COSATU believes that the provision of a strong public broadcasting service is crucial to the achievement successful completion of South Africa’s democratic transformation, and is a basic human right of all South Africans. COSATU has identified communications and telecommunications as one of the basic needs which need to be retained under state control. The Broadcasting Amendment Bill (hereafter "the Bill") proposes to introduce significant changes to the public broadcasting service and is therefore likely to impact on the achievement of these objectives. Accordingly we would like to thank the Portfolio Committee for affording us the opportunity to participate in oral hearings on the Bill.

These hearings take place at an important time for the SABC. There is growing public debate about the direction of the public broadcaster, and mounting concern about the lack of progress in taking forward the mandate entrusted to it. Eight years down the line after the democratic breakthrough, the transformation of the public broadcaster or lack of it, is one of the important barometers of how far we have travelled. COSATU has been actively engaged in issues around the public broadcaster since our inception, and were at the forefront of campaigns for the creation of an independent board and transformation of the Broadcaster. It was only through the intense campaigning by the liberation movement that the creation of an independent public broadcaster was made possible. We now need to defend this principle. Our concern with the lack of progress in taking the public broadcaster’s mandate forward has resulted in the COSATU executive considering this matter in a number of discussions since the beginning of the year, culminating in our decision to embark on national demonstrations for the transformation of the SABC on September 24, 2002.

The public broadcasting system has an extensive role to play, particularly in South Africa, which has a history of state propaganda and denial of information to the majority. As stated in our submission on the 1998 Broadcasting Bill and White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, the broadcasting system should be guided by the following principles:

• Universal access;
• Redress of past imbalances;
• Human resource development;
• Promotion of local production and content;
• Job creation; and
• Promoting ownership and control by South Africans.

In conjunction with the above it has a substantial role to play in supporting constitutional principles such as freedom of expression, the right to access to information, promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and the right to equality. The public broadcaster should be primarily responsible for rolling out services to previously disadvantaged communities and guarantee universal access to a broadcasting service, which meets people’s needs. Commercial broadcasters cannot be relied upon to achieve such access.

Having said this we are deeply concerned by the trends towards what is in our view rampant commercialisation of the services of the public broadcasting service, which has seriously compromised the achievement of its public service mandate. In this respect we believe that it is important to take stock of the following two key considerations governing these trends:

• Bias of the leadership of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and consequently overall operations towards narrow commercial interests at the expense of servicing its obligations to the broader public; and
• National policy and regulatory framework that has driven an agenda of corporatising and liberalising the broadcasting sector.

Although some may argue that these considerations may appear to fall outside this legislative process, we believe that this Bill does in fact make important policy choices, and entrench others, and that there is therefore a need for broader discussion to precede legislation of the issues contained in the Bill. We therefore recommend that some of the key policy issues proposed in the Bill be suspended pending finalisation of a holistic investigation and review into the current direction of the SABC within the context of the broader policy objectives. It does not make sense to implement measures, which are supposed to fix a problem when in fact these very measures may exacerbate the situation.

The Bill attempts to implement specific policy choices (especially around the increasing corporatisation of the SABC) without first interrogating the failure of these choices in the first place to advance the public mandate. Further, it attempts to legislate greater accountability on the part of the SABC in a clumsy and inappropriate way. While we support the objective of accountability, we believe that the Bill fails to address adequately the underlying causes of the SABC’s failure to meet its public mandate and in particular its overwhelming domination by a commercial agenda. If, however, the Committee would like us to engage further on possible drafting arising out of our proposals, we will make ourselves available to do so.

We do not propose detailed redrafting of clauses, since we raise fundamental policy concerns, which if accepted would mean the suspension of key sections of the Bill, pending the proposed investigation. If, however, the Committee would like us to engage further on possible drafting arising out of our proposals, we will make ourselves available to do so.

