RESPONSE OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY TO THE "PENULTIMATE REPORT ON THE WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN RESPECT OF PUBLIC HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS
Cape Town: October 20, 2000

This document comments on the above-captioned report ["the report"] released in Cape Town on October 11, 2000 for deliberation by the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs ["the Committee"].

At the outset, it must be stated that the report is so constructed as to support the conclusion that the White Paper on International Migration is flawed and the process of policy formulation needs to begin again from scratch. The Chairman of the Committee proposed this conclusion even before hearings were held and the report gives the impression of being completely directed towards and instrumental to finding reasons and justifications to support this conclusion. One cannot find other ways to explain the many distortions, inaccuracies, irrational statements and factual errors with which the report is punctuated throughout. After reading the report, one does not identify a clear reason to support the statement that the White Paper is flawed.

The contents of the report often have little to do with an objective analysis of the issues of migration control raised and addressed in the White Paper. The report is burdened with chapters designed to conduct unwarranted and often preposterous political attacks and puts forward bizarre notions about policy making, legislative process and the role of the Committee, all of which should be expunged from the report to give it some degree of credibility. As it stands, the report is a disgrace to our parliamentary institutions and the quality of their documentation. Furthermore, the report completely ignores the preliminary comments offered by the Department of Home Affairs ["the Department"] in a detailed written submission presented when the antecedent of this report was tabled in the Committee. This highlights the report's intention of pursuing its thesis, irrespective of arguments and facts to the contrary.

1. Introduction
It is true that the Committee has the responsibility of supervising the activities of the Department, including its processes of policy formulation and legislative drafting. However, the Committee is under the obligation of discharging this responsibility rationally and in good faith. Like in respect of any other organ of the State, the discharging of a responsibility for purposes other than those for which it was granted, and in an irrational, biased or tendentious manner, constitutes an abuse of power. As it will appear from the contents of these comments the distortions contained in the report would constitute an abuse of power if the Committee were to adopt it.

It is irrational for the Committee to have stubbornly proceeded to consider the White Paper without, and outside the parameters of, its implementing draft legislation. This has resulted in dialogue and discussions being held on erroneous assumptions and general statements intended only to offer a basis for the formulation of actual legislative options. A policy document creates a mere framework which can only be understood in detail if read against the chosen legislative options. Instead of matching the general statements of the White Paper with general comments or criticisms, the submissions discussed in the report raise issues of detail which have been addressed in the draft legislation, or are the product of erroneous assumptions on how the White Paper could be implemented through legislation.

The conduct of the Committee is even more peculiar in light of the White Paper not yet having been formally tabled with it. The White Paper was adopted by Cabinet on March 31,1999 and published the day after. Thereafter, the Department solicited comments to direct its drafting of the legislation to give substance to the White Paper. Within this context, the Department and the Minister approached the Committee to request its inputs along with all other public inputs. The Minister indicated that the matter was urgent and that it was his intention to finalise draft legislation for public comments by the end of 1999.

A draft Immigration Bill ["the Bill"] was finally published on February 15, 2000 and reflected the many inputs and comments received by the public. However, by that time, the Committee had made no comments nor started its public hearings. It would stand to reason that the public hearings should have concentrated both on the White Paper and the draft Bill. After its publication, the draft Bill received a vast number of comments which led to its reformulation in many substantive aspects, leading to a consultative conference held on July 6 and 7, 2000.

Throughout the history of the new South Africa, policy papers have been considered by portfolio committees together with draft legislation in different forms, including Bills already adopted by Cabinet or draft documents produced by the relevant departments for purposes of consultation or public comments. There are even cases in which the policy document reached Parliament after the relevant portfolio committee began deliberations on the Bill. The constitutional task of Parliament is that of processing legislation, and portfolio committees are required to focus their attention on Bills. Policy documents are aimed at the formulation of legislation and they should not be read in abstract.

