The Portfolio Committee on Provincial and Local Government, having undertaken an intergovernmental relations study tour of Spain, reports as follows:

A. Introduction

1. With the finalisation of the new system of local government (but for outstanding issues of local government finances), the Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government are beginning to increasingly focus on developing our system of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and co-operative governance in order to improve delivery and development. This is going to be a major pre-occupation of the Ministry and Department over the next few years.

2. In terms of section 41(2) of the Constitution, legislation has to be passed to:

"(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations; and

(b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes."

3. The Department has for some time now been pre-occupied with these matters - it has commissioned reports, sent staff abroad, engaged with experts, and commenced an internal policy formulation process.

4. The Department intends to introduce initial legislation in terms of Section 41 of the Constitution either late this year or early next year.

5. In order to equip the Portfolio Committee more effectively to participate in the process of developing policies and legislation on IGR, the Portfolio Committee undertook an IGR study tour of Spain from 7 to 14 December 2001.

6. Spain was specifically chosen because there are a number of features of the Spanish system of government that are either similar to those obtaining in SA, or which have a bearing on possible future developments here. These include:

(a) The history of centralised or autocratic government and recent turn to democracy.

(b) The relative newness of the national constitution.

(c) The constitutional recognition of at least three tiers of government.

(d) The presence of strong regional identities.

(e) The existence of a diverse set of intergovernmental relations mechanisms and structures.

(f) The existence of a body similar to our intergovernmental bodies.

(g) The internationally unique intergovernmental concept of "asymmetrical devolution".

7. Those who participated in the tour were: Mr Y Carrim (Chairperson, ANC), Mr J Kgarimetsa (ANC), Rev A Goosen (ANC), Ms C Lobe (ANC), Ms G Borman (DP), Mr P Smith (IFP), Ms R Southgate (ACDP) and Mr C Sibanyoni (Researcher).

8. The central government and the regions (provinces) of Madrid, Andalusia, the Basque Country and Catalonia were visited. These included visits to Madrid, Seville, Vitoria and Barcelona. Meetings were held with a wide range of stakeholders, including national and regional parliamentarians, local government councillors, government officials, academics and representatives from the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces.

9. The study tour was very helpful and valuable. It might have been useful to also have visited a relevant developing country to examine its IGR system and draw comparisons.

10. The study tour was facilitated by the South African embassy in Madrid. The Committee records its appreciation to the embassy and in particular Ms D Viljoen, the political counsellor. Mr C Sibanyoni is acknowledged for his assistance in the preparation of this report. The Committee is also especially grateful to its secretary, Mr L Brown, for the enormous amount of work he did to ensure the success of the study tour.

B. Background on Spain

1. Spain has now experienced some 23 years of democracy after almost 40 years of autocratic and strongly centrist rule under General Franco. Since the adoption of its new Constitution in 1978, Spain has been acclaimed for the uniqueness of its constitutional system, premised as it is not only upon the asymmetrical allocation of powers and functions to the State (central government) and Autonomous Communities (ACs) (provinces), but equally, on the constitutional method by which these powers and functions are allocated. Variously identified as asymmetrical federal or asymmetrically decentralised, Spain is a parliamentary monarchy whose transition has been long and complex but also highly successful.

2. A key political and constitutional theme in Spain has been that of centrism versus regionalism, and more particularly, of centrism versus community autonomy, especially in those parts of the country which have historical, linguistic and cultural claims to being different to the rest of Spain - such as the Basque Country, Navarre, Catalonia and Galicia - and in which secessionist sentiment exists. The Constitution "is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, ... and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that make it up, and the solidarity between them" (Article 2).

3. During the constitution-making process there were different conceptions on what the political system in Spain should be. The parties on the right were in favour of a unitary state and they asserted that any concession to the nationalities of Spain posed a threat to national unity. The parties on the left wanted federalism. The nationalists wanted greater power and autonomy for the Basque Country and Catalonia than for the other regions. Consequently, the negotiating parties agreed on establishing three routes to autonomy. The regions that voted in a referendum in favour of autonomy in the past were allowed to follow a relatively fast process towards full autonomy. The Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia qualified to follow the fast process. Andalusia, however, followed an exceptional route towards full autonomy. The reason is that it did not qualify as a historic nationality but had a majority support for full autonomy. The other 13 ACs followed a 5-year long route in order to achieve autonomy.