One of the primary objectives of enacting various key pieces of broadcasting legislation and policy was to bring about a fundamental change in the overall nature and orientation of the South African broadcasting system from its pre-1994 role, which was chiefly directed at serving the interests of the apartheid government. Specifically in relation to the SABC, this required a realignment of its function as the government broadcaster and propaganda tool to one that fulfilled a broader and legitimate public mandate. This includes inter alia ensuring universal access to its services in a manner that reflects the overall language, cultural and regional diversity of South Africa, providing significant amounts of educational programming and fair, balanced and unbiased news coverage and public affairs programming that is independent from government, commercial and other interests.

Significantly this Bill is being considered at a time when the SABC’s operations are being subjected to intense scrutiny on a number of different fronts. COSATU is especially concerned by what we consider to be a dismal failure on the part of the SABC to fulfil its public mandate, as we have outlined above. Our concerns include:

• Poor coverage of labour issues, particularly on TV, which is to be contrasted with the considerable coverage of business issues. This is in large part dictated by the emphasis on attracting advertising revenue. The resultant commercialisation of the SABC is in direct contradiction of its public service obligation to be independent of commercial interests.
• Biased commentary especially in relation to economic issues, and imposition of a particular economic ideology. Economists are most often drawn from the business sector especially the major banks and Business South Africa. Rarely is there representation from more progressive economists from labour and civil society organisations. This unevenness does not reflect balanced or impartial coverage, which it is obliged to provide.
• There has been inadequate development of local programming content. Where there has been delivery, this has been met through the development of poor quality and highly commercially orientated game shows and "reality" based shows. These have little social or cultural relevance to the majority of South Africans, who are by and large black and working class.
• Failure to reflect the African cultural diversity unique to South Africa especially in relation to music and languages that are broadcast by the corporation. Whilst it is important to acknowledge that some progress has been made by public service radio stations with respect to language coverage, this should not obscure the fact that SABC television channels have largely failed to reflect a similar commitment. Here again the emphasis on attracting advertising revenue dictates programming content, with broadcasting in indigenous languages (especially minority languages) not being seen as commercially viable.

While increased commercialisation of the public broadcaster has in large part been stimulated by national policy emphasis on corporatisation, the SABC appears to be proceeding along this path at a faster pace than is currently required. For example, section 11 of the Broadcasting Act requires the Public Commercial Broadcasting Services unit (PCBS) to subsidise the public broadcasting services (PBS) of the SABC. However, the SABC’s Chief Operating Officer, Solly Mokoetle, is on record as saying that PBS have the potential to fund itself since "SABC 1 is the biggest station in the country, it has the critical mass to attract more advertising." If the public broadcaster is to embark on a path to pursue advertising revenue in order to become self sustainable, this will necessarily lead to an abandonment of programming that is more consistent with its public mandate but which is nevertheless unable to attract advertising. This is also likely to increase the targeting of select audiences with "disposable income" who may be viewed as more favourable by advertisers.

In order to put forward the grievances that we have outlined above, COSATU intends to march to the SABC on 24 September 2002. We believe that there is a need to implement a transparent system requiring the SABC to account to the public on its delivery in relation to its public mandate. This should include requiring the SABC to indicate how a diverse range of audience needs are assessed and catered for.

In our earlier submission on the 1998 Broadcasting Bill, we argued against the withdrawal of state funding for the public broadcaster. Our concerns were outlined as follows:

Our objections raised in 1998 have been vindicated by what has unfolded in relation to the current state of affairs at the SABC. The initial division of public broadcasting into commercial and public services divisions was to promote self-sustainability through the cross subsidisation of the latter by the former. However, what has in fact resulted is the commercialisation of both arms of the public broadcaster and not merely the commercial division. This we believe confirms the need for state funding of the public broadcaster, which is in line with standard practice in most other countries in the world, combined with a new model and structure for the various SABC radio and TV stations.

COSATU also objected in our submission on the 1998 Bill to the incorporation of the SABC as a limited liability company in terms of the Companies Act. Our concern was that this, coupled with the restructuring of the SABC into commercial and services units, was a precursor to the eventual privatisation of the public broadcaster, or large chunks of it. Clause 8 of this Bill now proposes to amend section 7 of the principle Act, to provide for the conversion of the SABC from a limited liability company into a public company. In addition, clause 10 proposes to implement a more complete separation of the operations of the commercial and public services divisions, creating further momentum for the eventual privatisation of the SABC and the severing of cross-subsidisation of the PBS.