The Committee is only now beginning to finalise its deliberations on the White Paper, 19 months after its adoption by Cabinet. Immediately after its adoption by Cabinet, the Department began the process of drafting what is universally recognised as urgent legislation. It would have been impossible and totally against the interests of the country for the Department, to wait until this time, or perhaps the end of this year, before beginning the process of drafting legislation, which in itself took from November 1999 to August 2000. This would have meant a further delay of almost two years in providing needed solutions which can no longer wait. The report indicates that there is no reason for such a dramatic delay, for it fails to articulate any intelligible criticism of substance to the direction taken by the White Paper and its draft Bill. Its only thesis is that the process must start again, to which end a variety of pretexts which do not survive critical scrutiny are employed.

Therefore, paragraph 1.4 remains unintelligible as it purports that the report is the "synthesis" between the White Paper posed as a "thesis" and the public hearings posed as an "antithesis". In fact, as pointed out in the attached comments of the Department, the summary of the public inputs and feedbacks do not match the issues at hand, nor the proposals of the White Paper and its implementing legislation, and therefore are not their "antithesis". Moreover, the "proposals" contained in the report are unrelated to both, and its 20 principles, irrespective of their questionable merits, have little to do with migration control or the dramatic issues confronting the Department, which makes them no "synthesis". These principles are immaterial to the formulation of solutions to the difficult choices confronting migration control and, if anything, reflect how distant the report is from even entering the realm of actual discussions and analysis of the relevant issues. It is unfathomable how such principles could be used to "carve legislation".

2. Background
The summary of the White Paper set out in the background is incoherent, for the shift of administrative and policy emphasis to law enforcement is but one of a multifaceted policy approach which includes a variety of proposals including main-streaming the criteria and procedures for the issuance of permits, the techniques for law enforcement, an ongoing process of policy formulation based on interdepartmental cooperation and public input, and the complete restructuring of the migration function on the basis of a new structural and administrative model of administration. The snippets selected from the executive summary and the conclusions of the White Paper are hardly representative of what this complex legislation and administrative reform is intended to be all about.

3. Parliamentary mandate
It is legally incorrect to utilise the Rules as a source for parliamentary powers and functions, for their purpose is that of organising and providing internal arrangements in respect of the powers and functions granted to Parliament by the Constitution.

4. Constitutional function
The exercise of this function is centred around the role of the legislature, which must be exercised within the boundaries which prevent any abuse of power and define the difference between good faith and bad faith. The exercise of powers should be finalised in the pursuit of national interest and not petty political agendas, especially when the line function concerned is faced with such a dramatic crisis as that confronting Home Affairs.

5. Rationale
The difference between the "deductive" approach ostensibly used in the White Paper and the "inductive" one allegedly underpinning the report is neither understandable nor traceable in either document. If anything, the White Paper utilises elements of empirical analysis.

6. Process
The process outlined in this section of the report should be read against the unusual circumstances of a White Paper not yet formally tabled before Parliament. It is also unusual that the process of a parliamentary committee and its report would rely so strongly on requests sent to, and approvals received from, the Chief Whip of the majority party, as if he were the spokesman of the whole of Parliament. This is an identified procedural flaw of this process which betrays its misguided intent.

The process highlights that public hearings did not begin until May 16, which is about 14 months after the adoption of the White Paper, 8 months after the Department had solicited inputs from the Portfolio Committee on the White Paper, and 3 months after the publication of the draft Immigration Bill which benchmarked the issues and parameters of public debate.

7. Observations
The Department prefers to distinguish between temporary and permanent residence, reflecting accepted terminology, and one wonders why the report would wish to introduce a completely new terminology. The reference to the White Paper mentioning a shift of emphasis to a community based approach to migration control is a selective misstatement, for the White Paper deals with a community based approach only in respect of how to structure law enforcement activities, which are but a small segment of the overall system of management of migration regulation.

8. Actual content of the public hearings
The summary of public inputs is flawed. We are not in the position of stating whether the summary reflects what was actually conveyed during public hearings. However, it is clear that what was offered or what was registered and minuted is not entirely germane to the purpose of the hearings. Perhaps the chairmanship of the hearings did not focus the inputs on the subject matter concerned and people spoke about the present situation or irrelevant matters rather than the policy for the future. Moreover, not having had the benefit of discussing and commenting on the Bill, the possibility of going astray on relevant matters was enhanced and multiplied.

