INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR: THE AFRICAN UNION
01 – 02 MARCH 2002
DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT

Draft Report by the Parliamentary Information Sercives Section

SESSION 1
OVERVIEW OF THE OAU

Introduction

The objectives of the seminar were to:

Acquaint Members of Parliament with the African Union (AU).
Allow Members to engage with the challenges posed by the implementation of the Constitutive Act.
Encorage Members to begin to thinking of the participation of Parliament in the process of shaping the evolution of the AU.
Begin discussion on the possible role of South Africa in the implementation of the Constitutive Act.
Share knowledge and insight with the Africa Insitute of South Africa, South African Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for Global Dialogue on the African Union.

South Africa will assume the Chair of the African Union in July 2002 and therefore will have to play an important leadership role.

Ideological Framework

Pan Africanism

The development of the OAU is linked to Pan Africanism, as Africans realised their common descent and therefore their common destiny, common historical experiences, the opposition to slavery, racism, colonialism and the common notion of an African revival or renewal. In South Africa the notion of revival and renewal was encapsulated in the idea of an African Renaissance.

African Rennaisance

The African Rennaisance may be conceptualised as the vision for the nature and status of the Continent that should be developed.

The African Rennaisance rests on 5 pillars:

Political pillar – the creation of democracy, and respect for human rights.
Peace and stability – to bring an end to conflict.
Development – to eradicate poverty and to become economically competitive.
Cultural identity – to affirm African culture.
Global standing – to improve Africa’s position in relation to the rest of the world.

It has been proposed that the mechanisms to realise the African Rennaisance are the organisation of the African Union, and the Programme of Action of NEPAD. Contingent on these mechanisms is the need for popular participation in the process of the formation and the functioning of the AU.

Toward African Unity

Phase 1: 1960 – early 1970’s

The OAU was formed on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa. A compromise was reached between African leadership who were divided on the question of whether there should be a Unitary State or a Union of Independent States.

Phase 2: End of 1970’s through the 1980’s

The adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 followed the Monrovia Declaration in 1979. It represented the first Plan for Africa’s recovery and it affirmed the issue of regional integration as integral to the Pan African Agenda. The Lagos Plan of Action also articulated the principle of self-reliance. The Plan was to be implemented between 1980 to 2000. However, the success of the Lagos Plan of Action was impacted by the following:

The Cold War – The African continent was divided along ideological lines that were shaped by the Cold War politics at that time.
Structural Adjustment Programmes – These Programmes were imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and prevented many African States from managing their own economies.
Post-colonial States – characterised by few democracies.

Phase 3: The Abuja Period (1990’s )

The Abuja Treaty was adopted in 1991. The aim of the Treaty was to develop a regional integration strategy for Africa. The Treaty describes six detailed stages to be implemented over a period of 34 yeas up to 2035. The approach was based on the European model and the major debate was whether an economically driven integration strategy was appropriate for Africa, given the state of African economies. There was thus a need identified for a politically-driven integration. This need served as the impetus for the establishment of the AU.

Similarities and difference between the OAU and the AU

The AU retains non-interference in state sovereignty, which was emphasised by the OAU. The AU however qualifies the issue of non-interference in Article 4(h). This article provides for the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It is thus important for there to be a common understanding of what constitutes war crimes, genocide and crimes against humantiy in order for the provision to be enacted. A further challenge remains whether these are the only elements that could initiate intervention.
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act provides that goverments which come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union. This provision of exclusion was not contained in the OAU Charter.
The focus of the OAU was on state security whilst the AU prioritises human security, which includes poverty, underdevelopment, political and socio-economic rights. This new conception of security from state security to human security in many respects epitomises the difference between the OAU and the AU.
The AU is based on principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights. These principles were essentially absent from the OAU Charter.
Popular participation. The Constitutive Act in Article 22 specifically provides for the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, as the mechanism to foster popular participation of civil society in the African Union.

Some key challenges for South Africa and other Member States

It is a significant challenge for Member States to popularise the AU as the Constitutive Act was drafted by Member States with no civil society involvement. Given the current political discontent on the Continent it will be important to infuse in civil society the value to the Continent of the African Union. Furthermore, it is necessary to give effect to the principle of public participation stipulated in the Constitutive Act.
Member States need to consider the inclusion of security mechanisms in the AU as the Constitutive Act makes no reference to this. Furthermore, harmonisation of security strategies and mechanisms on the Continent must be explored.
The Constitutive Act also makes no reference to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a basic document which is essential for promoting respect for and the protection of human rights on the Continent.
Determining the establishment, powers and functions of the Pan African Parliament, and the mechanisms by which the Pan African Parliament can foster democracy, good governance and the protection of human rights on the Continent.
To use the spirit and momentum of the establishment of the AU to address xenophobia in Africa.

SESSION 2
Situation Analysis: Department of Foreign Affairs

Current Status of the OAU/AEC
Transitional arrangements and consolidation
Discussion

A representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs hihgligthed the inittatives taken by the Deaprtment on the process of teh formation of the AU. Broadly, an introductory background, of the transitional arrangements from the OAU to teh current status of the AU.

Introduction

The African Union will replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African Heads of State confirmed the establishment of the African Union on March 2001, during the Extraordinary Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Sirte, Libya. South Africa signed-in on 23 April 2001, agreeing to the formation and the law establishing the African Union called the Constitutive Act of the African Union. By doing so, South Africa joined other 35 African countries that are the founding members of the African Union. This is South Africa's proud achievement, as it did not have the opportunity to be part of the founding members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) because apartheid had left it out of international affairs. Now, South Africa can rightfully take part in the fight to build a better life for all in Africa.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union replaces the Charter of the OAU. However, the Charter will remain operative from 11 July 2001 to 10 July 2002, until the African Union is in operation. The African Union will not be the continuation of the Organisation of African Unity under a different name, but it will have the capacities built into it to improve the economic, political and social development of the African people. It will also help ensure that the Continent is more prepared to deal with the challenges of the 21^st Century and to achieve the ultimate goal of a complete African Unity. On July 2002, South Africa will host the first Summit of the African Union.

Components of the African Union

Article 5.1 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union specifies that the organs of the Union shall be:

(a) The Assembly of the Union;
(b) The Executive Council;
(c) The Pan African Parliament;
(d) The Court of Justice;
(e) The Commission;
(f) The Permanent Representatives Committee;
(g) The Specialized Technical Committees;
(h) The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
(i) The Financial Institutions;

This is an ambitious list, reflecting a model drawn from the European Union. The
Constitutive Act lays out blueprints for each of these, while also leaving many of the details for future elaboration. We need to ask several questions:

1. Which are they key organs?

The Union cannot function at all without two of the organs, namely the Assembly and the Commission. The Executive Council runs a close third. These are essentially the same organs as exist today under the OAU. However, their governance and administrative responsibilities will be considerably heavier, given the task of setting up and running the other institutions envisaged by the Constitutive Act. If the AU is to truly become a Union, the Parliament and the financial institutions will be key.

