Prison Escapes and Vetting of Officials; Krugersdorp Incident: Ministerial and Department briefings

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
04 June 2007
PRISON ESCAPES AND VETTING OF OFFICIALS; KRUGERSDORP INCIDENT: MINISTERIAL AND DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS

Chairperson: Mr D Bloem (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Management of Security Incidences PowerPoint presentation

Audio Recording of the Meeting

SUMMARY
The Chief Deputy Commissioner gave an account of the escapes from prisons, with a detailed presentation on the incidences. He added detailed graphs that illustrated the trends that were surfacing in the correctional facilities. It was noted that the awaiting trial detainees attempted most of the escapes, and that most were taking place at the older facilities. The Hon Minister also said that he accepted responsibility for the escapes and realised that something should be done. He noted that there were additional security measures being rolled out to all correctional facilities. He remarked that harsher tactics would be used against members of the public who saw fit to convey illegal items to prisoners.

A brief report was given on the Krugersdorp incident and the Groote Schuur incident, with a specific note by the Department that both matters were still under investigation and there were pending actions. It was noted that the Mathe escape was also still under investigation and that the investigations did take some time.

Questions by Members addressed the escapes by awaiting trial detainees, the fact that only the numbers of incidences were recorded, rather than the numbers involved, security measures, the appropriateness of facilities, the possibility of using isolated prisons for maximum security detainees, separate facilities for awaiting trial detainees, courts in prisons and the possibility that technological advances should counteract staff shortages. Further issues related to training of staff, the vetting of officials, escapes from work parties, the possibility of offenders repeating crimes to stay in prison, and the assaults. It was noted that the inmate tracking system would be discussed at another meeting. Furthermore a closed session would be planned to deal with some outstanding issues.

MINUTES
Introductory remarks
The Chairperson noted that this meeting would concentrate on discussing the escapes from prisons, vetting of correctional service officials and the Krugersdorp incident where three people had died. It had been agreed at a previous meeting that the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) would report back on the matters of escapes, however it was worrying to note that the escapes continued. Some of these involved violence and occurred despite the high technology systems that had been installed. The number of escapes and the number of officials that seemed to be involved were also worrying.

The Committee had made extensive recommendations after the escape from Middledrift in the Eastern Cape, in November 2006. At the time of the escape the correctional facility had experienced some problems but after the intervention of the Committee, the Regional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape, and the National offices, the facility was now up and running. The Regional Commissioner would report on progress in due course. In 2005 an official was fatally injured when an awaiting-trial detainee tried to escape from Groote Schuur Hospital. It was alleged that his fellow perpetrators of crime had aided him in the escape attempt, and the Committee had expressly queried at the time how the information leaked out that he would be at the hospital.

It was further disturbing to note that on 04 June two inmates escaped from Leeukop prison, and the week before inmates had escaped wearing the uniform of DCS staff, from a Johannesburg prison. He felt that management at the prisons should also account for these escapes.

A five-year security plan based on minimum-security standards was developed and put at all centres of excellence. The Department had plans to install fences and motions detectors and these plans should be prioritised. The vetting of members and staff and classification system for placement of inmates in these facilities should also be prioritised. The Committee had strongly condemned any escape from the prisons. He hoped that this report would give a plan of action from the side of the DCS.

Address by Hon Minister Ngconde Balfour
Hon Minister Ngconde Balfour (Minister of Correctional Services) stated that he accepted responsibility for the incidents that had occurred. Some of the questions that the Committee asked would be same questions that he himself would ask. He reported in a previous meeting that he was doing a national round of the country to see everyone in each region. He examined their activities as well as their plans to create a stable and safe environment, and the everyday work that they were doing. The Minister had managed to visit all the regions within a week.

The Hon Minister began with his thoughts on the escapes. He put several questions on the table that would be asked of the officials who were in charge on the day of the escapes. These included questions such as how did the prisoners manage to escape, where were the officials in charge, and what else was happening at the time. He would receive a full report from Leeukop. The two prisoners who had escaped on 4 June were still at large. He requested that the Committee look at the escapes at a holistic manner. It was their job to assist that these incidents were prevented from recurring. The safety of the public was paramount and the Courts and the public expected the DCS to look after them.

