(a) a high standard of professional ethics;

(b) efficient, economical and effective use of resources;

(c) development-orientated public administration; and

(d) accessible and accurate information which fosters transparency.

(a) While it is permissible for the Bill to go beyond the mandate contained in section 33(3) of the Constitution, SARS has reservations about the unintended consequences for the efficient and effective administration of the Government and administration generally.

(b) Although requiring just and fair administrative action can and does promote efficient administration, this factor has not been given sufficient weight in the structure of the Bill. It is recommended that it could, for example, be specifically included as a consideration or factor in exempting administrators from some of the obligations in the Bill, or be set out expressly as a ground to be considered when assessing the suitability of procedures that administrators must follow or that the courts must consider when reviewing an administrative action and making an order.

(i) spell out the meaning of just administrative action in compliance with the Constitution and in a manner that is accessible;

(ii) place a positive duty on the State to give effect to those rights;

(iii) address the systemic problems that create an environment in which unjust administrative action can occur, in particular corruption and maladministration; and

(iv) provide a suitable, accessible and affordable mechanism of enforcing those rights.

(a) Clause 8 of Prof Jeremy Sarkin's draft Bill (AJU 29) provides for a set of "Standards for Administrative Action" which offers a framework for the adjudication of disputes by not merely looking at whether the action was authorised, but whether the legislation authorising the action complies with the Bill. It is recommended that a similar clause should be included in the Bill.

(b) It is suggested that a clause, similar to clause 13 of Prof Sarkin's draft Bill, which places an obligation on administrators to compile and maintain up-to-date registers of rules and standards used by them, should be included in the Bill. (See submission for a proposed formulation of such a clause.)

(a) The range of Presidential functions excluded from the definition of "administrative action" has been extended to include section 84(2)(e), (f) and (j) of the Constitution. These exclusions are consistent with the decision in President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) (the SARFU-case). As similar exclusions should be made in relation to the provincial Premiers, it is proposed that the reference to "section 127(2)(a), (b), (c), d) and (f)" in paragraph (ii) of the definition should be replaced with a reference to "section 127(2)".

(b) In view of the finding in the SARFU-case, namely that the constitutional responsibility to ensure the implementation of legislation is an administrative responsibility which will ordinarily constitute "administrative action" within the meaning of section 33 of the Constitution, the exclusion of section 85(2)(a) of the Constitution from the definition of "administrative action" should be reconsidered. There is also no reason for the blanket exclusion of section 85(2)(e) of the Constitution. It is proposed that the reference to "section 85(2)" in paragraph (i) of the definition should be replaced with a reference to "section 85(2)(b), (c) and (d)".

(c) It is not clear why—

It is proposed that the reference to "section 92(3)" in paragraph (i) of the definition should be replaced with a reference to "section 92(3)(b)". (Compare the reference to section 133(3)(b) in paragraph (ii) of the definition.)

(d) The Constitutional Court remarked in the SARFU-case (at paragraph 143) that "[d]ifficult boundaries may have to be drawn in deciding what should and what should not be characterised as administrative action for the purposes of section 33". The Constitutional Court made it clear that certain acts, decisions etc. of certain organs of state are not "administrative action" for the purposes of section 33 of the Constitution. As a result, the view is expressed that the definition of "administrative action" may well be unconstitutional. In order to address this problem, a formulation along the following lines is suggested:

(a) It is submitted that the definition of "administrative action" is too wide and should be more narrowly construed. The above definition also needs to be reconsidered insofar as Government's various roles are concerned. The issue of Government's role as employer have led to suggestions that all matters governing that relationship should be dealt with in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which is adequate to ensure all the safeguards envisaged by the Bill.

(b) In terms of the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the public sector, it is contemplated that all Public Enterprises operate as efficient businesses which are able to compete with the private sector. It is recommended that the role of Public Enterprises who are required to operate on a commercial basis should be reconsidered and that they should be exempted from the provisions of the Bill.

(a) The phrase "rule or standard" should be defined as it is not clear whether it includes subordinate legislation, directives, policy statements, circulars and guidelines made by an organ of state or other person performing a public function.

(b) The exclusion of the legislative functions of a "municipal council" in paragraph (iii) will mean that municipal regulations will become undisputable as far as the application of the Bill is concerned. Such exclusion is questioned.