We are concerned that privatisation of the public broadcaster is likely to have negative implications for the fulfilment of the overall public mandate. Firstly, continued cross subsidisation between the respective arms of the SABC is likely to further decrease. Secondly, the current trends of commercialisation are only likely to increase.

In our submission of 1998, we argued that any restructuring of the SABC should be in line with the process set out under the National Framework Agreement(NFA). We further argued that restructuring of state broadcasting enterprises should be the subject of parliamentary legislation and not Ministerial regulation as provided for in the principal Act. The process envisaged in terms of the NFA has been consistently marginalised in the restructuring process of the SABC. Accordingly, we believe that clause 8 should be withdrawn. We propose alternative legal forms for the SABC below under point 2.2. of our submission.

If it is not withdrawn then we propose the insertion of an amendment expressly compelling government to follow a legislative as well as NFA process should it wish to sell off SABC shares in the future. This redrafting would not preclude further restructuring of the SABC’s ownership, but would, however, ensure that such an important move would at least be subject to the scrutiny, input and approval of stakeholders and elected representatives.

We are concerned that the emphasis on corporatisation and self-sustainability may have had a substantial role in influencing other crucial policy decisions. For example, the White Paper proposed an investigation into the feasibility of introducing a dedicated education channel as part of the public service. Although the completed study proposed various possible models for the dedicated educational channel, it was decided to introduce instead an informal education network linking educational institutions through the internet. Taking into account South Africa’s varied educational needs (low levels of education, literacy rates and skills development) and lack of universal access to the internet a dedicated educational channel would go a substantial way to meeting these needs in an accessible manner, catering for both formal and informal educational needs of adult learners and children.

Accordingly, we believe that the failure to introduce a dedicated educational channel should be reconsidered, along with other policy options, as part of a holistic review of the public broadcaster. The continued, indeed growing reliance, of the SABC on the commercial sector and advertising revenue, again raises strongly the need for public funding of the public broadcaster. The current reliance for more than 70% of its revenue from advertising makes a mockery of the SABC’s public mandate. We propose that this should be a key element oif the terms of reference of the proposed investigation into the restructuring of the public broadcaster.

The SABC administers a number of State-owned broadcasting services on behalf of the government. These include:

1. Channel Africa, which is an international radio service broadcasting into Africa.
2. Bop Broadcasting, comprising Bop TV and two radio stations, Radio Bop and Radio Sunshine. These were transferred from the former Bophuthatswana homeland to the administrative control of the SABC in 1998, but was never integrated into SABC’s existing services.
3. CKI FM. This radio station was transferred in 1998 from the former CISKEI homeland to the SABC’s administrative control, but continues to operate as a separate business unit.

The process of restructuring and corporatising these services are underway. Since there is no intention to incorporate these into the SABC, we believe that this is likely to result in the eventual privatisation of these services. We seek clarity regarding whether any studies were conducted on using these services to increase the SABC’s capacity in relation to delivery of regional and linguistic services. This is especially relevant at this stage with the government proposing to introduce two new regional television stations.

Further, as with our proposals above in relation to the restructuring of the SABC, we believe restructuring of these services should be made subject to the NFA process and parliamentary scrutiny.

Our comments on individual provisions of the Bill should be read in context with our overall concerns outlined in the first part of this submission. We reserve comments on any provision not dealt with in this submission.

The Bill proposes to introduce substantial amendments to both the Broadcasting Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority(IBA) Act, affecting amongst other things editorial independence, programming policy and the code of conduct for broadcasting services. While the proposed amendments to the Broadcasting Act affect the SABC only, amendments to the Code of Conduct under the IBA Act apply to all broadcasting services. We comment on each of these provisions in turn.

Clause 6 of the Bill in its current form proposes to delete section 6(2) of the principal Act, which explicitly provides for the SABC’s freedom of expression, journalistic, creative and programming independence. However, according to the statement released by the ANC Study Group of the Parliamentary Committee on Communications, the intention is to retain the current wording of section 6(2). We believe that this is the correct approach.