2. What is the timing and sequencing of the establishment of the institutions?

Theoretically, all are important. However, the priority given to the respective organs will depend on what is seen as the overriding political concern. If the principal impetus is for regional economic cooperation and integration, then the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the specialised committees and the financial institutions should be prioritised. If the first agenda is governance and democracy, then the parliament and court of justice should be established first. If the main concern is peace and security, then the existing organs should suffice, but will require a much more extensive engagement with existing problems and related institutions. A related question is how the AU will relate to existing institutions and initiatives in these areas, including NEPAD, the RECs, ADB and ECA in the field of economic integration, the African Inter-Parliamentary Union, existing sub-regional parliaments and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in the case of democracy and governance, and the RECs, CSSDCA, NEPAD and the UN Security Council in the case of peace and security.

3. What is the sequencing of cooperation?

The African Union process is founded on a sharing of powers between states that have hitherto retained sovereign control over all aspects of decision-making. In reality, due to aid dependence and lack of resources, this sovereign control has often remained fictional, but governments have continued to claim their right to independent decision-making. Treaty obligations such as the commitment to an African Economic Union have rarely been implemented in full. There are reasons for this reluctance to share powers. It follows that ‘softer’ issues of cooperation, such as the environment, HIV/AIDS, and information and communication technology cooperation, should be prioritised, while ‘harder’ issues of establishing regional enforcement measures should be tackled when a higher degree of confidence has been built between states.

4. What are the resource requirements for the Commission and other institutions?

The first issue here is, have the Commission and the other organs been budgeted? And to what extent can their tasks be shared with existing institutions in order to cut down duplication and reduce costs? Second, it is evident that, under any scenario, the AU will be much more expensive than the OAU. Where will the resources come from? If these resources are to be primarily membership dues, how will the AU augment its resources in comparison with the OAU, which has always had chronic funding problems? Or will the AU be seeking other sources of funding? Given that most African countries are highly dependent on concessional finance from OECD countries for their basic budgetary requirements, does it make sense for the AU to turn to these governments, or would it be advised to go directly to international aid partners for its financial needs? That in turn, however, has far-reaching political implications for the
accountability of the Commission and other organs of the AU. It should be borne in mind that the viability and credibility of the AU will depend critically on its level of resourcing.

5.What are the human resource requirements for the AU?

One challenge is the expert task of actually designing the institutions and the management systems required. What provisions are envisaged for seeking technical assistance in building the necessary institutions? Building a regional organisation is a complex task and there are relatively few experts on whom to draw. There is experience both within Africa at subregional level and outside Africa that can be utilised. The second challenge is the skilled staff required for managing the institutions themselves. This may require special training programmes to upgrade the skills of AU staff members. The third challenge is selecting the individuals who will head the institutions, including the Secretary General and Commissioners. Special procedures for nominating and short-listing for these exceptionally demanding positions will be necessary. The candidates should be chosen on the basis of leadership skill and managerial capacity. In this respect, lessons can be learned from the UN and other international organisations. The 6 AU must be able to attract and retain the very best. We must avoid the situation in which governments remove their least desired individuals to multilateral institutions, or merely pursue placing their people in post in order to have a presence. Transparent criteria and standards will be required. 6. What changes in the structure and policies of member governments are required? An effective African Union will require substantial changes in the methods of working of member governments, placing additional burdens upon them at the same time as lessening their discretionary powers. Membership of the AU will entail sharing sovereignty in key areas of lawmaking as well as economic measures to lower tariffs and promote economic and financial convergence. There is a pressing need for detailed studies about the additional requirements on member governments A basic point underpinning all these considerations is that institution building has eluded Africa, at both national and regional levels. The history of building institutions in Africa has been disappointing. In designing the African Union and building the necessary institutions, it is necessary to review the record of building and sustaining the required governance capacities. The weakness of institutions has been a major impediment to the private sector and democracy. A general African standard for institution building has been lacking.

Outreach programme
The OAU Extra-ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001, adopted a resolution calling on all member-states to popularise the African Union among their citizenry. The campaign will be two fold:
mass mobilisation through a national launch in the Free State led by President Mbeki, provincial workshops for members of parliament and provincial legislatures, mobilisation of the diplomatic corps, continental expert meeting, organisation of the continental civil society summit including the youth and the utilisation of the mass media;

and involvement of large section of our people in discussions and debates around the Union with a view to making our humble contribution towards the strengthening of the Union. Critical to this campaign is the need to bring the African Union and NEPAD to the doorstep of the people of South Africa and in a manner that will incorporate the two into the campaign of Vuk’Uzenzele recently unveiled by President Mbeki in his state of the nation address.
Linkages between the AU and other International and Regional
Organizations

When the Organisation of African Unity was established almost four decades ago there were many fewer international and regional organisations, and their mandates and tasks were much more limited. In the intervening years, matters have changed substantially. Within Africa, a range of sub-regional organisations has developed in response to specific challenges. These include SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, AMU etc. In addition, international organisations, especially the UN, have taken on larger and more complex mandates. One of the major challenges facing the AU will be how to relate to these other organisations.

Immediate issues regarding linkages between the AU and RECs.

For historical reasons, there is no structural relationship between the OAU and RECs. This has been problematic given the peace and security mandate of the OAU, alongside the fact that the principal responsibilities for enforcing peace and security has been assumed by the RECs. An immediate question is, what kind of interface is required between the AU and the RECs? Should this be several structures specific to the functions of RECs (e.g. one for peace and security, one for economic integration, etc) or is one single interface required?

2. Long-term issues of integration or cooperation between the AU and RECs.

A longer term, strategic question is, does the AU propose to integrate RECs into its structure or to cooperate with them? Will the RECs continue to exist as autonomous entities as the AU is established or is it envisaged that, over time, they will gradually be absorbed into the AU? If the ‘integration’ or absorption scenario is followed, how will this occur? If the ‘cooperation’ scenario is followed, which is the most realistic given the relative capacities of the organisations as they exist today, mechanisms will be required to promote and monitor consistency between RECs’ policies and their compatibility with the long-term aim of regional convergence.

3. Security organ.

As outlined in the Constitutive Act, the institutions of the African Union do not provide for a ‘security council’ or similar. This reflects the set-up of the EU, within which armed conflict is unthinkable, and which delegates external security affairs to the OSCE and NATO. Given the importance of peace and security issues in Africa, it seems unlikely that the existing Conflict Management Centre at the OAU will be disbanded and the security functions of the Central Organ will be discontinued. But this raises the question of how the AU will relate to the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), both of which have peace and security mandates at a regional level. To avoid competing or contradictory regional security authorities, it is important that there should be a single ‘African security council’, whether located at the AU, CSSDCA or NEPAD, with ancillary specific peace and security functions delegated to RECs and other regional security bodies.

4. Governance, democracy and human rights.

One of the tasks of the AU is to promote governance, democracy and human rights. Democratic decision-making is a complex task and some clarifications of the principles will be required before structures are established and mandates give. The European Union theoretically operates on the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, whereby decision-making power is delegated to the most devolved competent authority. But the tendency of disgruntled parties to appeal against lower-level decisions leads to an upward drift in authority. Where roles are not clear, mandate disputes between different bodies can lead to paralysis of the decision-making machinery. In the African context, the challenges are likely to arise in the area of liaison between the African Parliament and national and subregional parliaments, such as the recently established East African Parliament. Another set of challenges arises in the field of the rule of law, and the extent to which regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights are justifiable through regional mechanisms. In these respects it is important that the AU promotes existing regional organisations, such as the African Inter-Parliamentary Union and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

5. Relationship with the UN and other international organisations.

Many key activities in the peace and security field, as well as the sectors of development, planning, health, education and the environment, are increasingly dealt with by international organisations. The UN Security Council currently spends about half of its time dealing with Africa. The UN specialised organisations such as UNDP, UNICEF,UNHCR, WHO and FAO are also deeply engaged in African affairs, along with multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank. In fields such as poverty reduction strategies, these institutions have taken the lead not only in national partnership but at a regional level as well. The AU will need to explore modalities for engaging with these international organisations.

