Appendix to PIOC Report
Minister of Defence
Deputy Minister of Defence
BMATT REPORT FEB 0l
INTRODUCTION 1. This is my last written report to you before I depart at the end of March. As such, it will comprise:
a. An overview, from my perspective, of my last 3+ years of monitoring the integration process. The content and tone is deliberately worded to provide you with background notes for any briefing you may shortly need to produce for the Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee (PIOC). Hence, for ease of reference, I have also included a few statistics which I briefed you on last month.
b. The detailed BMATT Service Commanders reports to their respective Service chiefs at…
These are more comprehensive and probably not for the PIOC but they record, for completeness, the progress, or otherwise, since last month.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE 2. BMATT regular reporting of delays, unfairness, lack of transparency; obstructionism and transgressions of the mutually agreed integration rules may sometimes appear unduly negative, especially to the Services who feel criticised: the Services may even occasionally wonder if they are achieving much! It is therefore important, periodically, to keep any such criticism in overall perspective. Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world have reminded objective observers that the integration process in SANDF has still been a remarkable success, by any yardstick. The 3 incidents in the last 18 months at Tempe, Phalaborwa and Simon's Town were undoubtedly serious setbacks and important lessons needed to be learned. However, there have also been well over 2,000 days when nothing so extreme happened. The complex and sensitive integration process will always be particularly vulnerable to the actions of the unbalanced minority or disaffected individuals but, hopefully, these local storms have now been weathered and the subsequent Boards of Inquiry should have reassured all concerned that the causes as well as the effects of such events will be investigated thoroughly and their findings exposed transparently;
3. Racism is still widespread in South Africa and it would be naive to expect SANDF to be isolated from it. Eradication of it will not happen overnight but we do see some encouraging signs, especially amongst the youngsters. The vast majority of SANDF members appear to be simply getting on with their jobs, and with their work mates, whatever their personal feelings may be. Unfortunately; the media thrives on 'racist' stories - 'good news is no news' - and the achievements of the majority can be severely prejudiced by the publicity afforded to the extreme incidents which are widely broadcast. Such episodes polarise the former forces and disrupt the progress which has been made towards achieving cohesion. It is also injurious to discipline, morale and SANDF efficiency when individuals allege racism to cover up their own shortcomings, and this is an all too regular occurrence.
4. Notwithstanding BMATT's monthly recording of delays and inefficiency, the total Bridging Training (B Trg) bill is gradually being eroded and the package is currently about 85%complete. Promotion of ex-NSF members who have completed their B Trg is actually quite rapid; in some areas it is now measurably faster than for other component groups. There are now 70 black, Asian or Coloured Brig Generals or higher (out of 197), 23 Major Generals or higher (out of 48) and 9 Lt Generals or higher (out of 14). There is still a white bulge of Colonels and Lt Colonels (1,666 out of 2,045) and WOls and WO2s (2,695 out of 3,602). However, these ranks are the areas where the majority of the command, training, planing, discipline and 'operating' functions are executed, and most conventional forces worldwide would have a similar reservoir of experience and expertise in these key areas. Clearly representivity in these key ranks does need to improve, but it would be more constructive if this happened through rapid development and training rather than through tokenism or by a white exodus.
5. The core areas of capability remain largely unchanged i.e. white dominated. Integration of thousands or non-statutory forces, the majority with disadvantaged educational backgrounds, was never going to affect seriously the representivity figures in areas of technical, medical, naval or aviation specialisation. It is probable that a number of members did not have their potential in these areas fully assessed or developed in the early days ('94,'95) but the reality is, generally, that most of the ex-NSF members had no chance of gravitating into those specialised niches. The only core area to date where real progress has been made (and a few risks taken) is in the infantry where 8 out of 20 battalion commanders are black (6 ex NSF, 2 ex TBVC). The best hope for changing the status quo in most of the other core areas is by aggressive and highly focused recruitment of young black men and women (especially those aged 16 to 21) with maths and science qualifications. Innovative, bold and well targeted programmes to attract these young people are needed now.