Having said this we believe that the current state of affairs reflect that the SABC does not enjoy commercial independence and is not adequately fulfilling its public mandate. Accordingly, we believe that section 6(2) should be amended explicitly requiring the SABC to apply these rights to fulfil its public mandate.

Our proposal for the redrafting of section 6(2) is set out below:

1. will in pursuit of its objectives and in exercise of its powers, enjoy freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence; and
2. must actively apply these rights to promote and fulfil its role as the public broadcasting service in accordance with the objectives identified under sections 8 and 10.

Clause 6 of the Bill proposes the insertion of a new section 6(3), which will require the Board to submit to the Minister for approval a policy on "accurate, accountable and fair reporting".

Further, clauses 11 and 12 propose that policies be submitted to the Minister for approval relating to the public broadcasting service division and commercial broadcasting service division respectively. In both cases these cover news editorial policy, programming policy, local content policy and language policy. In the case of the public broadcasting service division, this includes policies relating to education and universal service and access as well.

We believe that there is a need for clear policy guidelines governing the operations of the SABC and ensuring its accountability to the public mandate. However, we have a few concerns in relation to the approach adopted by the Bill in this regard. Read with the proposed deletion of section 6(2) above, it has raised, legitimately in our view, the concern that it reverses the movement towards a truly independent public broadcaster, and raises the spectre of a state or state-controlled broadcaster.

It is unclear why there is a need to separate policies on reporting under the proposed section 6(3) from the policies provided for under clauses 11 and 12. Accordingly, we propose that this clause be deleted and that policies on reporting should be incorporated under those relating to news editorial policy under clauses 11 and 12.

We believe that the development of these policy guidelines should not have the effect of allowing Board or State interference into editorial independence. This must be protected by explicitly providing for the protection of editorial independence within the context of this provision. In addition, the emphasis of the policy guidelines should be on requiring reporting and monitoring of compliance with objective criteria.

Further, we believe that the overall objective of introducing these policies should be to hold the SABC accountable to the public. This calls for a process allowing for the public to participate in the determination and approval of these policies. Accordingly, we propose that clauses 11 and 12 be amended, removing the requirement for the Minister’s approval. Instead the policies should be made subject to public comment and parliamentary approval.

We are concerned about the differential treatment applied to the public and commercial broadcasting services. Firstly, the public commercial broadcasting service (PCBS) division is not required to submit an educational policy or universal services and access policy. This is likely to send further signals to the SABC endorsing increased commercialisation of its programming content. Secondly, the PBS division is required to include a code of conduct in its policies regulating its services and personnel in relation to such issues as constitutional principles of fairness and equality, rights of access to information etc. It is not clear why the PCBS division will not be subject to a similar code. The underlying implication is that this has been left out in order to make way for the eventual privatisation or partial privatisation of the PCBS division.

Our comments above should not be interpreted as support for the code of conduct envisaged under clause 11(4). Section 56 of the IBA Act allows for broadcasters to subscribe to broadcasting codes considered acceptable by ICASA. We seek clarity regarding the implications that this Code has for the applicability of the Code of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa(BCCSA), to which the SABC subscribes. While the principles for the proposed Code are not problematic, no reason is given as to why these cannot be advanced through the BCCSA’s Code. Accordingly, we propose the deletion of clause 11(4).

The current wording of section 13(11) of the principal Act provides that the SABC Board controls its affairs and is required to "protect" the matters related to the SABC’s freedom of expression, journalistic, creative and programming independence under section 6(2). Clause 14(b) of the Bill proposes to replace this with an amendment providing that the "Board determines the overall policies of the Corporation as contemplated by the Act".`

Since it has now been proposed to retain the current section 6(2), the fate of this proposed amendment is unclear. If the proposed amendment to section(11) is retained, we believe that the Board’s power to determine overall policies should be explicitly subjected to it fulfilling the SABC’s public mandate. Further, the Board’s duty to protect the matters under section 6(2) should also be retained.