(a) policy decisions made by Ministers constitute "administrative action" and are therefore subject to the requirements of the Bill; and

(b) the list of exclusions relating to the functions of the National Executive excludes policy decisions from the ambit of the Bill.

The SAHRC's understanding of the provisions of paragraph (v) is that the exclusion only applies to a "decision to institute or continue a prosecution". If a wider understanding is intended, the SAHRC objects to such a wider understanding. To preclude an administrator from giving reasons why he or she has failed to institute a prosecution or to discontinue a prosecution, will amount to a profound negative impact on peoples' rights.

(a) Ad definition of "administrative action"

The reason for the express singling out of a "prosecuting agency" in the above definition is not clear as it must, in the ordinary sense of the term, be included within the ambit of the overarching term "organ of state". By singling it out, it opens the door for affording a "prosecuting agency" a status different to all other organs of state, or for arguing that it is not an "organ of state". In addition, the term "prosecuting agency", which is not defined, would appear to include a private prosecuting agency. It is recommended that paragraph (c) of the above definition should be omitted. Alternatively, should the expression "prosecuting agency" be retained, it should be defined.

If the above proposal is supported, the reference to "prosecuting agency" in the definition of "administrator" should also be deleted.

It is not clear what is meant by "either generally or in respect of a specified class of administrative action" in paragraph (c) of the definition. The wording opens the door for resorting to the classification of administrative functions as per the unhelpful, confusing and archaic classes of purely administrative, judicial and quasi- judicial acts found at common law. It is recommended that paragraph (c) of the above definition should be amended as follows:

(d) Despite the fact that the terms "rule" and "standard" are specific components of the definition of "administrative action", they are not defined in the Bill. For the purposes of distinguishing one from the other, it is recommended that they should be defined as follows:

(e) The concept of a "standard" is used throughout the Bill and is an integral part of the grounds of review provided for in clause 7(1)(e)(iv). It is submitted that the status of standards should be clarified and a duty should be imposed on administrators to act consistently in accordance with standards where failure to do so would adversely affect a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations. The following draft formulation is proposed:

(a) The definition of "administrative action" is exceedingly wide and goes beyond the range of decisions and actions that similar statutes in comparative jurisdictions normally cover.

(b) Statutes in other democratic countries normally specify the tribunals or agencies or the nature of the decisions which are subject to administrative justice requirements. The Bill, which purports to apply to all acts performed or decisions taken by a broad range of persons, contains no limitation or qualification whatsoever, provided the action is taken by an organ of state. It is recommended that it would be better to follow the practice established elsewhere, and clearly define the kinds of tribunals, agencies or functions which should be subject to administrative justice procedural requirements. As an alternative, it is recommended that the current definition should limit the application of the Bill to those decisions or actions relating to the exercise of a public power or duty.

(c) The expression "performing a public function" is vague and too far-reaching and should be deleted. Furthermore, a proper exclusion of all executive action is required in the same terms as that used to exclude the judicial function.

(d) One of the consequences of the wide range of actions in respect of which the Bill imposes prior procedural steps, is that the derogation provisions are equally wide.

The following concerns are raised in respect of the definition, namely—

(b) For the sake of clarity, it is recommended that "rule" and "standard" should be defined.

(a) Ad clause 2(1)

It is doubtful whether clause 2 is compatible with section 33(3) of the Constitution, which requires national legislation both to give effect to the rights in section 33(1) and (2) and to impose a duty on the state to give effect to those rights. The inclusion of the word "adversely" in clause 2(1)(a) to (d) might also give rise to constitutional problems.

(b) Ad clause 2(3)(b)

This subclause seemingly permits "any independent and impartial tribunal" to review all administrative action (i.e. confers plenary review powers on all tribunals). It is proposed that the words "established for that purpose" should be added after "by any independent and impartial tribunal".

(a) It is suggested that the heading of clause 2 should reflect the heading of section 33 of the Constitution, namely "Just administrative action" in stead of "Right to administrative justice".

(b) Ad clause 2(1)

Clause 2(1) is at times narrower than section 33 of the Constitution and so fails to give effect to section 33. It is suggested that the wording of subclause (1)(a) should be substituted by the wording of section 33(1) of the Constitution and that subclause (1)(b) and (d) should be deleted. As subclause (1)(c) goes further than section 33 of the Constitution by providing for "interests" in addition to "rights", it is proposed that a reference to "legitimate expectations" should be inserted in subclause (1)(c) and that the word "public" should be substituted by "publicised".