6. Nonetheless, and despite all the setbacks and shortcomings, the integration process is on course. It is true that some standards have dropped, discipline has suffered and the effectiveness and deployability of the Force is probably lower then it should be. But the 'gloom merchants' often conveniently ignore the sheer scale and pace of change which SANDF has been subjected to, simultaneously; during the last 3 years. Transformation, in all its forms, reduced budgets and fundamental re-structuring would have diluted the capability and morale of most, well established, conventional forces let alone a fledgling force trying to meld together former forces of radically different backgrounds and expertise. Thus while SANDF still has a long way to go to be truly cohesive, it is a relative 'miracle' that so much has been achieved, so far.
7. In the broadest terms, the last 6 months have seen the restoration of equilibrium following the incidents at Phalaborwa and Simons Town. As more of the 'old guard' take VSPs or natural wastage occurs, and as more of the 'new guard' gain confidence in their new responsibilities, HQs in particular have become less polarised and more convivial workplaces. Our greatest source of encouragement for the future, however, is the quality and attitude of the youngsters who have joined since 1994 and have no baggage from any previous forces. They now constitute the second biggest component of SANDF (12,479 vis a vis 43,486 ex SADF, 10,734 ex MK, 5071 ex APLA and 5,970 ex TBVC). In places like the Army Gymnasium at Heidleberg. SAS Saldanha etc, the young men and women are not only undergoing arduous training together but, importantly, also play sport and socialise together. And hence are arguably far better integrated than their superiors and elders.
8. More specifically, each Arm of Service has made varying degrees of progress in the last
6 months. In order:
a. South African Army. The Army continues to bear the brunt of the integration process having taken about 6 times the number of ex NSF integratees that the other 3 Services took altogether (since 1994, the Army has taken 18,000 out of the 21,000 ex-NSF integratees). Of those still serving, in the Army 'proper' i.e. those not in another joint 'Pool,' 99% have completed their Basic B Trg, 95% have completed their Corps B Trg and 89 % have completed their Career B Trg (longer courses like the Senior Staff Course). The figures are not so high in other 'Pools', like Joint Support, due to the length and availability of more technical courses. In short, the overall B Trg package in the Army is about 95% complete and virtually all of the remainder have been tracked down and put on to the necessary courses this year. Pass rates in the training institutions have remained high and there is now a discernible impression of most instructors doing all that they can to pass students rather than find ways to fail them. The vast majority of instructors work harder than their students.
b. SAAF. 'Steady progress' is the verdict as ex-NSF members complete their scheduled courses. Not all the senior ex-NSF officers have covered themselves in glory but at least there is now a one Chief Director (Maj. Gen. Ngema) and 2 more newly promoted Brig Gens to protect their former charges' interests from within the chain of command. BMATT has briefed the Air Command Council on our views apropos improving representivity in the core areas, especially for aircrew, which remain predominantly white. We understand that a recruiting initiative is underway and that up to 2,500 prospective candidates have been identified. The reality is that with only 755 ex-NSF integratees since 1994 (8% of SAAF), there were never enough non-white members to affect representivity totals markedly. Real progress will need to come through the recruiting channels, and speedily.
c. SAN. A real injection of momentum has taken place since the arrival of the new Chief of the Navy in Nov 00. He has issued clear guidance, clarified divisions of responsibility and given sharp deadlines by which actions are to be completed. In particular, the long running saga of re-ranking virtually all former MK and APLA ranks is now nearing completion. An innovative solution is within reach (this month?) which should not compromise consistency across SANDF and is, in BMAT’s opinion, very generous to those affected. The appointment of Rear Admiral Mudimu to CDMS (the de facto Deputy Commander of the S.AN) is a very welcome development, as is the departure of some disruptive non-contributors. Significantly, the SAN's recruitment of black youngsters is hugely encouraging: 31% of young Sub Lts are black and 48% of the ensigns (ESNs) - remarkable statistics vis a vis 1994 when less than 1% of officers were black. It is a pity that so few, so far, have volunteered to go to sea in a warfare branch.