He continued the issue of vetting of Correctional Service officials was an ongoing matter. There were slight problems with capacity with the agencies that did the vetting.

With regard to Middledrift, he had hoped that the last report that was given by the Eastern Cape had covered all the issues.

The Groote Schuur incident raised a series of questions, most importantly how did the information leak out. This was something that had to be worked through because when prisoners were taken to hospital no date was not given, to cut down on the possibility that the prisoners could convey the information to people outside. The DCS had approached Telkom to record most of the phone calls that were made from the centres to the outside. He broached his extreme concern that the person who had killed Mr Horn was still at large.

With regard to the rollout of security cameras to improve the security of the prisons, the Hon Minister indicated that he was not happy with the pace of the instalments and had asked to discuss this matter with the company who were doing the work to raise his concerns and to try to speed up the process.

The Hon Minister asked the Committee that they look at the report as a whole. He stated that no escape was insignificant, and that the report should be read in the context of the country as a whole.

The Chairperson expressed his appreciation for the involvement of and address by the Hon Minister.

Briefing by Department of Correctional Services (DCS)
Mr Vernon Petersen, Chief Commissioner of DCS, noted that in his report he would engage with the trends, the programmes and interventions embarked on, and some of the specifics of the incidences.

He noted that the safeguarding and custody of the prisoners was the core function of the DCS and it therefore had to prioritise security. Those that posed the greatest risk were the awaiting-trail detainees, and hence DCS were involved in the Awaiting Trial Detainees Project, which was a nationally- integrated project that had to be looked at also in the context of the facilities development programme and the security plan. These all formed part of their seven-point service delivery improvement plan. This year the DCS had appointed dedicated teams led by senior managers to address challenges and find the appropriate linkages.
 
It was important to note that the DCS had a dual function as a state security institution, and as one that contributed to the rehabilitation of inmates. There had to be some risk-tolerance, as many prisoners were participating in the development and rehabilitation programmes and the Department did not want the fear of escapes to prevent participation in or running of these development programmes. Therefore the debate had to consider the situation from a much broader strategic focus, taking a realistic view of the problem, where it occurred, and problems that were faced. Specific incidences, and the increasing tendency in Johannesburg to violence, must also be considered. There were certain trends that could be analysed and the DCS must then learn ways of combating them. Courts were receiving high volumes of prisoners. The security incidences had to be looked at in the broader context as well as examining their specifics. The DCS noted that any security incidences posed threats, whether or not they resulted in escapes. It had recently started a post-incident management review process to monitor the progress of investigations

Management of Security Incidences: Briefing by DCS
Mr Teboho Motseki, Chief Deputy Commissioner, DCS, outlined the areas he would cover. He noted that DCS security operations sought to provide safe and healthy conditions for all those incarcerated, consistent with human dignity, thereby enhancing security for personnel and the public. The security threats were analysed. It was noted that there were changing profiles of crime, which often involved sophisticated syndicates and single incidences involving multiple crimes. There was a large and unpredictable population of awaiting trial detainees (ATD). This increased the vulnerability of the officials, as the new type of criminals were extremely resourceful and would stop at nothing to escape from the jail. Facilities wee old and not responsive to new trends. Staff were often not ready, and were vulnerable to corruption temptations. The rapid process of staffing reduced the readiness and delays in technology investments generated a slow response to changed. There was inadequate information sharing, and overcrowding made the problems more difficult.

The critical security indicators were the escapes, the number of people in maximum security awaiting trial, the inmate-on-inmate assault, the inmate-to-staff or to-service provider assault, and unnatural deaths.
 
A number of graphs that illustrated the trends were included. These statistics included the number of escapes, number of unnatural deaths, number of inmate-on- staff and inmate on inmate assaults and assaults by staff on inmates. These trends were analysed. Mr Moseki commented that when it came to staff on inmate assaults this was usually a case of over reporting, where the inmate would allege assaults if a form of punishment had been issued. The inmate on staff assaults tended to be under reported, as staff would know that many assaults were a form of provocation. It was noted that more than 50% of the escapes took place from within correctional centres, and about 60% of these escapees were ATDs. The sentenced offender escapes were mostly those at medium and low security, who were escaping from work teams and hospitals.

