SUBMISSION ON THE

COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL

AND THE PERFORMERS

PROTECTION AMENDMENT BILL

5 October 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary 4

1. Introduction 6

2. Impact of needletime on the broadcasting industry 8

2.1 Background on the broadcasting industry 8

2.2 Broadcaster support for South African music 10

2.3 Broadcasting still in flux 12

2.4 Impact of needletime on radio 13

2.5 Conclusion – How will needletime impact on the broadcasting industry 16

3. Distribution of the needletime royalty 18

3.1 What needletime does 18

3.2 Value of the recording industry 19

3.2 The structure of the South African recording industry 20

3.3 Where needletime revenues will flow 21

3.4 Conclusion – Will South African artists substantially benefit

from needletime 24

4. Analysis of the amendments under consideration 26

4.1 Lack of consensus 26

4.2 Questionable policy basis for the amendments 26

4.3 Disregard for international best practice 28

4.4 Inappropriate extension of exclusive rights 29

4.5 Lack of reciprocity 30

4.6 Misunderstanding of international obligations 31

4.7 Additional affects on the TV and film industry 32

5. An alternative solution 34

5.1 Background 34

5.2 Why the needletime amendments may not achieve the objectives 34

    1. The NAB’s alternative solution: the South African Music

Development Fund 36

5.4 Structure and administration 37

5.5 Objectives 38

5.6 Beneficiaries 39

5.7 How will it achieve its objectives 39

5.8 How will it be funded 40

5.9 Why is it more suitable than needletime 41

6. Conclusion 42

Appendix 1: Letter from NAB to DACST on MITT report 43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NAB represents the South African broadcasting industry.

The NAB is dedicated to finding a lasting solution to the problems faced by all stakeholders in the music industry, especially South African artists. We believe, however, that due to the structure of the South African recording industry, the primary beneficiaries of needletime will not be South African artists. In the absence of any comprehensive data on this matter, we have developed preliminary scenarios which show that the benefits of needletime are likely to flow elsewhere.

Rather than effectively addressing the problems faced by South African artists, we believe needletime is essentially an intervention in the business relationship between broadcasters and recording companies. This relationship is presently symbiotic and mutually beneficial to both parties. Needletime upsets this balance by ensuring that a portion of revenue is diverted from the broadcasting industry to the recorded music industry.

This is a cost which should not be imposed on broadcasters, especially given the tenuous financial position of the South African broadcasting industry. We believe that the consequence of the needletime amendments will be to damage our local broadcasting industry. This has social, economic and cultural implications, which we strongly submit are not in the public interest.

We believe the need to comply with international treaties on these matters needs to be weighed up against the public interest in our own country. When considering this, it must also be noted that the international treaty on which the amendments are based does not require South Africa to implement needletime.

Before South Africa makes a decision on the implementation of needletime, we believe a full cost-benefit study must be conducted. We are not aware whether such a study has been undertaken and we submit that its absence, while legislation is being considered, is cause for concern.

Also absent is a detailed policy framework for the amendments laying out the public interest goals and likely impact of the amendments. We believe such a framework is required in order to develop a holistic strategy for addressing problems in our local music industry. We believe a Green paper / White paper process, which was not followed in this case, could have provided both for comprehensive analysis and full consultation on this matter.

We believe these critical gaps in the process leading to these amendments has led to problems and deficiencies in the formulation of the amendments themselves. It appears that no consideration has been given to developing a model of needletime which, while in principle would still be to the detriment of the broadcasting industry, would guarantee that its application would not negatively impact either on the viability of individual broadcasters or on the viability of the broadcasting industry generally.

The NAB believes that any solution to the problems in the local music industry, including the adequate remuneration of artists, must be well considered and appropriate to the unique circumstances in South Africa. We submit that needletime does not provide a sustainable solution and that the negative consequences arising from the amendments under consideration outweigh any positive benefits.

We submit that there appear to be two main initiatives presently attempting to address problems in the South African music industry – these are local content regulation and needletime. Both of these are focused on increasing the contributions of broadcasters. We submit that a sustainable strategy for the South African music industry cannot solely focus on broadcasters’ contributions.

We propose that an alternative to needletime may have more beneficial consequences for South African artists and the South African music industry. We have detailed one such proposal – a South African Music Development Fund. We are committed to pursuing this and other proposals, such as a provident fund for musicians proposed by the SABC, in further consultation on this matter.

 

 

 

1. INTRODUCTION

    1. The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is the leading representative of South Africa’s broadcasting industry, representing:

    1. The members of the NAB are dramatically and adversely affected by the Copyright Amendment Bill and the Performers Protection Amendment Bill, as published on 18 September 2001. Accordingly, we have a variety of comments. Notwithstanding that the amendments may apply differently to radio and television broadcasters, the introduction of needletime will have a detrimental and burdensome impact on both radio and television broadcasters. It should be noted that this submission represents the views and is submitted on behalf of radio and television broadcasters.
    2. The proposed amendments ("the amendments") which are of primary concern to the NAB and comprise the basis of this document, are those relating to section 9(c) of the Copyright Act, when read with the proposed amendments to section 5 of the Performer's Protection Act.
    3. These amendments amount to the introduction of what is popularly termed ‘needletime’. Needletime refers to the payment of a royalty for the broadcast of a sound recording to a performer and the owner of copyright in a sound recording. The introduction of needletime is erroneously perceived to be a solution to certain problems affecting the music industry.
    4. This submission will argue that needletime is not an appropriate solution. The submission is structured as follows:

    1. Let us first look at what impact needletime is likely to have on the broadcasting industry.

 

  1. IMPACT OF NEEDLETIME ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
    1. BACKGROUND ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
      1. Broadcasting has undergone a significant transformation since South Africa’s democratisation. This has resulted in the introduction of an authentic public broadcaster, a fledgling community sector of approximately 100 stations and a largely empowerment based commercial sector consisting of 15 radio stations and two television operators. This represents a vast change from pre-1994 when there were two commercial radio stations and one private pay TV service, in addition to the SABC.
      2. This change can be attributed to significant intervention from government and the industry regulator, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ("ICASA"). Many aspects of the business of broadcasting are subject to regulation. This regulation secures substantial public interest contribution in exchange for the use of public frequencies. While the public broadcaster has the most extensive public service obligations, all broadcasters are required to make public service contributions. Examples are listed below:
      3. Ownership and Control

        The IBA Act lays out a number of ownership restrictions which exist to promote diversity in the sector. In terms of these restrictions the number of broadcasting services which can be controlled by one entity is restricted, foreign shareholding in broadcasters is limited to 20% and print media may not control broadcasting services.