6. Wider linkages within Africa.

The OAU was set up at a time when civil society organisations were weak, and were rarely regarded as legitimate international actors.
This has changed dramatically. Theory and practice of international relations today focuses on the multiplicity of actors and their roles in building ‘security
communities’, promoting economic integration and social and cultural exchange. The AU needs both a theory and practice of how it can engage with these actors. How will it seek to leverage a collaborative and meaningful association with relevant CSOs, private sector corporations, research institutes, foundations, universities, and other independent institutions?

Participation in the Process of Setting up the African Union

From the above points, it is evident that we should not assume that the AU can spring into being, as a fully-formed set of institutions, and drive the process of African political and economic integration. Rather, the process of establishing the African Union and the processes of integration should be conducted in parallel. In this respect, our immediate aim should be one of process not of end result. As with the vision of the EU, the constitution of the AU should be to promote ‘ever closer union’. Therefore the final set of concerns we must address are to do with how this process is to work, what checks and balances, what feedback and correction, what monitoring, will be required.

The role of summits and the council of ministers.

Major decisions about the AU architecture and capacities will be made in the existing OAU organs and their successors.

The complexity of the issues to be resolved by the summits and council meetings will entail extensive preparation and briefings before these meetings, and perhaps changes in the structure of the meetings so as to allow for technical committees to work in parallel and present their findings and recommendations to the heads of state and ministers.

Broadening the engagement.

Up to now the AU process has been driven almost exclusively by governments. It is necessarily a sovereign process, but the experience of elsewhere indicates that success will depend upon broadening the ownership of the process, so as to engage others more fully. Public dialogue on the AU was initiated at the June 2001 OAU-CSO meeting, which included presentations and a question-and-answer session led by the former Secretary General and senior staff members. At Sirte in 2000 and subsequently at the 2001 Lusaka Summit, Africa’s Heads of State and Government agreed that broader consultation was necessary. This raises the question, how are people to be engaged, sensitised and activated on a regular basis in the process of building the Union? One component of this is the engagement of the media to cover the activities and deliberations of the AU. Another is regular consultative fora, both for general issues (along the lines of the 2001 OAU-CSO meeting, perhaps held annually before the summit) and for specific issues.

Democratising the process.

The Constitutive Act invites parliamentarians to take on a pivotal role in the architecture of the Union. One of the recurrent themes of regional organisations, including the EU, is that they suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’—i.e. that the decision-making process at the regional level is less democratic than at the national level. If the AU were to follow this pattern it would be unfortunate, as some African countries do not score highly in terms of democratic freedoms and decision-making. Given that one of the aims of NEPAD is the promotion of democracy and good governance, it seems appropriate to construct an AU system that provides a ‘democratic surplus’—i.e. the regional institutions and processes are more democratic, transparent and accountable than most national political processes.

Internationalising the process.

Like it or not, the reality of Africa today is that it is integrated into a global order on unequal terms. The viability of African initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU depend critically on the extent to which they are able to obtain buy-in from OECD countries, both in terms of agreement on the basic concepts, and in terms of resource provision.

Leadership, cooperation and sovereignty.

The first section of this paper has underlined that powerful political and economic interests, overriding the concerns of sovereignty, impelled regional integration in Europe and south-east Asia. In Africa, there are equally powerful reasons why sovereignty should be pooled. If Africa speaks with one voice at an international level, it is able to obtain a far better deal on issues of common concern such as the environment, international trade rules and HIV/AIDS drug prices. If African governments unite, they will become individually as well as collectively stronger and more prosperous. However, unlike in Europe and south-east Asia, the political constituencies and economic interests backing integration are relatively weak. This is related to the quality of governance and level of economic development. The most democratic countries on the continent are the most enthusiastic supporters of integration, while the most powerful business interests (South African industry) are already actively promoting it by region wide investment strategies. These processes need to be boosted. The most important factor in this respect is leadership: Africa needs inspiring, consistent, high-level political leadership that repeatedly emphasises the imperative of unification.

Basic Information: Birth of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development
The birth of the African Union (AU) goes hand-in-hand with the launch of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, popularly known as NEPAD, and the implementation of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) initiative. Although these three processes represent different Continental initiatives, success in one area will influence success in the others, and all of them are meant to fast-track African Renaissance and make an African century a reality. 
Contentious Issues
Under the rules of procedure these were the core issues discussed:
Powers and functions- extent to which member countries can intervene in political situations in other member states
Equality of geographical regional representation
Commission - quota system- what is it based on - issue of commissioners, technical committees etc.
Identification of candidates at sub-regional and regional level
Central organ of the AU, specifically the mechanism for peacekeeping. Implementing and ensuring political stability on the continent. 15 of the OAU states have looked at the modalities of the central organ. They have that the CEO should not be a political appointee but strong administratively. Will the central organ of the OAU be adopted into the AU?
Will the central organ be similar to the UN Security Council? There will be a name change from the central organ to the African Union peace and Security Council.
Important questions raised
Financial and human resource implications. There has been no costing by DFA of the estimated funds required for the launch of the AU and the infrastructure.
Establishment of the Pan African Parliament and incorporating it into the process of the launch of the AU.
Gender representivity in Pan African Parliament and structures of AU.
Conclusion

Africa has embarked upon its most ambitious combination of regional initiatives ever, including the African Union and NEPAD. These initiatives cannot afford to fail: failure would be devastating blow to the self-regard of Africa and the reputation of African institutions and initiatives globally. The coming year presents an opportunity that needs to be seized. In order for this to work, careful attention must be paid to the requirement of institution building.

Africans must examine best practices in management and institution
building. Leadership of institutions is also called for. We need to focus on establishing standards for leaders, and examine how we select our leaders.
If the African Union is to succeed, national governments must cede some of their
sovereignty. The Constitutive Act, in both spirit and letter, is not threatening to the standing of governments. Sovereignty is combined for the common good. This will be a gradual process, but it must be begun at once.

The following issues need to be addressed:

1. Given the background of weak linkages in the past between the OAU and the
subregional organizations (SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, AMU etc.), how is
the AU process rectifying this weakness?

2. How can subregional organizations be helpful to the integration process? What
kind of structural relationship is envisaged to integrate the RECs into the AU?

3. How does the AU model reflect specifically African experiences and aspirations?

4. How are CBOs and other stakeholders to be engaged, sensitized and activated in the process of building the Union?

5.What is the timing and sequencing of the establishment of the institutions?

6. Given the provisions for human rights in the Constitutive Act of the AU, what
monitoring and enforcement mechanism should be established?

7. How are existing national and subregional parliaments to relate to the African?
parliament? What principles for assumption of powers are to be followed?

8. What are the resource requirements for the AU Commission and other institutions? Where will the resources come from? If they are to be primarily membership dues, how will the AU augment its resources in comparison with the OAU, which has always had chronic funding problems?