4. In its change to democracy and in the decentralisation of its system of government, Spain has been fortunate that socio-economic factors have strengthened rather than hindered the process. In the first place, Spanish society was at the time of the 1978 transition, and remains today, a society with considerable social equality, unlike South Africa. Spain is indeed, a welfare state. Moreover, the post-1978 period has been characterised economically by significant stability, diversification and growth, reducing the prospects of civil unrest and increasing the legitimacy of the system. Notwithstanding the much lower levels of inequality compared to South Africa, there is strong emphasis placed on reducing inequality between regions and within regions. Membership of the European Union (EU) is important in this regard, and it was observed on several occasions that in a sense the Spanish system is of four, not three, spheres of government. Spain's relations with the EU is a major preoccupation.

5. Interestingly, the transition from a centrist state to a decentralised one is not quite complete - after over 20 years - and the decentralisation process in respect of local government has barely begun.

C. Evolution of IGR in Spain

1. The drafters of the 1978 Spanish Constitution fudged several contentious issues in favour of reaching consensus, leaving a range of matters to be resolved in the future. One consequence of this is a division of powers and functions reliant on a process to be fulfilled rather than a rigid and uniform constitutional enumeration of allocated competences. Another is that since the ACs only came into being after the Constitution was adopted, the Constitution makes no reference to the 17 ACs making up the current territory of Spain.

2. But importantly, from an IGR perspective, this purposive constitutional obfuscation resulted in what was initially at least, a highly litigious system in which the State and ACs made extensive use of the Constitutional Court, largely in respect of defending their respective competences against perceived encroachment. There have been some 800 cases before the Constitutional Court over 20 years, though the vast majority of these were in the early years of the transition. A view commonly expressed was that following the development of a necessarily large body of authoritative and politically accepted jurisprudence, the system is currently far more mature in that both ACs and the State operate in terms of an established understanding of the limits of their respective competences. The result is far less conflict now than in the past.

3. Another noteworthy feature is the extent to which reliance has been placed on mechanisms and institutions not directly created by the Constitution. Instead, a combination of statutory and non-statutory bodies play key roles in an interlocking system in which negotiation plays a major role in addressing potential or actual conflict.

4. As in any multi-sphered system with the same political party in control at both the national and sub-national level, governmental disputes are frequently mediated within the party rather than between governments. This was accentuated by a strong Proportional Representation electoral system strengthening the role of the political party in respect of its public representatives, though it appeared that the left of centre parties permitted greater sub-national autonomy and thus deviation from party policy than did the centre right parties.

5. A key theme was the length of the transition. Stakeholders often referred to the fact that the transfer of powers to the ACs and the concomitant finalisation of structures, staffing and finances associated with AC governance is only now reaching its conclusion, while those ACs wanting greater competences saw the process requiring yet more time to reach "finality".

6. Allied to this 23-year time-frame has been a single-minded focus on completing the first phase, AC governance, before commencing on the so-called "second wave of decentralisation" - to municipalities. This contrasts with South Africa in which the transition is commonly conceptualised as a far more condensed process.

D. Powers and Functions of Central and Regional States

1. The Spanish Constitution utilises a unique approach towards the allocation of powers and functions between the State and the ACs. The focus is more on the constitutional process than it is about any a priori allocation of competences. Indeed, the essence of the system is one in which the Constitution merely enumerates which competences an AC may assume whereas the specific competences actually assumed reflect a constitutional negotiations process between the State and a particular AC.

2. In general, the sequence is as follows: the State and the AC in question reach broad agreement on the competences to be assumed; the AC drafts its "Statute of Autonomy" or Constitution which is ratified by way of a referendum and is adopted by its Parliament; the State Parliament then passes the statute - with a special majority - as a law of the centre. The Constitution provided for a fast-track approach (adopted by the historical communities) and a slower approach (the other ACs). The actual allocation of competences over time reflects these two groups of ACs, though there are differences, sometimes significant, within each group. In addition to the enumerated functions an AC may assume, it may also, with State agreement, assume competence over specified issues falling within the scope of non-allocated residual competences. The Constitution further guarantees the historical position of specified communities. This for instance, is why revenue collection in the Basque Country is completely different to the rest of the country.