Schedule 1 of the IBA Act contains a Code of Conduct for broadcasters. According to section 56 of the IBA Act, this Code applies to all broadcasters, except for those bound by other codes that the "Authority" (ie ICASA) considers acceptable. Taking into account recent constitutional court findings that certain provisions of the IBA’s Code are unconstitutional, there is a need to review this Code. According to ICASA a new Code of Conduct has been developed after a public process of consultation and is ready for promulgation.

The schedule of the Broadcasting Amendment Bill proposes an amendment to the IBA Act, which has the effect of repealing the current code and allows a new one to be prescribed through regulations. While we acknowledge the need to review the current Code, we have a number of concerns with the approach adopted by the Bill specifically in relation to its promulgation.

Firstly, the current Code was passed as part of an Act of Parliament. However, a new Code will follow a less rigorous public process applicable to secondary/subordinate legislation. Secondly, while ICASA will determine the acceptability of other industry codes (including content and procedures), the Minister will determine the content of the Code in terms of the IBA Act. In practice this could lead to the application of different standards in relation to industry codes and creates the potential to undermine ICASA’s role in regulating the conduct of broadcasters.

Arguably the code of conduct in practice is not likely to apply to the public broadcaster, which subscribes to the Code of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa(BCCSA). Accordingly this provision is likely to affect commercial and community broadcasters who are not subject to the BCCSA’s Code or other "acceptable" broadcasting codes. Ideally these services should contribute to such principles as the right of access to information and freedom of expression. While their role is substantially different from that of the public broadcaster there is a need to ensure accountability to the public since they are using a public resource, the airwaves.

Accordingly, we propose that amendments to the code of conduct should be subject to the approval of Parliament and should therefore not be prescribed through regulation. In order to effect this, item 3 in the Schedule should be deleted. We further propose that the repeal of the current Code under the IBA Act be effected through a separate of Act of Parliament, which simultaneously provides for the enactment of a new Code.

Clause 23 proposes an amendment requiring subscription television services to provide programming including local content, the nature and extent of which will be prescribed in terms of regulations. We welcome the strengthening of requirements in relation to broadcasting of local content. However, we believe that more effective enforcement of quotas is required in relation to local content broadcasting and programming especially in relation to public broadcasting. We note with concern that E-TV is reportedly performing considerably better than SABCTV in this regard. We acknowledge the proposed amendments requiring local content policies under clauses 10 and 11. However, we do not believe that this is adequate.

Clause 8 of the Bill provides for the conversion of the SABC into a public company in terms of the Companies Act. Transitional arrangements are provided for under clause 29, which proposed the insertion of Schedule 2 into the principal Act. We believe that these provisions are the precursor to the eventual privatisation of the public broadcaster. We acknowledge that the state is retained as the sole shareholder under the proposed section 7(2). However, eventual partial or total privatisation of the SABC is alluded to in several provisions in the Bill, which contain the words "whilst the State is the sole shareholder". This implies that the role of the State as sole shareholder is likely to change in the future. As indicated earlier, we cannot support the conversion of the public broadcaster since this is likely to lead to the undermining of the servicing of the public mandate.

We do not believe that conversion of the SABC is necessary, if the intention is not to privatise the corporation. A broader discussion is required on the most appropriate legal form for SABC. Rather than opting for conversion into a public company (or even the retention of the current provisions of its status as limited liability company), more appropriate alternatives exist such as a specifically created statutory entity. In order to ensure appropriate systems of financial and managerial accountability, this statutory entity could adopt preferred elements of the Company’s Act. COSATU therefore recommends that there be a detailed thorough discussion of the most appropriate legal form that should be legislated for the SABC, in the context of broader policy issues which are outlined in this submission. Accordingly, we strongly believe that this clause should be deleted pending the outcome of the investigation we have proposed.

Clause 29 proposes the insertion of Schedule 2 covering "transitional arrangements", which is applicable to the process of conversion. In line with our overall recommendations on the question of conversion, we believe propose that this clause should be deleted as well.

If, however, parliament approves the conversion of the SABC, it should at the very least, require public scrutiny and accountability of this process. Clause 8 proposes an amendment to section 7(3) providing that the Minister must determine the memorandum and articles of association of the Corporation. We believe that the memorandum and articles of association should be gazetted for public comment and be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny since this involves the restructuring of a state asset, which is part of the national heritage. Our proposal in this regard should not in any way be interpreted to mean support for the conversion/incorporation of the SABC.