The current DCS measures that had been implemented included minimum security standards, personnel interventions, technology installations, physical measures such as improved fencing and access control, upgrading and renovation of facilities, operational measures and information sharing. Further interventions were in the areas of management and training, and protocols had been set up to handle security incidences immediately after occurrence. Full details of interventions were included in the presentation document. There was also a post-incident review mechanism. The challenges and way forward included the development and implementation of a five-year plan, the conducting of a risk threat assessment, the drafting of amendment legislation, and capacity building for post-incident support. The rollout of videos in 17 correctional centres covering 40 courts, the implementation of the anti-gang strategy, further capacity-building and the rollout of the inmate tracking and identification verification systems were ongoing issues.

Discussion
The Chairperson understood the need for caution with regard to information, and would be careful not to go into too much detail. He commented that perhaps the Committee should try to schedule a closed session to discuss further details.

Ms W Ngwenya (ANC) had noted that awaiting trial detainees were responsible for most of the escapes, but asked how this tied in with the view that such escapes were not in the hands of the DCS.

The Minister responded that most of the escapes happened when the detainees left the DCS facilities. Most of the contraband that the awaiting trial detainees received was from their visitors. Sentenced offenders rarely had this problem.

Mr J Selfe (DA) required clarification on the fact that number of incidences was recorded, rather than the number of people involved. .

Mr Selfe suggested that, in view of the fact that a substantial number of escapees were awaiting trial detainees, it would be better if the Cluster could arrange for more trials to take place within the correctional complex itself.

The Hon Minister agreed with the suggestion, and mentioned that the DCS was aiming for more trials within the corrections facility complex, and this worked in some areas such as Durban-Westville already. He also mentioned the rolling out of video postponement was quite good and had been linked to Durban and Pinetown Courts. The DCS wanted to instal this in all the other centres, particularly where there were a huge number of awaiting trial detainees.

Mr Selfe then mentioned the security measures that would be put in place and queried whether the right measures were being put in the right facilities.

Mr Petersen responded to the challenges about the appropriateness of the facilities. The Remand Retention programme made it possible to look at specific types of facilities. These types of facilities would have to be built close to the courts, or with courts already in the facility. The DCS had to look at effective ways of dealing with the issue.

Mr N Fihla (ANC) remembered that there was a time when those criminals that were classified as dangerous were sent to an isolated prison, such as Robben Island. He was concerned about the fact most of the prisons that housed extremely dangerous criminals were in the centre of cities, surrounded by residential suburbs. He inquired whether there was a way to reclassify the grading of prisons so that the more dangerous criminals would be housed in an isolated prison.

The Hon Minister emphatically stated that Robben Island would not be used for incarceration again, but in his view it should not have been given over to the exclusive use by the Department of Arts and Culture as it would have would have been a good training ground. He noted that DCS did have facilities where such prisoners should not be held, and most of these were old facilities. For instance Pollsmoor prison was older than the suburb of Tokai, and the building had taken place around the prison. It was a matter of concern to him that if anything were to happen the safety of the residents was at risk

Mr Fihla thought that with the technological advancement surely the staff shortage could be counteracted by the advanced security measures that could be put in place.

Mr Petersen replied that when DCS had started to use technology they had seen a decrease in the number of security incidences. This had allowed for better utilisation of staff.  

The Minister added that there was a two-way system of recruiting staff. They either went straight to the college or straight to the centres, and afterwards their training would alternate between the two facilities. Numbers increased because of this system. The Commissioner had been given the task to look for more training colleges as it would be more accommodating if a college was created in the Western and Eastern Cape.  

Mr M Shah (DA) noticed that the Hon Minister mentioned in his opening statement that there was a lack of capacity regarding vetting of officials yet on the other hand there was a rapid process of staffing which also presented a challenge. There were no specific details on the challenges, but lack of personnel readiness was mentioned. He asked if that meant that the new staff were not properly trained, which would present a further problem. He asked for clarification on all these related issues.