3. The AC competences are of three types: exclusive, concurrent and shared. Though the Constitution theoretically provides for an intervention or override mechanism, it appears in reality as though exclusive powers permit of no State competence in that same field within the AC in question. The nature of Spanish concurrence differs from ours. Whereas in our case both national and provincial spheres have full competence in respect of any particular Schedule 4 functional area, this overrides being the means of resolving a dispute, in the case of Spain, State competence is limited to setting out broad principles which the ACs are free to give effect to as they see fit. Conflict over the extensiveness or otherwise of what is permissible has been addressed by the Constitutional Court, in favour of a limited rather than extensive State competence. In respect of a shared competence, the AC is obliged to simply execute national legislation. State competence is likewise exclusive (enumerated) and concurrent. Residual powers lie with the State except in so far as any particular functional area has been allocated to an AC by way of agreement.

4. As far as the classification of the system is concerned, there appear to be two firm views in Spain: one group claimed the country was clearly federal in nature or that it was federal in all but a few matters, such as the structure of the senate; the second group felt the system was simply decentralised. Interestingly, these views tended to correlate with political party affiliation: centre-right centrist parties, such as the Popular Party (PP), view the system favourably as merely decentralised while socialist parties view the system favourably as federal, stating that Spain was simply incapable politically, of recognising this fact.

5. The Portfolio Committee participants in the study tour noted the particular challenges posed by the specific circumstances of the Basque Country and the role of the ETA in particular, but does not feel competent to make any useful observations, except to stress the need for negotiations to solve political conflicts wherever they may exist.

E. Local Government

1. At one level, local government seemingly occupies the same type of constitutional position common to most three-tiered systems - it is subordinate to and is a creature of the national or AC governments. This is so because it derives its legislative competence from national and AC statutes and is not accorded original powers by the Constitution. Indeed, "local administration" is expressly listed as a competence that may be assumed by ACs. However, it would be simplistic to assume from this an exaggerated position of subordination.

2. First, in terms of human capacity and financial capacity, municipalities do not on the whole appear to suffer significant capacity constraints. Whilst it is acknowledged that there are far too many (about 8,000 mostly very small) municipalities, the view was commonly expressed that local identity took precedence over the need for rationalisation, and that despite this need, local government worked. Certainly, State and AC capacity building did not feature in our discussions.

3. Second, while in terms of national legislation municipalities are required to provide a minimum set of services according to the population of the municipality in question, they appear to enjoy considerable freedom in respect of how they give effect to what is a nationally-determined framework. For instance, municipalities provide for service delivery via a host of mechanisms equivalent to those provided for in Chapter 8 of our Local Government: Municipal Systems Act.

4. Third, the larger municipalities have competences that in our country reside with national and provincial governments - such as social services and housing. These municipalities are seeking more competencies. Many of the service delivery functions preoccupying us are delivered not directly by the municipality but by what in Spain is called a Province. The Province is indirectly elected by municipalities and is superficially similar to our District. Though acknowledged as a tier of local government, it is not expressly termed a municipality. The larger municipalities visited exercised more than the minimum competences, having negotiated the transfer of further powers. A view was expressed that the ACs were sometimes too remote from local communities and too inclined to provide services in a manner incongruent with the views of the local community, necessitating that municipalities expand their delivery role.

5. Fourth, there are two constitutional guarantees of key significance. On the one hand, the Constitution provides that municipalities must be guaranteed the funding required to carry out their services; the existence of unfunded mandates did not appear to be a major issue in Spain. On the other hand, and most important, the Constitution guarantees the "autonomy" of municipalities. This appears to be of an institutional form in particular, including its administration, and has the effect of reducing State and AC intervention in the manner provided for in our Constitution. The only intervention mechanism available to the State and AC appeared to be the courts. Interestingly, it appears as though municipalities cannot be compelled to accept new competences, even if funded, but have the discretion to accept or deny them.