Furthermore, many of the comments relate to matters falling under the responsibility of other line functions, including tourism, trade and industry, labour, education, safety and security, and health. Migration control does not formulate policies in respect of these matters but it wishes to be the mere gate keeper which ensures that those who come in as tourists, businessmen, investors, or workers, comply with the policies and requirements set out by the relevant line function departments. In certain respects, migration control will need to make these requirements specifically applicable to foreigners or determine the conditions under which foreigners would qualify for the application of such policies and requirements. However, such determinations are not contained in the White Paper nor in the Bill, for they are bound to change from time to time and under various circumstances.

The White Paper and the Bill merely provide a matrix to ensure that such determinations are performed from time to time in the most satisfactory manner which, they suggest, must be centred around and rely upon interdepartmental coordination, public participation, and the regulation-making process which reflects and respects public inputs. This is set out in principle in the White Paper and in detail in the Bill. Discussion should have been focussed on the adequacy and desirability of the proposals made, rather than on the actual but abstract details of what could be the outcome of such determinations.

Another flaw of the public hearings is the total confusion between present and future, for a great deal of the comments relate to present problems which are readily admitted by the Department and acknowledged by the White Paper, rather than to the solutions designed to address such problems. It is concerning that the critical analysis of these comments presented by the Department on September 12, 2000 has not been taken into account. We see no reason to repeat the contents of such submission, which is endorsed, hereby incorporated by reference and attached hereto as Annexure A. Many others have long been overtaken by further stages of the public debate. Furthermore, it is clear that most of the issues discussed in this section have been addressed by the reformulation of the August 16, 2000 version of the draft Bill, which was distributed to the Committee. Moreover, it has long been accepted that many of the issues raised related to abstract and erroneous hypotheses on how the White Paper could have been implemented through legislation.

Reading the summary of public inputs, one cannot find one single and clearly identified flaw with the White Paper, especially when it is read together with its implementing legislation. There is no counterproposal nor critical objection to the proposals of the new legislative and administrative reform, nor its underpinning policies and intents. The public inputs show a great deal of dissatisfaction with the present system as well as a divergence of ideas, which always characterise migration control. It must be accepted that migration control must reconcile conflicting interests, for there will always be sectors of our society which are to benefit from a more open or a less open approach to migration control. For instance, the fact that both business and labour organizations criticize certain migration control techniques from different perspectives is almost unavoidable: the real question should be about how well the White Paper and its implementing legislation have reconciled, or struck a compromise between, the necessarily divergent interests of these two sectors of our society

However, even the inherent difficulty of conflicting sectorial interests does not seem to be addressed through the comments. In fact the White Paper does not decide how such interests are to be reconciled in detail, but merely sets in place a mechanism for it to happen. There is no criticism on whether such mechanism is adequate or desirable, or a better one should be put forward. Nor is there an indication that a preference exists that such mechanism be substituted by fixed and fast rules set in place once and for all in legislation or through the discretion of a department or its minister.

9. Report on the Lindela Repatriation Centre
This report seems unrelated to the White Paper, and is misplaced in the report.

10. Lebombo Border Post and related matters
Even though matters of importance, these matters have nothing to do with the White Paper and its implementing Bill, save for the possibility of focussing the mind on the capacity which the envisaged SAIS should have to deal with and solve these problems in a more effective and satisfactory way. However, even this assessment is missing. We have heard that the Department feels that things will improve if the proposed legislative and administrative reform is no longer delayed.

11. Recommendations of the Committee
Recommendations relating to the "beefing up" of the Lebombo Border Post, the reopening of the Mbuzini Tunnel, the granting of dual citizenship and the repairing of fences damaged by floods, have nothing to do with discussions on the White Paper.

12. The proposed principles
The proposed principles, irrespective of their merits, have little or no bearing on the actual formulation of policies, options and legislative solutions confronting migration control in the 21st century. They are generalities of dubious value and trite restatements of points of departure, with little capacity of setting direction. They do not even enter the debate of relevant issues. They give the perception that the Committee has not reached an understanding of the relevant issues. Even though one may not discard the value of their conventional and trite wisdom, this does not warrant their inclusion in the report of a parliamentary committee dealing with a serious issue of international relevance.

