NATIONAL RAILWAYS SAFETY REGULATOR BILL

DISCUSSION NOTES

Submitted by Oliver Page and Prudence Moeketsi

CSIR/Transportek (members of a team that looked at Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport in South Africa 1998 – 2000)

 

Section

Page

Discussion

Preamble

5

  • Customer Focus - there could be reference made that through safety railways are placing customers first, i.e. reorienting rail operations towards existing and/or potential customers. With the mooting of the Gautrain, to get many of the targeted passengers to use it, safety and security will be key issues determining customers preference for rail rather than their private cars.

Preamble

5

  • SADC railway operations - we do not see them being defined or referred to a specific document. Some stakeholders may argue if there is a need to mention the SADC safety guidelines with respect to railways.
  • There is also a need to ensure that the SADC standards are compatible with that being promulgated. Does this proposed Bill look at compatibility of signalling systems (which impact on safety). From discussions with stakeholders in the region, there was a deliberate move not to use the Spoornet signalling system in some SADC member states, in order to lessen the dominance of South African standards and procedures in the region.

Definitions

1 (xv)

6

  • There may be a need to define an ‘accident’ as implied under railway occurrence. One definition of an accident is; any event involving the revenue service operation or a rail fixed guideway system if as a result: an individual dies; an individual suffers bodily injury and immediately receives medical treatment away from the scene of the accident or
  • a collision, derailment, or fire causes property damage in excess of RXXXXX. (Taken from Chapter VI—Federal Transit Administration, Department of Transportation Part 659 Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety oversight).

Definitions

1 (xix)

6

  • Safe railway operation. The clarity as to which ‘safe’ is defined could be enhanced. One definition of safe is; freedom from danger (Taken from Chapter VI—Federal Transit Administration, Department of Transportation Part 659 Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety oversight). Another; Safety - The lack of incidents, fatalities and injuries (within a transportation system) that do not involve criminal activity.
  • ‘are as reasonably practicable in the given set of circumstances’ – who or what determines this, the railway safety regulator, operator, international best practice, or what? For example, the fencing of railways; it may be practically impossible to fence-in all railway lines, nevertheless, to minimise the potential for an accident the railway operator should make all effort to achieve this. If an accident occurs due to the lack of a fence, who will determine the level of practicability, the operator or the regulator?
  • This definition also has the potential to be abused by a rail operator (who may use a unique operating environment as grounds for the existing safety status quo). In another example, in the United Kingdom, a passenger train cannot commence to move whilst any the doors are open (and this is what passengers expect); whereas in South Africa commuter train sets can. It is argued that certain passengers using the commuter railways in South Africa deliberately force open the doors and thereby damage them (i.e. the unique operating environment), but a train moving whilst any door is open places passenger safety at risk.

Definitions

1 (xix)

6

  • Security - there is a need to define security, or is a secure environment implied from a safe operating environment. Safety and security and two sides of the same coin, but each must be defined clearly and not implied from the definition of the other. A definition of security is; freedom from intentional danger (Taken from Chapter VI—Federal Transit Administration, Department of Transportation Part 659 Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety oversight). Another definition of security is: a perceived or actual feeling of a sense of security (i.e. freedom from physical, emotional or environmental anxiety/harm).
  • The rail operator may provide a safe operating environment, but a passenger may feel insecure. For example, sitting on a well lit platform (well away from the platform edge), if the station is used as a shortcut between two points, the non rail traffic people using the station, may subject the waiting passenger to increased feelings of insecurity.
  • If security is not to be implied from safety, this must be clearly stated.

1 (6)

6

  • Safety of persons with disabilities
  • The current passenger rail infrastructure is not suitable for persons with disabilities. A blind person could not use the system (unassisted). Platform levels and coach levels are not the same in many cases, which would cause a blind person to trip when entering a coach. What should happen in this case, do station operators correct the existing infrastructure to be inclusive of all needs of potential passengers? Unlike passenger railway systems in other countries, the move to include patronage of all commuters has been slow, this may be due to the lack of funds necessary to correct design shortcomings as well as the State not pumping enough money into the system itself etc.,

1 (6)

6

  • Does this include persons living in informal settlements, right next to the rail line (who in most cases have located there illegally?). When a train is derailed and goods spill over into the informal settlement, will such persons have any claim against the rail operator (i.e. are they included in the term ‘other persons’)?