        Empowerment

        Upon application for a licence, broadcasters must show ICASA that their station is broadly representative of the population at the level of board, management and staff. These undertakings are then written into broadcasters’ licence conditions.

        Local content

        Broadcasters must comply with a minimum airtime quota of 20% for radio, 5% for pay TV, 20% for free to air television and 50% for the public broadcaster.

        Programming

        Broadcasters’ licences specify extensive programming obligations including conditions relating to language, childrens’ programming and news. These conditions relate to the quantity of programming to be provided, the allocation of resources to this programming and the time at which this programming is broadcast. Television broadcasters are regulated on who can make their programmes – 40% of local programmes must be made by independent production companies.

        Coverage

        Broadcasters’ licence conditions specify the level of coverage they must reach. Broadcasters are obligated to roll-out infrastructure to ensure audiences are reached.

        Promises of Performance

        In addition to these contributions, broadcasters frequently make additional contributions which are captured in their licences as promises of performance. These include extensive training obligations over and above the obligations under the Skills Development Act, such as the payment of a certain percentage of turnover towards training; and additional payments into other funds such as language and bursary funds.

         

      4. This regulation results in significant contribution to the diversity of South Africa’s cultural landscape. These contributions are seen as a justifiable exchange for the use of public frequencies. In being granted access to these frequencies, however, broadcasters are not given an exclusive licence. The regulator may licence competitive services when it so decides. ICASA recently announced that it in this financial year it will be considering whether additional commercial radio licences should be issued.
      5. The legislation and regulations are the legal framework within which the broadcasting industry operates and there are a variety of checks and balances to ensure compliance with this legal framework. There is a requirement, for instance, that in addition to a substantial annual licence fee (between 1% and 2% of turnover), each broadcaster submits an annual report to ICASA detailing its compliance with licence conditions.
      6. The policies and regulations governing the industry have been developed in consultation with broadcasters and are supported and complied with by the industry. This is evident in broadcasters’ support for South African music which exceeds the minimum requirement in broadcasters’ licences.

    2. BROADCASTER SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC
      1. Music radio is required to comply with a quota of South African music. At present this means that one in five songs played on radio must be South African. This quota is presently being reviewed by ICASA.
      2. In ICASA’s report, it is evident that there is wide compliance with the quota. The community sector generally exceeded the quota while, amongst public and commercial stations only three services were deemed not to have complied.
      3. During the local content hearings, broadcasters reiterated their support for local content regulation. Appearing at these hearings on behalf of the industry, the NAB committed itself to the letter and spirit of local content regulation and put forward a proposal for a variable quota which takes into account the amount of South African music being produced in each genre. We also proposed that, along the lines of the Australian AMPCOM model, the regulator convene a forum of all stakeholders whereby quotas are raised in accordance with commitments to increased production by the recording industry.
      4. In addition to the quota, broadcasters give substantial ‘in-kind’ support for South African music. For instance, the 33 radio broadcasters that responded to a KPMG survey had, during 2000, held an average of:

      1. This translates into a total of 5448 events per year in addition to compliance with the quota, which contributed to the promotion of South African music.
      2. Over and above this exposure, radio broadcasters in the course of 2000 made substantial financial contributions to the development of domestic music. These contributions took the form of:

      1. Broadcasters support South African music all year round but make a special effort during South African Music Week. During South African Music Week 2001, the NAB surveyed 20 music radio stations and found that the stations made available over R1.4m in airtime for promotional spots in support of South African Music week. Midi Trust, the organisers of South African music week, report having received substantial support from both radio and television broadcasters to promote South African Music Week.
      2. It is evident that the support of broadcasters for South African music frequently takes the form of additional contributions which are not mandated through licence conditions or regulations. We believe that these contributions are an indication of good faith on the part of the broadcasting industry.

 

 

    1. BROADCASTING STILL IN FLUX
    2. South Africa’s present broadcasting industry has developed in a short space of time. Most commercial broadcasters are only four years old. Many community broadcasters are only months old. As a young industry it has not yet fully stabilised, as is reflected in the following:

      1. The SABC is still the most significant player in the industry - it has three out of four free-to-air television channels and twenty radio stations. Even though it commands significant adspend and audience, it has a formidable public service mandate to achieve and revenue streams which fall short of supporting this mandate. The SABC still has to implement the recommendations of the Broadcasting Act which may see an increase in its contributions to education, language and programming diversity.
      2. Of the 15 commercial radio stations, eight are greenfields operations. Just one of these greenfields stations has broken even. None of these stations have yet recouped losses that have accumulated over the past four years. Two stations suspended broadcasting in 2001 due to financial difficulties.
      3. The only commercial free-to-air television station e-tv has only been on air for three years and is only expected to break even after another two years.
      4. The community radio sector, for a variety of reasons, is still struggling to reach financial sustainability. Largely made up of under-resourced, grass-roots community stations, these stations are all non-profit and are frequently run by volunteers.
      5. Instability in the broadcasting industry has affected investor confidence in broadcasting. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) last year among investment analysts concluded that broadcasting is no longer perceived as an attractive area for investment.

       

    3. IMPACT OF NEEDLETIME ON RADIO
      1. Within broadcasting, radio is likely to be most directly affected by the introduction of needletime. Given the likely significance of this impact, a full study would be needed to measure the economic, social and cultural implications. These implications would need to be weighed up with the likely benefits arising from needletime. In the absence of such a study, the NAB has provided a broad analysis of what impact needletime could have on radio.
      2. Below is a breakdown of the annual gross advertising revenue per radio station.