The Hon Minister remarked that he was quite happy with the training as all officials were trained properly. The capacity to vet staff was building up at the moment.

Mr Fihla mentioned that both minor and serious offenders were arrested. He suggested that those who were arrested for the more serious crimes should be kept in a special place while awaiting trial.

The Hon Minister responded that the prison courts worked very well. These limited movement, which made the security better. He added that the awaiting trial detainees were categorised and DCS did attempt to keep them separate, however their lawyers often intervened.

Ms Ngwenya asked whether there were specific plans that ensured that there were enough staff to implement security measures, as the escapes usually happened when security was at its weakest.

The Hon Minister replied that motion sensors were being rolled out to all centres, in as far as this was possible.
 
Ms Z Nawa (ANC) observed that there were quite a few escapees within the prospective parolees’ category, because of the laxer security.

Mr N Xolo (ANC) wanted to know if the DCS devised plans to increase security. He mentioned this because when he did oversight at the Westville jail in Durban he had noticed that there were inmates who were working outside the gates of the prison, with officials and trained dogs for supervision, and as far as he knew he had not heard anything of prisoners escaping from the prison.

The Hon Minister replied that the work programmes did not take the maximum security grade prisoners as it would be too much of a risk. Only the medium and minimum grade prisoners were on the programme, as it would help them on the offender rehabilitation path. He added that if such a prisoner did escape it would be a source of great disappointment as the officials were learning to trust them, and this could also lead to complacency. However some of these prisoners had been incarcerated for so long that they could not imagine life outside of prison and would prefer to be kept inside.

Minister Balfour commented that sometimes those who escaped were medium security, might not realise what would happen to them when they were released, and therefore committed something extreme to remain in prison.

Ms Nawa wanted to know how many of the 10 000 officials were really trained at the College.

Mr E Xolo (ANC) wanted to find out what was being done with regard to staff-on-inmate assaults and whether the inmates involved advisors in the process. He also asked what mechanism was in place to prevent this.

The Hon Minister expressed his distress at the staff members who assaulted the inmates. He remarked that when he had spoken to them he had indicated that there was no reason for such behaviour. The same principles applied to inmate-on-staff assaults. Officials had to be trained to manage their anger and only minimum force could be used. The staff should ignore provocation from the offenders.

Mr S Mahote (ANC) mentioned the inmate on inmate assaults and asked if this posed a risk to other inmates at times when security was at its lowest.

Mr Mahote asked for clarification on the fact that Mr Moseki stated that in excess of 50% escaped from with the correctional facilities.

Mr Xolo wanted the response of the DCS with regard to the inmates that violated their security measures and clarity on how did the DCS respond to this.

The Hon Minister replied that most of the escapes were from old prisons. They rarely happened from new prisons as these were built so that one could constantly track the movement of the inmates. He was pleased to announce that the last escape from Durban-Westville was two years ago.

Mr Shah requested the statistics of the suicide rate of prisons.

Mr Moseki answered that he did not have the figures with him at the moment.

Mr Shah questioned whether the DCS had an intelligence gathering system within the prison to do a risk assessment regarding whatever might pose a threat.

The Chairperson intervened with the comment that this kind of intelligence was sophisticated and that the Committee could not jeopardise the plans, which were worked out for complicated situations and inmates.

Mr Mahote required clarification on the inmate tracking system.

The Hon Minister replied that the inmate tracking system would be the subject of another presentation, which he would like to talk about at a separate meeting.

The Chairperson proposed that these issues would be addressed later, and the Hon Minister had addressed most of the questions by the members.

The Chairperson asked how far the DCS had proceeded with the Krugersdorp investigation, and mentioned that there was no need to go into detail.

Krugersdorp Investigation: Preliminary briefing
Mr Petersen mentioned the disciplinary process with regard to the investigation in Krugersdorp. He stated that the offenders had been charged together and that caused some delay. The case had been scheduled to continue in July. The criminal charges on the other hand were taking a while to be formulated.