d. SAMHS.. SAMHS has now completed 91% of its B Trg remit and we are optimistic that the recent decisions to allow SAMHS to conduct its own personnel and logistics courses will not only reduce the figures further but will also clear out a backlog which had built up in those trades over several years. Some recent promotions of ex NSF officers to Maj Gen and Brig Gen rank should also ensure that the interests of the ex MK and ex APLA members are better catered for from within the Chain of Command. We also welcome the Surgeon General's decision to invite all the "over 50s' to complete an abridged version of the senior staff duties course this year to qualify them quickly without subjecting such senior folk to undue pressure when they have so little residual service. During the last 6 months we have also done a 100% audit of ex NSF members and SAMHS now has a very accurate handle on the B Trg bill. Courses have been allocated to all who need Basic B Trg, less for 3 members who are still sick.
AREAS OF CONCERN 9. None of the major areas of concern are new, indeed some have improved recently but the scale of them is such that they cannot yet be considered as having been 'solved.' Six months ago, our principal concern was the level of indiscipline, and it is still so. When over 8,000 members were awaiting court martial (as a comparator, the SAN is only 7,000 strong) something had clearly gone seriously wrong. There were many contributory reasons why the numbers were so large, the main concern was arresting the decline and restoring respect for sound military discipline and the morale and standards that are thereby engendered. The advent of the Code of Conduct has helped; at least everyone now has no excuse for not knowing what SANDF, and the country, expects of them. The removal of the worst criminals remains vital not least because of the harm that such bad apples can do in the barrack rooms, especially to the keen and able youngsters. Without having access to the latest figures, it is nonetheless our view that indiscipline has at least 'plateau'd out' if not decreased. We still recommend that the Code of Conduct is prosecuted with vigour, and that offences are dealt with fairly, transparently arid speedily. Too many officers and NCOs had become too wary of imposing discipline in case they were accused of racism. Commanding Officers in particular must have the confidence to do what is right, albeit in a compassionate way, and know that they will be supported by their superiors, especially the Generals, regardless of former force.
10. Anxietv about Transformation Staffing. There is now less anxiety about transformation staffing than there was 6 months ago - i.e. does the Individual rnember have a job in the transformed structure? The concern remains most acute in the Army, which is still scheduled to take almost all the cuts. But the fact that no enforced redundancies have yet occurred, and that there is less widespread speculation about retrenchment, has at least partially assuaged their concerns:
11. Dubious Oualitv of Staff Work. In general terms, we view a great deal of the policy and guidance coming from the Defence Staff Council and higher Defence Force fora as being both clear and progressive. At the other end of the scale, we similarly view the performance of most tasks at unit level and below (battalions, companies, air stations, ships, hospitals, sick bays etc) as being recognisably effective. It is therefore doubly disappointing that so many of the observations, delays, and criticisms that BMATT has reported over the years, as well as in the last 6 months, can only be attributable to the dubious quality of the staff work between the 2 levels (i.e. Maj. Gen. to Lt Col level responsibilities). Poor passage of information, lack of co-ordination of effort, unwillingness to accept responsibility, lack of anticipation, foresight or initiative and a variety of other shortcomings have been regularly reported and, to varying degrees, account for the policy not being fully delivered in the units. BMATT has refrained from implicit criticism of the new structures - the bottom line is that no matter how complicated, arcane or 'different' they are, they must be made to work, and not used as an excuse for non-delivery. The net result has been regular under-utilisation of courses and scant resources, career disruptions or delay to promotion prospects, and additional confusion for many officers and their staffs who are trying to get to grips with their new responsibilities
12. Pay and Promotion. It is with some relief that I report that we have heard less complaints about pay in recent months. There are still too many pay problems; often as a result of the individual members' indiscipline or financial over-commitment' but some progress is discernible. The most common grievance around the units is still frustration about promotion, invariably because they want the additional money not responsibility. Clearly there is a direct linkage with both success on courses and comparison with peer groups but, overall, expectations are also over-optimistic. Only the very best get promoted at the earliest stage of eligibility (i.e. minimum time in rank) in any Defence Force but the common perception that a member will be promoted once he or she has completed the minimum period in rank creates unrealistic aspirations. More education and information needs to be disseminated, if necessary by ex-NSF officers doing personal briefings at unit level to their former comrades.