(a) clause 2(1)(a) and (c) overlaps with various grounds of review provided for in clause 7(1); and

(b) clause 2(1)(b) overlaps with clauses 4 and 5.

(b) a reference to "interests" should be included in clause 2(1)(b), as procedural fairness must apply where interests as well as rights and legitimate expectations are adversely affected.

With reference to the expression "if circumstances justify it", the question is raised why the benchmark for an administrator to depart from the minimum requirements is set so low and in such a vague manner. The view is expressed that such wording may even be unconstitutional on the grounds of uncertainty and vagueness. It is recommended that the expressions "in exceptional circumstances" and "to the extent necessary" should be used. It is further recommended that a definition of the quality of such circumstances should be included in the Bill.

Clause 4(1), which refers to "rights or interests", appears to be inconsistent with clause 2(1)(b) which refers to " rights or legitimate expectations".

In order to give clarity to subclause (2), it is proposed that paragraphs (c) and (d) should be amended as follows:

The concern is raised that subclause (4) is too vague and open ended to afford much protection to persons affected by administrative action. The discretion of an administrator should be bound in terms similar to those applicable to the Minister in terms of clause 4(6). It is proposed that subclause (4) should be amended as follows:

It is suggested that the right to reasons should be recognised as a peremptory, as opposed to a discretionary, component of the right to procedurally fair administrative action. It must always be regarded as necessary and therefore it is proposed that the right to reasons should be included in the list of requirements provided for in clause 4(2).

The standard for allowing an administrator to depart from the requirements in clause 4(2) should be higher. It is suggested that the standard should be "exceptional circumstances".

It is submitted that—

Subclause (2) contains a statement of the absolute minimum standard for procedurally fair administrative action. Those requirements must always be complied with as they are the essence of fair procedures and they are the standard against which any existing procedures contained in other laws will be tested against to determine whether they are fair. It is proposed that clause 4(5) should be amended as follows:

(a) No obligation is placed on an administrator to give reasons for his or her administrative action, except if he or she is requested to do so in terms of clause 6(1). This procedure places an undue burden on the individual and may also imply additional costs, financial and otherwise. It is suggested that this procedure should be deleted entirely.

(b) Individuals must timeously be informed of the reasons for an administrative action that effects them negatively, in order to enable them to take appropriate measures to alleviate these effects. It is recommended that—

(c) When reasons are furnished, it must be accompanied by suggested alternatives, remedies or mechanisms for alleviating the adverse effects of the decision. It is recommended that reasons provided upon notice of administrative action should be accompanied by—

The attempt to establish the elements of "procedural fairness" is unsatisfactory. If the requirements set out in clause 4(2) are core requirements, then it would seem that they are seldom appropriate in regard to the vast majority of everyday actions taken by administrators, particularly in regard to the internal functioning of an organ of state.

There is little guidance in the expressions "if circumstances justify it" and "to the extent necessary" to guide an administrator as to when he or she may depart from the requirements set out in clause 4(2).

It would seem that where an exemption from the provisions of clause 4 is justified, there is little purpose in requiring that such exemption must, nevertheless, "be compatible with the right to procedurally fair administrative action". It is recommended that this requirement should be removed. It is further proposed that the exemption should be limited by a proportionality requirement rather than a compatibility requirement.

The test for procedural fairness should not be limited in its application to situations where a person's rights or interests are adversely affected. It is proposed that clause 4(1) should be amended to read as follows:

Although clause 4 establishes a test for procedural fairness, additional criteria should be incorporated into that test. As many failures of administrative justice arise not from unfair action by administrators, but from a failure to act, the said test should recognise inaction as unfair. It is proposed that the following paragraphs should be added to clause 4(2):

If prior notification and an absolute application of the audi alteram partem rule are required in respect of all administrative actions, it could nullify powers such as those related to cordoning off, search of areas and the application of directions issued in terms of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992. In this regard it is suggested that the interrelationship between clause 4(4) and (5) should be set out in clearer terms.