Over R50m per annum

R30m – R50m per annum

R15m - R30m per annum

 

 

 

 

 

R5m - R15m per annum

Under R5m per annum

      1. As can be seen, the assumption that radio is a highly lucrative sector is incorrect.
      2. While radio is certainly growing year on year and is maintaining its share of adspend relative to other media, real growth, after being discounted for inflation, was 4.1% per annum between 1996 and 1999.
      3. Actual growth for the first quarter of 2001 was 2% and, worryingly fell to –2% for the second quarter. This corresponds to negative real growth for the year to date.
      4. What is striking about the radio sector, is that of all the private commercial music stations, only six were profitable in their last reported financial year.
      5. Revenue from profitable SABC stations are used to cross-subsidise the SABC’s public mandate. The SABC declared a R98m deficit at the end of their 1999/2000 financial year.
      6. The losses for the rest of the radio industry are estimated to run into tens of millions of rands per annum.
      7. The financial position of community radio is particularly dire. The average earning from advertising for community radio ranges from about R6000 per month to about R30 000 – R40 000 per month. Costs range from R5000 to R50 000.
      8. Both radio and television rely heavily on advertising for their revenue. In a tough economic climate, marketing costs like other costs are reduced. Already commentators are predicting zero growth in adspend for this year. One commentator has stated that "with economic conditions worsening, 2001 looks likely to be South African advertising's worst year since 1985".
      9. In this climate, where a number of radio stations are already struggling to reach a break even point, the needletime amendments, which would result in an additional levy on gross turnover for all broadcasters using sound recordings, could have severe consequences for the radio industry. We believe the needletime amendments will reduce the profitability of a few stations and drive the bulk of the sector into further debt

    1. CONCLUSION - HOW WILL NEEDLETIME IMPACT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
      1. Broadcasting, like other media, is presently facing difficulties. We do not believe these challenges are insurmountable. However, the difficulties of a young sector are likely to be exacerbated by the introduction of needletime.
      2. Needletime will introduce an additional right to performers and producers and the consequence of that right will be that broadcasters will have to pay a new royalty for playing music. This will add to the already substantial costs that broadcasters pay for music use.
      3. The needletime right therefore represents a direct increase in the cost of doing business for broadcasters. If the right is granted, broadcasters will not be able to avoid this cost. Music radio could not, for instance, convert to talk radio, as ICASA stipulates that radio stations may not deviate more than 15% from their licensed format.
      4. It should be noted that broadcasters are already paying substantial amounts for existing content rights. NAB members estimate that the amount presently paid by broadcasters for content related rights could be as much as R90m annually. Needletime will not replace these costs but will merely add to them.
      5. The needletime amendments will affect all radio stations that play music. Community stations, greenfields stations and our public broadcaster in particular are likely to be profoundly affected.
      6. Our initial analysis indicates that the likely consequence of needletime will be to reduce the profitability of a few stations and to drive the vast bulk of the sector into further debt. The closure of some radio stations could therefore follow. It is therefore also likely that needletime could act as a disincentive for future investment in radio.
      7. As well as causing a loss of jobs and investment, the closure of radio stations would represent a reduction in the diversity of media voice. Each day nearly 400 hours of radio programming exposes South African music. Over 100 hours of local, national and international news in all South African languages is broadcast each day.
      8. Ironically increased financial pressure on radio stations would also detrimentally affect the music industry, as radio’s ability to act as a powerful promotional tool for music would be constrained.
      9. We submit that a full impact study is needed in order to quantify the impact needletime will have on the broadcasting industry and to inform a decision on whether the amendments act in the best interests of South Africa. The NAB is committed to participating in further consultative processes to undertake such studies.

  1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEEDLETIME ROYALTY
    1. WHAT NEEDLETIME DOES
      1. We can see from our previous arguments that needletime has the potential to damage the broadcasting industry. Let us now look at whether it will substantially advantage local artists as it is intended to.
      2. Although needletime is frequently characterised solely as a mechanism which supports local artists, it is primarily a direct intervention in the business relationship between broadcasters and recording companies. In short – needletime confers a new right which ensures that a portion of revenue is diverted from the broadcasting industry to the recorded music industry.
      3. At present, although the recording industry is declining in value both globally and locally, the South African radio and recording industries do not differ significantly in value. These industries have a symbiotic relationship and rely on each other. Broadcasters do not levy a fee against record companies and performers for advertising and promoting the products of the music industry, when in all justification they could. Rather broadcasters choose to promote this product and earn revenue from advertisers while record companies and artists earn revenue through the sale of that product.
      4. Needletime will result in record companies receiving payment from a source which was not intended by the Copyright Act. The existing framework envisages that record companies derive revenue from sales. The Copyright Act gives recording companies protection to derive this revenue. This revenue stream may have suffered in recent years due to factors such as piracy but we submit that this is not sufficient justification for introducing a new revenue stream which acts to the detriment of the broadcasting industry.
      5. Artists usually earn the bulk of their income through live performances and sales. It is reported that internationally, artists are challenging standard contracts in the recording industry. Artists complain about the long-term nature of the contracts, and that they are prevented from owning their original music. Rather than intervening in the contract based relationship between artists and recording companies, the introduction of needletime is likely to weaken the radio industry in order to directly advantage the recording industry. Given the structure of the South African music industry, it will be primarily multinational interests within the recording industry who are likely to profit from this intervention.

    2. VALUE OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY
      1. The value of sales of recorded music in South Africa was just over R1b in 2000. This is on a par with the gross estimates of the value of the South African radio industry, which in the same year was estimated to have generated approximately R1b in gross advertising revenue.
      2. These estimates of the recording industry’s value exclude other revenue streams from sources such as the production of CDs and royalties. Including these streams would increase the total revenue of the sector. In contrast, radio revenue is made up almost exclusively of advertising. Estimates of gross radio advertising revenue do not take into account agency commissions, discounts, self-promotions, trade exchanges, added value and free public service announcements. The NAB estimates that actual net radio revenue is between 20% and 40% under the gross estimates, varying from station to station.
      3. The South African music market experienced steady growth in sales by value between 1995 and 1997. Between 1992 and 1999 the value of the market expanded by 114.4%. By 1998, however, sales by value had started to decline. In 2000, the industry experienced a negative growth rate of 12.4% in sales by value.
      4. In their report on the South African music industry, KPMG attributes this lack of growth to levels of disposable income driven by the relatively slow growth of the South African economy and continued high levels of unemployment.
      5. Despite the overall decline in the South African music recording industry, South African music has increased its market share to 23% of total sales by value during 2000.