In any case, most of the principles have already been accommodated in the White
Paper, including the need for developing autochthonous solutions to meet South
Africa's own needs [Principle 1], the respect of the rule of law (Principle 2), the principle of equality [Principle 4], the notion of state sovereignty and security [Principles 5 and 7], the notion of legislative stability [Principle 11], the techniques for accountability, public awareness, public inputs and interdepartmental cooperation [Principle 12,13, 14. 16), and the notion of ensuring that whatever law is adopted is actually enforced (Principle 17). Discussion should be about how these principles have been adopted and implemented within the legislative proposals set out in the White Paper and its implementing Bill so as to make such principles relevant to the specific context of migration control. In respect of Principles 3, 8, 9,10,15,18,19 and 20, one cannot form a specific opinion nor react to them, for they are neither sufficiently detailed nor meaningful to warrant discussion. Rather than "principles", they sound more like sanctimonious outbursts of irrelevancies.

13. The ten significant stages in the legislative process
The "ten stages" identified in the report are not the stages of the legislative process as defined in the Constitution and do not reflect any established or accepted constitutional and legislative practice of our country. All stages of policy formulation are not part of the legislative process and, contrary to what has often been absurdly stated in the Committee, they have no relevance to the assessment of the constitutionality of a law adopted. It is legally absurd to suggest that matters relating to the formulation of green or White papers may affect the constitutional validity of a law, which depends exclusively on how the Bill is published and processed through Parliament and not on any underlying policy documentation or discussion.

The establishment of parameters for policy formulation is a prerogative of the executive, for it affects how it discharges its responsibilities. Furthermore, there are no established parameters for policy formulation. Certain legislation has been adopted without white papers, while in other cases the green paper stage was skipped to be substituted with consultation processes leading directly to a white paper. In most cases, the white paper has been accompanied by a draft Bill or even a Bill already tabled before Parliament. This has been the case for legislation ranging from refugees to local government, police, defence, land affairs, water affairs and culture. In fact, one cannot think of a single example in the past 6 years which has followed exactly the ten stages that the report pontificates as being a necessary part of the legislative process.

Furthermore, the purpose of a green paper is not that of putting forward an idea, but it has historically embodied a full draft policy, which has often not been substantially changed in the white paper. Furthermore, fully drafted legislation has accompanied white papers and very seldom has a draft Bill been crafted in a "skeletal" format. The stages of policy formulation set out in the report are in the mind of its author, not in the documented parliamentary practice of our country.

The incontrovertible fact remains that no other process of policy formulation has had as many stages and opportunities for public comments as the one about international migration, which has undergone the following stages during more than four year:
1. Public Notice to formulate policy
2. Cabinet approves green paper process, task team and terms of reference
3. Minister tables in Cabinet his input on green paper process
4. Public comments
5. Draft green paper
6. Green Paper approved by Cabinet
7. Consultative conference
8. Public comments
9. Cabinet approves white paper task team and terms of reference
10. Public comments and public hearing in all provinces
11. Cabinet approves White Paper with amendments and after long deliberations
12. Public comments
13. Draft Bill circulated among stakeholders and role players
14. Draft Bill published
15. Public comments
16. Consultative conference
17. Extensive Cabinet discussion on the draft Bill leading to substantial reformulation

The Committee was involved or could have been involved in all these stages, even though these stage in fact relate to the performance of an executive rather than parliamentary function. The Minister and the Department made several presentations to the Committee and the Committee and its members were invited to the public hearings, the consultative conferences, and various consultative stages organized by the Department, such as the workshop with the CED.

14. The views of the Portfolio Committee on the White Paper
The disclaimer relating to the lack of contribution of the Portfolio Committee formulation of the White Paper, which is repeated in the preliminary conclusions, is unwarranted and erroneous. The Committee participated in the process of policy formulation which culminated in the White Paper. During the green paper stage several of its members travelled abroad and during the subsequent stages the Committee was invited to participate in the public hearings, which invitation was accepted by many of its members. Furthermore, during routine meetings Director-General, Mr AS Mokoena, briefed the Committee on the White Paper maintained dialogue with it on the subject.