KEY MILESTONES / DEADLINES / TASKS 13. I am optimistic that several key milestones can be achieved this year, and a few essential integration tasks thereby brought to a successful conclusion.
14. End of Integration Bill. The key activity is the End of Integration Bill, which we understand will occur by 31 Mar 01. This ‘drawing of a line in the sand' is a watershed between looking forwards instead of backwards. Despite the criteria for eligibility to join S.ANDF, it is reasonable to assume that after nearly 7 years those who really want to enlist have done so already. Some may have been delayed by studies or by being in jail but those numbers have been fairly small for some time. A final 'final' intake is currently being planned to mop up the stragglers (the DSC has approved 139 names but we understand there may be just over 200). Whatever the numbers, we would strongly recommend that their assembly; induction and Basic B Trg course starts within a month i.e. before 30 Mar 01. Thereafter, there will of course be a need to continue to run B Trg courses until everyone, including those in the final intake, has completed their individual Basic, Corps and Career Courses. And this will, realistically, take a further 2 years. But the total numbers should not exceed a few hundred in each Service and hence should no longer seriously affect their corn activities.
15. End ofDemobilisation. Demobilisation as an integration task should also therefore cease as at 31 Mar 01. The longer it has run the more it has been in danger of being abused, and the more it has cost (already over R260 million).
16. End of Verification. The SAAF, SAN and SAMHS have completed the verification process and the Army has recently (this month) completed its auditing of the files. The long standing vexed issues of RSA citizenship and Educational Qualifications have at last been resolved and all that remains is the bureaucracy of dispatching 7,000 letters of acceptance to the members concerned, and their return of that correspondence. Hence, clerical activities aside, verification should also be complete by 31 Mar 01.
17. Completion ofBasic B Trg. The saga of tracking down the final 100 or so members of the Army who, for a variety of odd reasons, had not completed their Basic B Trg courses, has run for months but the latest figures from the Army indicate only 33 members now come into the category: (SAMHS has 3, SAAF and SAN nil). With a possible intake of 139 to 200 from the ‘final’ intake (see 14 above) it seems sensible to run one final, multi-service Basic B Trg for the 250 (max) members in all these categories, at 3 SAl in Kimberley starting in late Mar. Completion of Basic B Trg, for everyone affected in all 4 Services, could thus be complete by 30 June 01.
18. In my opinion, the delay in the start of rationalisation/retrenchment has been very beneficial. The implications of discarding about 20,000 soldiers which gave us great concern 2 years ago, have been abated by the passage of time and the 'withering on the vine' during that period. SANDF is now only 9,348 above its transformation target of 70,000. The SAN and SAMHS are already about 1,000 arid 800 respectively below their transformation target and the SAAF is only 200 over. Hence while, in theory, the Army still needs to shed about 9,000, natural wastage is accounting fbr about 3,000 a year across SANDF. While it is not BMATT business per se, we still wonder whether SANDF will have enough battalions to meet its SAPS/border and other duties if it also has to commit battalions to PSO abroad, and has to relieve them in place. (Experience elsewhere has shown a need to keep 4 or 5 battalions in the orbat to keep one battalion deployed overseas and working on 6 month roulement ‘tours'). In short, the spectre of retrenchment is receding and will do so further if intra-Governmental department transfers also take place (e.g. to the SAPS). The sobering predictions about the onset of HIV/AIDS should also militate against an indecent haste to discard trained soldiers albeit the average age of the infantry in particular is too high. Finally if some members still need to be dismissed, there may be merit in applying linkage to the ill disciplined, sick and non-contributors - and keep the 70,000 who will contribute most to SANDF, both overseas and at home.