    3. STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RECORDING INDUSTRY
      1. There are 5 major recording companies and 136 independent recording companies in South Africa. It is estimated that the majors control 90% of the South Africa market (R997m in 1999).
      2. With the exception of Gallo, the majors’ financial results, are not to our knowledge, publicly available. According to the Johnnic Communications audited financial statements, 2000 – 2001, the Gallo music group generated R469m in that year. These results include revenue from publishing, manufacturing, distribution, MFP and studios.
      3. The majors are all multi-national companies. We understand that there is no way of determining how much of the majors’ turnover stays within the South African economy.
      4. It is likely that the majors generate most of their revenue through the sale of international products which constitute 73% (R809m) of the total South African market.
      5. In contrast, most local music is produced by the independent sector. In interviews with 30 independent record companies, KPMG found that they produced on average four South African albums per annum. If extrapolated to the rest of the independent sector, this would total 540 local albums produced by independents per year.
      6. By way of comparison, EMI, BMG, Universal and Gallo reported to ICASA that they collectively produced 241 SA albums in 1999/2000. These figures did not indicate how many of these albums were developed by independent record companies who initially signed and recorded the artist and then licensed the product to a major. As of 1998, the majors commanded 90% of the total South African market by value.

    4. WHERE NEEDLETIME REVENUES WILL FLOW
      1. Needletime will be payable on all music flighted by radio stations – not just South African music. As more international than local music is currently played, this may mean that most of the benefits of needletime will flow to those who produce and sell international music.
      2. Currently, the local content quota in South Africa is 20%. Notwithstanding broadcasters’ support for local content, it is not likely that, in the short to medium term, a uniform local content quota could be set much higher due to insufficient amounts of South African product in all genres being produced by record companies. A representative from one of the majors has submitted that anything above a 25% quota for most commercial radio would be unsustainable at present.
      3. As is shown below, even if the local content quota is increased dramatically from its present level, local artists are still not likely to substantially benefit from needletime.
      4. As there does not appear to be any data on how needletime revenues would be distributed, the NAB asked KPMG to develop preliminary scenarios on how needletime royalties could be distributed in the South African market, presuming a 50/50 split in royalties between producers and performers and using the majors’ share of South Africa’s recorded music share by value as the determinant of market share. It should be noted that while these scenarios are not comprehensive the trends demonstrate how the underlying economic structure of the music industry would limit the benefits South African artists would derive from needletime. It should also be noted that the scenarios do not measure the royalty flows on actual music flighted. A more comprehensive impact study would need to do this.
      5. Scenario One

Presuming that:

For every R100 paid in royalties by broadcasters, the R50 for performers would be distributed as follows:

The R50 for phonogram producers would be distributed as follows:

For every R100 paid by South African broadcasters, only R11,00 is likely to reach South African artists and South African owned independent record companies.

 

 

      1. This flow of royalties does not change significantly with an increase in local content, as is shown in the second scenario.
      2. Scenario Two

Presuming that:

For every R100 paid in royalties by broadcasters, the R50 for performers would be distributed as follows:

The R50 for phonogram producers would be distributed as follows:

For every R100 paid by South African broadcasters, only R19,25 is likely to reach South African artists and South African owned independent record companies.

      1. It is sometimes argued that the flow of revenues outside the country would be balanced by an in-flow of royalties from other territories. However, to the NAB’s knowledge, no evidence has been provided to support this view.
      2. Based on the current usage of South African music internationally, using SAMRO’s royalty collections as a measure, the revenues from other territories would make up less than 4% of total revenues (local and international). SAMRO estimates that what it received in revenue from other territories (in respect of the broadcast, public performance and cable transmission of SAMRO repertoire) would total at most only 3.6% of its gross revenue for the financial year ending June 2000. Again, a comprehensive impact study could determine more accurately what South Africa could expect in royalty in-flows. The NAB submits, however, that South Africa cannot expect to receive a major in-flow of royalties from other territories.

    1. CONCLUSION - WILL ARTISTS SUBSTANTIALLY BENEFIT FROM NEEDLETIME
      1. From the preliminary scenarios laid out earlier, it appears that the benefits which will accrue to South African artists from needletime will be comparatively small. These benefits may not be worth the negative impact needletime could cause for the broadcasting industry and related industries.
      2. We further believe that South Africa generally may be disadvantaged by requiring South African owned broadcasting companies to pay royalties out to foreign rights holders and multinational companies.
      3. Needletime also does not envisage requiring recording companies to reinvest their royalties in the production of South African content so there is no guarantee that needletime will result in increased production of South African music.
      4. For the above reasons, we submit that there are other, more sustainable strategies, for growing the music industry and benefiting local artists.
      5. The introduction of needletime will also upset the balance of interests which currently exists between the broadcasting and recording industries, greatly advantaging the majors to the detriment of the broadcasting industry. The Copyright Act already protects record companies’ right to control the selling and hiring of sound recordings.
      6. We submit that a full impact study is needed in order to ascertain what benefits from needletime will flow to South African artists. The NAB would welcome further consultative processes which would provide the opportunity to undertake such studies.

 

  1. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION
  2. Our concerns about the affects of needletime on the broadcasting sector and the music industry are exacerbated by the amendments and the manner in which needletime is sought to be introduced. The amendments appear to be deficient in various respects. In our view the amendments have not been prepared in the context of a cogent and co-ordinated policy, are based on fundamental misconceptions, ignore international best practice and developments and fail to address issues of reciprocity.

    1. LACK OF CONSENSUS
      1. Both the Memorandum on the Objects of the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2001 and the Memorandum on the Objects of the Performers' Protection Amendment Bill, 2001(collectively "the Explanatory Memoranda") state, in paragraph 4, that consultations with stakeholders within the music industry have taken place and consensus was reached amongst stakeholders that the issue of royalties should be addressed by means of amending the Copyright Act, 1978 and the Performers Protection Act, 1978. The NAB believes that no consensus has been reached between all stakeholders in the music industry. In particular, it has always been the view of NAB that the introduction of needletime is not a suitable mechanism for addressing the difficulties faced by performers.
      2. We repeat our concerns that the NAB was not part of the Music Industry Task Team (MITT), which recommended the implementation of needletime. A letter to the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology outlining our concerns on the MITT Report, is attached as an appendix to this document.