9. What provisions are envisaged for seeking technical assistance in building the
necessary African institutions?

10. What are the human resource requirements for the AU? How should its senior staff and leaders be selected?

11. How will it seek to leverage a collaborative and meaningful association with
relevant research institutes, foundations, CSOs, universities, and other
independent institutions? What interface does the AU anticipate with the UN?

SESSION 3
The African Union and Regional Organisations: South African Institute for Global Dialogue.

Preliminary Remarks

A representative from the South African Institute for Global Dialogue made the following preliminary remarks:

He argued that the first two decades after Africa’s independence were dedicated to the fight against colonialism, nation building and the fight against poverty. These constituted the building blocks towards African solidarity and the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

2.The period from the 1980s was characterised by economic decline and marginalisation of Africa. The continent was afflicted by wars, fragmentation, famine, HIV/AIDS and other natural disasters. The African leaders had to deal with the challenges of globalisation and liberalisation of economies. These problems were further aggravated by an inadequate state, which lacked the institutional capacity to deal with the myriad of problems facing the continent. In response to these challenges, African leaders signed the Abuja Treaty, which promoted regional integration and the formation of regional blocks.

Furthermore, faced with the spread of conflicts and wars, African leaders sought to equip the OAU with the mechanisms of intervention. However, the OAU has shown an inability to intervene resolutely in war situations.

In 1993, the African Heads of State sought to accelerate the establishment of the African Union (AU) and the Pan African Parliament. In July 2000 the OAU adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU seeks to extend solidarity among African countries and to streamline and restructure OAU activities to become a strong body able to address the crisis of marginalisation in the global context.

Regional organisations are important building blocks towards the creation of the African Union. At present there are five key regional formations. These are:

Maghreb Arab Union (MAU)
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Countries (COMESA)
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The Character of the Regional Blocks

1.Maghreb Arab Union

Some of member states are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc.
One of its principal objectives was to negotiate with the European Union on trade and other economic issues, but little was achieved. It has no defence mechanism.

2. ECOWAS

It was formed in 1975 after signing of the Treaty of Lagos. There are 16 member counties. There are nine Francophone countries, two Portuguese-speaking countries and five Anglophone countries. In 1993 they resolved to create en economic and monetary union with common external tariffs. In 2001, they resolved take steps towards the harmonisation of their legal system and to offer defence assistance to member countries. But they have shown limited ability to intervene as a community in conflict situations.

4.COMESA

The community came into being in 1994. It has twenty member countries. It negotiated and adopted a good protocol on free trade zone and reduction of tariffs. Several members of the community are plagued by conflicts and wars.

4. SADC

The community was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordinating Community to lesson frontlines dependence on South Africa. In 1992, it resolved to become the Southern African Development Community with fourteen member states. It made substantial strides towards integration. But some member states are plagued by conflict.

5. ECCAS

It was established in 1975, comprising of 9 states. It has a shared common currency and central bank. It included countries engaged in wars. As a consequence, it has produced negligible results.

Conclusion

The evolution of the African states raises the question of the nature of the state in African and how state power is to be approached. There are basically two dominant views on the nature of the state. The first view is that is an instrumentalist approach to the state. The significance of the state lies in its ability to dominate over society. It sees an authoritarian state as powerful. However, this view is incorrect. It is not sustainable and leads to corruption and violence. The second view is that of state power as being more about governance. In this view, power is seen as a positive sum game. The state exercises power with the citizens or society. The political system of such as state reflects democratic values and strong commitment to good governance.
Economic growth requires a strong state or strong business class. In Africa, we have none. The role of the AU could be to help foster a strong state able to deal with the challenges facing Africa.

Key Issues raised during Discussion

There was the need to investigate how the various regional blocks with their differing histories, objectives and mandates could constitute an effective foundation for the African Union. There will be a need to look at restructuring of the regional blocks.

It was felt that political integration should not postpone issues dealing with economic integration.

There was the need to re-examine the nature of the African state that has led to many conflicts, including issues such as the inherited borders from the colonial past.

It is important that the African Union must not be limited to the gathering of the politic elites but should identify means of involving the people.

SESSION 4

CONSTITUTION, POWERS, ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF ORGANS OF THE AFRICAN UNION (AU)

Introduction

The AU attempts to combine political and economic development in Africa. It has a strong political intent as well as an economic agenda. These processes must be complementary if the objectives of the Union are to be realised. The importance of self-reliance in both the economic and political spheres was emphasised. New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has been proposed as a concrete programme of action, while the AU could offer the overall institutional framework for achieving African unity.

This session focused on concerns and possible problems raised by civil society organisations regarding the AU. Many of the concerns raised in the discussion constitute a synthesis of the issues raised at several workshops held on the establishment of the AU.

Strengths of the AU

The AU is the brainchild of African leaders themselves, not that of AU officials. There is thus a true political will to make it work.
The mandate of the AU is expanded. Whereas the mandate of the OAU focused on unity, the AU’s mandate focuses on greater unity in Africa.
Although the AU is based on the European Union model, it is born out of the African experiences and inititatives (especially the Abuja Treaty).
The AU reinforces the social, economic and political integration agenda of Africa.
The AU may provide a useful vehicle to NEPAD and co-ordinated regional integration.
The Constitutive Act of the AU is flexible and leaves room for possible input by various stakeholders.
The AU is committed to involving ordinary people and civil society in its consultation processes (for example the Lagos Plan of Action).

Priority organs that have to be in place for the launching of the AU

The following essential structures have to be in place before the launching of the AU:

The Assembly of the Union (a structure for Heads of State)
The Executive Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other designated Ministers/authorities)
The AU Commission (the Secretariat of the AU)
The Permanent Representatives Committee (prepares work for the Executive Council and acts on the Council’s instructions)

Gaps in the legal framework of the AU

The Constitution of the AU is a loose legal framework which allows for input of all stakeholders. However, there are gaps and contradictions. Some of the most prominent ommissions are a lack of human rights structures, conflict resolution mechanisms and an African Development Bank. Addressing these and other ommissions would require discussions focusing on matters ranging from gender-sensitive language to substantive input on reinforcing peace mechanisms, financial institutions, etcetera.

Civil Society participation

The AU is committed to involving ordinary people at grass-roots level in its consultation processes. This is seen as an opportunity to generate and promote consciousness of African unity. This commitment is clearly illustrated by the following:

The loose framework of the AU Constitutive Act provides ample opportunity for intensive consultation between the organisation and Member States and civil society on the rules of procedure, powers and functions of the Organs of the AU.
Member States must create the opportunity for national and regional consultative processes through workshops, submissions and inter-departmental initiatives.

Human Rights

The AU Constitutive Act does not make sufficient provision for the protection and enforcement of human rights. It lacks enforcement mechanisms such as a Human Rights Charter, Commission and Court. It has been argued, though, that these types of mechanisms can be incorporated by means of a Protocol and/or negotiation.

It was suggested that a Human Rights Court be collapsed with the Court of Justice to serve as a multi-purpose court. The existing problems with the Court of Justice, viz. poor ratification of jurisdiction and unequal representation (the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of some regions), should not be repeated in the proposed Human Rights Court.