1 (7)

6

  • ‘Death or dies’ should be included in the definition, or is this implied from injured (i.e. fatally injured).

3(5)

7

  • ‘Objects of Regulator’ should be changed to ‘Objectives.’
  • Again ‘security management’ is not mentioned as one of the objectives of the Regulator, or is it implied from safety management?

3(5)

7

  • Functions of the Regulator
  • There is a need to explicitly state that one of the tasks, is the collection and dissemination of performance statistics relating to safety and security. The collection of this data, must be done independently from that of the railway operator. The availability of accurate statistics enables problem identification and its subsequent resolution. The statistics published in rail operators annual reports, should not be taken as the complete picture. This is particularly true for rail commuter transport, where many security infringements suffered by passengers are not reported to the rail operator.
  • A database of collected rail safety/security data could also be managed and maintained by the Regulator, who may give access to such information (to interested parties) as and when required.
  • If rail concessioning is realised in South Africa, one of the criteria for awarding a contract must be the applicant’s safety/security record.

8 (5)

9

  • Again ‘security management’ is not mentioned as one of the objectives of the Regulator, or is it implied from safety management? There is also a need to seriously consider having a senior officer from the SAPS as a member of the Board, who is an expert in security management
  • A person well versed in the carriage of hazardous goods (by rail) should also be a member of the Board. This person could come either from industry, SABS, or from the Emergency Services.

14

12

  • Minutes of Committee Meetings – will these be accessible to the public?

23 (3)

14

  • Possibly the Safety Management System Report, could also include performance statistics, which could be used to compare each applicant with others.

28 (c)

15

  • We would like to suggest that aspects of the NOSA (National Occupational Safety Association) star ratings be included in the Safety Management System. Clarification is needed if NOSA contributed to the Draft Bill?

30

16

  • Design, construction and alteration aiming to provide a safer environment for rail operations should also take into account the major advances in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles. If done correctly, one is able to positively impact on safety and security simultaneously through the physical design of facilities etc.,

31 (l)

16

  • Is this clause inclusive of informal settlements that have encroached on railway lines?

32 (a)

17

  • Security has not been mentioned here. Is security not an issue on board a stationary train, moving rolling stock etc?

32 (b)

17

  • Security has been mentioned here with respect to terrorism.

33

17

  • Railway safety inspectors – where will these come from, the existing rail operators? Could there be a case for bias in their reporting as they have knowledge of the operating environment of existing operators? If safety inspectors are few in numbers at the present time, how long will it take for them to be trained and in the intervening period, how will the proposed Bill be implemented?

34 (2)(b)

17

  • Does this include statistical information, data contained in a database etc.?

35

17

  • Does assistance to the safety inspector also entail giving access to electronic information, e.g. data held in a database?

35 (2)

18

  • Self incriminating answers – this may result in officers of the rail operator not making any statement until authorised by their superiors. This delay, could exacerbate the situation.

37

18

  • Unsafe conditions, we refer to the example above regarding the train doors (under definitions 1(xx)), how will this clause be enforced?

38

18

  • Reporting to the CEO of the regulating authority, but what of the SAPS or emergency services? This is why there are often conflicting statistics because incidents are reported to one authority and not to another. It could then be for one authority to be designated as the reporting authority, and then forward relevant information to other stakeholders.

39 (b)

18

  • Does the occurrence investigation report become public? Should not the public know and understand how safety is an important element in railway operations?

39 (6)

18

  • Self incriminating answers – this may result in officers of the rail operator not making any statement until authorised by their superiors. This delay could exacerbate the situation.

40

19

  • Should this not include safety/security performance statistics?

41

19

  • An independent audit (conducted at regular intervals) would also ensure that the information coming from rail operators is up to date and accurate. A thorough understanding of rail safety/security is required to enable the Regulator to develop a monitoring system that will house all the necessary information to ensure the highest level of safety/security on the rail system.

42

19

  • The general public is not explicitly defined as a potential recipient of information from the monitoring system. Basic information should be made available free of charge, i.e. placed on a web site, to keep in line with transparency and customer focus.