    2. QUESTIONABLE POLICY BASIS FOR THE AMENDMENTS
      1. It appears that the amendments have been based on a policy which has been developed in isolation and without regard to the relevant existing policies of government and the regulators of stakeholders in the music industry.
      2. It is a grave concern that ICASA does not appear to have been consulted on the amendments. ICASA is the regulator of the broadcasting sector. As part of its duties, ICASA prescribes the licence fees payable by broadcasters and plays an integral role in the local music industry by, inter alia, prescribing local content quotas. Presumably, ICASA performs its duties in terms of a considered policy based on considerations as to the development of the local music industry and ensuring the sustainability of the broadcasting sector. The amendments will have a significant influence on the success of ICASA's policy and may jeopardise this policy by placing excessive burdens on broadcasters, which burdens have not been contemplated by ICASA.
      3. It is fundamental that a co-ordinated and consistent policy is established between government, the legislature and ICASA. Without such a policy, the amendments may only serve to undermine the efforts and mandate of ICASA and ultimately compromise the sustainability of the broadcasting sector.
      4. To the extent that the amendments are based on policy, the basis and principles on which this policy and its objectives are based must be questioned. We note that there has been no Green paper / White paper process to provide for comprehensive analysis and consultation on this matter. Such a Green paper / White paper process could have included a full cost-benefit analysis, could have developed detailed impact scenarios and could have brought together all industry stakeholders. These stakeholders would have included ICASA who, as indicated above, has a statutory obligation to ensure that the broadcasting industry remains viable.
      5. On a reading of the Explanatory Memoranda, we understand that the amendments seek to address the payment of royalties to performers and owners of copyright in sound recordings. They also seek to address inequitable agreements relating to the payment of royalties which are disproportionately in favour of broadcasters and recording companies. These issues are, however, a symptom of larger problems faced by performers (by way of example, it has been argued that performers are subject to onerous recording contracts and are exploited generally, not only with regard to the payment of royalties). It is the NAB's view that the correct approach is to address the causes of the problems faced by performers, rather than the symptoms. In this regard we refer you to our discussion below of an alternative solution to needletime, as it is the NAB's view that the alternative solution proposed by NAB will address these causes.

    3. DISREGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE
      1. As has been shown above, it is critical that a balance is achieved between the interests of the recording industry, performers and the broadcasting industry. In examining needletime legislation in territories where it has been applied, we note that some jurisdictions have attempted to achieve this balance by:

      1. There does not appear to be any indication that these issues have been considered in the preparation of the amendments. Due to the complex nature of the South African broadcasting industry, as described earlier in this submission, it is imperative that the above issues are explored and that a real attempt is made to understand the impact of needletime and how the adoption of international best practises can mitigate any negative consequences and achieve a balance between the interests of stakeholders.
      2. We repeat that a full impact study is necessary, including a comprehensive cost benefit analysis with reference to international models prior to the introduction of needletime.

    1. INAPPROPRIATE EXTENSION OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
      1. The failure to account for international trends and practises is further reflected in the fact that the amendments seek to give the copyright owner (recording companies) additional exclusive rights relating to the use of sound recordings.
      2. Section 9 of the Copyright Act presently provides that copyright in a sound recording vests in the author (the person or company by whom the arrangements for the making of the sound recording were made) the exclusive right to do or to authorize the doing of any of the following acts in South Africa:

      1. It is apparent from this section that the present section 9 deals with limited exclusive rights in respect of restricted acts namely, prohibitions against copying, duplications, conversions, translations, alterations, reprint and so forth.
      2. The proposed amendments introduce exclusivity in respect of three more restricted acts, namely:

      1. We are concerned that the amendments give producers an exclusive right to refuse to authorise the use of a sound recording, irrespective of whether the broadcaster offers to pay a royalty. The enquiry as to the value of the royalty in terms of the proposed section 9 A will only take place after authorisation or consent for the use of the sound recording is given. The question as to what is an appropriate royalty only falls to be determined when and if consent is obtained.
      2. We understand that an exclusive right was unsuccessfully lobbied for inclusion by the recording industry in WIPO’s negotiations pre-1996. The outcome of those negotiations – the WPPT treaty – does not provide for an exclusive right but instead grants broadcasters a compulsory licence to use sound recordings subject to the payment of an equitable remuneration to performers and producers.
      3. It should be noted that the South African recording industry has also previously indicated that it would no longer pursue an exclusive right.
      4. Without conceding the merits of giving owners a right to receive additional royalties in the form of needletime, it is the NAB's view that the amendments to section 9 are not necessary in that the objective of ensuring that owners of copyright in sound recordings receive revenue in the form of royalties can be effectively achieved through the proposed section 9A. It is possible to provide that such copyright holders receive royalties without granting exclusive rights for the performance and broadcast of sound recordings.
      5. We submit that the granting of an exclusive right to owners of copyright in sound recordings is unreasonable, too extensive and contrary to international developments.

    1. LACK OF RECIPROCITY

      1. It is noted that the amendments do not make any provision for reciprocity i.e. restricting the right of remittance to any rights owner resident in a jurisdiction which does not offer reciprocal benefits to owners of rights in South African sound recordings.
      2. We understand that unless a reciprocity provision is specifically included, royalties will be paid to rights holders in other territories which will not pay to South African rights holders. We believe that this may mean a net outflow of millions of Rands while no revenue is received in return.
      3. We understand that some countries which have introduced needletime have insisted on reciprocity provisions. We submit that the absence of these provisions in the amendments is irregular and inequitable for South African rights holders.

    1. MISUNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
      1. Perhaps one of the reasons for the proposed introduction of needletime in South Africa relates to South Africa's adoption of the World Intellectual Property Organisation ("WIPO") Performers and Phonograms Treaty ("the WPPT Treaty"). Paragraph (1) of Article 15 of the WPPT Treaty provides as follows:
      2. "Performers and producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to a single equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of phonograms published for commercial purposes for broadcasting or for any communication to the public."

      3. Paragraph (3) of Article 15 of the WPPT Treaty, however, gives Contracting Parties the discretion whether to adopt the provisions of paragraph (1) in whole, in part, or at all. Paragraph (3) provides that:
      4. "Any Contracting Party may in a notification deposited with the Director General of WPO, declare that it will … not apply the provisions of paragraph (1) at all."