Mr Petersen agreed with the Chairperson that the Committee should be cautious on how this was debated so as not to compromise the criminal and disciplinary processes. He made it clear that the DCS did not want to hide behind those provisions. Every incident provided a lesson. Management had gone into very intense introspections and it seem as if some of the incidents were symptomatic of broader problems. However the DCS did not expect staff to use violence against the inmates, nor did they expect inmates to be violent against staff. Obviously the DCS had to improve and increase the number of opportunities for their staff to learn about conflict management and expand on the importance of Rights Education for the staff. The incident started out as a gang related crime, and it must be acknowledged that there was organised crime. The staff were human and worked under very difficult circumstances, and perhaps DCS had not paid enough attention to the staff mental health. There was a need to enforce compliance, which was the lesson learnt from Krugersdorp.

Mr Petersen added that all the people involved had to face the consequences, not only front line staff and that the DCS was beginning to ask questions related to management responsibilities. This had illustrated that an improvement had to be made to the system of performance management, and because of the poor record it had to respond by moving people to other departments. However, transferring people was not a sustainable response, and it was their system that had to improve to enforce a better managerial performance.
 
The Chairperson queried if the C-MAX killings were actually an attempted escape, and what was the progress of the investigation.

Mr Petersen stressed the need for caution regarding dealing with C-Max issues. The regional management of Gauteng had decided that C-Max in the current form was being phased out and would operate it as a normal maximum facility. It had been assured that those involved had appeared in court, but one of the accused’s legal aid attorney had withdrawn, and another had been appointed. Eight days in November had been set aside for the case.

The Chairperson wanted an update on the Middledrift escape.
 
Ms Ntsiki Jolingana, Regional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape: DCS, felt that the Commissioner had responded on the issue of what the DCS had done in Middledrift, and this had adequately been covered. The person who had a gun had been charged through the police, and the criminal case was proceeding.

The Chairperson wanted an update on the Baviaanspoort incident, which involved the two nurses who were almost killed.
 
Mr Petersen responded that the Baviaanspoort incident should not have happened. This was a result of a lack of training of people who were not directly working with the inmates on a regular basis. The DCS had changed the management and an incident review would be done.

The Chairperson wanted an update on the Mathe escape.

Mr Petersen replied that there was not much to report on Mathe. He said that the criminal investigation took a long time. It was dependent on verifying certain information. There were 52 charges against Mathe, some of which were formulated around corruption, and through this DCS could find those who colluded with him.
 
Ms Ngwenya commented on the fact that the security inside the cells was lax as DCS was not allowed to place cameras inside the cells because this would violate human rights. She asked the Minister to find a way to find an alternative form of monitoring.

Mr Petersen reinforced the issue that some of the security incidences that had happened were because of the involvement of the public. The DCS had resolved to take stronger action against them.

Mr Petersen welcomed ideas on how the DCS could classify its facilities. He pointed out that DCS had shifted from the traditional approach to repair and maintance to one of planned maintenance. This would look at what was currently on offer and adapt. This new approach was much more comprehensive.
 
Mr James Smalberger, Deputy Regional Commissioner of the Western Cape: DCS, started with the Groote Schuur Hospital incident, by giving a brief description on what had happened. The offender was taken to hospital where he was to be examined by a doctor. Officials were not aware of what would happen. They had arrived at the hospital, where two unknown people shot and killed Mr Horn with military precision. The second official, though wounded, also fired, and the escape was unsuccessful.

The DCS had not given specific information because of the confidentiality of medical records. Management was identified as weak and non-compliant with certain security measures at the institution. It was important to note that the criminal case was still ongoing; therefore he could not add any more details.

Civil cases had been lodged against the DCS by Mr Horn’s family, the official who was shot and the third official who was traumatised during the incident. It was clear that the DCS needed to be careful. In terms of the weakness identified there was a much closer liaison with the security agency. DCS now also had a service level agreement with the Department of Health in the Western Cape. This allowed that when dangerous criminals were to come to the hospital appropriate measures were to be taken. The position of head of centre was filled. This official’s task was to enforce management.

The Chairperson stressed that if things were kept hidden then people would ask questions. He stated that DCS would want to be open and honest.
 
The Chairperson was worried about all the issues that had been mentioned and will plan a closed meeting.

The meeting was then adjourned.