OTHER CONCERNS 19. Some members of the PIOC and elsewhere (academia, and within SANDF) may possibly think that 'story so far’ is too upbeat and that there are more problems than we have articulated. We certainly do not under-estimate the problems but we also see risks in exaggerating them too. Yes, there is still a white officer/black troop perception amongst many, especially in units. Some white officers are still too rigid in implementing 'rules' and there is a worrying lack of concern for the training, welfare and care of many junior ranks. Some pay problems take too long to resolve, some members wait far too long for courses and, in their opinion, for promotion. The clearance rate for disciplinary offences is woefully slow and the loss of white expertise is also of major concern. Mentorship is often weak, both by the donor and by the receiver. And just as there is a natural inclination for members to personalise problems there is also a risk that people hearing these problems generalise about the extent and depth of them too.
20. We also feel that the training world, up to and including combined arms formation training needs some attention if the ex-NSF members are to really make their presence felt. There are still far too few ex-NSF and ex-TBVC instructors at Staff Colleges and in the Training Schools/Institutions with the result that white enclaves remain in too many areas. Allowing members only to apply for the jobs they want, in the areas they prefer, will maintain this status quo. It is in some ways symptomatic of a number of the integration dilemmas of the individuals' rights or wishes versus SANDF's requirements. In some areas, SANDF may have been too accommodating to the individuals' circumstances. Whilst this is a laudable 'fault', any sizeable deployment e.g. a 2 battalion group for PSO abroad would contain a significant number of sick (cardio vascular, psychiatric etc as well as HIV/AIDS), unfit/obese, welfare cases (e.g. single parents with dependant children) and uncommitted members (those who regard SANDF as a day job, not a career commitment).
21. There are many other concerns, some of which are integration issues per se, others which impact on the overall integration aim of achieving a genuinely cohesive force. It is true that many junior ranks still feel absorbed rather than integrated into SANDF and rules can still be interpreted/manipulated to suit the circumstances. Hence, while it is foolhardy to ignore the extent or nature of these problems – especially when remembering the damage that can be inflicted by one sufficiently aggrieved or disturbed member with a weapon - it is also important to note that the vast majority of the problems are known about and are being addressed. We are as frustrated as anyone is by the slow speed of resolution of some of these problems, especially as some appear to us to be pretty straightforward to rectify. Perhaps more of the Maj. Gen. to Col level officers (802) should individually and collectively accept responsibility to help delivery of the desired product: it is in everyone's interests.
CONCLUSION 22. I hope this report has indicated that progress on integration is neither as good as you would wish but not as bad as the pessimists say. The latter can often unfairly blame integration as the reason for shortcomings in Defence capabilities elsewhere and take little heed of the other contributory factors like limited funding. Similarly, while progress in the last 6 months has not been the most noticeable of my time here, it has not been the worst either. In short, 2 steps forward one step backwards.
23. We have been encouraged by the impetus since our Jan 01 report to you: there have definitely been foxes running around inside the hen house since then! As a result, I believe that the deadlines suggested last month are now even more achievable. The End of Integration Bill should also provide additional impetus to progress the final intake of integratees (130-200?) before the integration gate closes. Thereafter, processing the resultant B Trg and the residual B Trg packages should be more procedural and relatively straightforward.
24. I believe it is also important to record the contribution of the unsung heroes and heroines of the piece. I suspect that Ministers, Generals, BMATT and all sorts of other agencies could do all within their power to make integration a success but without the compliance - willing or passive - of the vast majority of the ordinary SANDF members, for less would have been achieved and far more setbacks have resulted. Like Service personnel in most professional forces, the majority has simply got on with the task in hand, even if they have moaned beneath their breath! Most of the disaffected or obstructionist factions have left and once all parties turn their loyalty totally to SANDF instead of their former forces, there will be a sound base upon which to build further.
25. As this is my last report to you, may I thank you for all your support to BMATT during your tenure of appointment. It has been a huge privilege to be 'on the inside' and witness this remarkable integration process which, warts and all, remains the most successful of its kind in the world. You, CSANDF, the Secretary for Defence, the 4 Service Chiefs, Lt Gen Matanzima, Lt Gen Masondo and countless others have afforded great support, access, hospitality and generosity and I wish you all the very best of luck with all your endeavours in the future.