      5. Needletime should therefore not be introduced as a result of a misconception of South Africa's obligations arising from the WPPT Treaty. It should also be noted that the implementation of the WPPT Treaty is by no means universal – we understand that, in addition to the fact that there are just 50 signatories to the WPPT Treaty, only 24 of these have ratified and acceded to the WPPT Treaty, with many of these taking advantage of the reprieve provided by paragraph (3) of the WPPT Treaty and choosing not to introduce needletime.
      6. It is submitted that the reason why Contracting Parties are granted a discretion to adopt the provisions of paragraph (1), relates to a recognition that each Contracting Party is unique and in different stages of development. It may therefore be inappropriate and unsuitable for a Contracting Party to adopt paragraph (1). In light of our submissions above regarding the fact that our broadcasting sector is in its infancy and that many South African broadcasters face significant financial challenges, the South African situation is one where the ill considered adoption of needletime will be detrimental to the local broadcasting and music industries at such a critical stage of their development.

    2. ADDITIONAL AFFECTS ON TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AND THE FILM INDUSTRY
      1. It appears that the proposed amendments to the Performers’ Protection Act go significantly further than making provision for changes relating to copyright in respect of sound recordings and will have a dramatic impact on the television broadcasting sector. The performances covered under the Act appear to include musical as well as dramatic works, and will accordingly affect all films and dramatized television programs produced and broadcast in South Africa, regardless of their musical content.
      2. The apparent introduction of a compulsory statutory royalty for the broadcast of any performance, widely framed to include dramatic as well as musical performances, in the proposed section 5(1)(b) of the Performers' Protection Amendment Bill, will have the necessary effect of making every performer in a cinematograph film (as defined in the Copyright Act) an effective copyright owner in the work, regardless whether the performer is a lead cast member or small part extra. This means that a broadcaster will have to negotiate a royalty in respect of every performance for its right to broadcast a cinematograph film and will give even the smallest part performer an effective right of veto over the broadcast of major television films and programs, regardless of the amounts which the commissioned film producers have paid such performers in respect of their acting contributions to the film or television production.
      3. The same effective veto powers appear to apply in respect of the storage and archiving of broadcast material (so-called ephemeral copies) in the proposed amendment to section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Performers' Protection Act. A broadcaster now has to obtain each performer’s consent to store a television film or program for which it has paid the performer if it wishes to store copies of the film or program for a period greater than six months.
      4. Clearly the above will have fundamental and far-reaching impact on the way that film producers and broadcasters do business in South Africa and, to the extent that neither film and television producers nor broadcasters have been consulted on this element of the proposed legislative changes, it carries the real risk of plunging this important developing industry into chaos. Broadcasters cannot accept that such important aspects of their legitimate business by subject to approvals by performers (large or small) who comprise only one discreet part of the creative process of television programming.
      5. We note in this context that the real issues at hand relate to questions of payments for repeat broadcasts which are properly issues of collective bargaining between respective industry representatives rather than intellectual property rights.

 

 

 

 

 

  1. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
    1. BACKGROUND
      1. The NAB is dedicated to finding a lasting solution to the challenges and problems currently faced by all stakeholders in the South African music industry. We believe that any solution which is implemented must be well considered and provide tangible and enduring benefits for the South African music industry.
      2. The needletime amendments seek a solution to the problems facing stakeholders in the music industry. While these objectives are laudable, the amendments may not result in the achievement of these objectives and could be detrimental to the South African music industry.
      3. In light of the above, the NAB proposes the establishment of The South African Music Development Fund as a solution which will not only achieve these objectives, but will also provide benefits to the entire South African music industry. As broadcasters’ require local material to air, it in broadcasters’ interests to have an environment in which South African music thrives. Unlike the needletime amendments, the NAB's proposed solution will provide significant, long lasting and tangible benefits to all stakeholders, including South African performers and recording companies. We have made proposals on a structure for such a fund but the details of such a fund would need to be finalised in further consultation with music industry stakeholders. The fund could alternatively be housed in an existing institution such as the National Arts Council. This proposal does also not preclude discussion on other proposals such as that of a provident fund proposed by the SABC.

    2. WHY THE NEEDLETIME AMENDMENTS MAY NOT ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES
      1. As we have seen earlier, in order to understand why the needletime amendments may not achieve the objectives, they must be considered in the context of the structure of the entire South African music industry and the unique problems and challenges it faces.
      2. For instance, in South Africa local music constitutes only 23% of total sales by value whereas sales of local repertoire in countries such as Brazil and Turkey is well over 70%. South African performers also allege exploitation and inequitable contractual relationships with recording companies. South African performers also have difficulty in generating significant and sustainable revenues. These problems are compounded by the inefficient distribution of royalties to performers.
      3. Notwithstanding this, the problems faced by South African performers cannot be viewed in isolation, without being aware of and considering the challenges and difficulties faced by other stakeholders in the South African music industry.
      4. It must be recognised that broadcasters face severe economic challenges with many broadcasters struggling for survival as a result of increased competition, prohibitive operational costs (including licence fees), extensive regulations and diminishing revenues.
      5. Broadcasters, performers and recording companies have an inter-dependant relationship. Broadcasters are a vital and cost-effective means for performers and recording companies to market and promote their products. As broadcasters do not charge recording companies for promoting their products, recording companies are able to limit marketing and promotional costs while enjoying the significant benefits of increased sales of their products arising from the exposure given to those products by broadcasters. Further, broadcasters also play a vital role in raising the profile of local performers and giving exposure to local performers. An example of this is the significant exposure obtained by performers through initiatives such as South African Music Week.
      6. To the extent that the financial and operational viability of the broadcasting sector is jeopardised by legislative developments such as the needletime amendments, this will effectively compromise the inter-dependant relationship between broadcasters, performers and recording companies. Ultimately, the very entities which the needletime amendments seek to protect, performers and recording companies, will be prejudiced and suffer as a result of increased burdens imposed on broadcasters.
      7. It is also apparent that the needletime amendments will result in limited benefits for the local recording industry and local performers. As the recording industry is dominated by large international recording companies representing international performers, most of the royalties paid by broadcasters will ultimately enrich foreign recording companies and foreign performers. The needletime amendments may potentially compromise the South African broadcasting industry in order to further enrich foreign recording companies and foreign performers. As has been shown above, any benefits for local performers and local recording companies will be limited and short-lived.
      8. While the needletime amendments may appear to be a solution to the problems of South African performers, the NAB submits that in reality it is a short-sighted approach that will only provide a temporary and partial solution. Ultimately the needletime amendments will undermine and jeopardise the sustainability of the South African music industry with detrimental results for stakeholders.

