BRIEFING TO PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE RE ANGOLA
DEPUTY MINISTER AZIZ PAHAD WEDNESDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 2002
Political situation
The signing of the cease-fire on 4 April 2002 ended hostilities between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA. A statement by the government of the Republic of Angola, issued on the 13^th of March 2002, proposed an agenda for peace with the aim of promoting national reconciliation.
The Memorandum of Commitment between the Angolan Government and UNITA, which was signed on 26 August 2002, is a further important milestone on the road to peace and reconciliation.
Challenges re integration of former UNITA combatants, preparations for elections [scheduled for 2004], reconstruction and development; humanitarian tragedy.
The Government of Angola has established a Parliamentary Commission on Peace and Reconciliation (PCPR) with the aim of consulting with community representatives, church groups and civil society on the revival of the peace process.
During his visit to Angola in April 2002, South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma addressed the PCPR and reiterated South Africa’s commitment to assist Angola, when called upon, with regard to matters of national reconciliation. The recently ratified Joint Bilateral Commission between South Africa and Angola provides the former with a platform with which to engage Angola.
Following a preparatory meeting of the Joint Commission, held in Luanda on 23 August 2002, it was decided that the first meeting of the Joint Commission, to be chaired by the respective Foreign Ministers, will be held in Pretoria during the latter half of November this year (Provisional date: 26 November). Expected that the following topics would be discussed:
Trade – (Agreement on the reciprocal protection of investments)
Crime – (Cross-border issues)
Migration – (Abolition of visa requirements)
Minerals and Energy – (oil and gas exploration)
Health issues – (training of personnel and control of transmittable diseases)
Agriculture
Tourism – (the Hotel trade)
The humanitarian situation
The peace process is, however, still being threatened by a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions.
Much written about Angola dwells, however, less on options for political direction than the humanitarian situation. This is not surprising in a country ranked the world’s 13^th most underdeveloped. More than four million (one-third) of its population is displaced, and nine million out of 13 million people live on less than a dollar a day. This is all the more striking in Angola, so richly endowed with mineral wealth, as the second-largest African oil producer after Nigeria and the fourth-largest diamond producer world-wide.
It is a land of great contrast, with around two million refugees in Angola living in appalling conditions on Luanda’s surrounding hills. Those who survive by eating out of Luanda’s garbage cans exist cheek-by-bumper with sparkling four-wheel drives, late-model Volvos and up-market BMWs. Only 40% of the population has access to safe water and sanitation; and life expectancy is only 44 years. Widespread humanitarian crisis is graphic evidence of the high cost of military victory – even though the cost of defeat could have been much higher. No wonder the Archbishop of Luanda, Damiao Franklin, ranks "social justice" and "the fight against poverty" as the first priority for Angola. Even former Angolan Army Chief of Staff, Joao de Matos, the man widely credited for defeating Savimbi, has highlighted the "enormous challenges" facing his country.
Military budget consumed 30% of government budget.
In view of South Africa’s commitment to assist Angola, a Committee has been set up, in accordance with a mandate from a Cabinet Lekgotla in July 2002, under the chairmanship of the Department of Social Welfare to devise a strategy for South African humanitarian assistance to Angola.
The following progress has been made regarding humanitarian assistance to Angola:
A number of Government departments have been participating in the work of an inter-departmental committee established by the Minister of Social Development to co-ordinate arrangements around the issue of an appeal for humanitarian contributions. Undertakings to provide financial contributions and in-kind assistance have been received from a number of departments and civil-society institutions.
Financial contributions are being paid into the "Angola Appeal" account established by the Department of Social Development at ABSA Bank, Pretoria. These contributions will be used, in the first instance, to pay for the costs of transportation of the consignments to Angola. The balance of funds received will be used either to purchase additional in-kind contributions, or to make financial contributions directly to the international organisations providing emergency assistance on the ground in Angola.
Arrangements are currently being put in place to receive in-kind donations at warehouses in Pretoria and Durban, and to transport some of the in-kind donations (clothing), as the first and most urgent consignment, from Port Elizabeth, East London and Caledonspoort to Durban, for shipment to Luanda. As much additional in-kind assistance as has been received by the time the clothing is ready for shipment will be dispatched as part of the same consignment. It is envisaged that a second, and possibly further consignments, can be sent in the near future once the religious-based aid organisations have had time to collect and deliver their in-kind contributions to either Pretoria or Durban. It is considered too cost-ineffective to airfreight in-kind assistance to Angola.