Financial Institutions

The Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the following 3 financial institutions, namely the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. This multiplicity raises questions of financing, co-ordination, overlap and duplication. It was recommended that these institutions be integrated into an independent, multi-purpose Central Bank with a development, investment and fiscal mandate. This would require the harmonisation of financial and trade policies, the mobilisation of domestic human and capital resources and a uniform approach to, amongst others, foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development aid (ODA). It is important to note that FDI and ODA tend to be offerred where natural resources are abundant and not necessarily where the publicised political preconditions exist.

A prequisite for the establishment of a Central Bank is the existence of national banks in participating countries. However, not many African countries have authentic national banks.

At present, the OAU faces financial constraints. One of the main reasons for this is the inability of some member countries to pay their membership fees. This is largely due to the fact that member countries also hold membership of a number of other organisations which require membership fees. Article 23 of the AU Constitutive Act aims to regulate this situation.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Although the AU is bold on promoting peace and stability, its Constitution is silent on creating conflict resolution mechanisms, nor does it mention any relationship with existing resolution mechanisms. There are concerns about the sovereignty of states and non-interference. Since there are no conflict resolution structures in place at the moment, we could now build on the experiences of conflict resolution mechanisms established at regional level.

Legal implications for the establishment of the AU

The AU needs to focus its attention on legal inconsistencies, contradictions and assumptions. The AU Constitutive Act contains socio-economic and integration issues that are open to different interpretations. This could impact on the sovereignty of States. The principles and objectives are seen as vague. The ‘soft’ legal drafting in Article 3(c), (l) and (n) compared to the definitive legal drafting in Article 9, for example creates some ambiguity and contradiction in the Act. Questions such as whether countries are obliged to harmonise their laws with the AU in the event of AU laws being in contradiction with country-specific laws must be addressed It was suggested that checks and balances are built into the AU Constitutive Act, or, alternatively, that the current quorum for Assembly decisions be re-examined. The South African Parliament will have to decide how to approach these issues.

What are the constitutional implications for South Africa in signing the AU Constitutive Act? Would South Africa be willing to consider amendment to the Constitution should this arise as a consequence of ratifying the Constitutive Act of the AU?

South Africa also needs to examine whether the Constitutive Act of the AU is in harmony with international law and practice, particularly regarding human rights issues.

On the matter of the African Court for Human and People’s Rights, it was suggested the Protocol makes this court the supreme institution for the protection of peoples and human rights. In South Africa however, the Constitutional Court is the supreme court protecting basic human rights. What would be the consequences of deferring or referring matters to the Africn Court.

The African Court will make decisions based on the African Charter which may have become outdated in terms of human rights development since it was developed a few decades ago. The South African Constitution, being more recent is more in line with international best practice. Also, the equality clauses in the African Charter and the South African Constitution are different. The African Court will therefore function from a diferent legal basis. This may cause some tension. Mechanisms may be required to regulate issues that can be brought before the African Court.

It was noted however, that the jurisdiction of the African Court is between States. This would impact on the number of cases lodged.

Issues such as how will the court be constituted and amendments to domestic judicial laws for the harmonisation of country and continental laws would need to be addressed.

It is envisaged that the Central Organ would be established through Article 9(1)(d). Since this represents such an important organ, it should be integrated into the Act as an organ establshed under Article 5 and not by the Assembly under Article 9.

Some key issues/challenges

The Act establishes a multiplicity of organs. Consideration should be given to whether it would be more desirable to integrate organs to form fewer organs or whether all organs should be phased in.

Article 14 envisages the institution of specialised technical committees. Consideration should be given to whether these committees may represent a practical, strong foundation for the realisation of the AU objectives and should therefore be amongst the priority organs.

Article 19 envisages the establishment of the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. The desirability and sustainability of such multiplicity should be examined.

The creation of a Pan-African Parliament should ensure the full participation of the people in the AU. This needs to be established as soon as possible and the process should be accelerated in order to facilitate people’s participation. The delay in the establishment of the Pan African Parliament is incongruent with the principle of popular participation, under Article 4(c) of the Act.

What mechanisms should be used to facilitate, ecourage and monitor the involvement of civil society of Member States in the AU?

Extensive participation processes are needed in South Africa on the AU in order to ensure effective public participation. South Africa sould decide on whether a process similar to that conducted during the development of the South African Constitution would be appropriate.

Consideration should be given to whether it would be advisable for the NEPAD intitiative to be integrated into the AU machinery since the implementation of NEPAD is already quite advanced. Perhaps NEPAD should be maintained as a parallel pocess, closely associated with the AU until the AU is fully established. If NEPAD is accepted as the programme of action for the AU, political commitment from all Member States is required.

The reconciliation of the different economic development levels of the various African countries poses a particular challenge. The support of African countries with weaker economies, by those with more established, stronger economies (in accordance with Article 4(a)) should be carefully considered.

The establishment of the Central Organ requires urgent consideration. This should also be considered in conjunction with the CSSDCA – will both structures be required?

SESSION 5:
COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
Economic and Financial Implications

Chairperson: The Hon. Dr R. Davies, MP.

Background

Tensions exist on whether an economically driven integration strategy is appropriate for Africa, given the state of African economies. Another tension is whether to follow the European Union’s conventional trade integration theories that are economically driven. There is a need for a clear developmental integration approach, which is not solely focused on trade. The approach to regional and institutional integration must be based on the developmental projections for Africa.

Problems

African countries have similar and complementary development patterns and a need for diversification exists. There are also major barriers to promoting integration and removing tariff and non-tariff barriers because of underdeveloped infrastructure. Furthermore, South Africa and other African countries are signatories to other free trade agreements with, for example, the European Union as well as reciprocal trade agreements between South Africa and Britain and different regions in Africa. South Africa could therefore find itself trading with countries inside the region with worse consequences for herself. The EU is also envisaging entering into economic co-operation with some of the African countries. Hence, integration in Africa is not happening in a vacuum, there are existing agreements.

African economic performance has weakened over the last 20 years and has never recovered since the 1970s. The Human Development Index is also very low. The AU is therefore a response to these problems and is expected to lead to economic regeneration of Africa. It will also allow Africa to compete globally and provide her with means to improve the standard of living of her people. That is why the AU’s economic programme with a controlled developmental focus is more important.

It is, however, important to describe the kind of economic partnership that will benefit Africa. The question of how to engage institutions like the G7 in order to reap the benefits of globalisation also needs to be addressed. There is therefore a necessity to think strategically in order to face the challenge of globalisation.

Solution

A need for development integration exists in Africa. When integrating, political co-operation is necessary. Barriers must be addressed at an earlier stage. It is necessary to concentrate on sectoral co-operation when introducing integration. The integration strategy needs to build on what is already in existence in the regions and improve sectoral co-operation as well as capacity building. However, these regional integrations are based on different principles from those of the proposed AU. SADC, for example, is built on functional co-operation and COMESA is based on the removal of trade barriers.

Africa needs a functional sectoral co-operation within a developmental paradigm.

As far as the establishment of an African Central Bank for financial integration is concerned, this is still ambitious at this stage, although there can be a gradual move towards monetary union in the long run. One has to remember that financial integration within regional integration has not been very successful. Furthermore, Africa has more than 50 different currencies with very unequal values. The OUA has also been unable to sustain current financial arrangements and this therefore raises a question whether the new AU will have the capacity to sustain these. In 2001, only a third of the member countries paid their fees.

Regarding the Customs Union, which was to be established by 2025, this is very ambitious and unrealistic when looking at the timeframe. No African regional body has ever achieved what it set out to do. Furthermore, only 15 per cent of African trade is between African countries because the primary focus has been on developed countries and global markets.