    3. THE NAB’S ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC DEVELOPMENT FUND
      1. It is NAB's view that the any real solution must take account of all the factors affecting the South African music industry and must seek to achieve a balance between the interests of all stakeholders. We submit that the only real solution is one which will provide ongoing and enduring benefits, while ensuring the development of the South African music industry.
      2. The NAB therefore proposes the establishment of The South African Music Development Fund as an alternative to the needletime amendments. It is envisaged that The South African Music Development Fund will be a non-profit organisation, administered by representatives of all stakeholders and having the primary objective of developing and investing in South African performers and recording companies. Consultation should, however, take place with government and stakeholders in order to identify the most appropriate structure and principles to govern the fund.
      3. What follows below is a broad outline of the general principles and objectives which NAB believes should underlie the operation of The South African Music Development Fund. It is envisaged that industry-wide consultation will take place to address the specific details relating to the structure and administration of the fund.

    4. STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION
      1. The South African Music Development Fund should be administered as a non-profit organisation. For this purpose, it is suggested that The South African Music Development Fund be operated through a company registered in terms of section 21 of the Companies Act No. 61 of 1973, or, through a trust. The fund could also be a statutory body created by legislation. As a section 21 company, a trust and a statutory body must be operated in accordance with the relevant company, trust or empowering legislation, this will have the additional benefit of ensuring the proper administration and accountability of The South African Music Development Fund.
      2. The objects and powers of the section 21 company will be detailed in its Memorandum of Association, while the Articles of Association will dictate the manner in which The South African Music Development Fund is to be administered. To the extent that The South African Music Development Fund is operated by a trust, the objects and powers of the trust will be detailed in a trust deed. The manner in which the trust will be operated will be contained in the rules of the trust. If the fund is a statutory body its objects and powers would be created by the empowering legislation.
      3. The board of directors (if a section 21 company is established) or the trustees (if a trust is established) will comprise of parties representing government, performers, broadcasters and recording companies. This will ensure the involvement of all stakeholders in the decision making processes.
      4. It is anticipated that regional offices may be established with regional representatives. A project manager / managing director will be appointed to co-ordinate regional and national initiatives and report to the directors or trustees.
      5. Relevant mechanisms will also be implemented to ensure accountability, good corporate governance and reporting to government and stakeholders, while still allowing for flexibility with regard to the objects of The South African Music Development Fund in order to ensure that it remains effective and continues to address the current needs of the beneficiaries.
      6. Appropriate dispute resolution procedures will be established to address any disputes which may arise between stakeholders and beneficiaries.

    5. OBJECTIVES
      1. The objectives of The South African Music Development Fund will include the following:

 

 

    1. BENEFICIARIES
      1. The beneficiaries of The South African Music Development Fund will be stakeholders in the South African music industry. Additional eligibility criteria will also be imposed. In respect of performers, it may be necessary to require that a performer must have had a full length release within the last two years, the copyright of which must be 100% owned by South Africans. Alternatively it may be necessary to require performers to demonstrate significant support and investment from a recording company. With regard to recording companies, it may be necessary to impose additional eligibility criteria relating to the length of time that the recording company has been in business, the number of new recordings released by it and the number of artists contracted to it. The company should also hold the South African ownership in the copyright of the masters of these recordings.
      2. It will be necessary to allow for flexibility to introduce new beneficiaries and vary the eligibility criteria should a justifiable need arise.

    2. HOW WILL THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC DEVELOPMENT FUND ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES

The South African Music Development Fund will achieve its objectives as follows:

    1. HOW WILL THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC DEVELOPMENT FUND BE FUNDED
      1. It is envisaged that The South African Music Development Fund will be funded primarily by broadcasters and other stakeholders. The value of contributions will be determined by a proper analysis of the value of contributions which can be made by broadcasters without jeopardising or threatening the existence of broadcasters.
      2. Additional revenue will also be obtained through revenue generating projects and initiatives implemented by The South African Music Development Fund, including festivals and concerts. Attempts will also be made to secure endorsements and sponsorship from the private sector. Mechanisms will be implemented to ensure that revenues are reinvested in the South African music industry and limit revenue flow outside of South Africa.
      3. A limit will be imposed on the percentage of revenues which are directed to meet administrative costs.

       

    2. WHY IS THE FUND MORE SUITABLE THAN THE NEEDLETIME AMENDMENTS
      1. There are a variety of reasons why The South African Music Development Fund is more suitable than the needletime amendments.
      2. Unlike needletime, The South African Music Development Fund provides a holistic solution to the problems encountered by performers, recording companies and other stakeholders and nurtures the inter-dependant relationship between performers, recording companies and broadcasters.
      3. The South African Music Development Fund encourages the development and growth of the entire industry and the reciprocal investment in local artists, rather than short-sighted and temporary solutions. This will be achieved by means of the direct involvement of stakeholders in order to identify and implement co-ordinated solutions with the objective of securing enduring benefits.
      4. The South African Music Development Fund guarantees that revenues remain in South Africa and are reinvested for the benefit of the South African music industry.
      5. Furthermore, The South African Music Development Fund is dynamic and provides flexibility in order to address issues as and when they arise.
      6. The NAB also proposes that professional, consistent and predictable management and administrative procedures are implemented, with accountability and reporting to government and beneficiaries. These features are absent from the needletime amendments.
      7. Ultimately, The South African Music Development Fund focuses on South African interests and will ensure significant, rather than incidental, benefits to South African performers and recording companies.