Although the Minister may determine certain exemptions from the application of the Bill, the SAPS would prefer that powers relating to law enforcement be clearly and specifically excluded from the Bill. This should include, among others, the issuing of warrants of arrest and other police powers where the application of prior notice and the audi alteram partem rule could defeat the object of the administrative action.

The Bill should give recognition to the particular rights of people with legitimate expectations and therefore the insertion of the expression "or legitimate expectation" in clause 4(1) is proposed.

The exercise of the right to just administrative action requires information. In "serious or complex cases" people must be given the opportunity to defend their rights. This must not only occur after the action by review, but must also occur prior to the action through legal representation. It is submitted that it is a desirable objective of the Bill to provide for prevention and not solely review of unjust administrative action. It is proposed that the provisions of clause 4(3)(a), (b) and (e) should be moved to clause 4(2), which sets out the minimum requirements for a fair procedure.

It is undesirable to give administrators such wide discretionary powers which will limit the effect of the Bill and its ability to build an effective and accountable State administration. Although there may be a need to suspend the minimum procedure in exceptional circumstances or to ensure the efficiency of administration, it is submitted that clause 4(6) already grants the Minister discretionary powers to exempt administrators, administrative action or a class of administrative actions from the application of clause 4. It is proposed that clause 4(4) should be deleted from the Bill.

In exercising his or her power in terms of clause 4(6), the Minister will be exercising a legislative power. It is submitted that this function will have a great impact on the administrative powers of administrators. It will also have a direct impact on the functioning of the Bill and the exercise of the right to just administrative action. It is proposed that the exercising of the Minister's discretion should be made subject to a notice and comment procedure.

Administrators should only depart from the obligation to adhere to a procedurally fair administrative action in "exceptional circumstances". It is recommended that "exceptional circumstances" should be defined to mean that there is a mandatory obligation on the part of the administrator to give effect to the right to fair administrative procedure, which can only be departed from upon proof of exceptional circumstances. The onus to prove that exceptional circumstances justify the deviation from the established requirement must rest on the decision-maker.

The requirement that the Minister may, in order to promote efficient administration, permit the deviation from the requirements of procedural fairness, makes certain assumptions that may be in conflict with the objective of the Bill. It is proposed that the minimum requirements of fairness in every process that an administrator adopts, should be prescribed and that the adoption of a different procedure must be justified and scrutinised for compliance with the minimum standards of the Bill.

It is necessary to draw a distinction between procedures which must be followed prior to the administrative action and those which must be followed once the administrative action has been taken. It is also necessary to create a core or minimum procedure which should not be deviated from, otherwise it will weaken administrative justice. In order to give effect hereto, the following formulation is proposed:

As the Minister's power to exempt an administrator or a group or class of administrative actions from the requirements of clause 4 will have an impact on administrative action, the Minister should, prior to implementing such a decision, publish his or her intended decision in the Gazette for public notice and comment. It is proposed that the words "after public consultation" should be inserted after "may" in the words preceding clause 4(6)(a). It is further proposed that the words "for a period to be determined by the Minister" should be inserted after the word "necessary" in subclause (6)(a).

(a) how will an administrator know that his or her action is adversely affecting the public; and

(b) should an administrator not be given certain criteria to enable him or her to make such a judgment.

(a) It must be seriously doubted whether the Bill, if enacted, will "promote an efficient administration". The following reasons are advanced in this regard, namely—

In order to give more clarity to paragraphs (a) and (d), it is proposed that those paragraphs should be amended as follows:

See comment under clause 4(4).

It is proposed that the Bill should provide that an administrator, in addition to publication in the Gazette, must also publish a concise summary of the report in a newspaper relevant to the locality of the inquiry.

See comment under clause 4(4).

The expression "adequate reasons" will give rise to debate and uncertainty, whilst the presumption may be open to constitutional challenge.

Clause 2(1)(c) refers to "rights or interests" which are adversely affected, whilst clause 6(1) refers to a person whose "rights" have been adversely affected. In order to eliminate this inconsistency, it is proposed that clause 6(1) should be amended so that it also refers to "rights or interests".

As in the case of clauses 4(4) and 5(4), it is proposed that clause 6(4) should be amended as follows:

See comment under clause 4(4).

See comment under clause 4(6).