This disclaimer serves a political purpose of dubious value. It is also a shocking indictment of the Committee, for it would suggest that the public notices requesting comments and inputs are sufficient to stimulate the participation of stakeholders and role players but do not solicit those with the constitutional responsibility of making inputs to make their views known and become active in the process. Those who have chosen to stay on the sidelines have been in dereliction of the duty of their office, and should hardly point this out claiming that it was a flaw in the process.

The comments set out under the paragraph titled "Precedents" are incomprehensible because the two Acts mentioned therein are the current migration laws in the country. The issue at hand is that of substituting the Aliens Control Act with a comprehensive legislative and administrative reform. It is not clear what the report would have in mind when suggesting the adoption of an umbrella law on international migration of Aliens Control Act and the Refugee Act would be somehow implementations. It is a bizarre idea, never before aired.

The comments relating to the Minister seeking to "circumvent parliamentary procedure" set out under the title of "Recognition of ministerial initiatives" are utter nonsense and an intolerable insult to the Minister which is rejected with the contempt it deserves. Furthermore, there is no indication of how the Minister would have circumvented such procedures as reference is made to non-existing paragraphs in the report. Furthermore, the statement is even more bizarre if one thinks that no parliamentary procedure has in fact commenced, for nothing is before Parliament, neither the White Paper nor the Bill. The suggestion that an attempt has been made to pass a law outside a parliamentary process is either the product of ignorance or bad faith.

15. Briefing of the Committee at its October 3 meeting
This is the section of the report which more clearly shows its bias and intent to bend facts to accommodate a preset political agenda. While the summary of Minister Buthelezi's remarks is accurate, perhaps on account of his having spoken out of a prepared text delivered to the Committee, the summary of the briefing by Dr Oriani-Ambrosini is vastly inaccurate, which also questions the credibility of the summaries made in respect of the inputs of the public. The summary of his briefing does not capture its content and is presented in a simplified form, often mentioning examples without the point to which they attach.

The critique of the report of Dr Oriani-Ambrosini's briefing is false, vicious, and
unjustified. It is not true that he deviated from the essence of the White Paper for he spoke about nothing other than the White Paper. Reference to the Committee report were made to point out misunderstandings of the White Paper due to knowledge or because of sectorial interests. The statement that he rendered an "unscholarly presentation" for the purpose of "whitewashing" the white defamatory and totally groundless, for his presentation was excellent and highly professional. Whoever witnessed such presentation will find in this statement the acid test of the bias of the report. We formally request copies of the tape recording of Dr Ambrosini's presentation so that the transcript thereof may corroborate this point.

The statement that Dr Ambrosini presented a version of the White Paper "vastly different from the version the public got" is as bizarre as it is concerning, as it boarders on delusion, for he spoke about nothing other than the White Paper as it stands. It can only be explained if one did not read or could not understand the White Paper and its subject matter, or wrote the report in bad faith. The statement "the second version of the White Paper is calculated at selling the Immigration Bill" borders on surrealism because there is no second version and obviously whatever is said about Paper would reflect on the legislation which implements it. Perhaps whoever wrote this section of the report had such a biassed image of the White Paper that when confronted with the truth, he could not even recognize the subject matter.

It is not true that the issue of community based enforcement was "downplayed" at the meeting: this is not an issue. It is revealing that the report wishes to make it irrespective of contents and truth. The statement that the White Paper has already been implemented ahead of the adoption of legislation because it suggests that the Immigration Service may be headed by a Deputy Director-General, is nonsense, bordering on the surreal. The reform suggested in the White Paper and outlined in the Bill is a complex one which has nothing to do with Director-General, Mr BL Masetlha, not having attended a meeting of the Portfolio Committee.