Concerns raised by the members of the Commission

The nature of the interrelationship between the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) and the other Specialised Technical Committees. It was still unclear as to what would be the role of this Council in the AU.
There are structural crises that lead to cross-border migration of labour and goods. As a consequence of this, there is unrecorded informal trade. Globalisation is also allowing free movement of skilled labour and restricting the movement of unskilled labour.
The establishment of an African Central Bank for financial integration is still ambitious at this stage, although there can be a gradual move towards monetary union in the long run. There was a suggestion that an African Investment Bank be established as a starting point rather than African Central Bank.

Approach

It was suggested that an infrastructural developmental approach should be adopted. There is a need for a clear developmental integration approach that must emphasise infrastructural issues like transport, telecommunications and information technology. Sectoral co-operation that will promote programmes for development of certain sector priorities must be seen as a priority. Although trade integration is not the main focus of this initiative, it cannot be avoided because of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

There must be a move towards the creation of a continent-wide monetary union in the long term, and not as yet a priority. There must be co-operation with already existing monetary unions in the SADC region like the one shared by Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia.

It was suggested that countries could be categorised, for the purposes of having a common currency with those with the similar levels of development. These countries including Morocco, Egypt, Botswana and South Africa, could consolidate and work as an engine for growth and co-ordination. However, tensions between Northern African countries and the rest of Africa have to be considered.

Challenges were identified as:

Promoting removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers. There needs to be a harmonisation of quality standards of goods.
Promoting agrarian reform systems like rural livelihoods in Africa to control the tendency to migrate to more developed economies. There is a need to educate on migration issues because there are African countries that do not share the same philosophy on cross-border migration.
Harmonising existing and future trade and economic policies. The feasibility of this is still a major challenge, as African countries do not share the same economic policies.
Defining the economic growth path of Africa in view of globalisation because it has become evident that industrialisation is declining globally.
Establishing structures and forums that can allow debate on integration issues. The debate must be much more profound and involve politicians, intellectuals and civil society.
Promoting debate at regional and national level. How to get civil society, academics and Parliamentarians involved. The question is, however, who represents civil society as most of these organisations are sustained by international funding organisations with their own agendas.
Talking to the institutions like the WTO and the IMF to further the agenda for Africa and addressing the challenges of globalisation. Africa has to speak decisively and collectively on issues of globalisation.
There must be harmonisation of protocols on objectives for investment.
Not all African states have a regional development philosophy.

Role Definition

It became evident that clarity on different roles was necessary and therefore the description of the role of:

South Africa in the African Union has to be clarified, whether it will take a leading role because of its economic weight in the continent.
Regional institutions and co-operations around identified key issues i.e transport, information technology and telecommunication.
ECOSOC in the AU. The terms of reference have to be spelt out.
NEPAD in relation to an economic growth strategy.

Conclusion

The style of the AU should be facilitative rather than regulatory with NEPAD promoting more effective economic diplomacy. NEPAD is not in conflict with the establishment of AU but will play a complementary and facilitative role. South Africa has a very pivotal role to play in shaping the AU.

The AU plan is very ambitious. Strengthening and expanding the existing regional and national structures must be the starting point. The acceleration of the Abuja Treaty that enhances the relationship between different regions needs to be embraced for the success of the AU.

Migration should be part be part of economic issues although it was not included initially. National interests should not be subjected to larger interests of Africa.

Priorities were identified as:

Infrastructural development;
Production; and
Finance in the long run.

In implementing all these priorities, the principle of variable geometry must apply because of the diversity in the level of development of African countries.

SESSION 5:
COMMISSION ON LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Chairperson: The Hon. Ms F. Chohan-Khota, MP

Introduction

The Commission’s discussions centred on the legal issues raised by Member of Parliament, Advocate Johnny de Lange, namely:

The Central Organ
Ceding Sovereignty
The use of force in International Intervention
The Protocol
Enforcement Mechanisms.

The commission also formulated certain recommendations for a proposed way forward in terms of the involvement of Parliament in the work of the Working Group on the Protocol.

Legal Issues

Central Organ

It was noted that the intended focus area of the Central Organ is safety and security. However, in reality the focus of the Organ is much broader as it also includes other matters such as food security. The Commission raised 3 general issues with regard to the Constitutive Act of the AU (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty) and the structures established by it, namely:

There are contradictions and a lack of clarity within the Treaty.
There is an overlap in authority between various bodies created by the Treaty. For example, it is not clear which of the structures envisaged would have jurisdiction over which matters.
The relationship between the Central Organ and the Assembly of the AU should be redefined.

In its discussion, the Commission noted that there are some lessons to be learnt from the SADC experience in this regard. When the former President took over as chairperson, the former chairperson, Robert Mugabe continued as head of the security organ of SADC, and was thus able to call for separate meetings. The Commission agreed that this type of situation should be avoided.

Ceding Sovereignty

The Members of the Commission were ad idem that it is inevitable that a country who accedes to the African Union Treaty will, to a certain extent, have to cede some of its sovereignty. However, such cession should take place within the framework of a structured plan of action.

The Commission reached general consensus on the following issues:

It is of utmost importance that South Africa discusses the principles and terms of ceding its sovereignty in such a way that it does not impact negatively on the existing human rights of citizens.

The issue around the ceding of sovereignty with regard to policy will have to be reviewed. Quorums in respect of decisions relating to the adoption of policies must be raised. A decision also has to be made as to the nature of a quorum needed to decide on other matters of less significance than policies.

Whilst South Africa has extended the right to class actions to organs of civil society in the interest of the public, many developed countries do not cater for class actions by individuals. Thus, if the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for class action, many countries would have to pass internal legislation to comply with their obligations in terms of this Treaty.

With regard to the Charter on Peoples’ and Human Rights, the general feeling expressed by the Members of the Commission was that many human rights developments have taken place, especially in South Africa, since the adoption of the Charter in 1987. South Africa should thus negotiate the possibility of expanding the provisions of the Charter before it can be incorporated into the Treaty.

The Use of Force in International intervention

Whilst the Members of the Commission acknowledged the need for intervention as envisaged by the Treaty, they were all ad idem that South Africa must ensure that any form of intervention occurs within the South African context. Thus, people who negotiate on behalf of South Africa should be provided with a list of this country’s international obligations to ensure that the AU does not adopt any provisions that will contradict or impact negatively on existing international obligations. Instead, a balance should be sought within the provisions of the Treaty.

Protocol

The Commission resolved to recommend to Parliament that it request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to table the Protocol on the Pan African Parliament as soon as possible. It also expressed the need for clarity as to whether this is a Protocol to the Abuja Treaty or to the AU Constitutive Act.

Furthermore, Parliament should request the SADC Parliamentary Forum to expedite the ratification of the Protocol. It should also begin to look at the implementation of the Protocol.

Enforcement Mechanisms

The Commission noted that whilst the Treaty provides for the establishment of various enforcement mechanisms, it does not set any time frames. Unless time frames are included in the Treaty, it will be ineffective.