(c) Because the right to written reasons for administrative action is partly based on the need to establish whether an administrative action is just, the reasons furnished have to be detailed enough to enable a person to establish that the action taken was lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It is proposed that the Bill should provide a basic minimum for information that must be furnished in giving reasons, which must include a statement of—

(d) As the Bill should seek to pro-actively prevent unjust administrative action and to promote efficiency, the addition to clause 6 of a further subclause, providing that administrators have a duty to inform of the right to written reasons, is proposed.

(a) Provisions which encourage pro-active disclosure of reasons consistent with the "right to know" approach in the Open Democracy Bill, should be included in the Bill.

A standard format to guide administrators on what constitutes "adequate reasons" should be included in the Bill. It is proposed that clause 6(2) should be substituted by the following subclause:

Clause 7(1) assumes that certain facts have already been established, for example, in subclause (1)(c) which provides that a court has the power to review an administrative action if "the action was procedurally unfair". The view is expressed that it can only be alleged that the procedure followed was unfair, an allegation which will have to be proved during the review. It is proposed that where a request for review is based on an opinion of the applicant, the word "alleged" should be used.

It is not clear how a standard could be applied "too rigidly".

In view of the reference to "good administrative conduct" in clause 11(1)(e), it is suggested that the words "good administrative" should be inserted before the word "conduct" in clause 7(2)(b).

(b) As an administrative action is reviewable also by a tribunal in terms of clause 2(3)(b), it is suggested that the words "or tribunal contemplated in section 2(3)(b)" should be inserted after the word "court" wherever it appears in clauses 7, 8 and 9.

(a) Clause 7 applies to all administrative actions and not only administrative actions which affect rights or interests. Although correct, it should give rise to caution in setting an appropriate threshold for judicial intervention.

(b) Ad clause 7(1)(g)

Subclause (1)(g) appears to invite courts to make decisions on policy matters. It appears that the courts, either institutionally or in terms of their expertise, are not well equipped for this role. It is suggested that a more appropriate test should be introduced, for example, the test of rationality or of whether the action is justifiable in the sense of being capable of rational justification.

(a) As administrative actions are divided into rules and decisions, both should be covered by the Bill. It is unclear whether the above provision applies to both decisions taken, and rules made, by Ministers.

(b) It is unclear whether the expression "the effect of the action" refers to the implementation of the rule as well as the decision.

(a) A shift in emphasis is necessary so that the legal requirements implicit in the grounds of review are seen by all concerned as being applicable in advance to all administrative actions, prior to the administrative action being taken, as opposed to merely being considered by the administrator upon a review application being brought. It is proposed that the grounds of review contained in clause 7 should be phrased as positive duties. (See submission for proposed formulation.)

(b) It is suggested that the following duty should be included in the list of positive duties which all administrators must comply with so as to give effect to the right to just administrative action. The following draft formulation is proposed:

The bold extension of the common law grounds contained in clause 7(1)(g) invites the Courts to canvass the merits of minor administrator's most routine decisions, and to substitute their decision for that of the administrator. It places an unrealistic burden on administrators at all levels of the public service to consider matters with a degree of complexity, which in many routine and minor cases, would be simply unrealistic.

(b) Ad clause 7(2)

It is suggested that the definition of "law" is too broad, and it is particularly so when it includes codes of international law and alternative courses of action. Furthermore, the definition of "relevant considerations" to include "all material information" is inappropriate. It is proposed that the definitions in clause 7(2) should be deleted.

(a) Although the grounds of review and the remedies provided for in the Bill regarding unjust administrative action are supported, the following amendments are proposed:

(b) The Bill envisages extending the administrative grounds of review to subordinate legislation, as well as other legislative acts. As the basic common law grounds of review for subordinate legislation is the ultra vires doctrine, reasonability and vagueness, the extension of administrative principles to legislative acts, and the regulation of difficulties in this regard by way of the mechanisms provided for in clauses 4(6) and 5(4), should be subject to piercing scrutiny and debate.

(a) It is uncertain why it is necessary to include the provisions of clause 7(1)(e)(iv) in the Bill.

(b) Clause 7(1) should also contain a reference to "independent and impartial tribunals", but it is unclear what grounds of review will be dealt with by such tribunals.

There appears to be an inconsistency in relation to the time periods for instituting proceedings for judicial review. The 180 days run from the time when the litigant was informed of the action. If the litigant was not so informed, then it runs from the time when he or she became aware of the action and the reasons for it, or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons. There appears to be no reason for these differing standards.