The statement that Dr Oriani-Ambrosini "did not come prepared" for the briefing and "his set of notes did not address the White Paper in a coherent way", is vicious, defamatory and utterly false. Similarly so is the statement that his presentation "was not systematic" and relied on "scattered elements" from the Committee's report. Ambrosini presented a coherent written outline of his presentation which he followed methodically, in spite of interruptions from the Chair. His presentation was coherent and highly professional and made reference to his written presentation previously submitted to the Committee, but which at the time he was prevented from delivering.

It is preposterous to state that the Committee "still has not received a proper briefing on the White Paper by the Department" for the Department gave two presentations of about 4 hours and presented three documents with attachments consisting of 27,746 words and 54 pages, in addition to oral presentations, question and answer sessions and addresses by the Minister. The Department has also made itself available for further presentations and offered to workshop the interim report of the Committee to point out its flaws and deficiencies. This is an enormous and unprecedented amount of interaction with the Committee at a stage at which no Bill or White Paper has even been tabled before the Committee.

It is the responsibility of the Minister to choose the officials in the Department most qualified and knowledgeable to answer any given question or provide any given briefing. It is erroneous to state that the Minister acted improperly when he gave notice to the Department that his Director-General conveyed to him that he was not knowledgeable about the new policy and legislation to brief the Committee. The reference to the rules of Parliament and the Constitution set out in the report are misplaced and erroneous, for the Committee will not have the power to invite nor even summon someone without specific knowledge on the matter on which he or she asked to address the Committee. Once again the powers of the Committee would be exercised in bad faith and, therefore, ultra vires. For instance, the Committee could not summon an immigration official to brief it on civic affairs matters, and it is the responsibility of the Minister to ensure that this would not happen. This incident also shows the intention of the chairmanship of the Committee to promote mischief and create issues where they should not exist.

16. Preliminary conclusions
The statement that the process has been flawed is meaningless, unsubstantiated and erroneous. It has been made as a political a priori for which evidence has been sought after the fact. There is no basis to state that there are only 4 key players in a process of policy formulation which lasted four years and involved people of high stature and intellect. This is an insult to the many Members of Parliament, University Professors, high-ranking Government officials and professional people who served in the Green and White Paper task teams, including our First Lady, and we wish to have nothing to do with this generalized insult to their stature, credibility and reputation. Moreover hundred of people made submissions which were taken into account. It is plainly wrong to state that the White Paper is the product of the Minister, his Adviser, his then Director-General and his deputy Director-General and these four people alone "pushed this document... without the appreciation of the role of the Portfolio Committee". These untruths demean the many people who contributed to this labourious process.

The statement about the separation of powers is meaningless because, in our constitutional practice and jurisprudence, all white papers have been developed by the executive and, comparatively, have had much less public and parliamentary inputs than the process of formulating a new migration policy. Similarly, the statement that the Committee is "expected to rubber stamp" the document is as inflammatory as it is meaningless. Soon after the adoption of the White Paper, the Committee was asked to produce substantive inputs in the formulation of the legislation, as it was previously asked to produce inputs for the formulation of the policy. One can do no more than ask, and it is the Committee's responsibility to come up with the responses, if any. Any public request for comments is also addressed to the Committee and this process has had a record number of opportunities for public participation, hearings and comments. To this day no substantive proposal has been forthcoming from the Committee. Similarly, as stated above, it is incorrect that the Portfolio Committee did not participate in the development of migration policies and made no contributions towards it.

The Committee was offered ample opportunities to participate in a process which at this stage rests with the Executive until the Bill is tabled in Parliament. Moreover one should question why the Committee members chose the bizarre option of participating in a high-profile consultative international conference on the Bill merely as "observers" rather than people with something to say and the willingness to contribute to the work of the executive. In any case this statement is not correct because certain members of the Committee participated in the conference actively and with valuable contributions and their contribution should not be obliterated in the report's bias.

The final conclusion that "there is a preponderance for the aversion fear of White Paper" is wrong, whatever this incoherent language sought to express. Throughout the report there is no fact to substantiate this conclusion. The only two facts which are put forward are as sweeping statements, namely that the policy is "schizophrenic" and that it advances rational persuasions" while "it recommends measures that contradict the motivation". If the report intends to undermine the outcome of a four-year process of policy formulation, it must do much better than this and resort to some degree of intellectual depth.