  1. CONCLUSION
    1. The debate about the introduction of needletime is frequently emotional. Understandably South African artists are frustrated by aspects of our country’s music industry. Unfortunately needletime has been characterised as the solution to these problems and has been championed on that basis.
    2. We submit that needletime is not a suitable solution for South Africa. Our broadcasting industry is still young and is struggling to find its feet. Our music industry is dominated by foreign interests. These interests are likely to be the primary beneficiaries of needletime.
    3. Broadcasters are an important feature of South Africa’s cultural landscape and we fear that the consequence of needletime may be to damage this industry. We submit that this would not be in the public interest. We submit that the impact on broadcasters of the needletime amendments must be given consideration.
    4. We believe South Africa needs a holistic strategy for the music industry which takes into account our unique context. This strategy could look at various aspects affecting the music industry including the local content quota, the need for increased production of South African music, the piracy problem and contracts between recording companies and artists. Such a strategy would endeavour to obtain consensus from all stakeholders on appropriate, long-term plans for growing our local music industry.
    5. Broadcasters are committed to working with other stakeholders on such a strategy. We believe the South African Music Development Fund could form a key part of such a strategy and we ask that you consider this alternative solution.
    6. We thank you for the opportunity to make this representation.

APPENDIX 1

LETTER FROM THE NAB TO DACST

ON CONCERNS ABOUT THE MITT REPORT

 

 

Dr Rob Adam

Director General: Arts, Culture, Science and Technology

Private Bag X894

Pretoria

Fax 012 325 2768

10 September 2001

Dear Dr Adam

RE: MUSIC INDUSTRY TASK TEAM (MITT) REPORT

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) represents South African broadcasters who are major users of South African music. The NAB is therefore fully supportive of strategies to grow the South African music industry. The NAB is, however, concerned by some aspects of the MITT report (‘the report’) released on 30 August 2001, which we believe do not give adequate consideration to the position of broadcasters. We have laid out these concerns for your information:

  1. NAB participation in the MITT
  2. Footnote seven in the report states that no broadcaster made a submission to the MITT, and that although the NAB was approached to make a written submission or to present at one of the five regional hearings it declined on the grounds that its views had been communicated through the Department of Trade and Industry.

    There unfortunately appears to have been some sort of communication problem on this matter because the NAB received no such invitation. Attached, for your information, is a letter from the NAB chairperson at the time laying out our concerns on this matter.

    The NAB is concerned that the report could give the impression that the broadcasting industry purposefully boycotted the MITT. The NAB wishes to restate its commitment to finding solutions to the problems faced by the South African music industry and its willingness to participate in any deliberations on these issues.

  3. Characterisation of needletime as only being payable to performers

Both section one on page seven and footnote six on page 20 of the report characterise needletime as copyright protection for performers alone. Footnote six explains that "it gives musicians the right to receive remuneration when their repertoire is either played on radio or performed live". Mention is not made in the report of the fact that 50% of any needletime royalty will be payable to producers of sound recordings (record companies). Given the dominance of multinational major recording companies in the South African industry, the NAB is concerned that the bulk of any needletime levy will be paid to these multinational interests and not necessarily to South African musicians. This has been one of the major reasons why the NAB has opposed the introduction of needletime.

The report does also not make explicit the fact that all musicians, not just South African musicians, will receive needletime payments. Given the limited production of South African music in all genres and hence the dominance of international music on broadcasting services, international musicians will receive greater benefit from needletime than South African artists. This is a further reason why the NAB has supported other mechanisms, such as a fund for South African musicians, rather than the introduction of needletime.

The NAB is concerned that the report does not make explicit who the major beneficiaries of needletime are likely to be.

3. Statement that no further public consultation on needletime is required

The NAB notes page nine of the report which states that "no further public consultation on the needletime issue is required". The NAB submits that given the very grave concerns of broadcasters on the efficacy of needletime as a solution to the problems in the South African music industry and the negative impact needletime could have for South African broadcasters, further detailed consultation is required. In particular, the NAB submits that a detailed cost-benefit study exploring the likely impact of needletime, should be undertaken. The NAB is concerned that the report seems to exclude the possibility of any further public deliberations on this matter.

  1. Statement that broadcasters are not adhering to the local content quota

Section four of the report states that broadcasters are not adhering to the local content quota. No evidence for this assertion is provided. The NAB notes that this statement is contrary to ICASA’s report on compliance with the local content quota, issued in December 2000, which shows that only three radio broadcasters were deemed not to have complied with the quota. The report also shows that many broadcasters exceeded the minimum quota.

In addition, in research conducted by KPMG on behalf of the NAB, it was found that broadcasters provide substantial ‘in-kind’ support for South African music, in addition to their compliance with the quota. In 2000, contributions by radio stations totaled:

The NAB is concerned that the report could be read to cast doubt on broadcasters’ commitment to South African music and to local content regulation. The NAB wishes to reaffirm that the broadcasting industry is fully committed to the objectives of local content regulation and to compliance with local content quotas.

  1. Recommendation that a quota of at least 50% be set
  2. Recommendation nine of the report states that the local content quota should be increased to 50%. The NAB is fully supportive of local content regulation and increased airplay of South African music in genres where sufficient South African music is being produced. However, as is detailed in KPMG’s Music Industry Report 2001, record companies produce variable amounts of South African music in different genres. The NAB therefore believes that quotas should be set for licensed radio formats in line with the supply of South African music within those formats. The NAB has made detailed proposals on an industry forum which could liaise with the regulator on the production and airplay of South African music in all genres.

    The NAB is concerned that the recommendation in the report does not take into account the variable supply of South African music per genre or the extensive proposals made by various stakeholders during ICASA’s local content inquiry held earlier this year.

  3. ASAMI figures

Attached as an appendix to the report are figures prepared by ASAMI which seek to compare the performance of the South African radio and recording industries. The NAB is concerned that by attaching these figures to the report, they are accepted as a valid and objective comparison of the two industries.

The NAB submits that ASAMI / RISA is championing the introduction of needletime and that its analysis of the state of the two industries must be seen in this light.

For instance, the figures in the presentation compare the value of radio advertising with the value of sales of local music on cassette. The value of sales of international product (the primary revenue source for major recording companies) are excluded. We therefore do not believe this is a valid comparison.

The NAB is concerned that the ASAMI figures used in the report do not give a full or accurate picture of the state of the radio and recording industries.

The NAB hopes that the information above will assist in deliberations on the MITT report and on strategies for the South African music industry.

The broadcasting industry would like to reiterate its commitment to engaging in further consultative forums on these important issues in order to assist in developing appropriate strategies to grow the South African music industry.

Yours sincerely

 

 

RANDALL ABRAHAMS

CHAIRPERSON