Clause 10 provides for a more complete separation of the operations of the public broadcasting service from the commercial broadcasting service. This extends to the keeping of separate financial records and accounts. The memorandum argues that the objective of this to ensure that the PBS is not subsidising the commercial broadcasting services. While we support this objective in principle, it would have been addressed adequately by simply structuring financial records appropriately to reflect the different operations of each television channel. We do not believe that it is necessary to effect a formal legal division between the different arms.

Enquiries into whether the commercial arm of the SABC is not being subsidised by the PBS should not be confined to SABC 3. The commercial arm also includes the pay channel services, "Africa-to Africa" and "SABC Africa". These services are available only to a small elite minority in South Africa (estimated at 847 000) who have access to satellite TV. It is of concern that the latest SABC Annual Report 2001/2002 projects the potential viewership figures, and not actual average daily viewership figures as it does for its free services. Further, it is not clear from the report what percentage of its revenue is derived from operating these pay channels.

The key issue is not only the purported cross-subsidisation of the (PCBS) by the PBS. It has not been clearly stated why this is such a major concern. More serious is the extent to which effecting the total separation of the two arms will reduce and ultimately phase out cross subsidisation to the PBS by the PCBS, in the absence of any coherent funding model for the public broadcaster. Accordingly, we propose the deletion of clause 10.

Clause 15 of the Bill proposes to insert a new section 13A into the principal Act, providing for the separation of the management and control of the public and commercial divisions of the SABC under two separate management boards. These management boards are to operate in addition to the Board of the SABC. Further, the composition of these management boards will be drawn from the membership of the general SABC board. The three executive Board members will sit on both management boards, with the 12 non-executive Board members being distributed equally between the two management boards as nominated by the Minister.

We believe that this amounts to an unnecessary bureaucratisation of the SABC’s operations and suggests ministerial interference in the Board’s operations. Further, the nomination process by the Minister may have unintended consequences with the possibility of the representation of skills and qualifications being skewed in one division at the expense of the other. Further, clause 16 proposes the amendment of section 14 allowing both management boards the discretion to delegate their powers and duties to an executive committee comprising of the executive Board members and four other non-executive Board members. Taking this provision into consideration, it is difficult to ascertain the exact purpose of creating additional management boards especially if they are simply allowed to delegate their functions "as they deem fit".

We are concerned that while the Bill makes provision for the creation of management boards, it will be left up to the Minister to determine their powers and duties in terms of the memorandum and articles of association. The implication is that these boards will be created by a statute that provides no vision as to their role or functions.

If the underlying intention of creation of the management boards is to achieve a more hands on approach to the management of the SABC, we believe that it would be more effective to provide for the setting up of standing committees. However, these should not be established around the division of the PBS and PCBS. Rather standing committees should focus on specific individual policy mandates for example, local programming content and should feed into the fine-tuning and elaboration of key policy questions.

The alternative is to further fragment the SABC and undermine an integrated and holistic approach to running the national broadcaster. We therefore propose the deletion of both clauses 15 and 16.

Further, as we pointed out in our 1998 submission, the Broadcasting Act does not set out the functions of the existing Board. If the underlying intention of the proposed Management Boards is to provide for the more effective and accountable functioning of the public broadcaster, then surely the first line of action should have been to investigate and address shortfalls in the existing structure before creating new ones.

Accordingly, we propose that consideration should also be given to the inclusion of a clause setting out the specific functions of the Board. Provision should also be made for other relevant operational processes, which include amongst others convening of Board meetings, setting up of ad hoc and standing committees and implementing various public reporting mechanisms. The emphasis should be on providing a framework that will not only guide the functioning of the Board, but may also be used by Parliament to hold the SABC accountable to its public mandate.

Clause 26 of the Bill proposes the insertion of a new section 32A, which is to provide for two regional television services consisting of the northern and southern regional services. We point out below a number of problems with the current model suggested in the Bill.