It has been explained over and again that the drafting of the Bill could not wait indeterminately. Now that the report is out in its "penultimate" form, it is obvious that this was the right choice, for the parliamentary process has not highlighted any new elements which were not taken into account in the drafting of the Bill, beyond doubt that discussions on the White Paper without the assistance of implementing legislation translating general policy statements into tangible and administrative options is fruitless, confusing and punctuated with potential for
nonsense.

The continuing reference to paragraph 5.1 of the White Paper relating to the structure of the Immigration Service as having been already implemented by virtue of the Director-General briefing the Committee on migration matters is surreal. It clearly shows no understanding of the nature of the administrative reform and connects together two events with no relation whatsoever for purposes of finding support for the equally surreal suggestion that the White Paper has already been implemented before Parliamentary deliberation.

In reading the Bill, it becomes clear that issues or details such as those of the accounting officer are properly provided for and that there is no hidden agenda in what the Department is trying to achieve in the interests of the country. Similarly, the financial implications of the new policy could only be worked out once it is translated into actual legislative options, which has been done within the process of formulating the Bill and its submission to Cabinet. This shows once again that consideration of the policy document outside its implementing legislation is often meaningless, for it is not policy but legislation and administrative actions which carry financial implications and must be costed.

It is not true that Dr Oriani-Ambrosini "de-emphasised the emphasis on community
enforcement". He merely explained something which has been explained for the past 18 months, including by the Minister on two occasions before members of the
Committee. The accusation that he "put an acceptable gloss or veneer on the White Paper" is as vicious as it is unwarranted and possibly derives from the ignorance of law enforcement aspects of migration control under present legislation and in other countries, or as clarified in the Bill. The statement that "the authors of the White Paper constantly adjusted when it suits them to make it saleable" is perhaps the product of people wanting to find fault where there is none, finding reasons to reject the document not because of its content, but because of its origin. When confronted with the matter they end up thinking that something different is being presented to them.

It has not been stated that the proposals in the White Paper are "unconventional" rather that they are innovative. It has been stressed over and again that the 21st century poses challenges and opportunities which cannot be addressed in the mould of solutions drafted in the 19th century or early part of the 20th century. This has got nothing to do with "experiments or gambles", especially when existing solutions are proven to be inadequate and unsatisfactory.

In conclusion
1.The report contains no rational basis to support the statement that the White Paper should not be proceeded with;
2. The consideration of the 20 principles does not provide any tangible contribution to bring forward the debate on the real issues of migration control;
3. The statement that "we must go back to the drawing board" is the essence of the political agenda which the report intends to capture, which existed before any finding was made and has no relation whatsoever to the findings nor to the contents of the White Paper or the Bill. It is the political intention to hold this process to ransom, not because of its contents but because of its origin, and to this end feeble and even surreal pretexts are utilized both as points of procedure and as points of substance. The language of the report speaks volumes corroborating this conclusion;
4. Any further consideration by the Committee of the legislative and administrative reform on migration control should be based on the combined reading of the White Paper and its Bill, which will make discussions topical and relevant, being mindful that the primary role of Parliament is that of formulating and processing legislation, rather than policies;
5. The statement that the present process is "bottomed on quicksand" may be true only to the extent that there are people who, for petty political reasons and agendas, are creating such quicksand and have chosen to be part of the problems rather than part of the solutions, acting against the interests of the country in a matter which is disruptive rather than constructive. The Minister and the Department have constantly indicated their full willingness to take on board any substantive and relevant proposals the Committee may wish to make, as they have taken on board those which they have received from a broad variety of role-players and stakeholders, within the NEDLAC process and from many other Ministers and their departments within the ongoing process of Cabinet deliberation on the Bill.
6. As it stands, the report is not part of the exercise of the supervisory powers of the Committee, but represents the abuse of such powers employed in bad faith to pursue a political agenda contrary to the interests of the country, and, as such, it is illegitimate, unconstitutional and worthy only of being rejected in its entirety.