Recommendations

Following discussions on the legal issues above, the Commission formulated the following recommendations:

Mechanisms should be created to facilitate improved interaction between Parliament and the Executive on the AU.
The Pan African Parliament Protocol must be tabled in Parliament as soon as possible.
Parliament should request the SADC Parliamentary Forum to expedite the ratification of the Protocol.
Parliament should set up Ad Hoc Committees that will focus on specific issues of concern with regard to the Treaty that have been identified. Such Ad Hoc Committees should have strong staff support (such as legal and research support). The existing Working Group would still fulfil a co-ordinating function in relation to these ad hoc committees.

Conclusion

Part of the Commission’s discussion also centred on general issues on which no substantive resolutions/recommendations were formulated. These include the issue of gender sensitivity within the Treaty. The lack of gender sensitive language in the relevant Articles of the Treaty came under review by Members of the Commission.

The Members of the Commission also expressed the importance of instituting a vigorous public participation campaign to make all citizens aware of the AU.

SESSION 5:
COMMISSION ON POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Chairperson: The Hon. Dr. B.L. Geldenhuys, MP

Introduction

This Commission discussed issues focusing on political integration, sovereignty, the Pan African Parliament, a conducive political environment and human rights.

Political Integration

According to the State Law Advisors’ Office the AU Constitutive Act does not seem to conflict and impact negatively on SA’s Constitution.
There is an urgent need to bridge historical and language divisions in Africa and to harmonise the different approaches.
Political integration is a means through which African States are empowered to face the challenges of our time. This process could develop into a more formal structure in the future. The AU can be perceived as an evolving structure responding to the challenges of the day.
The Commission is of the view that there are contradictions or ambiguity between Articles 4 (a), (g), and (h). There may however be a conflict between the functions and powers of the Assembly and the sovereignty of states. The issues of sovereignty are generally addressed unsatisfactorilly in the Act. The Working Group should explore this further.
Article 4(h) dealing with grounds for intervention by the Union in Member States’ affairs should take into account Article 3 (h) in respect of reference to the promotion and protection of human rights.

Pan African Parliament

The Commission discussed whether the Pan African Parliament Protocol should be ratified in terms of Article 7 of the Abuja Treaty or Article 17 of the Constitutive Act.

Political Environment

Discussions ensued about the admissibility of African states to the AU. It was proposed that instead of adopting an exclusionary principle we should look at what mechanisms can be adopted to pressurise and encourage states to create and maintain a political environment conducive to attaining the objectives of the AU.


Human Rights

The Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights should become an organ of the AU.

Recommendations:

The Commission endorsed the proposals made by the Speaker as follows:

That the Working Group in its report to the National Assembly should request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to table the Protocol for its ratification by Parliament as soon as possible.
That Parliament establish an ad-hoc committee to consider the Protocol and report back to Parliament for its ratification by the end of March 2002.
That the Presiding Officers are requested to contact the Southern African Development Community’s Parliamentary Forum to request that a similar process take place in the Region.

An additional recommendation was proposed by the Commission:

That Article 4(h) of the Act, dealing with the grounds for intervention by the Union in Member States’ affairs, should be amended to take into account Article 3 (h)’s reference to the need to promote and protect human rights. That the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights should be made an organ of the AU.

SESSION 5:
COMMISSION ON SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Chairperson: The Hon Mr. F. Cassim, MP

Introduction

As an introduction to the session, the chair provided an overview of where the Commission, as an organ of the AU is placed within the structures of the African Union (AU). The structure is as follows:

Assembly of the AU

Assembly

Executive Council

Commission

The Assembly comprises the Heads of States.
The Executive Council is composed of the Ministers. The Executive Council has the power to create Specialised Technical Committees, which can assist the Commission in fulfilling its mandate.
The Commission functions as the Secretariat of the AU.

The Functions of the Commission

Certain functions of the Commission were outlined in the session. The functions are entailed in the Draft Statutes of the Commission of the AU. Amongst others, they set out to:

Accelerate socio-economic integration of the continent.
Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.
Strive for peace.
Strive for the spread of democratic principles.
Promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels.
Support research and development initiatives.

Authority and Functions of the Commission

Some of the domains of responsibility that may be delegated to the Commission by the Assembly and Executive Council include:

Control of pandemics such as HIV and AIDS and malaria.
Disaster management.
Environmental management.
Food security.
Population migration.
Socio-economic integration.

The Secretariat not only has administrative functions assigned to it, but it has the power to deal with issues of an economic, scientific and technological nature as well as issues related to social and gender aspects.

An important aspect of the Commission relates to the manner in which it should act. Characteristics of robustness, proactiveness, engagement and dynamism should be core in its execution of its functions. It should be the driving force in initiating, executing and following up on the decisions of other organs of the AU.


Portfolios and Directorates of the Commission

The Commission’s portfolios, based on Article 14 of the Constitutive Act, pertain to:

Rural economy and Agricultural Matters.
Monetary and Financial Affairs.
Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters.
Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, natural Resources and Environment.
Health, labour and Social Affairs.
Political Affairs and Human Rights.
Finance (of the Commission), Administration and Coordination.
Transport, Communications and Tourism.
Education, Culture and Human Rights.

Size of the Commission

The Commission shall consist of a Chairperson, 1 Deputy-chairperson, and a certain number of members, the number of which has as yet not be determined. They can be appointed for a maximum of 2 terms.

Recommendations for the way forward for Parliament:

The formation of an ad hoc committee to replace the current working -group on the AU in Parliament. This committee is an overarching committee, which will comprise of the Presiding Officers, amongst others and will deal with all issues in relation to the AU. The ad hoc committee should be established within 7 days after the tabling of the AU Seminar Report to the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.

The ad hoc committee may form smaller sub-committees comprised of members of Portfolio and Select Committees. They should be elected from the following Portfolio and Select Committees:

Education
Health
Social Development
Arts, Culture, Science and Technology
The Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women
Labour

These sub-committees will work independently and then collectively deal with pertinent issues that need to be reported back to the ad hoc committee. These reports should then be tabled in Parliament.

One of the primary functions of the ad hoc committee should be to arrange public hearings on all issues related to the AU and to solicit civil society input. The public hearings should also be used to generate, mobilize and encourage social movements in South Africa to engage in debates and discussions on the AU. It is suggested that public hearings be conducted by the end of March.

The function of the ad hoc committee could also be extended to include visits to particular areas to receive proposals and consult as widely as possible on the AU.

All relevant documentation including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights should be made available before the public hearings.

The proposed theme during the time when South Africa chairs the AU (from July 2002 to July 2003) is likely to focus on the Socio–economic aspects in Africa. It was suggested that specific priority areas under this theme be identified.

The Presiding Officers are requested to interact with the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum and other regional structures to speed up the process, discussions and ratification of the Protocol on the Pan African Parliament.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs should be requested to table the Protocol as soon as possible with a view to ratification.

Discussions on the Pan African Parliament need to be prioritised. Consideration should be given to the development of the Rules and Procedures of the Pan African Parliament within the period that South Africa chairs the AU. It is suggested that the Pan African Parliament sit within 6 months after the inauguration of the AU.

While due consideration should be given to NEPAD, discussions around the AU should be prioritised.

It is requested that the Speaker tables all the constitutional and legal requirements emanating from the analysis of the AU documents before the House. This should be done as soon as possible.

SESSION 5:
PLENARY

The Implications of the Implementation of the Constitutive Act of the AU

Introduction

The presentation started with an overview of the need for establishing an African Union (AU). The establishment of the AU can be seen within the following context:

As a response to the weakened economic performance of Africa over the last 20 years. This has been identified by World Bank figures which stated that the economic performance began deteriorating in the mid-1970’s.

