOD and SANDF to do such tasks in a manner that is anything but ad-hoc.

• Page 10, fourth last paragraph refers again to "change fatigue". Again it may be advisable to delete such language.

• Page 11, paragraph 2 refers to young personnel. It would be useful if it could be expanded upon to detail what is its strategy to identify, attract and recruit the youth.

• Page 12, paragraph 1 refers to serious disciplinary problems. This needs to be further discussed to include what are the current problems in the Military Justice System, i.e. that the judges are predominantly white Afrikaans males and that it needs to be transformed. The procedures, types of cases, roles of Chaplains, grievance procedures and way forward need to be highlighted.

• Page 12, fourth last paragraph states that the FSS has largely failed. If so it would be advisable for the DOD to reassess the FSS’ implementation and propose a way forward.

• Pages 13-15 mention the challenges of dealing with ageing personnel. It also needs to elaborate on strategies for dealing with HIV/AIDS and ageing personnel.

• Page 16, third last paragraph needs to be expanded to mention ways to retain skilled personnel.

• Page 17-19, especially the conclusion, discusses representativity. Particular attention needs to be given to Affirmative Action and Employment Opportunities in specialised musterings and middle and senior management. The latter is not mentioned at all.

• Page 23, last paragraph’s "Enhancing command communication and grievance lodging procedures and their records." needs to be expanded upon

• Page 25-27’s Strategic Issues needs to mention the critical issues of morale levels and racial tensions.

• Page 27 the last bullet of the Critical Success Factors section, mentions needing the support of trade unions. This needs to be expanded to include what is the strategic approach to dealing with trade unions?

• Page 27-28, first black bullet needs to be expanded to look at the need for Military Intelligence to copy their NIA and SASS counterparts and actively recruit valuable university graduates. This needs to then be balanced between recruiting young graduates for MI and with the issues of age vs. rank and entry point levels.

• Page 28, third last bullet, needs to take into account gender equality and ratios and the impact of HIV/AIDS with regards to retirement age targets.

• Page 31, Needs to mention how to keep the Reserve Force up to uniform standards with the Regular Force.

• Page 36, second last bullet mentions the very important need to fully accredit prior training and experiences. This needs much more unpacking and a clear strategy and timeframe.

• Page 37, There needs to be a meaningful breakdown of its strategy to target and empower women, Blacks and disabled persons throughout the SANDF.

• Over all there is no real correlation between HR 2010 and SANDF’s readiness levels.
• All official documents should be written in plain language. This will help the broader public to understand the content better. Particular care needs to be given to avoid the unnecessary use of obscure acronyms.
• Has this document been discussed by rank and file personnel in the SANDF and commented upon? If not it should be.
• A proper recruitment policy is needed to attract and recruit historically disadvantaged persons into the SANDF. Personnel at large should also discuss this. What is the strategy currently? Do they target universities, schools, townships, rural areas, women etc.?
• Statistics are needed to shown the demographic changes, which have occurred in the SANDF since 1994.
• A statistical demographic breakdown is needed of the pass rate for artillery courses, the usage of fighter jets and the level of exposure in specialised army musterings.
• With regards to disciplinary systems and grievances procedures:

• Is Locus Group Methodology in use in the Army? If yes how effective and if no, why not? Documentation is needed on procedures, cases, successes, feedback from personnel and the way forward.
• What has happened to the process of reviewing the Military Justice System, i.e. is it still white dominated? Who has done the review and what are their recommendations?
• Is the Army adhering to the provisions of the Constitution which guarantees the usage of all official languages, i.e. issuing out of instructions, disciplinary processes etc.
• What progress has been made with fast track promotion since 1994? Demographic based Statistics are needed in this regard.

Department of Defence. SANDF’s Human Resources Strategy 2010, June 2002, Pretoria.