6. A recurrent issue raised was that with the first phase of centralisation now almost over, from State to AC, Spain is shortly to commence the next phase in the process, of the transfer of further competences to local government. Constitutionally, this is not a solely State-determined process, but requires AC co-operation. Although various State stakeholders saw AC resistance to having to hand over some of its competences as a serious impediment to the success of the process, a number of AC representatives viewed the process as inevitable and desirable. Municipalities have achieved low levels of development. For historical reasons priority was given to ACs rather than to local government. Local government wants more powers but the progress is very slow. The ACs are reluctant to devolve some of their powers to municipalities. To address this, the Socialist Party and the Popular Party have signed an agreement 4 years ago to devolve powers to municipalities. All stakeholders recognised that the process will take a long time and will require extensive negotiations.

7. There is a Federation of Municipalities and Provinces in Spain that unites local government. Of about 8 000 municipalities, about 6 000 belong to the Federation of Municipalities. The 6 000 or so municipalities account for 94% of the population of Spain. Out of 50 provinces in Spain, 49 are members of the Federation of Municipalities. The existence of the Federation of Municipalities is not recognised in the Constitution - but the central government does engage with it. The Federation of Municipalities has been promoting the devolution of power and expenditure to local government - but is not satisfied with progress so far.

F. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations

1. ACs are not only guaranteed political autonomy by the Constitution, but also financial autonomy: Article 156.1 provides that "the Autonomous Communities will enjoy financial autonomy for the development and execution of their competences ...".

2. The Spanish system is complex. Since the "historical communities" had their historical rights guaranteed by the Constitution, this has resulted in a measure of asymmetry. On the one extreme, and unique to the relatively wealthy Basque Country, almost all taxes including income tax, Value Added Tax (VAT) and excise duty are collected by the AC which then pays over to the State its agreed share. The State collects none of these itself. The share paid by the AC to the State is intended to reflect the cost of state services provided in the Basque Country as well as a pro rata share of other non-territory-based State expenditure such as foreign affairs and defence. It also includes a "solidarity" component - funds to be apportioned to the poorer ACs as part of the State's inter-AC financial equalisation efforts. Typically, costing these State services is a complex, lengthy and contentious process, entailing considerable negotiations. The Basque government emphasised that it, rather than the State, carried the risk, since the sum to be paid to the State was fixed irrespective of actual revenue collection and underlying economic performance. Importantly, agreement reached between the Basque Country and the State is enshrined in a freshly-negotiated and updated "Economic Agreement", enjoying high political and contractual status, equivalent indeed, to its Statute of Autonomy.

3. Other historical communities such as Catalonia are likewise, though not as extensively, differentiated from what is called the common tax regime system to be found elsewhere in Spain.

4. In terms of the common system, there are three groups of tax resources to be divided between the State and the AC. First are the "financial sufficiency" finances. This is revenue provided by the State from tax revenues intended to cover the cost of transferred functions. From specific taxes collected by the State in the territory of the AC, and especially income tax and VAT a percentage of each is apportioned to the AC for this purpose, to which is added "own-taxes" collected and managed by the AC. Costing of services transferred and thus of revenue transferred is not zero-based or need-based, but is based on the cost at the time of transfer adjusted for necessary increases. Moreover, should there be a shortfall between the cost of the services rendered and the fiscal capacity of the AC, the Financial and Fiscal Board comes into play to facilitate the transfer of further funding from the State.

5. The second group covers self-government, and is sourced from specific AC taxes. The application and extent of this taxing power is limited by a number of factors such as EU rulings, State prescripts regarding market unity and macro-economic stability, and the like.

6. The third group is centred on so-called "solidarity", being a geographical, basically AC, compensation fund or minimum balancing or equalisation fund aimed at equalising the quality of services for all Spaniards regardless of residence, especially in respect of education and health.

7. The allocations take place in terms of a "Quota Law" providing for a formula-based quota, negotiated for 5-year periods. There are currently attempts being made to make the formula permanent. Interestingly, Spain has reverted to the present system of AC entitlement to individual taxes raised by the State after experimenting with and rejecting a pooling system.

8. For the ACs in the common system, transfers from the State are thus critical, since "own" revenue is limited between 12% and 15% of revenue, EU transfers excluded. In most instances these transfers are unconditional.

9. Local government raises some 60% of its own revenue on aggregate, the balance comprising State transfers via the ACs. The level of financial autonomy is less than that of the ACs.