The Human Development Indices for African countries have generally decreased. This is with reference to child mortality rates which have increased and life expectancy rates which have decreased.

Globalisation has impacted on Africa in that it has curtailed its regulatory role, sovereignty, and reduced its impact on the global market.

Africa’s political and economic position has also been influenced by many ruling class elites that have broken all laws and robbed the Continent with the intention of increasing their own personal wealth and power.

The AU is therefore seen as a response to the above situational analysis. There is an urgent need for political and economic regeneration to enable Africa to play a role globally. This will also impact on the lives of Africans, as it will increase current standards of living.

Some Problems of Implementation

The presentation highlighted that the AU project is calling for a new kind of Africa, a new kind of politics and a new way of conducting politics. Some problems that have been identified in accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, include:

Sovereignty: This appears to be one of the most contested areas in the Act. The Act is ambiguous as it defends Member States rights to national sovereignty whilst proposing that the AU has the right to intervene in the internal matters of these States. There does not appear to be a clear way forward on this issue.

Political Will: The assumption that there is a sufficient degree of political will to implement the objectives of the AU needs to be interrogated. An important question that needs to be asked is whether African leaders are willing to follow through upon the signing of the Declaration.

The African Ruling Elite: The speaker stated that many of the African ruling elite are not loyal to the Continent and its people. Many of these persons have only been interested in holding public office for the purpose of individual benefit. The question that has to be answered is: how can the AU impact on the leadership structure of African States and move them in a new direction of governance?

Public Participation: At the moment the AU project appears to remain a top down exercise since there is little participation from the rank and file. The role and composition of civil society participation and its impact on the AU also needs to be interrogated. A related question is also on the participation and role of ordinary citizens in the Pan African Parliament.

What kind of Partnership will the AU have with the North, G7/8 and International Financial Institutions? The AU will have to think about the kind of partnerships it wants to engage in with various international financial institutions and partners in the North. This relationship should not be uncritical of institutions such as the World Trade Organisation.

Towards Developmental Regionalism

The presenter stated that the AU initiative raises the question of the envisaged role of Member States. To this end, he raises the necessity of entering into debates around development at the regional level. The notion of a developmental regionalism highlights the need for Africa to move from the premise of negotiating as a collective and not as individual African states. This will bring about successful participation in the global economy. Developmental regionalism is a State initiated project which is embedded in the market economy. It is an initiative through which the State seeks to regulate capitalism at the regional level because it has been difficult to do so at the national level.

Who Will Lead This Process?

Consideration should be given to who will be the driving force around the implementation of the AU project. It raises further questions on the type of State and political class needed to ensure the success of the AU.

Final consideration should be given to South Africa’s role as potential leader of this process and if it should take up leadership of this process, how it would negotiate this role with the current neo-liberal economic programme, GEAR.

Conclusion

The presenter concluded that Africa has no alternative but to find constructive ways of engaging with the dominant role players in the globalisation process.

Economic and Financial Implications

The presenter gave an overview of the political, economic, financial and social, implications of the implementation of the Constitutive Act of the AU. He made reference to work that has already been done and published by several institutions, including the DTI. The presentation’s main focus was on tensions in the approach to economic integration.

Tensions

Tensions exist on whether an economically driven integration strategy is appropriate for Africa, given the state of African economies. Another tension is whether to follow the European Union’s conventional trade integration theories that are economically driven. There is a need for a clear developmental integration approach, which is not solely focused on trade. The approach to regional and institutional integration must be based on the developmental projections for Africa.

Problems

African countries have similar and complementary development patterns and a need for diversification exists. There are also major barriers to promoting integration and removing tariff and non-tariff barriers because of underdeveloped infrastructure. Furthermore, South Africa and other African countries are signatory to other free trade agreements with, for example, the European Union as well as reciprocal trade agreements between South Africa and Britain and different regions in Africa. South Africa could therefore find itself trading with countries inside the Region with worse consequences for herself. The EU is also envisaging entering into economic co-operation with some of the African countries. Hence, integration in Africa is not happening in a vacuum, there are existing agreements.

A need for development integration exists in Africa. When integrating, political co-operation has to be established at an early stage and barriers addressed at an earlier stage. It is necessary to concentrate on sectoral co-operation when introducing integration. The integration strategy would be to build on what is already in existence in the regions and improve sectoral co-operation as well as capacity building. However, these regional integrations are based on different principles from those of the proposed AU. SADC, for example, is built on functional co-operation and COMESA is based on the removal of trade barriers.

Africa needs a functional sectoral co-operation within a developmental paradigm.

As far as the establishment of an African Central Bank for financial integration is concerned, this is still ambitious at this stage, although there can be a gradual move towards monetary union in the long run. One has to remember that financial integration within regional integration has not been very successful. Furthermore, Africa has more than 50 different currencies with very unequal values. The OUA has also not been able to sustain current financial arrangements and therefore this raises a question whether the new AU will have the capacity to sustain these. In 2001, only a third of the member countries paid their fees.

Regarding the Customs Union, which was to be established by 2025, this is very ambitious and unrealistic when looking at the timeframe. No African regional body has ever achieved what it set out to do. Furthermore, only 15 per cent of African trade is between African countries because the primary focus has been on developed countries and global markets.

Conclusion

The AU plan is very ambitious. Strengthening and expanding the existing regional and national structures must be the starting point. The acceleration of the Abuja Treaty that enhances the relationship between different regions needs to be embraced for the success of the AU.

The Pan African Parliament

Madam Speaker raised certain concerns around the establishment of the Pan African Parliament in relation to the ratification of the Protocol. The concern which arises stems from the fact that the Pan African Parliament is referred to in both the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The question that must be dealt with is, which founding document would be used as the basis for ratifying the Protocol?

Other key issues requiring consideration include the following:

Article 2 of the Protocol proclaims that ‘Member States hereby establish the Pan African Parliament. This may conflict with other international legal instruments and has to be clarified.

In terms of Article 4, each Member State shall be represented in the Pan African Parliament by 5 members, at least 1 of whom must be a woman. This needs to be followed up since many Parliaments are male dominated.

Questions have been raised around interaction with other AU structures. The new Assembly Rules addresses this issue. One of the Rules states that the Pan African Parliament reports directly to the Assembly.

Rule 19 refers to amongst others, attendance of the President of the Pan African Parliament at the sitting of the Assembly. Clarification of participation of the President is thus needed. For example, can the President place issues on the agenda of the Assembly?

According to Article 12(2) and (3) the Pan African Parliament shall elect at its first sitting a President and 4 Vice Presidents representing the regions of Africa as determined by the OAU.

The Assembly determines when Parliament shall sit. This may impact on the independence of Parliament since the Assembly may delay a sitting if it is not in its best interests.

Proposals on the Way Forward

Each Commission was requested to consider the following proposals:

That the Minister of Foreign Affairs tables the Protocol and clarifies its relationship to the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act. Parliament to set up an ad hoc committee to consider ratification by the end of March.

That the Presiding Officers be requested to contact the SADC Parliamentary Forum to ensure that the same processes of ratification are followed within SADC. All regional and other Parliaments should also be contacted to motivate for ratification. The first sitting of the Pan African Parliament should be convened as early as possible.