The Department of Agriculture has indicated that it will donate 6,000 kg of maize seeds and 200 spades. Due to the possible delays of shipping, the ambassador of Angola has offered to find transportation for the seeds so that they can be used during the rainy season.
The Gift of the Givers Foundation has indicated that it will contribute 50 tons of maize meal and 10 tons of bottled water immediately, with further contributions of in-kind assistance to follow.
A number of other Departments and organisations have indicated their intention to make various contributions.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Embassy in Luanda, is working closely with the Chair of the committee, and with the relevant international organisations on the ground in Angola, to receive the consignments, unload them, clear them through customs and deliver them using their available logistical facilities.
Transportation arrangements within South Africa, and to Luanda, are being co-ordinated by the Department of Transport in close co-operation with the Chair of the committee and with Spoornet and Delmas Shipping Lines (which has offered to transport one consignment free of charge to Luanda).
The logistical committee which is planning the humanitarian aid to Angola has agreed that the shipment should leave Durban immediately after the SADC Summit so that the Minister or Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs can hand over the donation to the ambassador of Angola.
South Africa’s commitments regarding Angola
Encourage the Angolan Government and UNITA to honour their commitments to the Luena Ceasefire Accord;
Encourage wide participation in the peace process by political parties, civil society, the churches and traditional leaders;
Encourage the International Community and specifically those countries with direct economic interests in Angola, to support the peace process as well as the post-war reconstruction of Angola.
Herein lies an opportunity for SA to work closer with Luanda, a policy shift and emphasis potentially bringing considerable benefit to both.
For Pretoria, Luanda is perhaps the only regional power which could bring President Mugabe under control, It has displayed a willingness to engage regionally (and to utilise its military prowess), not least in the Congo. Its relationship with Zimbabwe and Namibia through its involvement in the Congo has resulted in something of a regional political schism – portrayed as that between reformers headed by Pretoria, Gaborone and Maputo, and those recalcitrants in Windhoek, Luanda, Kinshasa and Harare. But this rift could be healed by rapprochement between Luanda and Pretoria, without which NEPAD’s progress is inconceivable in the region.
For SA-based business, closer ties with Pretoria could assist in providing the lack of regulatory cover currently missing from the Angolan business environment. Currently, while the risk profile of doing business is predictable and thus manageable, it is an enormously expensive operating environment, partly because the nebulous regulatory regime demands the establishment and maintenance of a costly network of contacts and partnerships. In this way, given the relative economic delinkage and independence of Angola from the SADC region, there is more to be gained by Pretoria than Luanda from an improvement in bilateral relations.
But for Luanda, a focus on regionalism offers a project other than war, a focus for national activity, an acknowledgement of regional status as the second-ranking economic power behind SA, and a conduit for investment from SA companies.
However there are political obstacles that will have to be overcome before such a regional partnership can eventuate. For one, Pretoria will need to make positive, public overtures to Luanda’s leadership, in doing so placating what many Angolans perceive as an ungrateful attitude on the part of the ANC for the years of sanctuary and military assistance Luanda provided. Small but significant steps can make this possible: such as was offered by the Rwanda-DRC peace accord recently facilitated by Pretoria, the failure. Pretoria’s failure to publicly acknowledge Angola’s role left many in Luanda smarting.
And there are also more practical tensions, such as the need for other bilateral actors such as Washington and the former colonial master Portugal to work together in facilitating such a regional consensus. In spite of Secretary Powell’s comments, US policy is shaped primarily by its strategic economic interests, with Angola now supplying around 10% of American oil imports. Lisbon and other European ‘Club Med’ players, will also likely be most reluctant to accept greater SA involvement, viewed as a threat to those who see SA not as a means to improve the size of the regional economic pie but rather as enjoying geographic competitive advantage. This reflects a paradigm of regional economic interaction as a short-term, zero-sum game.
Pretoria’s relations with Angola are akin to Franco-German relations before the European Union. While they can in variably develop apart, by working together they offer a regional future greater than the sum of their respective parts. Symbolic political gestures backed up by cultural and educational exchanges could complement the SADC vision, and in doing so realise benefits for both.