10. EU transfers have been extremely important in respect of promoting development in the poorer ACs. The quantum of transfers is based on the extent of AC deviation from an EU-determined standard of living norm, and is of two types: infrastructural grants (especially transport), and specific programmes (such as job creation). Among the key EU funds are the European Regional Development Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and European Social Fund.

11. Intervention measures by the State in respect of AC or municipal mismanagement is virtually non-existent, and the State is thus reliant on the courts to secure compliance.

G. Institutions and Mechanisms of IGR

1. Typically, the Constitution of Spain does not expressly provide for the full range of IGR institutions and processes utilised by IGR roleplayers. Some of the more important institutions are referred to below.

2. Senate: According to the Constitution, the Senate represents the interests of the ACs. In practice it does not. But political parties are trying to address this. The Socialist Party wants the Senate to play a role in mediating conflict between central government and the ACs. To achieve this, the Socialist Party wants the Constitution to be amended. However, the Popular Party does not want to change the Constitution. According to the Popular Party, it is better not to change the Constitution.

3. Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy: There is a special Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy, composed of the Minister of economics and finance from the central government, and his or her counterpart in each region and the Minister of Public Administration. The Ministry of Public Administration is directly charged with overall intergovernmental relations, co-operation, and capacity-development, but in practice this is shared with many functional ministries. This consultative body provides an intergovernmental forum for debate. The body is also concerned with the co-ordination of policy regarding the distribution of state resources to the regions, as well as public investment, the costs of services and public debt.

4. Multi-sectoral Conferences: There are sectoral conferences similar to MinMecs.

5. Bilateral Commission: There are also bilateral meetings between central government and some of the ACs.

6. Political Party System: Political parties contribute to stabilising IGR by mediating differences between ACs and the center and between ACs through party political structures.

7. It would seem that there is no forum which bring together all tiers of government on a regular and organised basis.

H. The European Union

Currently, there is a debate regarding the participation of the ACs in the European Union (EU). Some ACs want to be represented in the EU institutions. For example, the Basque Country argues that since it basically has its own fiscal system it should have a chance to defend itself in the EU. However, the central government argues that the EU is a union of states. In addition, the State asserts that foreign relations is a non-transferable competence of the Central Government. EU policy falls under foreign policy. However, a counter argument is that the process of the EU integration is not, in any way, a foreign relations issue, for the central government is giving its powers and those of the ACs to the EU. The ACs, for example, have competences in respect of agriculture. But decisions and policies on agriculture are made at Brussels. Thus, the EU impinges on ACs competences.

I. Conflict Resolution

1. The Constitutional Court plays a vital role in conflict resolution. This is more so, because the Spanish Constitution is unfinished. When the Constitution was drafted it was left flexible and some of the clauses are vague. This created particular challenges. In the 1980s many cases were taken to the Constitutional Court. The implication is that the Constitutional Court, which is not elected, has to finish the draft by clarifying the vague clauses in the Constitution. However, the Basque Country has raised a concern regarding the Spanish Courts. The Basque Country has decided not to use the Spanish Courts, for in 90% of cases they have taken to court their powers were reduced.

2. The Audit Tribunal reviews and adjudicates public accounts. The Audit Tribunal tries to resolve an issue before it is sent to the Constitutional Court.

3. Besides these mechanisms, there is another mechanism to resolving conflicts between the State and the AC. In this process the central government negotiates with an AC for 3 months. If an agreement is not reached, they go to the Constitutional Court for extension. The Constitutional Court can extend the period of negotiation up to 9 months.

J. Overview of Lessons for South Africa

1. Closer to the time that the Department begins to further develop its IGR policy and legislation, the Portfolio Committee will discuss this report in some detail, especially for the lessons it offers to our own country. The lessons have already been suggested in the way the report has focused on issues taken up above. Below is a brief overview of the lessons.

2. It is important to locate the Spanish system within a uniquely Spanish context. For instance, Spain was fortunate in that its transition to democracy took place within the context of relative social stability and a growing economy. It was, moreover, a society with relatively low levels of inequality within and between regions. These conditions do not apply to South Africa. They point though to the challenges our IGR system confronts, especially given the huge material disparities within our country. These disparities are reflected not just between provinces and municipalities, but within the population as a whole. We have among the highest income inequalities in the world. The need for redistribution partly explains the relatively strong national sphere of government we have, and the system of co-operative governance we have opted for.