It has been correctly argued that the current setup at the public broadcaster is not meeting the SABC obligations in terms of language. However, Tthe delivery of services in all 11 official languages should not be pursued in a mechanical way, purely to meet the constitutional mandate. The emphasis on languages needs to be combined with the purpose of improving the public broadcasting capacity in relation to content and accessibility. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to the link between programming content and the delivery of services in all official languages. It has not been cogently argued why retention of the current commercialised model of the SABC, together with an add-on of two regional TV stations will best serve this objective.

The proposed introduction of regional services should be seen as one option to be considered amongst others in the investigation we have proposed, based on comprehensive assessment of its strengths and weaknesses.

We are concerned that explicit provision has not been made for this service to be incorporated into SABC and that the proposed services would be set up parallel to the current structure. The proposed parallel operation of the regional station outside of the SABC’s current structures strengthen fears that these stations are intended to be organs for State communication rather than public broadcasting.

On the basis of our concerns outlined above, we propose that clause 26 be deleted and further consideration of the introduction of regional services be suspended pending the outcome of the investigation that we have proposed.

The proposed section 32A(4) provides for the State "initially" as the sole shareholder. Thereafter the Minister may invite public private investor participation. We believe that if the regional route is finally chosen explicit provision should be made for the regional services to be incorporated into the SABC. State funding should be provided to increase SABC capacity and to ensure the roll out of regional services as an integral part of the public broadcaster’s mandate. Private investor participation is likely to lead to the undermining of the meeting of the objectives of the public mandate.

5. Failure to Recognise Workers as a Constituency

It has long been a point of contention for COSATU that although SABC is obliged to offer a range of services targeting children, women, the youth and the disabled, similar recognition is not afforded to the largest organised constituency in South Africa, workers. We note in contrast that the Bill introduces a strong emphasis on "religion" and programming that "spiritually enriches". In view of the fact that Bill proposes to extend the range of its programming content and consequently the range of specific target groups as well, wWe believe that it is imperative thatthis is an opportune time to explicitly recognise the needs the needs ofof workers and labour issues be explicitly recognised in the Billwithin the broadcasting context. Accordingly, we recommend the amendment of relevant provisions inserting references to "labour issues" and "workers and organised labour" as set out below:

• "labour issues" into sections 10(1)(e) and 32(4)(c), which deal with programming content by the public broadcaster and community broadcasters respectively.
• "workers and organised labour" into section 10(1)(g), which identifies the groups that public broadcasting services should target..

The prescription of religious content in broadcasting raises possible constitutional questions in relation to the freedom of religion and belief. For example, section 10 requires the SABC to provide "significant amounts" of educational programming covering a range of topics covering both curriculum-based and informal educative topics. The Bill now proposes to extend this to programmes with a religious content. While it is possible to legislate and enforce quotas in relation to educational programming, it is unclear how this will be possible in relation to religious programming whilst at the same time upholding the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion. In other words, how will the broadcaster assess the correct representation of the various religions and belief systems (including those which specifically do not subscribe to a faith or religion) in its programming. Legislating religious content may raise different concerns in relation to commercial and community broadcasters under clause 23 and 25 respectively. For example, community broadcasters will now be required to provide programming, which is "spiritually enriching." Certain community radio stations are founded not purely on a geographic basis, but may represent sectoral interests or key policy or social interest areas, for example, radio stations targeting workers or focusing on health or education. Would such broadcasters now be required to provide programming with a religious content?

3. conclusion

In the course of this submission we have proposed the amendment and strengthening of certain provisions and the deletion of others. We believe that Parliament should propose appropriate institutional mechanisms as well as the terms of referencemake provision for the time required in order to accommodate for the proposed investigation, which should be a transparent process involving all stakeholders. Central to this investigation needs to be the question of an appropriate funding model, the required organisational structure, and processes of corporate governance. Some of the provisions in the Bill, which should be suspended pending the investigation include:

• The commercialisation, restructuring and further division of the SABC in respect of its public broadcasting and public commercial broadcasting services;
• Conversion of the SABC into a public company;
• Provision for regional televisions services.