Some existing statutes create their own procedure for judicial review. It is suggested that clause 8(3) should be amended so as to provide that "all proceedings for judicial review must be instituted in the High Courts or the Constitutional Court unless otherwise provided by another statute".

(a) be accessible, affordable, expedient and effective; and

(b) be aligned to the mechanism provided for in the Open Democracy Bill.

(a) a court will grant an application where the interests of justice do not so require and whether subclause (2) is therefore not superfluous; and

(b) it would not have been better to simply provide that a court will grant an application on good cause shown.

(a) A possible constitutional difficulty with the approach adopted in the Bill is that the Minister has a discretion to make regulations dealing with the matters listed in clause 11(1), but is not bound to do so. It may be argued that the Bill itself does not "provide for" review by an independent and impartial tribunal, where appropriate, as required by section 33(3)(a) of the Constitution or "promote" an efficient administration as required by section 33(3)(c) thereof. The question arises whether the Bill is "national legislation" as envisaged by section 33(3) and, if it is not, what the constitutional implications are.

(b) Item 23(3) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides that section 33(3) will lapse if the legislation envisaged by it is not enacted within three years of the date when the Constitution took effect. The Law Commission's Bill sought to overcome this difficulty by e.g. requiring the State Law Adviser to compile and publish protocols for the drafting of rules and standards (clause 11(a)) and requiring the Council within specified time frames to, amongst other things, formulate and publish a code of good administrative conduct (clause 15(b)(i)) and inquire into the appropriateness of establishing independent and impartial tribunals to review administrative action (clause 15(c)(i)).

(a) No obligation is placed on the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, when making regulations, to consult with the affected administrators.

(b) In view of the lack of clarity for the basis of the discretion of the above-mentioned Minister in making regulations and what the contents of such regulations would be, it is recommended that an exemption of the security services, as provided for in the Open Democracy Bill, should be included in the Bill.

(a) In order to give full meaning to the Bill, the regulations must contain detailed instructions to administrators and persons affected by their administrative actions. It is essential that the civil service be instructed to put codes, guidelines and policies in place in order to give effect to section 33(3)(c) of the Constitution, which mandates the Bill to "promote an efficient administration". This can only be achieved by translating the legislation into an instrument which promotes good practice.

(c) Ad clause 11(1)(g)

(a) In view of the fact that many substantive issues are left for future determination by the Minister by means of regulations, it is submitted that provision should be made for public participation in the making of those regulations. In this regard the following draft formulation is proposed:

(b) The duties that must be complied with to give effect to the rights to lawful, procedurally fair and reasonable administrative action and the right to reasons, must be provided for in the Act rather than in the code of good administrative conduct which will take some time to materialise. Furthermore, if the duties are contained in regulations, as opposed to the Act, they will acquire a less significant and urgent status.

Clause 11(1), which provides that the Minister "may" make regulations, leaves room for these regulations and other issues not to be addressed. It is recommended that the word "may" should be substituted with the word "shall".

The rules and procedures contemplated in clause 11(1)(b) and (c) will be crucial in establishing a foundation for further development of the culture which will eventually surround public hearings. As these are crucial elements of public participation and of access to decision-making, it is suggested that there be an opportunity for public engagement in the making of these regulations. It is recommended that the regulations contemplated in 11(1)(b) and (c) must be tabled in Parliament and the relevant Parliamentary Committee must invite public comment on these before implementation.

(a) those issues are of a polemic nature and should be subject to Parliamentary debate and inquiry;

(b) the common law is comprehensive and fair concerning procedural fairness and therefore it will not enhance administrative justice or good administration to prescribe formalities in this regard (clause 11(1)(a) to (d) and (f)); and

(c) there is no need for an advisory council as contemplated in clause 11(1)(g), nor for the bureaucratic overload which would result.

It should be mandatory for the Minister to make the regulations contemplated in clause 11(1)(a) to (f) within a specific time frame. To give effect thereto, it is proposed that clause 11(1) should be amended as follows:

The Public Service Commission has been established to develop an efficient public administration and therefore the objectives of the Bill lie within the constitutional principles which that Commission must promote. It is proposed that the functions of the advisory council, as contemplated in clause 11(1)(g), should be assigned to the Public Service Commission.