3. One of the striking lessons of the Spanish experience is how long it takes to develop a stable IGR system. It has taken Spain some 23 years to implement a national and provincial system which is only now being acknowledged as reaching some sort of finality. There are a number of reasons for this, the most important of which may be unique to Spain, especially the post-constitution process-led asymmetrical establishment of the ACs and negotiated conferral of powers and functions. But stakeholders made it clear that this time-frame, far from being a hindrance, has contributed positively towards the evolution of the system. In our country there has been a certain tendency to expect too much progress too soon. Some key practitioners have even called for a fundamental review of our provincial system or our new model of local government or our co-operative governance system generally, as relatively new as they are. While these systems must be regularly reviewed, surely it is far too soon to contemplate fundamental changes. The allocation of yet further powers to local government in South Africa should also be dealt with gradually and sensitively.

4. Constitutional asymmetry is not in itself unique, but the extent and manner of its application in Spain surely is. Though the reasons for this are largely historical, its adoption as a constitutional mechanism is viewed by key stakeholders in Spain as successful. In South Africa, however, there is little support for asymmetry. There are many reasons for this. This includes the need to create national unity following the deep divisions created by apartheid; the acute inequalities between the provinces; the lack of sufficiently strong regional identities; the need to create stability; and the establishment of a simple provincial system. The majority of the participants in the study tour felt, as much as there were many useful lessons to draw, that the Spanish system of asymmetry was not suitable for South Africa, at least not at this stage. The minority felt that consideration should be given to asymmetry in South Africa based in part on lessons drawn from the Spanish experience.

5. Each level of government plays an important role in revenue-collection. This is, however, less pronounced in the non-historical ACs which seem to collect only between 12% and 15% of their own revenue. The State and the ACs divide individual taxes between themselves rather than disbursing revenues from an undifferentiated pool. Of course, in South Africa provinces rely on the constitutional provision of an "equitable share" The Constitution provides for legislation to be passed for provinces to have further revenue-raising powers - but there is no significant step in this direction. There are many reasons for this. In the main, they revolve around the nature of our co-operative governance system and the early stages of it that we are in at present. Some limited form of revenue-raising powers are not to be ruled out altogether, especially if they do not undermine the objectives of creating greater social equality in the country overall.

6. While by no means unknown in Spain, unfunded mandates are seemingly not the problem as they are in South Africa. In Spain, both AC government and local government enjoy constitutional and statutory entitlement to adequate revenue as well as protection against unfunded mandates. Local government in South Africa is particularly vulnerable- and it might well be necessary to provide stronger safeguards for it against unfunded mandates, beyond to what is provided in the Constitution and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act.

7. Whether Spain is federal or decentralised is a question not unfamiliar to South Africans. Interestingly, left-leaning parties in Spain support federalism while right-leaning parties support a more unitary approach. This is the opposite of the situation in South Africa. Both ACs and municipalities enjoy considerable legislative, executive and fiscal autonomy. The central government enjoys fewer intervention mechanisms than is the case in South Africa. In many senses, the ACs have more power than our provinces. In some sense, local government in Spain also has more power, but in other senses, it does not. Unlike in South Africa, local government in Spain does not have original powers and functions set out in the Constitution. Key stakeholders in Spain were impressed to learn about our system of local government, and were struck by how advanced our vision and framework for local government as set out in the Constitution, legislation and policies is.

8. As is common in many federal or quasi-federal systems, there are a myriad of institutions managing IGR in Spain. Of note, however, is that most are not expressly provided for in the Constitution. Rather, they have evolved over time to reflect the exigencies of IGR within a particular period. Furthermore, they are even then not necessarily creatures of statute. This re-emphasises the need to avoid unnecessarily regulating our system of IGR, especially as it is so new.

9. It was instructive to see how political parties contribute to stabilising IGR by dealing with differences between ACs and the center and between the ACs through their internal party structures. This is, of course, also the case in our country - and obviously more so because of the strength of the majority party. Clearly, political parties in this country have a vital role to play in stabilising our system of IGR.

10. The Portfolio Committee was very stimulated by its study tour of Spain and would like to pursue the issues raised in this Report further through various means